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I have used a modified version of the Persian transliteration system of the 
International Society of Iranian Studies with some minor adjustments. In particular 
commonplace names have been spelled as they sound pheonetically in Persian and 
local vernacular, for example Khuzestan, Lorestan, Ahvaz, Masjed Soleyman, 
Bakhtiyari, and Majles instead of the more contrived and Phonetically misleading 
Khuzistan, Luristan, Ahwaz, Masjid-i Suleyman, Bakhtiari, and Majlis, except when 
they have been spelled differently in a quoted passage from an archival or historical 
source. Some words that have common usage in English are left as they are 
conventionally spelled, for example Sheikh. There are a number of words that have 
been variously spelled in different passages: For example, Mohammareh has also 
been spelled Muhammara, or Muhammara in some quotations; Iraq as Irak; and 
Abadan appears as Ebbadan on one or two occasions. These different spellings 
always occur within quotations, and reflect how the original authors referred to these 
places at the time of writing. Rather than standardizing the spellings I have left them 
as they are, to reflect the absence of standardization at the time of initial writing and 
to retain the integrity of scholarship. 
I have refrained from the practice of Persianizing place names, as it has 
unfortunately become somewhat common in recent years. Thus I have referred to 
Mohammareh, Khalafabad, Arabestan, Shatt al-Arab, for the time period when these 
were the official names in use, just as I have used the historic name Persian Gulf. 
Once the place names had been officially changed I have reverted to the new names, 
for example Khorramshahr in lieu of Mohammareh. The only exception is Khuzestan: 
Although the province was generally called Arabestan until the 1920s, the older name 
Khuzestan was also in use at the time, as it becomes clear in the text, although not as 
commonly as Arabestan.  
All the translations from Persian and French are my own. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
The Social History of Labor and Oil as an Urban History: 
This dissertation is a social history of the establishment of the Iranian oil 
industry and the formation of an oil working class in the southwest province of 
Khuzestan during the first decades of the 20th century. My approach to and 
perspective on the topic are essentially inter-disciplinary; although for reasons that 
will be explained below and further elaborate in the subsequent chapters, my entry 
point will be spatial and geographic. I will investigate the processes that contributed 
to the taking shape of the built environment of oil in the refinery city of Abadan, an 
industrial city that was assembled quite rapidly in a short but monumental burst of 
effort in early 20th century, and played a key part in making possible the 
establishment of a new and fast growing oil complex that went on to contribute to the 
reconfiguration of not only local conditions, but also national relations of power, the 
economy, regional geopolitics, and global industrial capitalism.  
This urban and geographic entry-point into the social history of oil offers a 
unique perspective: The built environment of Abadan was the material and physical 
place produced by the actions and interactions of the myriad social actors involved in 
the making of this history, the focal point where they were brought together, often 
violently; and it was from there that the extractive political economy of petro-
capitalism took hold of the existing natural and social environment of the region in 
order to transform it into an economic resource of global significance. This process 
involved oil workers, drillers, engineers, and corporate managers, but also spouses, 
extended families, urban landlords, bureaucrats, political activists, smugglers, 
prostitutes, beggars, indigenous farmers, merchants, policemen, and migrants who 
had flooded to the city and worked for and lived on the margins of the oil complex.  
The built environment of the city was produced by these oil encounters, but it 
also created the physical frame that gave them structure. In Abadan, the urban space 
itself and how it was assembled and re-designed through interminable efforts, violent 
frictions, and unpredictable events, has been a reflection of the “great 
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transformation”1 brought about by oil capitalism. In other words, the social history of 
oil and of labor formation in the oil industry in Khuzestan is also its urban history. 
This urban historical and geographic perspective will serve as my entry point 
in analyzing the interactions of the myriad social actors who were integral to this 
story. In this introduction I will elaborate my theoretical framework, and explain a 
number of concepts and terms that I will be using throughout the text, such as the oil 
complex, oil habitus, oil encounter, urban process, built environment, Global Labor 
History, and assemblage. I will then discuss my methodology, and how I see this 
work as part of a larger project on the relationship between oil, politics, and society, 
that I intend to continue later on. The introduction will conclude with a plan of the 
chapters.  
 
Theoretical Concepts:  
 
1. The Oil Encounter 
“If the spice trade had a twentieth century equivalent it would be the oil 
industry. Yet, while that earlier violent encounter generated a voluminous 
literature the oil encounter has scarcely produced an equivalent. Not much is 
known about the human experiences that surround the production of oil, while 
a great deal is invested in insuring the muteness of the oil encounter, all 
wrapped in regimes of strict corporate secrecy, and encased in enclaves… 
keeping especially the labor experience irrelevant and insignificant”2  
  
The “oil encounter” is how the novelist Amitav Ghosh calls the transformative 
coming together of local, national, and transnational social agents around petroleum 
portrayed in Abdelrahman Munif’s disturbing masterpiece Cities of Salt. Munif, a 
Saudi oilman exiled to Syria for his political views, published a trilogy of novels in 
the 1970’s about the rise of the oil complex in a fictional state in the Arabian 
Peninsula that captures all too well the underside of a story that is often missing from 
                                                           
1 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd ed. 
(Beacon Press, 2001). 
2 See “Petrofiction”, in Amitav Ghosh, Incendiary Circumstances: A Chronicle of the Turmoil of Our 
Times, Reprint (Mariner Books, 2007), 138–151.  
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the social analysis and the historiographies of oil3. Thus, the oil encounter refers to 
the historical interactions, frictions, conflicts, negotiations, and cooperation among 
the plethora of people whose lives were deeply and permanently affected by the 
construction of the oil complex in southern Iran and became integral to its subsequent 
development. These included not only those working directly for the oil complex in 
various capacities, but also indigenous agrarian populations as well as migrants, many 
of whom were not directly employed by the oil industry but, as we shall see in the 
following chapters, were affected by the advent of the oil industry and became an 
extension of it.   
 
2. The Social and Political Order of Oil as ‘Assemblage’: 
Perhaps more than any other internationally traded commodity in history - 
such as salt, sugar, tobacco, or cotton - oil has had a transformative and unifying 
impact on the globe, to the extent that it is not an exaggeration to claim we now live 
in an ‘oil civilization’.  The process of oil becoming the cornerstone of the 
contemporary global political economy and lifestyle was neither inevitable nor the 
end result of a natural progression of industrial capitalist modernization. Instead, I 
will argue that we need to think about and discuss the history of oil as one of an 
‘assemblage’4 – intentional and sometimes accidental acts of human construction, 
riddled with friction, uncertainty, and based on praxis - rather than one of 
‘emergence’ – an expression suggesting an almost biological and natural progression. 
The first expression, ‘assemblage’, frames the history of oil as the outcome of social 
and historical ‘encounters’ between the material world and the actions of different and 
unequal social actors, making calculated decisions that cannot be necessarily 
categorized as ‘rational’ or predictable, nor can their success or failure be taken as a 
                                                           
3 Abdelrahman Munif, Cities of Salt (New York: Vintage, 1989); idem. The Trench (New York: 
Vintage, 1993); idem. Variations on Night and Day (New York: Vintage, 1994) 
4 On relevant actor-network thinkers and social analysts whose work has influenced my approach see 
Timothy Mitchell, “The Properties of Markets,” in Do Economists Make Markets?, ed. Donald 
MacKenzie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 244–75; Timothy Mitchell, “Carbon 
Democracy,” Economy and Society 38, no. 3 (2009): 399–432; Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, 
and the State Effect,” in State/Culture, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
76–97; Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 19–53; Donald MacKenzie, Material Markets: How Economic Agents are 
Constructed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: A 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Gabrielle Hecht, 
The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2009); Michel Callon, ed., Laws of the Markets (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).  
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sign of anything but the outcome of the balance of power relations under the 
circumstances.   
The term assemblage as a social analytic concept was first used by Deleuze 
and Guatari, and later on adopted by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Donald 
McKenzie, and other actor network theorists, to highlight the often overlooked but 
central role of technopolitics, of the praxis of scientific and technical professional 
experts, in shaping contemporary social and political economic order. As in its 
common usage, here also the term assemblage refers to a group of objects brought 
together in close association with one another, usually for a purpose that is different 
from the individual characteristics of each object. While there are other dialectical 
social science concepts that view social change as active production of difference and 
heterogeneity, what I find valuable here is the equal emphasis on the material rather 
than discursive assemblages, without neglecting either or separating them. Thus, the 
material world, whether human manufactured or natural, is also considered as a social 
actor in human - non human relations. Tim Mitchell’s work, especially his essays Can 
the mosquito speak? and Carbon democracy, are examples of how the material world 
should be conceptualized not simply as a passive object, but an active agent (if not a 
conscious subject) in the making of the contemporary social and political order.  
The commodification of nature, in this case subterranean fossil carbon 
deposits, is not only a technical and scientific endeavor, but above all it is a social and 
political process that requires relentless effort to overcome and repress any resistance 
against it. It involves the continuous creative destruction of existing social and natural 
configurations through the dispossession of rival and competing claims to land and 
resources. Extractive industries also create a backlash by the natural world, resulting 
in a growing number of critical social scientists re-conceptualizing nature as 
possessing its own forms of agency. Although the relation of nature and society has 
been at the center of philosophical and social science inquiry since the 18th century, 
the validity of a clear-cut dichotomy between the two has come under increasing 
scrutiny in recent years. This has been in part as reaction to the environmental crises 
brought about in large measure by the hegemony of market society of mass 
production and consumption, and its carbon based sources of energy5.  
                                                           
5 See Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Noel Castree, “Commodifying What Nature?,” Progress in Human 
Geography 27, no. 3 (2003): 273–97; Karen Bakker and Gavin Bridge, “Material Worlds? Resource 
Geographies and the ‘Matter of Nature,’” Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 1 (2006): 5–27.  
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A point of clarification regarding the relation of nature and society may be necessary here. 
Critical social theorists have strived to challenge and decolonize the dichotomies of nature/object 
versus culture/subject at least from the advent of the industrial revolution. For Marx, the alienation of 
the laborer occurs as the time discipline and the division of labor of industrial work take hold of the 
very body of the laborer, turning her into an extension of the machine, and making the product of her 
creative and collective labor appear as the fruit of technology, private property, professional 
knowledge, or market exchange. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976), Ch.1, section 4. 
A more explicit rethinking of the consequences of positing nature and society as two mutually 
exclusive realms was articulated in the work Karl Polanyi Polanyi, The Great Transformation, which 
focused on the social consequences of the commodification of land, labor, and money; with the 
subsequent disembedding the economic institution of the market from the wider modifying constraints 
imposed by society and nature (which he appears to consider as mutually exclusive, but symbiotically 
interconnected). The critique of the instrumentalization of nature by positivist scientific rationality, and 
market criteria was also taken up by Frankfurt School theorists who argued in different ways that the 
quest for the domination of nature in fact leads to the domination of “man”. See Theodor W. Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory (New York: Continuum, 2001); Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic 
of Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional 
Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). Instead, 
Marxist critiques of the liberal and utilitarian theories that framed nature and culture as two separate 
and distinct realms introduced the notion of “the social construction of nature”, arguing that the natural 
world was effectively being continuously transformed by social intervention, and that the idea of a 
pristine and autonomous nature was an illusion Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and 
the Production of Space, 3rd ed. (Atens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008).   
It was the third wave of feminist thinkers, as well as post-structuralist theories of Foucault 
(inspired by the work of Nietzsche), who highlighted the gendered human body (the natural body) as 
the site of exercise of disciplinary power. See Emily Martin, The Woman in the Body, Revised (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish  : The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1977); Donna Haraway, Simians Cyborgs and Women (London: Free Association 
Books, 1996). These theorists critiqued the earlier Marxist notion of the “social construction of nature” 
as another way of objectifying nature as inanimate, passive, and ‘out there, lacking any agency or 
subjectivity’. They objected that this dichotomy would still limit agency to conscious subjective human 
interests, rendering ‘nature’ as the passive ‘other’. For example, Emily Martin’s discussion of the 
discursive effects of medical science in objectifying the female body was an important intervention in 
this debate, by demonstrating that the objectification of nature is effectively an exercise of power over 
the natural as well as the human subjects.  
 This critique stirred a response from Marxist geographers, who have begun to reconsider 
more explicitly the consequences of thinking of the physical world as simply inanimate ‘resources’ to 
be exploited for economic benefits. Harvey, in particular, has clarified and highlighted Marx’ insights 
into capitalist exploitation as a corporeal experience through which the human body becomes an 
extension of socially invented machines. David Harvey, Justice, Nature, and the Geography of 
Difference (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996); David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000); Smith, Uneven Development. In addition, Harvey has engaged and expanded 
on Marx’ original critique of the Malthusian legacy within classical political economy and its present 
version in neo-classical economics, with its objectification of the natural world as scarce resources, and 
the reification of subaltern populations as either a reserve army of the labor market, or as the 
‘undeserving poor’ who pose a menace to limited resources. His target of analysis has been the highly 
influential neo Malthusian work of Gareth Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” and its continuing 
legacy in development studies, welfare reform, and environmental policy-making. See for example 
David Harvey, “Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science,” in Spaces of Capital (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 38–67. 
Other critical scholars have continued the attempt to synthesize the insights of post-
structuralist and Marxist approaches to overcoming the discursive dichotomy between society and 
nature, emphasizing the fact that these two positions are not as mutually exclusive as some protagonists 
have claimed. See for example Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, eds., Violent Environments 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Richard Peet, Paul Robbins, and Michael Watts, eds., Global 
Political Ecology (New York: Routledge, 2011); Richard Peet and Michael Watts, eds., Liberation 
Ecologies, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004); Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño 
Famines and the Making of the Third World (Verso, 2002); William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: 
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Especially in chapter 4 I follow this line of inquiry to explain how the nature 
of the chemical substance petroleum as a new source of energy played an integral part 
in the formulation of the social question, contributed to paving the way for the 
transition to Fordism and the era of mass politics, and affected the assemblage of the 
oil complex in Iran. In particular, my spatial focus on the built environment of oil and 
the material landscapes created for and destroyed by it, will reveal that the new social 
and political order of petroleum was the end product of intentional but contested acts 
of assemblage, and not the natural progression of the evolutionary history of the 
capitalist industrial order.  However, while I borrow from the actor network theory 
and use some of its theoretical insights, I find its overall neglect of labor, value 
theory, and the historical and political agency of subaltern agents in favor of a 
structuralist emphasis on technopolitics, rather problematic. Tim Mitchell’s implicit 
work of synthesis with Marx, and especially his focus on and inclusion of the role of 
regimes of property in assembling the contemporary socio-technical systems of 
political economy is a compromise approach that is closer to my own interpretation. 
The Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) maintained that the territory it was 
claiming for the extraction and processing of oil was a ‘natural setting’, virtually 
empty of population. Repeatedly the region was portrayed as misused by its sparse 
population, who were ignorant of its resources, and wasted its potential commercial 
productivity by failing to exploit it properly. In addition, throughout the relentless 
propaganda generated by the Oil Company (chapter 5), the local peoples populating 
the Zagros range were presented as part of that natural world, virtually lawless bandits 
who would benefit from the civilizing effects of the industrial capitalist order (see 
below, as well as chapters 3, 6). This framing of the region as an empty frontier to be 
                                                           
Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); William Cronon, Changes in the Land: 
Indians, Colonists and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983); Donald 
Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing 
Water, Revised Edition, (New York: Penguin Books, 1993); Robert Gottlieb and Margaret 
Fitzsimmons, Thirst for Growth: Water Agencies as Hidden Government in California (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1994); Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged 
Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
The central concern of this new environmental scholarship is to rethink the notion of “social 
construction of nature” so that it is not about finding a more “sustainable” solution to the same practice 
of instrumentalization and subjugation of “the natural” by the “social”. Instead, the aim is to recognize 
that this dichotomy is an exercise of power, and conceptualizing a material world where these 
abstractions hold sway only as a way to facilitate interested actions, rather than explain a complex and 
overlapping reality (See the aforementioned Timothy Mitchell’s Can the mosquito speak? 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 7 
conquered for the universal benefit of all was a vision that was by and large shared by 
many Iranian modernist nationalists in the early 20th century, and even today6. As I 
will argue in a later section of this introduction as well as in the following chapters, 
these discursive geographic presentations of southwest Iran as a wild frontier, an 
empty land populated by noble savages or rogue bandits (pending on the normative 
preferences of the observers) who were simply an extension of its rugged and 
unclaimed natural setting, were integral to the exercise of power that made the 
assemblage of this extractive global industry possible.   
3. The Oil Complex 
The term ‘oil complex’ refers to the web of extraction, processing, production, 
distribution, and consumption that underline the global system of oil provision, and 
the oil encounters that accompanied its protracted historical assemblage. I use the 
term as distinct from “the oil industry”, and “the oil sector”, both of which are more 
frequently used but loaded terms that distort the frame of analysis in such a way that 
the wider social, spatial, and cultural relationships that surrounded the rise to 
prominence of oil are excluded from view. The first term, the oil industry, refers to 
the institutions and firms directly involved in the linked production processes in 
procuring oil and its byproducts as a final commodity for consumption; while the 
second term, the oil sector, analyzes oil as part of the economy, a financial and 
natural resource, and a source of employment and revenue. The term oil complex, is 
an alternative formulation to allow us to include in the analysis not only the people 
and institutions that were directly involved in the business of oil – such as oil 
companies, states, oil workers, technical experts – but also the plethora of other social 
actors whose lives were directly altered by being drawn into the global and local 
dynamics of the oil regime, and were integral to its continuance and eventual 
consolidation. 
These included the range of social actors I have investigated in this 
dissertation, including rural populations, urban migrants, and others who were not 
directly employed by the oil industry or did not participate directly in the economics 
                                                           
6 Kaveh Ehsani, “Sweet Dreams; Sugarcane and the Politics of Development in Pre and Post- 
Revolution Iran” (Conference presented at the Development After Development, New York 
University, 2003); Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000); Grace Goodell, Elementary Structures of Political Life: Rural Development in Pahlavi Iran 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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of the oil sector, but were organically connected to its everyday reproduction. The 
concept also allows us to incorporate the material and spatial transformations that 
paved the way for the consolidation of the oil industry, including the urban built 
environment of oil; the new property relations that were introduced to provide a legal 
framework for the operations of the new industry; as well as the ecological as well as 
architectural transformations that accompanied its new forms of land use.       
Harriet Friedmann first coined the term “complex” to differentiate between 
networks of social and political economic relations that surrounded the provision of 
specific and highly strategic food commodities that had become essential to the 
operation of the world system; namely the “wheat complex”, the “durable food 
complex”, and the “meat complex”:  
“The post war food regime consisted of different complexes, each defined as a 
chain or web of production and consumption relations linking farm workers to 
consuming individuals, households, and communities. Within each web are 
private and state institutions, which buy, sell, provide inputs, process, 
transport, distribute, and finance each link. Each complex involves many 
gender, class, and cultural relations within a specific (changing) international 
division of labor. Although each country or region inherits a specific legacy of 
incorporation and marginalization, each of the three complexes created 
general conditions for the third world”7 
 
Friedmann’s agenda was ambitious, and her own work did not incorporate and 
fully analyze all the linkages, commodity chains, and scales that had been outlined in 
her essay. But other scholars working on food and agriculture under the general 
umbrella of world system theory have been gradually addressing this agenda in 
exiting ways and gradually filling the blanks8. Nor am I claiming to be able to fulfill 
                                                           
7 Harriet Friedmann, “Distance and Durability: Shaky Foundations of the World Food Economy.,” 
Third World Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1992): 371. 
8 See for example Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael, “Agriculture and the State System.,” 
Sociologia Ruralis 29, no. 2 (1989); Philip McMichael, ed., Food and Agrarian Orders in the World-
Economy (Westport: CT: Praeger, 1995); Ben Fine, Michael Heasman, and Judith Wright, 
Consumption in the Age of Affluence: The World of Food (New York: Routledge, 1996); Alessandro 
Bonanno et al., eds., From Columbus to ConAgra: The Globalization of Agriculture and Food 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press Of Kansas, 1994); David Goodman and Michael Watts, eds., 
Globalizing Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring, (New York: Routledge, 1997); 
Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin, 
1986). 
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such an ambitious project in this dissertation, which is much more focused on 
producing a solid micro history and linking it to the larger national and global trends, 
than analyzing oil in a worldwide context. However, as it will become clear in the 
following chapters, I do attempt to analyze the social history of oil commodity as an 
‘open history’, situated within a larger social and geographic framework than its 
immediate institutional and geographic surroundings.     
While Friedmann did mention in passing an “oil complex” among the strategic 
commodity chains that knitted together the post WW2 world system, it was not her 
object of study. Michael Watts has used the concept of “oil complex” in his insightful 
review of the literature on transnational oil corporations, predatory national states, 
and dispossessed local populations9. While Watts’ copious work on oil, 
environmental degradation, state corruption and violence, and the trammeling of 
indigenous rights in Nigeria is very important and close to my own interests, it is 
interesting that neither he, nor many other authors who pursue similar critical 
investigations into the local impact of global oil consider labor to be an integral part 
of their analysis10. Indeed, for Watts and most of these authors oil seems to be a 
substance that simply emerges out of ground without any work. For example, Tim 
Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy, by and large excludes the role of oil workers from 
consideration of the historical dynamics of oil in shaping modern Middle East 
politics11. Mitchell compares the dynamics of labor process in coal mining against 
that of the oil industry, and concludes that the resulting political agency of coal 
                                                           
Timothy Mitchell’s analysis of the transformations of Egyptian food consumption within the larger 
framework of American geopolitics and foreign aid regime, and the shifting patterns of landownership, 
labor regimes, and elite formations in post Sadat era is an important model of analyzing a commodity 
complex within its larger social and political context.  See “The Object of Development” in  Mitchell, 
Rule of Experts, 209-243. 
9 Michael Watts, “Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 30 (2005): 373–407. 
10 Suzana Sawyer, Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in 
Ecuador (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Suzana Sawyer and Edmund Terence Gomez, eds., 
The Politics of Resource Extraction: Indigenous Peoples, Multinational Corporations and the State 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Tom Perreault and Gabriela Valdivia, “Hydrocarbons, 
Popular Protest and National Imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in Comparative Context,” Geoforum 
41, no. 5 (September 2010): 689–99; Andrea Behrends, Stephen P. Reyna, and Gunther Schlee, eds., 
Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Pauline Jones Luong 
and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
11 To be fair, Mitchell’s book (versus the earlier essay) is focused on the relation of oil, economics, and 
politics in general, although Middle East is his main study case. 
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miners weighed much heavier than oil workers in shaping popular politics12. This odd 
observation is based on Mitchell’s case study of the Haifa pipeline that carried Iraqi 
oil for export. Thus, oil is analyzed essentially as a mining and transport enterprise, 
and not as chemical manufacturing and processing.  
Mitchell’s analysis by and large excludes the Iranian oil workers, who have 
had a substantial continuous presence throughout the 20th century as political actors. 
In addition, workers in the Iranian oil complex have not been producing petroleum 
simply for export, but formed the backbone of further industrial developments in 
refining, petrochemicals, gas, and other related enterprises13. Their erasure as 
significant political actors has been the product of intentional political decisions and 
discursive maneuvers backed by administrative policies, such as the casualization of 
the labor market from the 1990s, rather than a reflection of their actual social and 
political irrelevance14.  Similarly, Fernando Coronil’s classic study of oil and politics 
in Venezuela, The Magical State, intentionally excludes the role of labor almost 
completely, and chooses instead to focus instead on the formation of elite nationalism 
and the establishment of other industries in Venezuela with the economic proceeds 
from oil, such as car and tractor manufacturing15.    
                                                           
12 The argument is that coal miners worked in large numbers underground, away from the direct 
supervision of employers. Their overseers shared similar high risk working conditions with rank and 
file workers, and therefore were not solely acting as enforcers safeguarding the interests of employers. 
Furthermore, the underground workspace allowed room form relatively unsupervised networks of 
workers solidarity and coordination to take shape away from the relentless surveillance of employers 
and their agents. By contrast, oil extraction and work on pipelines and transport employ large numbers 
of temporary workers, many for relatively unskilled construction work, who are dismissed as soon as 
the infrastructure is in place. The spatially scattered and isolated locals are easier to supervise, and 
more visible to disciplinary managerial gaze. Empirical studies of the petroleum industry’s operations 
in Iran, for example those presented in the following chapters, reveal a different and more diverse 
dynamic from this portrait. 
13 Fathollah Sa’adat, Jughrafiya-ye Eqtesadi-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 1 & 2, 2 vols. (Tehran: Pars Publishers, 
1967); Alexander Melamid, “Petroleum Product Distribution and the Evolution of Economic Regions 
in Iran,” Geographical Review 65, no. 4 (October 1, 1975): 510–25 
14 Kaveh Ehsani, “Crude Power: Rethinking Oil and Politics,” in Lecture Series: Fueling Societies: 
Energy Resources and Politics from Below (presented at the Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin, 2014); 
Mohammad Maljoo, “Eqtesad-e Siasi-ye Nirou-ye Kar-e San’at-e Naft da Iran-e Pas az Jang [The 
Political Economy of the Labor Force in Post-War Iran],” Kanoun-e Modafe’an-e Hoqouq-e Kargar, 
September 4, 2012, http://kanoonmodafean1.blogspot.nl/2012/09/blog-post.html. 
15 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011); 
Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1997). 
 Of course there are noted exceptions to this de-socialition of oil. For example, both Bob 
Vitalis and Miguel Tinker Salas situate the role of labor at the center of their historical analyses of the 
oil complex in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. See Miguel Tinker Salas, The Enduring Legacy: Oil, 
Culture, and Society in Venezuela (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Robert Vitalis, America’s 
Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2009).  
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Part of the reason for this glaring neglect may be the technical aspects of the 
oil extraction process itself. As an extractive enterprise the early phases of oil 
exploration and extraction involve large initial inputs of labor, which tends to fall off 
in the latter phases once the fixed capital investments have been put in place and a 
technical infrastructure of transportation and export has been consolidated. Offshore 
oil explorations have taken the isolation of oil installations from wider social settings 
and established centers of population to another level16. The often remote locations of 
oil fields, and the proclivity of oil companies to create protected enclaves around 
installations further add to their occlusion from outside view and hide the social 
relations around the oil-works behind protective walls, guarded fences, and barbed 
wires.  
However, as I will argue in a later section, this blindness to the integral role of 
labor is a symptom of a larger phenomenon that prevents oil from being analyzed as a 
social relationship. To quote Amitav Ghosh again,  “A great deal is invested in 
insuring the muteness of the oil encounter, all wrapped in regimes of strict corporate 
secrecy, and encased in enclaves… keeping especially the labor experience irrelevant 
and insignificant”. The systematic and glaring erasure of the role of labor in oil is an 
issue that I have addressed elsewhere17, and intend to take up in later publications. In 
this dissertation I provide a detailed micro history of how this regime of secrecy 
encased in enclaves became integral to the operations of the oil complex from its 
early inception in Khuzestan (chapter 6). Meanwhile, using the term “oil complex” is 
intended to frame the social history of oil within the larger spatial and social 
processes and relationships in which it is embedded.  
 
4. The Oil Habitus 
 The last theoretical concept I have found useful and necessary for this work is 
that of the oil habitus. Habitus is a concept coined by Pierre Bourdieu to explain how 
aspects of culture and socialized norms and tendencies that shape and guide actions, 
thinking, behavior, and practice, are not solely articulated explicitly at the level of 
ideology or conscious thought, or enshrined in codified institutional rules or 
customary norms. Rather, they are embodied (internalized) by societies, nations, and 
                                                           
16 Hannah Appel, “Offshore Work: Oil, Modularity, and the How of Capitalism in Equatorial Guinea,” 
American Ethnologist 39, no. 4 (2012): 692–709. 
17 Ehsani, “Crude Power: Rethinking Oil and Politics.” 
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individuals as non-verbal and transposable dispositions, or as “the totality of learned 
habits, bodily skills, styles, tastes, and non-discursive knowledges that go without 
saying. [Habitus] operates beneath the level of self-conscious rational ideology”18.  
 Trying to explain how agents make sense of the world beyond the simple 
object-subject dichotomy, Bourdieu’s defines the notion of habitus as produced over 
time and in concrete places -- a spatial and historical “structuring structure” that 
shapes individuals and their collective practices. Habitus shapes how agents think and 
perceive the world, but it exists only through the practices of actors and the way in 
which they interact with each other and their environment. Bourdieu also emphasized 
that habitus is produced collectively: “to speak of habitus is to assert that the 
individual, and even the personal, the objective, is social, collective. Habitus is 
socialized subjectivity”19.  
The oil habitus - how the range of social agents involved in the oil complex 
understood their world and behaved in it and with each other, and reproduced it 
through their practice - was shaped collectively, historically, and geographically. It 
was shaped not only by the actions of all-powerful macro-agents, like the Oil 
Company shareholders, their management, British policymakers, or Iranian state 
functionaries and politicians, but also by the collective and conflictual practices of all 
the other social actors there. These included workers, migrants, and their families 
(and by extension their extended kinship networks in their mostly rural places of 
origin), and expatriates coming primarily from Britain, India, the Caucasus, and 
Mesopotamia. It then contributed to molding the perceptions and practices of 
individuals, institutions, and collectives. 
Thus, as the following chapters will show, the historical encounters and the 
practices of various social actors involved in assembling the oil complex in Khuzestan 
created a new oil habitus that shaped and structured their subsequent actions and 
interactions in a manner that was substantially different from before, as well as from 
those of the adjoining and neighboring social settings.  
 
 
                                                           
18 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 66–67. 
19 Ibid., 126; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 81. (My added emphasis). 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 13 
Entry Points: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical 
1. The Urban Life of Oil: The Urban Process, the Built Environment, and 
Everyday Life in Abadan 
 
The human experiences surrounding the production of oil in Khuzestan took 
place in numerous distinct but interconnected spaces: There were the extractive places 
of oil wells and fields as in Masjed Soleyman; the link nodes of transportation routes 
and security zones surrounding them; the administrative centers that coordinated 
operations in Ahvaz and Mohammareh (later renamed Khorramshahr); and the 
industrial processing, storage, and shipping center that was the heart of the operations 
in Abadan. During the period under study there were other strategic nodes influencing 
local events in Tehran, London, Delhi, Basra, and Baghdad. Thus, the oil complex in 
Khuzestan was always part of a larger national and transnational web of interests and 
decision-making, while at the same time it began to take on a complicated dynamic of 
its own.  
In Khuzestan, these different oil centers did not operate in a spatial and social 
vacuum. They spread out into the countryside to appropriate territory from existing 
local populations and land users, and to siphon off human labor power to carry out the 
work of mining, the industrial production of petroleum products, and their export. 
Thus, the landscape of oil connected together as never before the urban and the rural; 
and the local with the provincial, the national, and global spaces, to make possible the 
supply of petroleum to its expanding markets and the accumulation of capital in the 
oil business. The everyday experiences that were essential to making the 
contemporary “oil civilization” occurred in these material places, the oil boomtowns 
and company towns where the encounter between the heterogeneous populations 
occupying many social roles made the production of oil and its reliable, cheap, and 
expanding provision to the market, in a growing variety of forms, a reality.  
  The following chapters will investigate the successive spatial reconfigurations 
produced by the advent of oil capitalism in Khuzestan, and analyze how they affected 
the oil encounters and shaped its new habitus. Conventional social histories of labor 
in the oil industry tend to focus on the workplace relations, wages and compensations 
structures, corporate management relations; or highlight workers struggles for 
collective bargaining, self-organization, and improvements in living conditions. This 
focus on the workplace can occlude what takes place outside and around the places of 
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production; and thus only partially reveal the dynamics of the new oil habitus. It 
leaves unanswered equally important questions such as how workers maintained and 
negotiated ties to their places of origin, how those places of origin were transformed 
as they became tangled in these new sets of long distance relations, whether the social 
and geographic background played a role in helping, hindering, and shaping the 
manners of oil workers interactions with their neighbors in their new urban settings, 
and reveal the range of novel alliances and hybrid and cosmopolitan new collective 
cultures that shaped their outlook and informed their subsequent practices in the 
workplace and outside20.   
 
      My intellectual influences will become evident in the course of the text, but 
for the spatial entry point followed here I must highlight the influence of critical 
urban geography on my work, in particular the framework for the urban analysis of 
capitalism provided by Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and Frederick Cooper21; as 
well as what I would generally label as the post-structuralist spatial analysis of 
colonial and industrial urban history and modes of governance22.  
 My primary focus of investigation will be the refinery city of Abadan, initially 
a rural and sparsely populated river island in 1909, before multiple social actors 
converged there and transformed it by late 1920s into an oil and shipping boomtown 
                                                           
20 For valuable, but partial social histories of labor in the oil industry see  Ervand Abrahamian, Iran 
Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Touraj Atabaki, “Sandicalizm 
dar Jombesh-e Kargari-e Iran dar Faseleh-e Salha-ye 1320-25,” Alefba Second Series, Paris, no. 6 
(1985): 39–60; Habib Ladjevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1985); Willem M. Floor, Labor and Industry in Iran, 1850-1941 (Mage Publishers, 2009); 
Cosroe Chakeri, Origins of Social Democracy in Modern Iran (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2001); Asef Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran (London: Zed Books, 1987); Sa’id Taeb, Az 
E’tesab-e Karkonan-e San’at-e Naft ta Pirouzi-e Enqelab-e Eslami (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e 
Enqelab-e Eslami, 2003); Peyman Jafari, “Reasons to Revolt: Iranian Oil Workers in the 1970s,” 
International Labor and Working Class History 84, no. 1 (2013): 195–217 
21 David Harvey, The Urban Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); David 
Harvey, Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Frederick Cooper, “Urban 
Space, Industrial Time, and Wage Labor in Africa,” in Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, 
and the State in Urban Africa, ed. Frederick Cooper (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 7–50; Frederick 
Cooper, On the African Waterfront (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Henri Lefebvre, La 
Production de l’Espace (Paris: Anthropos, 1983). 
22 Dolores Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American 
Homes, Neighborhoods and Cities (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); Robert Home, Of Planting and 
Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities (London: E & FN Spon, 1997); Gwendolyn Wright, 
The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
Paul Rabinow, The French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991); Anthony D. King, Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and 
Environment (New York: Routledge, 2007); Brenda Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: 
Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003); 
Janet Abu-Lughod, Rabat, Urban Apartheid in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
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with a rapidly growing population of over 60 thousand and the site of the largest 
refinery in the world. As a city built by and for oil, Abadan became the home of 
people in multiple roles – managers, workers, bureaucrats, merchants, servants, 
smugglers, indigenous date farmers, prostitutes, soldiers, etc. It was a polarized 
“quartered city”23, a city shaped by conflicting and competing claims to space that did 
not harmonize or succumb to the hegemony of a single urban form, but left their 
imprint on the urban geography and social relations within. Thus, while the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company (APOC) attempted to carve out exclusive enclaves on the island 
to build living and working spaces that would fit its stringent criteria and be organized 
under its monopoly control, other residents fought to shape space according to their 
own needs and priorities. The indigenous population struggled to keep hold of its 
agrarian spaces, groves, pastures, fields, villages, and modes of tribal life. The huge 
inflow of migrants lived under appalling conditions in precarious shelters and slums, 
which they attempted to defend against evictions and speculative commodification by 
creating new networks of neighborly solidarities. And state agents, newly arrived in 
the city after the gradual consolidation of a military, authoritarian, and centralizing 
state worked hard to impose the new legal and administrative order of the nation-state 
over the Oil Company, the strategic national border region, the restless local 
population, and the expanding oil boomtown. Thus, the urban process in Abadan was 
hardly harmonious, even though it became increasingly channeled toward the social 
transformation of the population and the urban space for the purposes of the refinery 
and the oil industry.  
Adam Przeworski argued in his essay Proletariat into a class, that the story of 
working class formation was the story of resistance to becoming wage laborers24, an 
observation certainly true in the case of the population of southern Iran who 
eventually formed the core of the oil industry’s labor force. Thus, a main challenge is 
to find an explanation for why people came to work in the oil industry when 
                                                           
23 The term “quartered city” is coined by Peter Marcuse as a critique of Janet Abu Lughod’s notion of a 
“Dual City”, as in colonial Rabat divided between a European sector and a native Qasba. Marcuse 
argues that neither the “traditional city” is ahistorical and unchanged, nor the European city is shaped 
exclusively and definitely by the will of colonial planners. He outlines multiple social and spatial 
dynamics that constantly muddy the urban and spatial boundaries, even in seemingly segregated and 
subdivided urban settings. See Peter Marcuse, “‘Dual City’: A Muddy Metaphor for a Quartered City,” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 13, no. 4 (1989): 697–708; Janet L. Abu-
Lughod, Rabat, Urban Apartheid in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).  
24 Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 47–97. 
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alternative modes of social and political life were not a nostalgic and distant memory, 
but a living reality in the province: Why did people consent to becoming an extension 
of the industrial order and accepted its time discipline, its harsh regime of corporate 
management and punishing physical labor, and allowed their social relations and 
aspirations to be defined by what Polanyi calls the “Satanic Mill”25? The built 
environment of Abadan, its refinery, and the oil habitus that framed people’s 
viewpoints and practices there was a product of these frictions and the interactions of 
all these heterogeneous social actors. Its micro social history provides an answer 
(although not the only one) to the larger questions of how this consent was obtained, 
and how oil capitalism and the nation state were consolidated.   
 Urbanization is a process that is celebrated normatively by a range of 
modernization theories as inherently progressive, modern, and inevitable 26. The 
critical approach I adopt here sees the urban history of Abadan not as a celebrated 
byproduct of the forward movement of history toward an ideal type modernity, but as 
a site of ongoing political and social tensions, struggles, and negotiations, over how 
alternative modes of life and heterogeneous populations are first fragmented, before 
being integrated into the new social order of capitalism and the nation state. Thus the 
questions I pose here are not only about employment, municipal services, food, 
housing, sanitation, property laws, and police; but also about culture, ideology, and 
new forms of solidarity and resistance, in forming a new spatial order.  These issues  
form the basis of the production and reproduction of the social and political economic 
order; they are not abstract and discursive, but concern the concrete experiences that 
are framed by and rooted in material space27.  
  The Oil industry produced many urban spaces in Khuzestan, the largest of 
which were Masjed Soleyman and Abadan, with significant differences between 
them. The first was a strictly mining town, built around oil wells and designed 
                                                           
25 Polanyi, The Great Transformation. Of course, the issue of proletarianization under capitalism and 
the place of labor in the transition to capitalism is of general concern to radical social history; a topic 
that I will address in the next section. 
26 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), is one of the classic articulations of this teleological approach in 
the post WW2 development literature. In the case of Iran see the example of Eckhart Ehlers and 
Willem Floor, “Urban Change in Iran, 1920-1941,” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3–4 (1993): 251–76; 
Jamshid Behnam, “Population,” in Cambridge History of Iran; the Land of Iran, vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), 468–88. My critical analysis of modernization theories and 
practices is sketched out in Kaveh Ehsani, “A Critique of Planning, Development and Progress” (MA 
Thesis in Regional Planning, University of Massachusetts- Amherst, 1986).  
27 Harvey, The Urban Experience, 17–89. 
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functionally and under the strict coercive control of APOC to extract crude oil. Its 
location was dictated by geology. It remained an enclave with the typical 
characteristics of a company town. Once oil began to run out, the city and its residents 
were discarded unceremoniously, gradually turning into a de-industrialized shell28. 
While I do discuss the urban and regional history of Masjed Soleyman, my focus is on 
the much more variegated and cosmopolitan Abadan.  
By contrast, Abadan’s choice of location was down to a political decision and 
not dictated by geology (chapters 2, 3, 5). It was a river port city, a border town, a 
major chemical industrial center that became the converging ground for tens of 
thousands of deracinated rural populations of diverse origin who formed the core of 
the oil working class and a new urban citizenry. The Oil Company never managed to 
cast a monopoly control over its development, and nor did the central government. Its 
vast slums and condensed neighborhoods were home to heterogeneous populations of 
different kinds of oil workers, ranging from temporary and casual to more skilled 
workers and artisans, as well as many others who were not directly employed by the 
Oil Company, but made a living there on its margins. Its urban space became a 
combination of organized company enclaves, industrial spaces, indigenous 
settlements, and a frontier boomtown, making it an ideal case study for analyzing the 
web of relationships that created this unique oil habitus and became the heart of the 
oil complex. 
 Marx argued that the basic reality of capitalism boiled down to the circulation 
and flow of capital requiring the simultaneous separation and concentration of capital 
and labor in one place. This dual movement becomes possible through the initial 
moment of the primitive accumulation of capital and the dispossession of existing 
communities whose economy and society are not based on money relations, 
commodity exchange, and private property29 (see chapter 3). David Harvey adds that 
this transition is essentially an urban phenomenon, which involves a revolutionary 
urban process to dissolve community by money, state coercion, and wage labor, “A 
                                                           
28 Kaveh Ehsani, “Social Engineering and the Contradictions of Modernization in Khuzestan’s 
Company Towns: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman,” International Review of Social History 
48, no. 3 (2003): 361–99; Kamal Athari, “Masjed Soleyman; Sherkat Shahri Madaniyat Yafteh,” 
Ettela’at-e Siasi-Eqtesadi, no. 47/48 (1991); Danesh Abbasi-Shahni, Tarikh-e Masjed Soleyman, 
(Tehran: Hirmand, 1995). 
29 Marx, Capital, 1:873–941. 
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built environment has to be created before capital accumulation can start. The urban 
process is all about how this new landscape is produced and used”30.  
In an industrial oil city like Abadan, this urban process meant that casual 
workers and migrants had to be controlled and co-opted, before being absorbed and 
integrated. Markets for land, labor, and living necessities had to be created where they 
did not exist at all, or did so on a limited scale. Customary relations of work had to be 
transformed, and the impact of social, technical, and political change had to be 
managed. As a result, from the 1920s onward, the Oil Company had to engage into a 
set of social policies, which I have called “reluctant paternalism” (chapter 5), that 
involved propaganda and public relations, educational and vocational training, 
municipal improvement, sanitary and public health measures, organized leisure 
activities (chapters 5 and 6). These social measures were in part a response to existing 
conditions in southern Iran, and partly a byproduct of the momentous changes taking 
place in the wider global habitus of industrial capitalism in the inter war era when 
welfare social policies promoted by professional experts, under pressure by working 
people, were being considered as credible alternatives to placate the rise of mass 
politics and class strife in the revolutionary circumstances following the end of WWI 
(chapter 4).  
 
2.  Social History of Oil as a Global Labor History 
 The approach I have adopted in this work falls within the field of research of 
the Global Labor History (GLH). Without being a grand narrative, GLH lays out the 
possibility of critically rethinking key concepts of social, historical, and geographic 
analysis in a manner that will be further outlined below31. In the first instance, GLH 
mounts a challenge to both nationalist and diffusionist historiography, by 
emphasizing relations and connections between various scales of analysis – for 
example, transnational, national, local - rather than privileging one over the others as 
more significant 
“Global history is primarily concerned with the description and explanation of 
the intensifying or weakening connections (interactions, influences, transfers) 
                                                           
30 Harvey, The Urban Experience, 59-89 
31 Marcel van der Linden, Workers of the World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History (Leiden: 
Brill, 2008), 6–14. 
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between different world regions, as well as of economic political, social, and 
cultural networks, institutions, and media that played a role in it”32. 
 
In this sense ‘global’ does not refer to large scale, or ‘the world’, with local 
dynamics reduced to mere case studies proving the universal rule. Rather, global 
history can be a local history, so long as the micro scale is understood as relational 
and an integral part of a global network of connections and interactions. Thus, I 
construct the story of urban change in Abadan in chapters 5 and 6 around the 
controversial history of the building of a small, modern, ‘sanitary’ market place by 
APOC in 1924-1927, where a seemingly micro event captured and reflected the 
revolutionary transformations taking place at national and transnational scales.  
Likewise, GLH allows the reconceptualization of the working class on the 
basis of inclusion rather than exclusion33. Thus, rather than focusing on a narrow 
definition of oil working class as only those directly employed for wages by the Oil 
Company, I will include the extended network of all those whose purposive activities 
contributed directly or indirectly to the continued functioning of the oil complex. 
These include soldiers, casual workers, landlords, extended family members in rural 
areas who shared economic ties with urban migrants, and well as professional 
company experts and staff. In the following sections I will further elaborate on this 
approach and my reliance on GLH as a framework of analysis. 
 
Concepts, Linkages, and Scales of Analysis:       
By and large, the historiography of oil in Iran has been dominated by works of 
geopolitical, corporate, economic, political, and nationalist history that focus on the 
role of formal institutions, elites, and states, framed within various meta-narratives of 
modernization34. While of great empirical value, this copious literature neglects or 
                                                           
32 Marcel van der Linden, “The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History,” International Labor 
and Working-Class History, no. 82 (October 1, 2012): 62. 
33 Ibid., 66–69. On widening the category of working classes see van der Linden, Workers of the 
World, 17–37, 366–377. 
34 Prominent examples include Ronald Ferrier, History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, of 3 
vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982); James Bamberg, History of the British 
Petroleum Company, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); L.P. Elwell-
Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955); Laurence 
Lockhart, The Record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd. (London: Anglo Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC), 1938); Lawrence Lockhart and Rose Greaves, The Record of the British Petroleum Limited 
(1918-1946) Relations with the Persian (Iranian) Government (London: British Petroleum Company, 
1968); Chamseddine Amiralaii, Khal’e Yad az Sherkat-e Sabeq-e Naft-e Iran va Engelis 
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even tends to erase the lived experiences surrounding the oil complex as it was being 
assembled in Khuzestan. Even local provincial histories tend to narrate what 
happened there once the oil industry and the central government were established 
instead of unpacking the mechanisms of how it happened. Furthermore, the equally 
central question of why it happened seems to be taken as self evident, inevitable, and 
not particularly in need of further inquiry35.   
The same can be said of the existing histories of labor in the oil industry, 
where “the making of” or “the emergence of” a wage laboring class in the oil industry 
is presented as a passage from a state of particularistic primordialism (tribal, ethic, 
local) to one of a universal modernity of wage earning in the labor market and of 
eventual inclusion in the nation state. To some extent this approach seems to 
characterize the labor historiography of the Middle East and not only Iran. In a critical 
review of an important collection of essays titled Workers and Working Classes in the 
Middle East, Dipesh Chakrabarty took issue with this tendency of accepting important 
analytical categories -- such as citizenship, the state, modernity, nation state, and class 
-- as universal and self evident, and not particularly open to contestation36. 
Chakrabarty notes that in this literature the state tends to be framed as external to 
class and society, and as an adversary and a repressive organ serving its own interests 
or those of a ruling class by hindering the development of self-consciousness among 
                                                           
(Dispossession of the Former Anglo Iranian Oil Company) (Tehran: Dehkhoda, 1978); Mostafa Fateh, 
Panjah Sal Naft-e Iran (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Chehr, 1956); Ministry of Petroleum of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, “San’at Naft-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran dar Yek Negah,” accessed 
January 20, 2014, http://www.mop.ir/; Mohammad ʻAli Movahed, Naft-e Ma va Masaʾel-e Hoquqi-e 
An (Our Oil and Its Legal Issues) (Tehran: Kharazmi, 1978); Foad Rohani, Tarikh-e Melli Shodan-e 
San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Tehran: Jibi, 1973); Sa’adat, Jughrafiya-ye Eqtesadi-e Naft-e Iran; Fathollah 
Sa’adat, Pajouheshi dar Masa’el-e Nafti-e Iran (An Investigation into Iran’s Petroleum Issues) 
(Tehran: AmirKabir, 1976); Iraj Zoghi, Masael-e Siasi-Eqtesadi-e Naft-e Iran (Tehran: Pazhang, 
1991); Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Mac Millan, 
1981); Nasrollah Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy; Powderkeg in Iran (New York: Whittier Books, 1954); 
Fereydun Fesharaki, Development of the Iranian Oil Industry (New York: Praeger, 1976).  
35 Danesh Abbasi-Shahni, Tarikh-e Masjed Soleyman (Tehran: Hirmand, 1995); Ali Ya’qubinejad, 
Raiis-e Naft (Tehran: Yadvareh Ketab, 1994); Mohammadi Yousefi, Tarikh-e Khorramshahr (Tehran: 
Nil, 1971); Eshaq Shakiba, Negahi beh Tarikh-e Mahshahr (Shiraz: Navid-e Shiraz, 2007); Abdolali 
Lahsaeizadeh, Jame’eh Shenasi-e Abadan (NP: Kianmehr, 2004). There are of course notable 
exceptions to this trend, where the social history of the local society is taken seriously and not 
subsumed under the larger political and economic histories of the nation or the oil industry, for 
example Mostafa Ansari, “The History of Khuzistan, 1878-1925: A Study in Provincial Autonomy and 
Change” (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974); Arash Khazeni, Tribes and Empire on the 
Margins of 19th Century Iran (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Stephanie Cronin, 
Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State 1921-41 (London: Routledge, 2007). 
However, these local histories are not primarily focused on the oil industry. 
36 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Labor History and the Politics of Theory; an Indian Angle on the Middle 
East,” in Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), 321–34. 
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the working classes. Likewise, workers become agents and subjects only when they 
fight the employers or go on strike, but if they fight amongst themselves or resist their 
subsumption to wage labor and various forms of state citizenship they are seen as still 
mired in a traditional and pre-modern state, or as victims of external manipulation by 
elites, employers, and government agents37. 
 The second issue that Chakrabarty has raised in his reflexive work on the 
historiography of labor in non-western settings is to ask how these histories can be 
written as if they were not a mere extension of ‘the real history’ taking place in the 
metropole:  
“There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become 
variations on a master narrative that could be called ‘the history of 
Europe’…Only ‘Europe’…is ‘theoretically’ knowable (i.e. at the level of the 
fundamental categories that stage historical thinking). All other histories are 
matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is 
substantially ‘Europe’…The paradox is that third world social scientists find 
these theories eminently useful to understanding their societies”38 
 
The problem to engage in this literature on the histories of oil in Iran is the 
recurring tendency toward Whig historiography, or the presentation of the social 
history of working people of the global south as a relentless forward march that is 
sometimes regrettable and costly in human terms, but ultimately moves toward 
inevitable industrial progress and modernization39. This narrative of transition frames 
the histories of local subaltern people prior to the advent of modernization in terms of 
incompleteness, inadequacy, and a series of,  
“Absences – [and a] ‘failure’ of history to keep an appointment with its 
destiny…This is a picture shared by colonialists and Indian [and I would add 
                                                           
37 Ibid., 321–327.  See also footnote 15 
38 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postocoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?,” 
in A Subaltern Studies Reader (1986-1995), ed. Ranajit Guha (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 263–266. 
39 There now exists a substantial literature that frames oil as a curse, both economic and political. I 
have discussed and analyzed this literature briefly and critically, and I intend to return to the topic later 
on. The common theme between both trends - framing oil as a boon or alternatively as a curse – is the 
reification of “oil” as an abstract historical agent that shapes politics and economics on its own, without 
being connected to any concrete history or social dynamics. See Ehsani, “Crude Power: Rethinking Oil 
and Politics”; Kaveh Ehsani, “Naft na estebdad misazad, na democrasy (Oil is neither the cause of 
authoritarianism nor democracy.,” Tarikh Irani, 2012, 
http://www.tarikhirani.ir/fa/files/13/bodyView/131/ .    
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Iranian] nationalists alike, as the diversity of ‘Indian pasts was conquered and 
represented through a homogenizing narrative of transition from ‘medieval’ 
period to ‘modernity’…of ‘despotism’ versus ‘constitutions’ presented as the 
rule of law and private property.”40 
 
 The approach I have adopted in this work challenges the narratives of 
transition (to modernity) and diffusion (of a western model of development and 
progress) by questioning their underlying assumptions, and by subjecting some of 
their key units of analysis - such as the state, oil, citizenship, class, and national 
identity - to critical historical inquiry. Specifically, I will make the following 
arguments: 
 First, state formation is inseparable from the formation of class and other 
social identities. Rather than being a self-contained monad, confronting another free-
standing entity called society by imposing its political will, the state is as shaped by 
class frictions and social dynamics as the other way around. As Tim Mitchell argues, 
the state is an ‘effect’ rather than ‘a thing’; its boundaries with civil society are fuzzy 
at best, but the state effect is nonetheless an important presence and a material force 
in shaping the political arena41. Like class and ethnicity, the state has a history, and its 
development is intertwined with those of the former.  
As the following chapters will demonstrate, the micro history of the oil 
complex in Khuzestan shows the state, class, ethnicities, and other institutions and 
social identities were formed through relational processes that were inseparable from 
one another. Chapter 2 shows how state institutions and governmental practices in 
Iran, as well as British government positions toward Iran and the Persian Gulf, 
underwent constant reconfigurations in an attempt to keep up with and to adapt to 
turbulent and novel circumstances. In Khuzestan, these shifts led to the emergence of 
                                                           
40 Chakrabarty, “Postocoloniality and the Artifice of History,” 267–268. For a brilliant deconstruction 
of the concepts of modernity, identity, and globalization see Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in 
Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 59–151. 
41 Mitchell asks, for example, whether financial institutions of Wall Street, multinationals such as 
Aramco or General Dynamics, or educational and social welfare institutions, such as universities and 
so on should be considered as extensions of the American state, as they are integral to its policy 
decisions, despite being formally private or semi private. He also questions the reductive Marxist 
argument that reduces the state to a mere instrument of the ruling class. His point is that ‘state theory’ 
is a construct that functions in various forms to present the state as a separate entity to a similar 
construct, the civil society, rather than a relational process. See Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the 
State Effect.”   
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a new oil habitus in the 1920s. Chapter 3 shows that supposedly primordial and 
traditional categories, such as tribal identity, were never stable, permanent, or 
hermetic, but were constantly adapting to the flows and demands of the larger world, 
as well as contending with their own internal frictions, that in the end proved 
insurmountable. Chapter 4 shows the manners in which the British state underwent 
profound transformation in the course of WWI in response to the rise of mass politics, 
the newfound prominence of the professional middle class, the rise of anti-colonial 
nationalism, and the advent of Fordism. The subsequent result of this was the rise of 
the social question as a central concern of the modes and institutions of governance. 
By the social I refer to the field between the economy and political institutions that 
began to be perceived by nation state builders and nationalists everywhere as the field 
where collective expectations, grievances, and demands needed to be addressed in 
order to avoid radical challenges to the political and economic order, and to increase 
the efficiency of the nation state42.   
The ‘social question’ also affected the modes of regulation of private 
corporations like APOC, and how their management and directors viewed labor 
relations and dealt with class frictions in their operations in Khuzestan. Chapter 6, in 
particular, reveals that new state agents in Iran had to invent novel notions of 
governmental responsibility and were pushed to define the fields of their sovereignty 
and administrative practices in response to ongoing barrages of local popular 
demands for new entitlements, as well as strategic calculations regarding their 
relations to transnational capitalism. As for class formation and acquiring the identity 
of “worker”, this history reveals that it was not a straightforward process of accepting 
wage labor as the new basis of economic existence, but a highly contested and 
politicized process that was entangled with the formation of the state, the violent 
dispossession of local economies, global oil capitalism, and modern citizenship.  
  
 Second, the notions of citizenship, social rights, and the production of identity 
and difference within a nation state are equally relational, and highly contested. The 
nation state is now taken as the normative and natural unit of analysis, but modern 
nation states are more often that not the result of nationalist and imperialist projects in 
                                                           
42 George Steinmetz, Regulating the Social  : The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jacques Donzelot, L’Invention du Social: Essai sur le 
Declin des Passions Politiques (Paris: Seuil, 1994). 
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establishing imagined communities through invented traditions, social engineering, 
and mythologized histories. This does not negate their ‘authenticity’, but accepting 
these notions as ‘natural’ ignores the historical fact that the projects of building nation 
states and citizenship are also coercive projects of power that displace alternative and 
competing categories of collective solidarity. While citizenship bestows certain 
democratic and coercive rights on individuals, and demands certain responsibilities in 
the name of universal belonging to a national community, it also eradicates other rival 
claims. For example, newly registered property rights for some dispossess the 
customary rights of others in the name of private property (chapters 3, 6, 7). Universal 
military conscription in service of the nation demands great sacrifice from working 
people (chapter 4) and dismantles labor regimes in agrarian and pastoralist 
communities (chapter 7). Individual identity registration and the census are the 
foundations of social welfare measures, yet they also subjugate everyone to the 
disciplinary gaze of the market and state institutions (chapters 5, 6, 7), which gain 
unprecedented power in determining what category of citizen each person belongs to, 
evaluate their relative usefulness or potential threat, and decide what rights they are 
entitled to enjoy or ought to be denied43. 
The question of citizenship is about the distribution of power - political, 
symbolic, and economic - within the nation state44. It is also “a universality that is 
always contested on the ground, as subalterns in whose name liberal democratic 
narratives are written can both embrace and reject [the liberal and nationalist 
imagination…whose project it is]”45. As Hannah Arendt argued, citizenship is not 
simply bestowed by the state (the liberal formulation), it is also enacted by people 
                                                           
43 Michel Foucault et al., The Foucault Effect  : Studies in Governmentality  : With Two Lectures by and 
an Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Sharon Lee, “Racial 
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44 Margaret R. Somers and Christopher N.J. Roberts, “Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A 
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45 Chakrabarty, “Labor History and the Politics of Theory; an Indian Angle on the Middle East,” 331–
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who stake their own claims to the political distribution of rights46, making the 
development of citizenship and social identity an “open history”, which is then 
scripted by democratic (and sometimes anti democratic) collective movements 
claiming equality and citizenship rights for labor, women, civil rights, and so on. 
Chapter 4 reviews the rise of mass politics and social welfare measures in the 
wake of WWI as partial response to subaltern demands for a range of rights that fell 
under the category of political and economic citizenship47. It argues that these social 
welfare measures became part of the repertoire of corporate responses to similar 
subaltern and working class challenges that faced the APOC in Khuzestan. Chapter 6 
investigates a range of new urban solidarities that emerged in Abadan in the interwar 
years to resist further dispossession by oil capitalism, and to demand the ‘right to the 
city’. These subaltern counter movements were by a heterogeneous and deracinated 
population, including oil workers but not exclusive to them, who were adopting the 
language of national identity as a collective strategy of negotiating their relations with 
oil capitalism and the authoritarian and nationalist central government.   
 
Third, the histories of local, national, and global development are also 
inseparable from each other. The following chapters show that the development of the 
oil complex in Khuzestan was not the outcome of ready-made diffusion of technical 
and scientific knowledge, capital investment, and labor practices from Britain to Iran, 
but was a clear case of tangled developments (i.e. a GLH) that linked together the 
different spaces, institutions, people, and social arrangements that were party to the 
assemblage of the oil complex. To be sure this was a highly unequal process: Its story 
is one of ruthless dispossession and of authoritarian social engineering on the one 
hand, and on the other the emergence of a new regime of vast accumulation of capital 
that took at its raw material the existing local social and material resources. However, 
it is not a story of diffusion, and without the entanglements and contributions of 
ordinary people and their material world in Khuzestan there would have been no oil 
complex to speak of.  
                                                           
46 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958); Norma 
Claire Moruzzi, Speaking through the Mask: Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Social Identity (Ithaca: 
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For one thing, oil was not a ready-made industry to be simply introduced to 
Khuzestan in 1908 (chapter 4). At the turn of the 20th Century oil was still a relatively 
novel and emerging extractive business not yet assured of its eventual role as the most 
significant commodity of the modern era48. As chapter 4 will elaborate, WWI and the 
advent of Fordism played a major part in the rise to global prominence of oil, and the 
oil complex in Khuzestan was very much part of this trend. This new paradigm was 
not simply economic and technical, but also social and political.  
At a quick glance, the scale of change can be seen in some important numbers: 
At the onset of WWI British forces in France had less than a thousand motorized 
millitary vehicles, by 1918 they had more than fifty thousand, in addition to tanks and 
an air force. Abadan’s contribution to this war effort was crucial in providing fuel to 
the navy and army, especially in the Middle East and Indian Ocean (chapters 2, 4, 
5)49. Between 1914 and 1918 APOC’s production increased tenfold, to nearly 900 
thousand tons of fuel products. By the end of the War the British government was not 
only the major shareholder of APOC, it was its most important customer, with the 
Admiralty alone taking two thirds of Abadan’s output50. This was a symbiotic 
relationship, for without the British governmental investment the Company, which 
had been seriously overstretched and found itself in dire financial state, may well not 
have survived (chapter 2)51. The strategic and economic benefits of Khuzestan’s oil 
for the British war effort was often acknowledged in a self-congratulatory language, 
for example by Winston Churchill who reminisced: 
“We may not unreasonably expect to claim that the mighty fleets laid down in 
1912-1914, the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were 
                                                           
48 See for example Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Free Press, 2008); Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company: Briefer Version, 
ed. David M. Chalmers (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003); Ferrier, History of the British 
Petroleum Company, 1:235–294. 
49 For these figures and for Abadan fuel supplied to military during WWI, see Ferrier, History of the 
British Petroleum Company, 1:213, 235, 243–244, 262, 278, 282.  
50 Ibid., 288-293. It is important to emphasize the commercial nature of the Company. APOC never 
was simply a patriotic majority government owned company. When given the opportunity it acted like 
any commercial agent out to maximize profits, even at the cost of becoming a war profiteer, for 
example at the expense of British troops fighting in Mesopotamia. For example, see the complaint by 
Arnold Wilson, who was by then the chief of police in Basra, to APOC general manager in 
Mohammareh, about the Company selling petrol to the army at higher rates than petrol imported from 
Burma via Bombay (28 October, 1915); and of being overcharged by the Company for mules and 
transport (12 December, 1915), BP 68779.  
51 See detailed discussion of the Company’s financial situation in Marian (Kent) Jack, “The Purchase 
of the British Government’s Shares in the British Petroleum Company 1912-1914,” Past and Present, 
no. 39 (April 1968): 139–68; Ferrier, History of the British Petroleum Company, 1:97–113, 160–200. 
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added to the British navy without costing a single penny to the tax payer 
…Fortune brought us a prize [Khuzestan’s oil] from fairyland far beyond our 
brightest hopes”52  
  
What Churchill portrayed as a piece of crafty business was perceived as 
outright plunder by successive generations of Iranian nationalists at the time and 
since, and contributed to the nationalist movement that finally saw the monopoly of 
APOC (renamed Anglo Iranian Oil Company after 1936 (AIOC)) over Iranian oil 
come to end in 1951. From the onset, the dispute between the Iranian government, 
APOC, and the British state, was over several intertwined issues: First, the Oil 
Company’s accounting practices in calculating the Iranian share of royalties53 (see 
                                                           
52 Quoted in Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 17. 
53 The question of oil royalties and shares of profits received by Iran were seen at the time of their 
signings and after, by Iranian critiques and even by the British agents and experts who overtime 
finalized various contracts with various Qajar monarchs, the Bakhtiyari Khans, and Reza Shah and his 
statesmen, as lopsided bargains benefiting the British side. While many in the Iranian press and among 
political commentators portrayed the concession as little better than thievery, the formal Iranian 
objections overtime were framed in legalistic terms against the arbitrary nature of the initial grant in 
1901 by Muzaffar al-Din Shah to William D’Arcy, a private individual, and not to the British 
Government, which had become the majority shareholder of a private concern by purchasing its shares 
and investing in its future. The Concession had been bestowed prior to the Constitutional Revolution, 
which had ushered in parliamentary jurisdiction and elected representation as the new basis of law 
making, thus nullifying previous royal decrees and concessions bestowed on foreign nationals by the 
arbitrary whim of the Monarch. The outrageously generous terms of the D’Arcy Oil Concession made 
in exchange for personal payment to the Shah, with little regard for what were now considered as 
‘national interests’, only added to the grievance. Furthermore, the separate agreements between APOC 
and the Bakhtiyari Khans, and the formation of the Bakhtiyari Oil Company with a 35 share for a few 
of their senior Khans who had signed the agreement, was perceived by Iranian nationalists as a direct 
challenge to the national sovereignty, and a violation of the government’s interest, which owned no 
shares of the enterprise.  
Through the D’Arcy Concession Iran was supposed to receive 16% of net profits as royalties, 
but the Company itself was in sole charge of accounting and of carrying out all details and methods of 
calculation of operations. Its accounting excluded highly profitable and rapidly expanding subsidiary 
activities, like tanker shipping, retail marketing etc. which ought to have been added to the balance 
sheet. Soon APOC came to own and operate considerable shares in other oil and commercial 
operations in Iraq (Mesopotamia), the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait), Mexico, and Britain 
(Llandarcy). The D’Arcy Concession had defined the share in net profits of APOC as the source of 
royalties, yet the Company refused to include any offshore operations as integral to the Concession. It 
paid taxes and duties in Britain, which were then deducted from the gross profits, but not in Iran, and it 
provided guaranteed quotas of various refined oil products to the British military at highly subsidized 
rates, regardless of their current market valuation. All of these political arrangements reduced the 
royalties’ share of the Iranian party and caused resentment and ongoing friction with the central 
government in Tehran. Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle; M Nakhai, Le Pétrole en Iran (Bruxelle: 
Editions J. Felix, 1938); Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions; Movahed, Naft-e Ma va 
Masaʾel-e Hoquqi-e An (Our Oil and Its Issues); Abolfazl Lesani, Tala-ye Siah ya Bala-ye Iran 
(Tehran: AmirKabir, 1978); Fateh, Panjah Sal Naft-e Iran; Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy. 
Eventually, these frictions led to the revised agreement of 1933, but that agreement was itself 
dissatisfactory to the Iranian nationalists. Reza Shah signed the 1933 agreement personally in the midst 
of a critical period of economic and political crises. The global impact of the Great Depression, the 
subsequent drastic reduction of royalties from oil, the major tribal uprisings of 1929, the 
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chapter 7); second, the legitimacy of the British Government as a majority 
shareholder in APOC and its obtaining preferential rates and influencing Company 
policy, when the terms of the initial D’Arcy Oil Concession were with a private 
company, and not an imperial state that was consistently and brazenly interfering in 
domestic Iranian affairs as an de-facto colonial overlord (chapter 2). Third, Iranian 
government demands for the Company to adhere to the letter of the Concession and 
hire Iranian workers only and to train managers and skilled workers to replace the 
Indian and Europeans who staffed the middle ranks and technical positions 
throughout the operations (what I will refer to as Iranianization. See chapter 5). 
Fourth, the recurring objections of the central government in Tehran against the Oil 
Company acting like a sovereign state in southern Iran, by drawing separate land 
lease and labor recruitment agreements with local magnates and tribal leaders in 
Khuzestan, and implicitly supporting their political and military autonomy and their 
flirtation with territorial separatism (chapters 2, 3, 6).  
In other words, the establishment of the oil complex in Khuzestan was not a 
straightforward act of capital and technology transfer by a ready-made industry from 
Britain to Khuzestan. Rather, it was a highly contested enterprise, intertwined from 
the onset with the internal political, social, and geographic dynamics of an Iranian 
society in throes of crisis and transition, and caught in the midst of international great 
                                                           
monopolization of foreign trade and key commodities by the state, and the rise of the Shah’s ever more 
personal tyranny which led to the physical elimination of some of his closest statesmen and erstwhile 
allies, undermined the legitimacy of the new deal and effectively meant that the 1933 agreement was 
never widely accepted as a fair deal by the majority of Iranians, as became evident in the rise of post-
WW2 Oil Nationalization Movement. The long simmering and accumulated political, legal, and 
economic discontent discussed above were at the heart of the eventual nationalization.  
However, the general account provided here, which is the standard narrative of Iranian 
nationalist grievances, does not include the most decisive aspect of these frictions, which is the local-
provincial dimension. The standard accounts of oil royalties cited above focus on questions related to 
royalties, contracts between national governments, and defining a fair division of proceeds: It is a 
dispute about distribution. But, as Marx notes correctly, capitalism is not assembled only in the open 
realm of exchange, contracts, and the market, where all parties are supposed to be equal and participate 
of their free will. Producing the wealth that circulates and is distributed in the realm of exchange takes 
place behind enclaves, in factories, mines, and refineries, which are shielded and highly controlled 
spaces, such as company towns like Abadan. 
Regarding the oil agreements, the focus of our discussion is not about what was obviously a 
crooked and shady relationship between unequal partners, but about why and how the manner in which 
the oil complex was constructed in Abadan depended so fundamentally on presenting the illusion of an 
equal and transparent contractual relationship. On APOC’s mode of calculation of royalties, and how 
this was integral to the oil complex see Katayoun Shafiee, “A Petro-Formula and Its World: 
Calculating Profits, Labour and Production in the Assembling of Anglo-Iranian Oil,” Economy & 
Society 41, no. 4 (2012): 1–30. 
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powers rivalries that were beyond its abilities to maneuver (chapters 2, 5), as well as a 
changing Britain itself (chapter 4) during a historical period of revolutionary change. 
 The oil complex was constructed out of a multiplicity of intertwined 
relationships across various scales. For simplicity and practicality’s purpose the scales 
of analysis that I have focused on in this work are global, national, and local. This 
argument requires that we clarify the notion of scale itself. But before proceeding to 
engage the topic theoretically, I will lay out the case study of the Bazaar of Abadan 
that serves as a convenient empirical entry point in the following chapters.  
 
The New Bazaar of Abadan: Small Case, Big Story? 
In 1925-27 APOC decided to build a “properly planned, efficient, and 
sanitary” market place in a small area sandwiched between the refinery, the European 
residential quarters, and the indigenous Town. It was to be roofed, made of modern 
materials, concrete floors, with properly ventilated and well-lit stalls, to be leased out 
until Company investment had been repaid. As always, there were additional motives 
involved: the Company was interested in socializing the locals in what it considered 
reliable ways of money accounting and unambiguous legal contracts. Equally 
important were considerations over sanitary issues and food security. As Abadan had 
grown exponentially so had the threats of food shortages and epidemics during the 
tumultuous years of war, drought, and conflict, with each crisis threatening the fragile 
but vitally important oil export operations at critical times. With regard to the bazaar, 
APOC argued that a modern and sanitary commercial space designed and regulated 
by the Company would go some way in reducing potential food crises stemming from 
the risks of contamination or the panic caused by hoarded supplies and predatory 
price inflations.  
APOC claimed it the initiative to take over the area and build a bazaar had 
come at the behest of local notables and it was only acting as a responsible corporate 
citizen and not a self-interested party. By the time it began preparations in 1925 the 
provincial ruler and British ally Sheikh Khaz’al had been deposed by the emergent 
central government under Reza Khan, and the position of the local elite associated 
with him had become shaky. Implementation of the bazaar scheme required the 
removal of area residents who had settled there in recent years – shopkeepers, 
peddlers, coffee shop owners, oil workers, company employees, and others who had 
made the place their home. However, in this case most of the residents refused to 
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move and demanded proper compensation. Unexpectedly the affair dragged on, when 
earlier the evictions would have been considered a rather minor routine, and handled 
forcefully and without hesitation. Only a few years back, Company experts had 
characterized the small island of Abadan as “unpopulated” and “desolate” (see further 
below and chapter 3), but by now (1925) it was home to an estimated population of 
more than sixty thousand, coming from quite diverse backgrounds. After the eruption 
of initial protests in the neighborhood, local Iranian officials and company managers 
got involved. As protests and petitions escalated and resistance continued, senior 
managers in London, Cabinet Ministers, the Prime Minister, newspapers, and even 
the Royal Court in Tehran got tangled in an affair that was becoming surprisingly 
messy. Eventually, after two years of wrangling, a compromise was reached and the 
bazaar was built. In the process a new form of urban politics had begun to take shape 
that affected all the social actors involved and shaped their future actions, but also 
signaled a significant reconfiguration of the oil complex itself, and changed the oil 
habitus.  
Why did APOC entangle itself with a controversial project that had little to do 
with oil? What prompted neighborhood residents who by all counts were poor if not 
destitute, had few resources, and shared little in terms of ethnic or communal ties 
except their common claim to a patch of  (what had become urban) land, to band 
together and resist a giant corporation? How did the neophyte state bureaucrats see 
the situation and react once Sheikh Khaz’al’s rule was at an end and a new form of 
politics and administration was being assembled54 around the oil complex and at the 
national level? How did the eruption of this new form of urban protest in the long run 
affect the oil encounter between workers, the Company, urban dwellers, and state 
                                                           
54 The new state institutions that began to be assembled from the mid-1920s, either from scratch or in 
radically reconfigured administrative form, included municipalities, property and legal documents’ 
registration, birth certifications, notary publics, mass education at various levels, including the first 
university, standardized taxation, public health, civil laws, etc. See Amin Banani, The Modernization of 
Iran, 1921-1941. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 52–111; Hossein Mahboubi Ardakani, 
Tarikh-e Moassesat-e Tamadoni-e Jadid dar Iran , 3 Vols. (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1975), 
especially volume 2; Stephanie Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910-
1926 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997); David Menashri, Education and the Making of Modern Iran (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 91–161; Jalil (Seyyed) Mohammadi, “Seyr-e Malekiyat dar Iran va 
Chegounegi-ye Sabt-e Asnad va Amlak (The patterns of property in Iran and the manners of 
registeration of documents and properties),” Kanoun (Nashriyeh-ye Kanoun-e Sar-Daftardaran va 
Daftaryaran) 41–45, no. 1–31 (1997- 2002); Cyrus Schayegh, Who is Knowledgeable is Strong; 
Science, Class, and the Formation of Modern Iranian Society, 1900-1950 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2009) 
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officials? These much larger questions lie at the center of the deceptively minor tale 
of the bazaar of Abadan. 
 
The New Oil Habitus in Post-War Abadan: 
Small and local as this episode may appear, it encapsulated the emergence of a 
new habitus around the oil complex in Khuzestan. WWI was generally acknowledged 
to have marked the end of an era, and the following decade and the interwar period 
were experienced globally as a period of transition, uncertainty, and experimentation. 
This was true in Europe, the primary instigator and the main theater of the total war, 
but also in West Asia, which the main protagonists had turned into a major center of 
conflict and contention.    
The struggle over the construction of the bazaar of Abadan caused major 
frictions55 between the Oil Company, the upstart provincial bureaucracy, and the local 
residents, which included oil workers and their dependents living in the 
neighborhood. It is ironic that a small patch of land and ongoing disputation over its 
control, ownership, and land use, became a major “ frontier of awkward engagement” 
between the key actors in the oil complex and played an important part in shaping the 
new oil habitus.  
As we shall see, the frictions caused by this protracted struggle over 
controlling and shaping physical space forced all the main actors involved to redefine 
their strategies, to re-conceptualize their practices, and to re-organize their actions and 
dispositions in relation to each other and to the built environment and the social space 
they inhabited: Local bureaucrats and administrators of the fledgling new centralizing 
state began to define their institutional responsibilities as the protectors of national 
citizens and providers of general welfare in the form of municipal services and public 
health. In the aftermath of the war the Oil Company officials were in the midst of a 
                                                           
55 The concept of ‘friction’ is borrowed from Anna Tsing, whose ethnography of extractive capitalism 
in Indonesian rainforest highlands sheds light on the mechanisms through which globalized capitalism 
is shaped not in a single privileged location, but through the awkward engagement between a diverse 
cast of characters ranging from speculative investors, adventurer and crony capitalists, 
environmentalists, eco-tourists, and indigenous activists. As in Tsing’s case studies, the friction over 
Abadan’s bazaar in the 1920’s demonstrates that the Oil Company was not merely introducing a set of 
actions intended to flatten out local differences and shape Abadan according to some existing 
universals of global urban modernity. Rather, the demand for this bazaar project emerged out of the 
frictions between various actors involved, and the eventual outcome was the result of these awkward 
engagements. See Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 4, 21, 33. 
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major strategic rethinking of their long-term goals in Iran, and of understanding and 
managing their internal re-organization and external transition into a global giant 
corporation (chapter 2). Like the local state bureaucrats, the Oil Company experts and 
strategists had to scramble to fill the political and social vacuum left from the 
elimination of Sheikh Kahz’al and the old social order. Last, the local residents were 
forging new networks and links of solidarity and resistance that were based not only 
on the so-called “primordial loyalties” of language, kinship ties, and ethnicity56; but 
on the novel, effectively coerced, and shared experiences of urban living, 
participation in a wage labor market, dependence on an increasingly monetized 
economy. These new place-based ties were being forged amidst new and unfamiliar 
forms of destitution that resulted not only from natural calamities, familiar material 
scarcities, or local conflicts, but by the newly imposed regimes of property and legal 
exclusion57.  
Khaz’al had ruled over a relatively homogeneous tribal-agrarian region. But 
by the middle of 1920s when he was removed from power, Abadan had become a 
sprawling industrial boomtown of global importance. The refinery, shipping docks, 
and storage facilities soon came to be surrounded by European enclaves on the one 
hand, and on the other by slums and shantytowns housing migrant workers, a town 
center called Shahr (the City), and some remaining indigenous villages. Its 
governance required new skills and resources that were altogether different from 
anything that either upstart provincial Iranian bureaucrats or the Oil Company 
managers had previously experienced or possessed. Under the circumstances, the 
political and social vacuum left by the removal of Sheikh Khaz’al and the end of his 
British-dependent patrimonial rule had to be filled by the embryonic Iranian 
bureaucracy and/or the Oil Company itself.  
There were major challenges facing the oilmen and bureaucrats. These ranged 
from the growing urban militantism among the new city dwellers, mounting class 
tensions in the workplace amongst skilled Indian workers who were angry at the 
                                                           
56 Essentializing notions, always open to internal challenge and re-interpretation, yet held dear by 
orientalists and modernization theorists. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Boston: 
Basic Books, 1977). For a pivotal critique of the notion of primordial identities see Edward W. Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).  
57 For an incisive social and cultural differentiation of poverty caused by material scarcity versus the 
very modern forms of destitution imposed by the social and cultural norms of the market see Ashis 
Nandy, “The Beautiful, Expanding Future of Poverty: Popular Economics as a Psychological 
Defence,” Economic and Political Weekly, January 3, 2004, 94–99. 
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repression of nationalist sentiments in India and against their own working and living 
conditions in Abadan, as well as among the unskilled Iranian workers demanding 
better treatment and decent work. There was the simmering discontent of indigenous 
populations that kept breaking out in bad tempered small skirmishes and 
confrontations, or on occasion into full-scale tribal revolts, as in 1925 and 1929 (see 
chapters 3, 6, 7). The anxiety of rising Soviet influence among oil workers, as well as 
the perceived threat of American competition for the oil business preoccupied 
Company managers and directors, and affected their policies; as did the ever present 
fear of deadly epidemics decimating the city, Europeans and ‘natives’ alike, scaring 
away valuable recruits, and harming production. There were cross border threats from 
Mesopotamia and an Arabian Peninsula that were in throes of nationalist upheaval 
under British occupation58, while regional centrifugal forces on the Iranian side of the 
highly porous borders were equally challenging59.   
For APOC as well as the Iranian bureaucracy developing new techniques of 
managing these challenges were partly shaped by trial and error, through dealing 
relentlessly with protracted and controversial events like the newly proposed bazaar; 
or by reaching out to global innovations in professional techniques of social and 
spatial governance and industrial management. But these new mechanisms of 
governing the oil complex (what Foucault calls governmentality, or the art of 
governing populations, territories, and mentalities60) were not forged in isolation. 
                                                           
58 On post-WW1 Iraq and British occupation there see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 30–73. The vital importance of oil in Mesopotami 
and British calculations in their subsequent military forays and occupation there see Helmut Mejcher, 
Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976). For a closer look at the range of 
political activism in Iraq, especially communists, see Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movement in Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).  although the great 
value of Batatu's analysis is his analysis of post WWII Iraq. The British imperial experience is well 
discussed from the first hand perspective of Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties; Mesopotamia (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1931). And critically evaluated by Marion Kent, Oil and Empire; British 
Policy and Mesopotamian Oil (London: McMillan, 1976). On Arnold Wilson’s stint as de facto 
governor of British occupied Iraq, prior to his becoming the managing APOC director in 
Mohammareh/Khorramshahr, see John Marlowe, Late Victorian: The Life of Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson 
(London: Cresset, 1967).  
59 See the fascinating memoirs of the British diplomat in Dezful C. J. Edmonds, East and West of 
Zagros Travel, War and Politics in Persia and Iraq 1913-1921 
 (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
60 Foucault defines governmentality as follows:  
“1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target 
population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
[the] apparatuses of security. 
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-
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They emerged during WWI and its aftermath in multiple but interconnected places, in 
Abadan as well as in London, Tehran, and other global nodes. They were the result of 
new parameters in social and political life that were tied to regulating the social 
domain.   
 
Abadan and the World: Conceptualizing a Relational Scalar Politics  
The story of the Abadan bazaar opens a window into the interplay of the local-
national-global forces that produced a new configuration of the oil complex in this 
formative period. Each of these geographic scales is conceptualized as networks of 
relations, connections, and transfers of goods, ideas, policies, and people across space 
and scales61. Consequently, in order to provide a thick description of the multiple 
layers of the local story of the bazaar, I will begin by exploring a number of 
interconnected and formative processes that were taking place at the larger global and 
national scales, before proceeding back to explore in more detail what transpired at a 
micro scale in Abadan during the pivotal decade of 1920s. This shifting back and 
forth between different geographic scales allows us to unpack the relational processes 
                                                           
eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc) of this type of power which may be termed 
government, resulting, on the one hand, in formation of a whole series of specific governmental 
apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs. 
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle 
Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the 15Th and 16th centuries, gradually becomes 
governmentalized.” Foucault et al., The Foucault Effect  : Studies in Governmentality  : With Two 
Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, 102–103. 
Foucault argues that the art of modern government under the contemporary welfare state has 
made a distinct shift from previous notions of statecraft that he calls pastoral power (government as a 
shepherd tending its individualized flock) and sovereignty (princely power imposing its hegemonic 
will over territory), to a notion of governance which combines disciplinary power (notions of 
productivity and self-improvement anchored within the individual body) with an even more absolute 
claim of sovereignty over territory and the individual, but not in the name of a prince, rather in the 
name of the universal welfare of all members of society. Foucault presents this shift as a defuse 
process, a “technology of power” embodied in individuals as well as in institutions, shaping ‘the soul’, 
and regulating the individual from inside. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish  : The Birth of the 
Prison; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population  : Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
As I will argue later, the modern professional middle class and the institutions it helped create, 
and by which it is reproduced, ought to be assigned a defining role in shaping this hegemony. I do not 
think assigning significant agency to particular social groups is contradictory to Foucault’s argument, 
even though Foucault saw modern power as a widespread, discursive exercise, rather than the exercise 
of particular groups seeking domination over others. I concur with Tania Li’s view that various forms 
of power – sovereignty, disciplinary, governmentality – are not historically superseded, but act 
simultaneously in shaping modern political economies, especially in the domain of ‘development’. See 
Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 1–30.  
61 Christian DeVito, “New Perspectives on Global Labour History, Introduction,” Workers of the Wold 
1, no. 3 (2013): 17. 
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that informed each geographic scale of the story historically, and the manner in which 
these scales overlapped and mutually shaped each other.  
Some critical geographers use the term “scalar politics”62 to capture this 
relational and formative power play between different geographic scales of analysis.  
Scale is an important analytical category in geography that has been highly contested 
in recent times as the discipline has become more engaged with the insights of critical 
social theory. Whereas conventional geography tends to view scale as naturally given, 
self-evident, and unambiguously bounded (the nation, the city, the countryside), 
critical Marxist geographers in the 1980’s and 1990’s began to challenge fixed 
notions of scale as pre-existing and external to social processes63. Instead, they argued 
that spatial scales - such as the local, the urban, the national, the regional, the global – 
are interconnected and actively produced by historical political-economic processes64.  
However, this still left open the question of determinacy and agency: Are 
there privileged scales that determine the eventual outcome of these interconnected 
layers? Post-structuralist critiques have raised objections that the Marxian approach to 
scale tends to privilege macro processes, such as global capitalism, as ultimately 
determining the micro scales, such as the local, the household, or the individual body. 
There was also the added question of how the boundaries of each scale are defined, 
and understanding how these boundaries are produced and partitioned65. 
Most notably, Doreen Massey objected against conceptualizing places as 
rigidly bounded and defined (what she calls the Heideggerian sense of place, see 
pp.64-65). Citing the example of Kilbourn, Massey pointed out that this London 
neighborhood was populated by migrants, artists, refugees, workers, etc. and did not 
really have a rigid boundary, as its varied population were linked and integrated to the 
world beyond through complex and quite uneven economic, emotional, legal, and 
social ties. Just as residents of Kilbourn have multiple identities, the same can be said 
                                                           
62 See Danny MacKinnon, “Reconstructing Scale: Towards a New Scalar Politics,” Progress in Human 
Geography 35, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 21–36..  
63 Eric Swingedouw, “Neither Global nor Local: ‘Glocalization’ and the Politics of Scale,” in Spaces of 
Globalization, ed. Kevin Cox (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), 137–66.  
64 See Neil Smith, “Scale,” Dictionary of Human Geography (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); David 
Harvey, “From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of Postmodernity,” in 
Mapping the Futures, ed. Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, and et.al. (London: Routledge, 1993). 
65 See Doreen Massey’s critique of what she considers to be David Harvey’s economic reductionist 
sense of place. Doreen Massey, “Power-Geometry, and a Progressive Sense of Place,” in Mapping the 
Futures, ed. Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, and et.al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 59–70; Doreen B. Massey, 
For Space (London: Sage, 2005) 130-194.  
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for the physical place itself. This multiplicity of connections to larger geographic 
scales demonstrates three important points: First, that defining a place like Kilbourn 
(or Abadan) does not require drawing of definitive boundaries; second, that the 
multiplicities of connections and identities is a source of constant conflict, but also of 
richness of collective life; and third, that the relational flows that shape a place are 
uneven, and so is the scalar politics that shapes a place. The flow of resources and 
people to a place does not happen in the same way, for everyone involved. To 
paraphrase Massey “some people are in charge and initiate the movements and flows, 
some are more on the receiving end, [others] are effectively imprisoned by it”. 
Refugees, disposed pastoralists, impoverished migrants moved to Abadan, just as 
English accountants and Punjabi skilled machinists. But they did so under very 
different circumstances, and as a result of very uneven distribution of power. 
In applying these insights to our case study, the issue becomes the manner in 
which we conceptualize and frame the processes and agencies that shaped Abadan 
and produced its variegated spaces. Do we frame Abadan as a small locality whose 
built environment was ultimately produced by the global forces of oil capitalism, 
British imperial policies, and Iranian state actions? In other words, as just one more 
example of the same story repeated everywhere?66 Or do we develop what Doreen 
Massey has called a progressive global sense of place, based on conceptualizing scale 
not as a determined by exogenous and abstract meta-processes, but a relational 
understanding of scale where locality itself is pro-active and a key vehicle for social 
mobilization, political intervention, and ultimately shaping larger macro scales, such 
as the nation and the global?67 And, ultimately, the question of scale is also 
determined by how boundaries are defined. In the case of Abadan, do we understand 
the refinery city as a self-contained physical entity? Or as a changing urban space 
embedded within a complex and relational web of cultural and political economic ties 
to the larger region and the world? 
My approach in this dissertation will be the latter. By mid 1920’s Abadan had 
become an important component in the global political economic transition to oil as 
                                                           
66 As stated by one of Marx’ more questionable and seemingly teleological statements “the country that 
is more developed industrially shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”. Marx, 
Capital. 
67 See Philip Cook, “The Contested Terrain of Locality Studies,” in Human Geography; An Essential 
Anthology, ed. John Agnew and et.al. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 487–488. 
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the new primary source of energy replacing coal (and steam power) and the most 
sought after strategic resource. The change to oil from coal was part of a larger 
paradigmatic shift where nearly all spheres of collective life -- from the forms of 
governance, to the contours of relations between nature-state-society, popular culture, 
class and gender relations, and the role of middle class technical experts -- were being 
challenged and revolutionized. In Iran a new nationalist central government was being 
assembled that questioned long established relations with Britain and was intent to 
forge a homogeneous nation state out of the fragmented territory and the 
heterogeneous population. In Abadan itself, the local population, mostly displaced 
migrants from different social and geographic backgrounds, now working for the oil 
industry or scraping a living on its margins, had to forge new forms of urban 
solidarity and militantism to resist their further dispossession, and to stake a claim to 
the city. The urban struggles to resist evictions to clear the path for the proposed 
bazaar of Abadan, and the expansion of exclusive Oil Company enclaves at the 
expense of the local population, affected the governmental practices of the new 
bureaucracy and the social, labor, and urban policies of APOC itself. Thus, what 
appears in the first glance as local and a micro scale, is shaped by global events and 
currents, but also affects these and contributes to their modification. 
This multi scalar historical and geographic approach allows us to avoid the 
pitfall of conceptualizing the development of the oil complex as determined by the 
agency of all powerful macro agents such as APOC or the Iranian state. The bazaar 
affair and other similar struggles over the built environment in Abadan and other 
enclaves of the oil industry were the product of larger global forces at work but, in a 
real sense, they also contributed to shaping the global. 
 
A Land Without People, and a People Without History? Making the Local 
Visible Again  
  
 The privileging of macro scales and meta-narratives of modernization and the 
nation state in the historiography of oil have tended to silence the lived experiences of 
subalterns, local populations, and the working people in the oil complex, or  has 
reduced them to mere footnotes of ‘the real history’ of modernization, diffusion, 
nation state, and industrial development. This discursive maneuver has been a 
common feature of the modernization narrative in its many guises, with rendering the 
landscape and the people living on it as irrelevant.  
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Eric Wolf showed that the recurring theme of “land without people, and a 
people without history” had been essential to the maintenance and justification of 
western colonial domination from the end of 15th century, as well as of settler 
colonization of the so called frontiers in the Americas, Asia, and Africa68. In Iran, this 
recurring theme of an exotic and empty land lying wasteful and unused by 
unproductive natives was a regular feature of the vast and informative literature 
produced by successive European (mostly British) adventurers, explorers, 
missionaries, spies, soldiers, scholars, diplomats, entrepreneurs, and philanthropists 
from 19th century onward (chapters 3, 6)69. It was also a theme readily adopted by 
Iranian nationalists, and later on by policymakers and development planners, to pave 
the way for the modernization of the country and especially of Khuzestan, by 
imposing a succession of vast development projects, including railroads, dams, 
agribusinesses, petrochemical complexes, sugar cane plantations, and so on, with 
enormous social and environmental consequences70.  
                                                           
68 Eric Wolf, Europe and People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). For 
the recurring theme in various reincarnations in frontier settler colonialism, such as Israel or the French 
in Morocco and Algeria, or the American West see Norman Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the 
Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: Verso, 2003), 21–50; Maxime Rodinson, Israel, a Colonial-
Settler State? (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2001); Will Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian 
Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Pierre Bourdieu 
and Abdelmalek Sayyad, Le Déracinement: La Crise de l’Agriculture Traditionnelle en Algérie (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1964); Worster, Rivers of Empire; Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis; ibid. On the 
fortified geography created as a consequence of this coercive colonial framing see Eyal Weizman, 
Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007). The adoption of the theme 
of empty land by Iranian nationalism is discussed by Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions.  
69 Prominent and selective examples of this orientalist literature covering Khuzestan include George 
Nathaniel Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London: Elibron, 2005 [1892]), Vol.2, 268–396; 
Ella Sykes, Through Persia on a Side Saddle (Piscataway, New Jersey: Georgias Press, 2008 [1903]); 
Percy Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia: Or, Eight Years in Iran (London: John Murray, 1902), 
239–260; Baron Clement Augustus Gregory Peter Louis de Bode, Travels in Luristan and Arabistan, 2 
vols. (London: J.Madden & Co., 1845); Austen Henry Layard, Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, 
and Babylonia, Including a Residence among the Bakhtiyari and Other Wild Tribes Before the 
Discovery of Nineveh, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1887); Vita Sackville-West, Twelve Days in Persia: 
Across the Mountains with the Bakhtiyari Tribe (London: Tauris Parke, 2009 [1928]); Merian C 
Cooper, Grass (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1925); Arnold Talbot Wilson, Persian Gulf 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1954); Arnold T Wilson, SW Persia; A Political Officer’s Diary 1907-1914 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1941); Edmonds, East and West of Zagros; Travel, War and 
Politics in Persia and Iraq 1913-1921. 
70 See Kaveh Ehsani, “Bohran-e Ab, Bohran-e Abadan [Water crisis/Abadan in Crisis],” no. 27 (2000): 
162–72; Kaveh Ehsani, “Tabar Shenasi-e Tarh-haye Bozorg-e Tose’eh dar Iran-e Mo’aser (Genealogy 
of large scale development projects in contemporary Iran),” Goftogu, no. 54 (2009): 113–32; Kaveh 
Ehsani, “Tajaddod va Mohandesi-ye Ejtema’ei; Negahi beh Tajrobeh Abadan va Masjed Soleyman,” 
Goftogu, no. 25 (1998): 9–45; Kaveh Ehsani, “Rural Society and Agricultural Development in Post-
Revolution Iran: The First Two Decades.,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 1 (2006); 
Ehsani, “Sweet Dreams; Sugarcane and the Politics of Development in Pre and Post- Revolution Iran”; 
Kaveh Ehsani, “Review essay: ‘Omran-e Khouzestan’; edited by Gholamreza Afkhami.,” Iran Nameh 
13 (1999): 403–10; Goodell, The Elementary Structures of Political Life. 
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The theme of ‘land without people’ resonated in Khuzestan with its ample 
river water resources, fertile soil, rich petroleum deposits, agrarian and mobile 
pastoralist populations, and proximity to open sea routes, especially when these 
economic potentials were juxtaposed to the supposed paucity of the history of its 
current ‘inferior’ inhabitants. These were themes that were constantly stressed in the 
European scholarly and travelling literatures of the 19th and early 20 centuries, even 
as the authors steeped in the romanticism of the Victorian era, and reinforced with the 
positive knowledge of the new scientific field of archeology, waxed lyrical about the 
ancient imperial legacy of the region and its surviving monuments: “The Bakhtiyaris 
are entirely ignorant of their own history, they are devoid of legends and traditions of 
any kind, lacking the romance and folklore of other mountain people” wrote Elizabeth 
McBean Ross, a “lady doctor” who spent a year among the Bakhtiyari in Dehkord, 
which she called “a dreary little townlet in the midst of a desolate district”, before 
succumbing to typhoid while serving in a hospital in Serbia during WWI71.  
 However, the story was a bit more complicated than presented in this 
narrative, as Khuzestan’s history had never developed in isolation from the larger 
world, and its current state was the result continued entanglement with it. Likewise, 
the notion of ‘an empty land’ is an ideational construct of the observer, rather than an 
objective reflection of an existing reality (chapters 3, 6)72. Thus, the relevant question 
becomes not so much whether the land was without people, but more pertinently, who 
constructed the image of the empty land, and for what purpose? Here I will first 
provide a brief long-term history of the province’s landscape and population, as one 
of entanglement with the larger world beyond its provincial borders73. I will then 
analyze the role and motivations of the technical professional experts who authored 
this narrative and reproduced it as a discourse, especially as it related to the 
establishment of the oil complex in Khuzestan. 
 
When oil was discovered in 1908 the river island of Abadan was populated by 
date farmers, fisherman, and sheepherders who lived in several villages across the flat 
                                                           
71 Elizabeth Ness MacBean Ross, A Lady Doctor in Bakhtiyari Land (London: L. Parsons, 1921), 22, 
32.  
72 Harvey, “Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science.” 
73 I should emphasize that a geographic history is meant to be different from a political or social 
history. Here I am merely sketching out the longue durée of the material landscape and dynamics of 
demographic change as a result of long-term regional and global connections. 
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and sandy stretch of silt land below the confluence of the major Mesopotamian rivers 
Tigris, Euphratus, Karun, and Bahmanshir. The latter initially had been a large canal 
excavated in pre-Islamic period to open an alternative channel to the Persian Gulf. 
Thus Abadan is an artificial island, similar to the ancient city of Shushtar, whose 
geography was shaped by the great irrigation engineering and water works carried out 
mostly under the Sasanids (224-651 CE) for whom Khuzestan was a major source of 
irrigated food crop production. By the early 20th century the Province’s ecology and 
demography had changed drastically, and was even renamed as Arabestan. Although 
it now lied at the periphery of Iranian political and economic life, nevertheless 
Khuzestan was always considered by whichever central government was in power as 
integral to its national territory, especially given its strategic importance as a border 
region to the Persian Gulf and Ottoman Mesopotamia.  
Sasanians (224- 651 CE) had built great irrigation works across Mesopotamia 
and Khuzestan, primarily for grain production. But these vast networks of canals and 
dykes lacked a proper drainage system that would have been too costly to build, and 
probably were beyond the era’s technical abilities. Soil drainage was not as critical for 
agricultural productivity further upland, around Dezful and Shushtar where the land 
had a higher gradient and better natural drainage. But further south below Ahvaz, 
where the slope decreased and the silty flatlands stretched toward the Persian Gulf, 
poor drainage significantly affected soil quality. Overtime the problem reached a 
critical scale, as a result of large-scale irrigation schemes, especially around the major 
rivers and their tributaries.  
Political upheavals and warfare made labor mobilization and maintenance 
work increasingly difficult. These problems were exacerbated by the failure to 
maintain a proper crop rotation and fallow schedule, and led to further land 
degradation. By the 9th century the lower reaches of the river networks were 
waterlogged and the topsoil had turned too saline for the shallow roots of many grain 
crops, and consequently lost its former productivity74. The Abbasids (750-1258 CE) 
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resorted to indentured labor from the region, supplemented by imported slave labor 
from East Africa, to manually remove surface salt sediments. The cruel forced labor 
led to the great slave revolt of the Zanj (from Zanzibar) that was eventually repressed 
savagely75.  
Despite Baghdad’s eventual bloody victory the long lasting civil war led to the 
destruction of the intricate network of dykes, levies, and canals that depended on 
constant maintenance and manual dredging. As a result, the once prosperous region 
fell into a long agricultural decline, and with it the Abbasid state itself. The Mongol 
invasion in the 13th century sealed the fate of the region’s large-scale irrigation works. 
By the late Safavid period (1501-1736 CE), an area that had once been a center of 
prospering cities and vast agricultural estates often operated on coerced labor, had 
become a distant periphery, only nominally controlled by the capital Isfahan. Dezful, 
Shushtar, Ahvaz, Askar Mokram, and Basra, declined to small towns and villages or 
disappeared altogether as viable urban centers. The broken irrigation network led to 
the permanent flooding of the lowlands and the formation of the great swamps and 
marshes of southern Iran and Iraq, where many of the slaves and refugees from the 
great repressions of the 9th and 10th centuries and subsequent incessant warfare took 
permanent refuge. As a consequence of these historical changes other modes of 
economic subsistence and social organization had taken hold in the province’s 
changed demographic and ecological landscape76. 
By the 16th century when the Safavids encouraged the large scale migration of 
Shi’a tribes from the Arabian Peninsula to settle the plains of Khuzestan as a bulwark 
against their rivals the Sunni Ottomans, the ecology and agrarian patterns of the entire 
region had been altered, along with the historic name of the province that had 
changed to Arabistan. In southwestern Khuzestan, the large-scale irrigated grain 
production estates disappeared, replaced by small-scale rain-fed subsistence 
agriculture along with limited irrigated rice, legumes, and vegetable productions as 
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76 See the remarkable orientalist travelogue of Wilfred Thesiger, Marsh Arabs: Seven Years with the 
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cash crops in the proximity of rivers77. Reeds from the expanding marshlands became 
raw material for housing construction, fuel, and winter fodder for the water buffalos, 
probably an import from India. Seasonal pastoralism and date farming along the 
rivers became more significant in the economy, especially in the lower reaches of 
Karun and Shatt al-Arab, relying on the sea tides of the Persian Gulf to raise the river 
water levels in the shallow and highly silted delta78.   
Thus, although to European observers thinking in terms of commercial 
agriculture production for consumption through the market, the land may have 
appeared as unused, unchanged, uncultivated and empty; the reality was socially and 
historically far more complicated. The region’s landscape and population had 
changed constantly as a result of its entanglement with larger global as well as 
internal currents, but it could not be categorized as “an empty land and a people 
without history”, until required so by the demands of oil capitalism and nation state 
development. Once oil had been discovered and petroleum became a global strategic 
resource that required the assemblage of a vast complex of social, technical, and 
human infrastructure, it became negligent to allow such abundant resources as oil, 
water, pasture, and fertile fallow land to go to ‘waste’ by ignorant and lazy natives. 
As a result, the development of these resources became a matter of historical 
responsibility to the grand and abstract ideas of scientific progress and welfare for 
all79. These are the themes that underlay the development of the oil habitus in 
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Khuzestan, and to which I will return to in chapters 3, 6, and 7. In the next section I 
will briefly discuss the role of the middle class professional experts who were the 
main authors of this narrative, and were instrumental in the consolidation of the oil 
complex.   
 
The Role and Rule of Experts in Establishing the Oil Complex: 
While the initial D’Arcy Concession of 1908 was the product of crafty and 
remarkably amoral negotiations and deals between British and Iranian statesmen and 
speculative investors (chapter 2), the actual work of discovery of oil and setting up 
the oil complex soon became the purview of professional experts. These ranged from 
geologists, engineers, surveyors, physicians, labor managers, accountants, corporate 
directors, security experts, urban planners, public health experts, chemists, and so on. 
As will become clear in the subsequent chapters, the boundaries between soldiers, 
diplomats, colonial officers, and technical experts in the employ of private oil 
business were rather fluid and ever shifting. However, the research in this dissertation 
reveals that they all played a defining role in assembling the oil complex in 
Khuzestan, and contributed significantly to shaping the oil habitus. Thus, rather than 
viewing the social history of oil and of labor in oil as defined primarily by frictions 
between labor, capital, and the state, I accord an equally important role to the 
mediation of middle class professional experts in this story. The role of experts was 
not limited to practical and technical affairs only. They were also instrumental in 
mediating political negotiations, contractual deals, and planning the long-term 
development of the oil complex by introducing ‘the social question’ (chapter 4) into 
the equation. This meant that in the defining interwar period, the question of social 
engineering, or of the active making of a permanent labor force in the oil industry and 
its cooptation through various strategies of coercion, as well as cooptation through 
class compromises and social policies, became a central tenet of APOC and the 
Iranian central government80.  
The following chapters will return to this theme and further expand on the role 
of technical experts. Here I would like to sketch out briefly the role of a few 
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individuals as an outline of the arguments to come. Arnold T. Wilson is a recurring 
character in this dissertation. As a young man from a middle class background (his 
father was a church minister), he went to a modest public school before joining 
colonial military service in India. Soon he was posted to Iran in 1907 as a young and  
inexperienced lieutenant heading of a force of 18 Indian Suwars (mounted cavalry) to 
guard oil explorers in Khuzestan who were under threat by local tribes. His 
intelligence, energy, and competence saw him rapidly elevated to act as British 
Consul in Mohammareh, to map and identify possible railroad routes in Iran as well 
as survey the possible location of the refinery in Abadan, before being appointed as 
acting head of the Boundary Commission charting the Iranian Ottoman border, once 
the actual Commission head was taken ill. During WWI he was posted to Basra as an 
administrative commander for the British military forces fighting the Ottoman army 
and local tribes. He was then rapidly elevated to the Acting Commissioner of British 
forces in Mesopotamia, serving as de-facto Viceroy of the new British protectorate of 
Iraq, an invented nation-state carved out by Britain, through a Mandate by the League 
of Nations, from three Ottoman provinces. Soon after the 1920 Arab Revolt in Iraq, 
for which he was partly blamed, Wilson left the military service and became the 
APOC Director in Mohammareh, in which capacity he was instrumental in the 
negotiations with the new Iranian central government that finalized the status of the 
oil complex in 1926.  
Wilson was a prolific and talented author, and a remarkable individual. He 
wrote memoirs, and produced copious and detailed geographic, social, and political 
analyses of local populations, economies, and physical resources of southern Iran, that 
became the basis of British policymaking, as well as APOC operation81. Although an 
exceptional character, he was not unique but personified the growing trajectory of a 
new social class of technical experts who straddled the older world of Victorian and 
Edwardian colonialism, but now were becoming essential to the operations of modern 
corporate industrial capitalism in the era of Fordism, as well as the developmental 
institutions of the modern nation state.     
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 The framing of Khuzestan as an “empty land and a people without history” in 
the period of oil explorations and the establishment of the oil industry during wartime 
(1908- 1921) was a discursive production of Wilson and other literary and technical 
experts like him, British, Europeans, as well as Iranians. In their writings, analyses, 
and policy proposals, Arnold Wilson and his colleagues emphasized the impending 
decline of the local social order in Khuzestan due to its many shortcomings. What 
they regularly failed to recognize or acknowledge was the historical and political 
context, and the connections between this state of affairs and the imperial policies of 
Britain and Russia, the political fallout from the upheavals of the Constitutional 
Revolution, the devastations of WWI, and the paradoxical impact of 
commercialization of southern Iran that had begun with the penetration of British 
merchant capital, and was about to expand into a whole new dimension with the 
establishment of the oil complex in Khuzestan (chapters 2, 3). They recognized that 
these momentous events were affecting local conditions, but they failed to 
acknowledge they were partially culprit in the current state of affairs.   
Wilson was a representative of a generation of post-Victorian British colonial 
agents during a transitional period of paradigmatic global change. He went on to 
become part of the core of the technical experts that established the next, decisive 
phase of the oil complex in Khuzestan (see chapters 4 and 6). After its chaotic and 
haphazard beginnings, the consolidation of the oil complex began to demand an ever-
greater degree of planning and coordination, technical as well political and social. The 
task of this coordination fell to professional experts: men (for they were all men) with 
certain credentials (formal education, maybe a university degree, military service, 
corporate experience, etc.) who began the task of planning for the successful 
operation of the oil complex amidst daunting difficulties.  
The modern “rule of experts” relies on isolating and categorizing selected 
aspects of the world into systems of specialized knowledge, which are then correlated 
into technical practices that first define certain issues as problems that can be 
classified, measured, and understood as obstacles and anomalies, before being 
overcome and resolved through the formulation of scientific and technical solutions. 
Once these solutions are professionally implemented some form of productive 
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‘normality’ is expected to be attained, otherwise the cycle may resume82. Systems of 
implementing scientific and technical expertise, such as urban planning, public health, 
industrial management, or economic development, in turn become the basis of praxis 
to shape the world according to the criteria they have pre-established as scientific and 
objective.  
Other equally significant figures of (more or less) Wilson’s generation who 
played a key role in establishing the oil complex in Khuzestan, and who will figure in 
the following chapter include Percy Cox (chief British diplomat and negotiator in the 
Persian Gulf, later Minister (Ambassador) to Tehran, C.J. Edmonds (who was acting 
consul and de-facto governor in northern Khuzestan in various periods between 1913-
1921); Sir John Cadman (APOC chairman in the 1920s), and J.M. Wilson (the main 
architect and urban planner of the company areas of APOC, from late 1920s until the 
nationalization of 1951), and Sir Percy Lorraine (chief negotiator with Bakhtiyaris 
while a council in Isfahan, and later Minister (Ambassador) to Tehran), among 
others83.  
These individuals followed a more or less similar personal trajectory: Most 
came form middling classes and were products of public schools, had stints serving in 
some official capacity in the colonies (especially India) or had established their 
carriers there. They seemed to circulate nearly seamlessly between government, 
military service, diplomatic responsibilities, colonial administration, and corporate 
professional occupations, across the Empire. This movement made the conventionally 
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accepted boundaries of private/public domain rather murky. A surprising number 
were dilettante scholars who dabbled in history, poetry, linguistics, and archeology, 
published travelogues and memoirs, wrote political commentaries, and made public 
speeches aimed at shaping public opinion, or establishing scientific credentials and 
contributing to scholarly knowledge84. Most combined some form of technical 
expertise with administrative management and political authority. Their trajectories 
often crossed as they ran into each other in professional capacities, somewhere in the 
expanse of the post-Victorian British Empire. Their convictions were often 
unshakable when it came to the prevailing conception of the world seen through the 
prism of national interests and the Empire, and their own place in it. They held fast to 
how they framed the world according to the universal criteria of modern science 
prevailing at the time, and what they regarded as objective knowledge irrespective of 
where they were geographically, the indisputable rightness of the market economy, 
the civilizing mission of the European, and more specifically the English white man85.  
These individuals did not stand out only because of their shared worldviews, 
social backgrounds, upbringings, and intellectual formations. It was also the 
geographic trajectories that made them move across the world, within the Empire’s 
dominions, and amidst hardships that local people, whom they invariably thought of 
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as ‘backward natives’, had long ago found ways to negotiate or to avoid altogether86. 
Most acted effectively as secular missionaries for the cause of European civilization, 
political influence, and economic enterprise, which they equated unquestionably with 
welfare for all. In the process they perceived their own role as one of selfless service 
to scientific progress (chapters 3, 5, 6), disregarding the coercive colonialism that 
underlay the whole edifice87.  
The shift to what I have called the social question, or the range of social 
reforms and interventionist projects that used non-market criteria to ensure the 
relative inclusion of selective segments of the local population within the sphere of 
technological and material modernity, was the strategy in part conceptualized by these 
men and others like them. These programs of social paternalism included urban 
planning, sanitary and public welfare measures, education, leisure programs and 
facilities, food provision, etc. that together constituted the extensive social 
engineering that began in Khuzestan from the 1920s, and were intended to facilitate 
the operation of the oil complex and allow for the smoother accumulation of capital in 
oil. Although these paternalistic programs were framed as strategies to deal with the 
political and social obstacles hindering the Company’s operations, they implied great 
changes in the lives of the people they affected. Some were welcomed; others felt 
coerced and alienating, and were resisted and fought.  
As for the professional experts, the pragmatic and utilitarian nature of their 
formation within the new technical and political habitus meant that upon encountering 
resistance to implementing their tasks, they sought practical and technical solutions 
involving the population and the material landscape for overcoming obstacles and 
planning for long term success of their enterprise, instead of resorting to coercion or 
limited alliances with local elites, as in the old days. In the post WWI era, the 
emergence of the social question was a turning point that gave more power to these 
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professional men as versus corporate shareholders, financiers, and politicians. These 
changes were most clearly reflected not only in the form of the parliamentary 
compromise that emerged in Britain after the 1926 general strike (see chapter 4), but 
also abroad, and in the reformulation of the whole paradigm of development. With the 
1929 Colonial Development Act the notion of development, and the role of 
indigenous professional experts from the global south was recast, consolidating the 
belief that regulating and planning for coordinated and rational development to 
smooth the path for a more frictionless accumulation of capital was the professional 
task of technically trained experts88. The posing of the social question opened the way 
for a different strategic approach to the development of the oil complex in the 
interwar years that allowed greater compromise with local society in the form of 
expanding social policies that were eventually materialized in the built environment 
of Abadan.  
 
Tribes, Ashayer, Ilat, Qabael: A Question of Terminology 
There are a number of questionable and problematic terms I have had to use 
extensively in this work that are loaded with troubling symbolism, but I have found 
hard to avoid. Foremost among these is Tribe, a problematic label that is accompanied 
by a heavy baggage from its extensive use in the English language in the colonial 
discourse and exercise of power, and its subsequent adaptation until the 1970s in 
various versions of post-colonial modernization theories and academic scholarship, 
especially anthropology. The colonial baggage comes from the period when the 
designation “tribe” was used as an instrument of British colonial governmental policy 
to categorize diverse and shifting populations as a-historical units, formed around 
fixed notions of hierarchic and segmentary chiefdom systems, putative kinship, and of 
economic systems based exclusively on subsistence and reciprocity.  
In the colonial exercise of power these fixed notions of “primordial” identity 
were then used to fit “tribal” groups into specific places within state strategies. The 
Sikhs in India, for example, were designated as a martial race; the Lurs in Iran were 
repeatedly portrayed as bandits and brigands, and so on by British authors and 
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diplomats. Mahmood Mamdani, for example, has provided a brilliant analysis of the 
operations of the administrative and discursive designations of certain groups as 
traditional tribes with fixed racial characteristics in Uganda and South Africa, and 
their subsequent incorporation and inclusion in the system of indirect rule under 
British colonial domination, but only according to those criteria89.  
More recently, Marshal Sahlins reiterated the essentializing and a-historical 
framing by presenting “tribesmen” as a third intermediate category of cultural 
development between the primitive and the civilized, “The state differentiates 
civilization from the tribal society…Tribal society is intermediate in complexity 
between mobile hunters and gatherers and early agrarian states…[Structurally, a tribe 
is a] segmentary hierarchy; i.e. a pyramid of social groups…[organized economically 
around] a familial mode of production”90. For evolutionary anthropologists such as 
Shalins, as well as for earlier colonial policymakers and scholars, tribes are defined as 
primordial groups who have failed to establish a proper state system, primarily 
because they live in geographic settings which force upon them a flexible ecological 
adaptation to nature and subsistence91.  
 Despite this troubling baggage that risks the association of ‘tribe’ with ‘the 
noble savage’ and a mere extension of nature, I have chosen to use the term 
throughout this text, but with the heavy qualifications discussed above. I have done 
this primarily for convenience, and because I don’t believe a keyword should be held 
hostage to a questionable part of its past. Persian (and other vernacular languages 
spoken in Iran) is quite rich in the lexicon referring to mobile pastoralists and other 
social groups organized around kinship, non-state chiefdoms, and economic systems 
based on reciprocity and mixtures of agriculture and animal husbandry. This rich 
vocabulary is understandable since at least until the 1930s an estimated quarter of the 
population belonged to various tribal and mobile pastoral groups. In Persian, the 
equivalent terms to “tribes” are “Ashayer” (plural of ashireh), an Arabic term 
referring to horizontal as well as hierarchic constellations of kinship-based groups; 
“Ilat” (Turkic word, il in singular, ilat in Arabicized plural), and “Qabael” (Arabic, 
singular qabileh).  
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These terms do not carry the potential ideological baggage burdening the term 
“tribe”; they are all still used by state agents as well as the ilati, qabileh-yi, and 
ashayeri populations, without being overly weighed by essentialist preconceptions or 
a negative hint of primitivism. However, they cannot be used interchangeably and 
without considerable awkwardness in English. Ashayer, for example, is used 
primarily to refer to Khuzestan Arabs. The various Lur groups, such as Bakhtiyaris, 
Kuhkiluyeh, Bahmai, etc.; as well as Turkic speaking groups such as the Shahsavan 
and Qashqai are referred to as Ilat. The same goes for a mixed confederacy such as 
the Kahamseh, who were made of an alliance of five groups of different ethnicity, 
including Arabs, Turkics, and Lurs.  
There is no single mode of production and economic activity that uniformly 
defines all these groups; as they can variably rely on mobile livestock herding, village 
based agriculture, or multisource exploitation of land and ecological resources.  In 
more recent times urban employment, including wage labor in the oil industry, has 
become a feature of these flexible social groupings. Most significantly, Ilat referred to 
confederacies of various clans, segments, and subgroups; not necessary claiming 
common parentage and blood ties, but forging contextual alliances that were 
consolidated by marriage and mutual political commitments, including in warfare and 
defense against external rivals, shared territories, and loyalty to common leadership.  
Although I use these terms on occasion, I have chosen to stick with the 
shorthand convenience of ‘tribe’. Using the local terms, or indeed a combination of 
them as necessary, avoids the baggage that accompanies the keyword ‘tribe’; but on 
the other hand, it would only convolute the narrative and divert from the main theme, 
which is the formation of the oil complex. In chapter 3 I have clarified some the key 
issues regarding landownership and contractual relations of property among the 
Bakhtiyaris and Khuzestan Arabs’ collective claims to territory. For the rest, I have 
used the term “tribe” conditionally, throughout this text, with the caveats discussed 
here. 
 
Plan of Chapters: 
At first impression chapters 2 and 4 may appear incongruous to a work of 
social history of labor and oil industry in Khuzestan. However, their purpose should 
become self-evident after the theoretical explanations provided in the preceding 
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pages. They are intended to provide the global, historical, and national-political 
context for the local social history that is being discussed here.  
At a global level, the period under study was an era of revolutionary 
transformations when oil was becoming the new predominant source of energy and 
the underlying chemical raw material for an emerging global industrial system of 
mass production and consumption that has been labeled Fordism. As I will argue in 
chapter 4, the First World War greatly precipitated this transition, which was 
accompanied by fundamental political, economic, intuitional, and ideational 
transformations.  
Chapter 2 investigates the regional and national reconfiguration of the Persian 
Gulf and Iran for a global imperial politics that was led by Britain. It discusses the 
different perspectives of political actors in Iran, London, British India, and locally in 
Khuzestan, over the long 19th century (through WWI and until 1926). It discusses the 
changing geopolitics of the region, the consequences of political upheavals, including 
the Constitutional Revolution, WWI, the 1921 Coup D’état, and the rise of mass 
politics and nationalism. The establishment of the oil industry in Khuzetan and its 
impact on local politics and alliances is analyzed within this framework. The chapter 
shows that in the aftermath of WWI the British state may have appeared as a unitary 
and powerful political actor, but was in fact riven with tensions, rivalries, and 
practical limitations as it confronted the possibilities and dangers of Iranian political 
landscape and the oil complex there. Without a clear understanding of this larger 
global and regional geopolitical landscape, I will argue that the social history of oil 
remains curtailed and cannot be properly understood within the context of a Global 
Labor History   
 Chapter 3 investigates the local agrarian societies and pastoral landscapes as 
they were integrated into the global circuits of oil capitalism. The chapter focuses on 
the politics of property and legal contract as an entry point into understating how local 
societies were subjugated to oil capitalism. The chapter also links the rural 
populations, the geographic hinterland, and the physical landscape to the oil complex. 
The social history of oil and labor is thus not curtailed to the places of industrial 
production and mining extraction, but also involves the rural world that may appear at 
first glance as external and irrelevant, but was integral to the consolidation of the oil 
complex. 
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   Similarly, chapter 4 may first appear as an odd addition to this work. For 
readers who are more familiar with European and Western History this chapter may 
initially come across as redundant and perhaps even irrelevant to the central story. On 
the other hand, approaching this investigation from the perspective of a Global Labor 
History, my aim was to historicize economic, industrial, governmental, and social 
managerial practices in order to demonstrate how these were not ready made criteria 
and practices that were simply diffused and transplanted from Britain and Europe to 
Iran. WWI was a horrifying and revolutionary watershed, for Britain as for Iran. Most 
of the practices of social engineering, public policymaking, and industrial 
management, that became the hallmark of the oil industry in the post war period were 
being forged during wartime and out of experiences not only in Europe, but also in 
the colonies, as well as in non-colonial dominions such as Iran. Chapter 4 historicizes 
these shifts in governmentality, and provides a context for the emergence of what I 
call ‘the social question’. The chapter zooms out of the local context of Khuzestan 
into the global landscape of the changing regime of accumulation of capital that was 
ushered in by Fordism, and the political transformations ushered in by the rise of 
mass politics, changing industrial labor relations, corporate re-organization, the rising 
power of professional managerial professionals, and the new prominence of social 
welfare measures that shaped the subsequent approach by APOC to its oil operations 
in Iran. 
Chapters 5 and 6 integrate these insights into a micro-historical analysis of the 
urban transformation of Abadan in the revolutionary 1920s, when the oil complex 
was consolidated in Iran. Thus, while chapters 2 and 4 provide a wider global, 
regional, and national context, chapters 3, 5, and 6 provide detailed micro histories of 
the social encounters in interconnected rural and urban settings where oil operations 
were taking place. Chapters 3, 5, and 6, are ‘the heart’ of the dissertation, as they use 
primary archival materials to unearth a subaltern history of social change as a result of 
the consolidation of the oil complex. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are constructed around the 
micro story of the conflicts surround the construction of the bazaar of Abadan. In the 
spirit of GLH they aim to show how a seemingly minute and inconsequential event, 
fought over reshaping the built environment of an oil boomtown in a remote location, 
encapsulated larger trends on national and world scales.     
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Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the social history of Abadan, the province, 
the oil complex, and the laboring classes in oil through the interwar years, and 







Chapter 2  
The Historical Geopolitics of Oil in Khuzestan 
 
The Post War Landscape of Unanticipated Outcomes (1918-1926) 
 In the wake of WWI, for the first time, Britain appeared as the absolute master 
of the situation in Iran and the Persian Gulf1. All its major imperial rivals in the region 
- the German, Ottoman, and Russian empires - had collapsed, thus eliminating the 
long maintained anxiety about defending the Indian colony from hostile 
encroachments. The Royal Navy dominated the Persian Gulf having subjugated the 
littoral Arab city states as its vassals, and the British Army surrounded the prized oil 
installations of Khuzestan with more than a half a million troops that continued to be 
deployed in the Near and Middle East2.  
 In Iran the Qajar state was in a position of near total dependence on the good 
graces of His Majesty’s Government. The state finances were good as bankrupt and 
its outdated bureaucracy was close to total disarray3. The fragmented, mal-trained, 
and small military forces were being paid not out of an empty treasury but from loans 
obtained with ever more difficulty from the country’s only, British owned, Imperial 
Bank4. Given the increasingly desperate state of the country after the Constitutional 
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Revolution and the war time occupation, there was little tax collection and the Royal 
Court was heavily indebted to Britain and Russia to foot its daily expenses, let alone 
to invest in any meaningful economic development or relief efforts for the 
impoverished population5.  In the south Britain had set up the South Persia Rifles 
(SPR) under Sir Percy Sykes to combat German and Ottoman incursions, and to 
subdue local resistance and brigandage6. In Khuzestan APOC had consolidated its 
operations and was planning major expansions there and internationally, relying for 
protection on British troops in Mesopotamia, as well as its local alliances with the 
virtually autonomous tribal chieftains7.  
At the global level, the British diplomatic machine was being conducted, for 
the first time, by a set of politicians who specialized in the so-called ”Eastern 
question” and the newly coined “Middle East” region8. With Nathaniel Curzon at the 
helm of the Foreign Office (FO) successive coalition governments were content to 
leave strategic decisions to the legendary and cantankerous politician9 who was 
viewed, not least by himself, as the ultimate expert on the “Persian Question”10. In 
setting up his Iran policy Curzon was assisted by a succession of equally prominent 
and highly regarded diplomats acting as Ministers in Tehran, such as Percy Cox 
(1918-1920), and Percy Loraine (1921-1926)11, who were crucial in helping to ward 
off American attempts to gain a foothold there, and preparing the ground for making 
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Iran effectively a British protectorate12. Such an outcome would have accomplished 
the long held dream of securing the western approaches to India13, and as good as 
guaranteed the continued monopoly of British control over the oil resources of Iran 
and the Persian Gulf area.   
 Under these circumstances the post WWI years ought to have been the golden 
years of unchallenged British hegemony in Iran. Ironically, this proved not to be the 
case, and by mid 1920s the whole edifice had been altered beyond recognition. 
Tremendous internal divisions and disagreements within the sprawling British foreign 
policy establishment scuttled the hegemonic appearance of monolithic unity in 
formulating and implementing imperial policies. The eruption of nationalism and 
mass politics in Iran proved difficult to handle for Victorian and Edwardian 
politicians who had spent years dismissing any such political agency among the 
despised “Persians”. The paranoia and fear of Bolshevik subversion significantly 
curtailed the British freedom of unilateral action. By the end of this period the 
moribund Qajar dynasty had collapsed and was replaced by the aggressively 
centralizing Pahlavi dynasty under the military strongman Reza Shah, who proceeded 
to depose the British local tribal protégés Sheikh Khaz’al and the Bakhtiyari Khans, 
and maneuvered for the newly established national army to take control of the 
Khuzestan province. The financial leverage that Britain had used effectively to 
enfeeble the state since late 19th century was also removed as APOC was forced to 
settle its arrear royalty payments; the crushing national debts to Russia and Britain 
were alleviated when the Soviets forgave the Tsarist debts to Iran; and Iran managed 
the opportunity to settle some of its outstanding British debts. By 1929 the British 
owned Imperial Bank was forced to cede its monopoly over currency issue and 
financial transactions to the newly established Bank Melli (National Bank).   
 APOC found itself in similar conundrum in Khuzestan. There was frustration 
among Company directors at the slow pace of the British Government outlining a 
global oil strategy following the war, and the lack of clarity over the boundaries of its 
political interference in the operations and the finances of the Company14. In Iran, the 
Company’s expanding operations ran into strategic difficulties with its labor force 
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after the end of the War. By the mid-1920s discontent among the indigenous workers, 
as well as its skilled Indian laborers had reached worrying degrees. The technical, 
organizational, and commercial transformations of the industry now required a 
different form of labor discipline and industrial culture that its existing practices 
simply did not provide adequately. Employee recruitment of European and especially 
British employees was becoming a major challenge, as were managing the rising 
frictions with local populations in Khuzestan, especially once the tribal allies who had 
hitherto mediated these relations to the benefit of the Company had been removed by 
the central government and replaced by bureaucrats and military officers. The fears of 
spillover from popular revolts in Iraq and India, and the politicization of workers 
through communist and nationalist sympathies were constant concerns. The sudden 
incursion of the Iranian army in 1924, and the establishment of the nascent 
bureaucracy in Khuzestan unexpectedly curtailed the near total sway of the Company 
in the management of local provincial affairs. With the British Government 
reconfiguring its strategy toward Iran, the Oil Company likewise had to find a new 
modus operandi to continue successfully to expand its operations.       
 In summary, less than a decade after the end of WWI, Britain was facing a 
wholly unanticipated new paradigm, not only in Iran and in Khuzestan, but also 
regionally in Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East, as well as in home 
country itself (see chapter 4). It had to adapt itself to the radically new state of affairs 
beyond its controls, and devise new long-term strategies. The unforeseen 
circumstances were the result of three factors: first, the fear of the rising Soviet threat 
and the radicalization of mass politics in Iran; second, the unanticipated vigor of 
popular resistance and of Iranian nationalism (overlapping with similar uprisings 
throughout much of its dominions), which itself was in large part a reaction against 
British proto-colonial policies; and third, the structural economic and strategic 
weakness of post war Britain, which curtailed the state’s range of abilities during a 
period of severe austerity. All three factors were directly and indirectly tied to the 
global shifts that will be discussed in chapter 4: the rise of mass politics, the changing 
role of the state, the coming to prominence of middle class professional elites and 
intelligentsia, and the structural shifts in capitalism. 
 The controversy that broke out in 1925-1926 over the new Bazaar of Abadan 
laid at the center of these transnational, regional, and national shifts and played its 
part in shaping the new oil habitus that emerged in Khuzestan’s oil complex. Chapter 
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4 investigates the structural and global changes that were precipitated by the WWI, 
and led to the emergence of the ‘social question’, with all that it entailed. In this 
chapter we will telescope into the narrower scales of the national context in Iran, the 
provincial dynamic in Khuzestan, and the local eye of the storm in Abadan to link 
together these different scales and to further investigate how the oil complex was 
assembled in this formative period. I will first discuss the context of British policy 
toward Iran, as it affected the oil operations. I will then analyze this dynamic from the 
Iranian perspective, again as they relate to the oil complex. The reverberations of 
these larger trends in Abadan and the oil producing areas of Khuzestan will be the 
topic of the next section. In concluding with a discussion of the Bazaar controversy I 
will attempt to demonstrate how the local struggles of oil workers and the urban 
population affected the manner in which the oil complex took shape in this formative 
period.   
 
The Political and Regional Context of Oil in 1920s and Shifting British Policy 
Toward Iran: From Buffer State to Sphere of Influence to Protectorate to 
Unwieldy Asset.  
 
   British policy toward Iran underwent significant reassessments throughout the 
19th and through the first three decades of the 20th centuries, with fundamental 
repercussions for southern areas bordering the Persian Gulf15. Since the subsequent 
development of the oil complex cannot be understood without this historical context I 
will briefly outline these developments in the following section to provide the 
geopolitical backdrop of what transpired in Abadan and the oil areas of Khuzestan 
during the decisive 1920s.  
 From the early19th century through the middle of the 20th century the 
importance of the Persian Gulf increased steadily for British imperial priorities, and 
with it came an expanded military, naval, and commercial presence16. Throughout the 
19th century until WWI the Persian Gulf was conceived by Britain within three 
intertwined but unequal geopolitical parameters: Strategically, it was seen as the first 
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line of vital defense of India on its western front17. Second, with the establishment of 
direct telegraph communication between London and India, the maintenance of the 
control and security of the northern (Persian) coast of the Gulf where the 
communication lines traversed became an added strategic priority18. Expanding 
commercial interests and securing supplies and outlets for British merchant goods 
was the third motive behind the increasingly active diplomacy that led to obtaining 
navigation rights in Karun, Tigris, and Euphrates from Ottoman and Persian 
governments, and the signing of the so called Trucial agreements with the city states 
bordering the Persian Gulf. Soon after, a series of ever more comprehensive 
concessions were granted to Europeans, encompassing mining, industries, banking, 
railroads, commerce, customs, etc. Curzon summarized these interests as 
“commercial, political, strategical, and telegraphic”19. The 1901 D’Arcy Oil 
Concession was the last of these controversial agreements, which were one of the 
targets of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Thereafter the granting of such 
concessions became far more controversial, and every government that attempted to 
issue a similar concession ran into major frictions with the Majles and the uproar of 
public opinion that were reflected in the increasingly vocal press. 
After 1912 oil was added to the British geopolitical priorities as a major new 
variable in the calculations of policymaking toward the region, while the deployment 
of wireless communication gradually began to reduce the importance of the telegraph 
by late 1920s20. 
 Russia’s 19th century expansion into Caucasus had led to two wars with Iran, 
both ending with the latter’s defeats (in 1813 and 1828) and resulting in exorbitant 
treaties that had forced open the Iranian society to Russian commerce and political 
interference21. Britain had withdrawn support from Iran during these conflicts, 
calculating that the official treaties, while weakening Iran considerably, would force 
Russia to recognize Iran’s territorial integrity and thus stop its southward territorial 
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expansion toward the Persian Gulf and eventually India. Instead, the situation turned 
Iran into a rapidly enfeebled and defenseless battleground of the more powerful 
imperial rivals. As Britain pushed for equal concessions in the south, Iranian 
economic development was further stunted to serve the priorities of its more powerful 
neighbors, British India to the southeast, Russia to the north, and Ottomans to the 
west, who all competed to extract as much as possible, while actively blocking any 
autonomous development that would threaten their own strategic interests. For 
example, these ongoing imperial rivalries prevented successive attempts to build a 
national railroad in Iran on defensive strategic grounds, to the extent that the railroad 
project became a nationalist obsession that was only carried out in the 1930s as one of 
Reza Shah’s grandest scheme22. Likewise, the geographic axis of Iranian trade roots 
for international commerce were shifted south-north, from the Persian Gulf to the 
Caspian and the Black Seas, at the expense of the historical east-west trans-Asian Silk 
Road that was effectively blocked off23. Iran’s last attempt to re-open its eastern flank 
by occupying Herat ended in defeat at the Anglo Persian War of 1857, a conflict that 
established a permanent foothold for Britain throughout southern Iran (see chapter 3).   
 Trapped among stronger neighbors, playing the imperial adversaries against 
each other, or banking on the assistance of more distant and supposedly neutral 
potential allies (France, Germany, the United States) became an integral feature of 
Iranian politics and political culture, at least until 1953. After the 1857 Indian revolt 
and the assumption of direct colonial rule by the British Raj the western approaches 
of the Empire, especially the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iran, came to be treated 
as India’s first line of defense. Iran in particular, was conceptualized in British foreign 
policy not really as an independent country, but more as an ambiguous “ buffer state” 
against the incursions of other rival big powers toward India24. This meant that any 
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internal development in Iran, economic, social, regional, or political, were viewed and 
treated by British policymakers primarily through the lens of their own imperial 
strategic priorities. One fascinating side effect of this situation was the sheer volume 
of information produced by the British intelligence gathering machinery on Iran. 
While domestic Iranian documentation and archives about this period are at best 
scattered and patchy, the amount of detailed and thorough strategic information 
systematically gathered and preserved by British travelers, diplomats, local consular 
officials and military attachés, merchants, scientists, archeologists, and adventurers, is 
simply remarkable by comparison25. Olson comments that Iran was far better studied 
than major colonies such as Australia, South Africa, or Canada, in order to facilitate 
strategic planning, lines of defense, assured supplies, potential allies and adversaries, 
manpower, etc.26 
 
Debt and Political Culture: 
 Between 1871 and 1907 the fallout from Britain’s buffer state policy had 
contributed to the significant economic and political deterioration of Iran. The 
weakness and incompetence of the Qajar state, as well as Russian rapacity, only 
exacerbated the situation. The travelogues of the highly competent engineer and 
geographer Najm al-Dowleh to the south, sent there on a mission by Nasser al Din 
Shah in 1882 and 1889 to repair broken dams, weirs, and bridges on Karun and 
Karkheh, as well as to report on the state of tax collection and farming, provide 
detailed accounts of the state of the disrepair that the general economy and 
infrastructure had fallen into27.  
 This period also witnessed the collapse of Iran’s silver based currency, the 
Qran, as a result of the international depression of 1890s and the shift to gold standard 
as the sole basis of monetary valuation by India and Britain, Iran’s imperial 
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neighbors28. As gold bullion had flown out of Iran and the country failed to adapt to 
the transnational changes that were taking place as a result of monetary actions by the 
Sherman Act of the US Congress (1893), the value of the national currency collapsed. 
A brief improvement in the 1880s saw Iranian merchants invest heavily in 
international commerce by drawing credit abroad. But the subsequent collapse of the 
value of silver left the Iranian merchants heavily in debt and unable to adapt to 
rapidly rising inflation. The Court’s attempt to draw in foreign capital by handing out 
a series of remarkable monopoly concessions first to Julius Reuter (1872) over a vast 
array of economic activities and resources, such as all mining, industrial, customs, 
and so on; and soon after to G. Talbot (1890), another British national, for the 
monopoly of all tobacco production and consumption, were met with furious protests 
by the public, as well as by Russian statesmen and merchants who felt left out29.  
Forced to retreat and compensate Reuter and Talbot when those concessions 
were annulled in response to the uproar, Nasser al Din Shah had to begin resorting to 
foreign loans to cover the mounting state deficit, thus beginning a cycle of chronic 
indebtedness that bedeviled the Iranian economy well into the 1920s. Foreign debt 
began to be used systematically by Iran’s Imperial creditors and neighbors as a policy 
tool to influence and control the actions of the government for the next three decades. 
Previously relatively free of debt, the state was now forced to borrow £500 thousand 
from the Imperial Bank of Persia (British owned) in 1892 to compensate the 
cancellation of the Tobacco Reggie. On the eve of WWI in 1914 national debts had 
risen to £7 million (of which £2.6 million were owed to Britain, the rest mostly to 
Russia); and nearly £11 million in 191930.  
 The consequences of these trends, coupled with a rising spread of democratic 
and reformist ideas from across the region and the world, contributed to a gathering 
cycle of popular discontent that eventually erupted in the Constitutional Revolution, 
that dragged on from 1906 to 1911. However, it is important to step back and situate 
this formative period also within a larger context, as an era of both regional as well as 
global significance. The global context of changes occurring in the regime of capital 
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accumulation as a result of the second industrial revolution, the crisis of laissez faire 
liberalism, the scramble for empires among European powers, and the political fallout 
of the Paris Commune are discussed in some detail in chapter 4. Russia’s defeat 
against Japan and the subsequent Russian Revolution of 1905 made a huge 
impression in Iran, and especially among the thousands of migrant Iranian workers in 
the Caucasus.  In the Middle East, the cycles of popular protests following economic 
crises, famines, epidemics, and a rising tide of mass poverty as a result of imperial 
policies spread across the region, from Egypt (the 1906 Dishaway revolt), to the 
Ottoman Empire (1908 Young Turks), and Iran (1890 Tobacco Movement, and the 
1906-11 Constitutional Revolution), to inaugurate what Joel Beinin sees as “the rise 
of mass politics”31, of nationalism led by professional middle class modernizers and 
other reformers (effendiyah in Ottoman territories, monavar al-fekran in Iran), as well 
as the initial steps of labor movement and peasant resistances32. 
 The great transformations taking place in the global economy were leading to 
ever faster and increasingly irresistible changes in economies, politics, as well as in 
material and cultural life, and the social modes of organization33. In the Middle East 
mass immiseration was causing vast movements of populations. Between 1884 and 
WWI more than 200 thousand people emigrated from Syria and Lebanon to the 
Americas, and up to an estimated 250 thousand Iranians sought work in the southern 
regions of Russia, in the Baku oilfields and the railroads and road works of Central 
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Asia34. The movement of capital and of new ideas accompanied the accelerated 
movement of people. In Iran the British firm of Lynch Brothers managed to extract a 
reluctant permission from Nasser al Din Shah to establish steam navigation on Karun 
and to build a road across Zagros from Ahvaz to Esfahan and Tehran35 (see chapter 3). 
The 1901 D’Arcy Oil Concession was the next and last such major and sweeping 
concession granted by a Qajar Shah to a foreign subject, before popular outrage at the 
increasingly blatant terms of these royal grants foreclosed the possibility of further 
such agreements. 
 The political shockwaves of mass movements inaugurated significant political 
rearrangements although, as we shall see, the Victorian colonial politicians 
formulating Iran policy were far too reluctant to acknowledge the significance of the 
new circumstances until the mid 1920s, with momentous repercussions. The new 
mass politics erupting throughout the Middle East, very much like the concurrent 
trends in Britain (see chapter 4), re-conceptualized ordinary people as citizens rather 
than uncouth rabble (ra’yat). This change had also very much to do with the rise of 
the formally educated middle classes, many of whom came from more humble 
background than the landed aristocracies or tribal elites. The expansion of the printed 
press, of political ideas about constitutionalism, notions of national progress as a 
result of individual enlightenment, and the ideas of universal education as the basis of 
enlightenment and material progress had begun to catch the popular imagination (see 
chapter 4)36. Analyzing the rise of mass nationalism during the turn of the century in 
Egypt Zachary Lockman summarizes the situation as: “the discursive articulation of 
the nations as legitimate political communities led nationalist intellectuals throughout 
the Middle East to revalorize peasants and workers as fully human subjects. The 
masses are thereby endowed with potential for political agency which can be 
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mobilized by the nationalist movements, and their interests and demands can be 
subsumed within the national struggle”37.   
 However, the entry of popular classes into the political arena of the Middle 
East took on different forms, according to national and local circumstances. “Popular 
conceptions of the boundaries of political communities, the collective interests, and 
the capacity to realize them, were formed and reformed through experience in specific 
political and economic contexts”38. In Iran, Avery and Simmonds claim that the social 
response to the near total financial dependence and economic malaise that occurred 
after 1893 marked this period as the beginning of “the era of bread riots”39, an apt 
observation especially in the case of the nascent labor movement.  
From the turn of the twentieth century, labor struggles in Iran were organized 
mostly among urban craftsmen, fisherman, menial wage workers, cobblers, bakers, 
etc. who increasingly protested the betrayals of ‘the moral economy’, such as food 
hoarding, the adulteration of bread, or corruption of governors and employers who 
sought to make a profit by misusing state provided provisions in times of famine and 
distress40. Urban crowds were also becoming more concerned with similar issues. For 
example, the first eruptions of constitutionalism in 1906 occurred when a corrupt 
governor wrongly accused a pious merchant in Kashan of hoarding sugar and had him 
bastinadoed in public41. Mass protests ensued and spread to other towns and cities 
because people held corrupt government officials responsible for inflation and food 
shortages. As we shall see, the increasingly virulent popular protests against threats to 
the moral economy by the rise of oil capitalism in Khuzestan were to play an 
important role in the frictions and conflicts that characterized the development of 
Abadan and the oil industry in the period under study.   
 
1907: From Buffer State to Sphere of Influence:  
 The success of the Tobacco Revolt of the 1890s and the assassination of 
Nasser al Din Shah had changed the political map prior to the Constitutional 
revolution. To these were added the fallouts in 1905 from the Russo Japanese War 
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and the Russian Revolution, which shook the hated Tsarist power and made a direct 
impression on the tens of thousands of Iranian oil workers in the Caucasus. However, 
while Iran was in the throes of the Constitutional Revolution, in 1907 Britain radically 
changed tack in its Iran policy from considering it a buffer state against Russia, to 
making an alliance with Russia to divide Iran into mutual spheres of influence, in 
order to turn it into a bastion against the rising power of Germany and its influence in 
Ottoman territories. This shift corresponded roughly with the discovery of oil in 
Khuzestan (1908) and the beginning of the establishment of the oil industry in 
southern Iran. It had significant repercussions for the way British diplomats acted on 
behalf of the Oil Company to strike deals with local magnates such as the Bakhtiyari 
Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al in complete defiance of the central government’s approval 
(see chapter 3). The lasting resentment from these developments later on would give 
impetus to the widespread nationalist support for the brutal centralization programs of 
Reza Shah after 1921. It would also affect the manner in which the oil complex 
evolved after the end of WWI, as we shall see later in this chapter.   
Britain’s buffer state policy had required a unified country under the control of 
a weak and dependent central government. Dividing Iran into spheres of influence 
effectively meant the further loss of that nominal sovereignty by the central 
government, and the division of the country into a southern protectorate of Britain 
(ruled through the Government of India), a Northern Russian sphere of influence, and 
an ineffective “neutral” central region nominally still under the control of Tehran.  
The main reason behind this Accord was the newfound fear of German militarization 
and its aggressive moves toward the region. German banks had struck an agreement 
with Istanbul to build railroads in Turkey and extend a line to Baghdad, with further 
plans to extend it all the way to the Persian Gulf (Kuwait)42. 
 The 1907 Anglo Russian Convention had significant and far-reaching 
repercussions in Tehran, within Britain, and especially in Southern Iran and the 
Persian Gulf. In Tehran it outraged Constitutionalists and nationalists who previously 
had considered the parliamentary and liberal Britain as a potential supporter of their 
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cause43. When Russia and Britain bullied and blackmailed the not-so-reluctant 
Mohammad Ali Shah to sign the Anglo Russian agreement in order to get further 
loans and financial support44 the popular reaction revealed an intense sense of 
betrayal, and it planted within Iranian political culture a deep and lasting mistrust of 
British intents, and an exaggerated view of its duplicity and conspiratorial ability to 
corrupt political figures to manipulate its desired outcomes at the expense of Iranian 
national interests. As a result, most British policies and actions began to be viewed by 
a growing majority of Iranian nationalists as harmful to national interests, and none 
more so than Britain’s operations in its sphere of influence in the south, and 
especially in the expanding oil operations in Khuzestan. Britain’s local allies among 
magnates in the south, such as Sheikh Khaz’al, the Bakhtiyari Khans, or Qavam al 
Mulk, the head of the Khamseh tribal confederation in Fars, began to be perceived as 
puppets and disloyal to national integrity. The same held true for a number of 
prominent national politicians who, probably more out of pragmatism than mercenary 
ethics, reasoned that a weak country in the midst of ruthless neighbors needed to 
adopt a strong patron and chose to side with England as the better available option, 
began to be perceived as little better than paid agents. Figures such as Prince 
Abdolhossein Farmanfarma, his son Prince Firouz, Vosough al-Dowleh the Premier 
in 1919, and eventually Reza Shah himself who, as we shall see, ascended power in 
1921 through the reluctant consent of British military and diplomatic commanders, 
have all been branded as pawns of Britain by much of the conventional nationalist 
political historiography45.  
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 The 1907 Accord also divided British opinion to an unprecedented degree. 
Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary who made the decision to reverse the long held 
policy of adversity with Russia in favor of allying with it against the greater threat of 
Germany, had prioritized global and especially European British interests against the 
more “local” interests in southern and western Asia. These long established priorities 
had been most energetically articulated by George Curzon, then Viceroy of India, 
who staunchly upheld the defense of India as the main concern of British foreign 
policy and absolutely integral to the maintenance of the Empire itself46. In Britain the 
debates surrounding the 1907 Anglo Russian Accord were acrimonious, with the 
Fabians, radical liberals, and academic scholars of Iran such as Edward Brown raging 
against the decision47.  
 There were even more significant repercussions from the 1907 Accord for the 
long held status quo in British geopolitical approach to the region. The newly coined 
label “Middle East”, as distinct from the Near East, was first coined in 1903 as a 
strategic designation of the Persian Gulf region, as the last line of defense of India48. 
In the first decades of the new century Britain moved more energetically to 
consolidate its undisputed authority over navigation, commerce, and diplomacy by 
designating the entire Persian Gulf an extension of the Government of India (see 
above)49.  The British Consulate in Bushehr had served as the official seat of British 
policy in the Persian Gulf, but now it became effectively the center of regional 
governance throughout the region50.  
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An indication of the changing significance of the Persian Gulf was the 
dramatic rise in the number of Foreign Office staff handling policy for the region 
from 40 in mid 19th century to 150 by 1914, with the number of annual dispatches 
they handled increasing from 30 thousand to 110 thousand51.  In this process, the 
British attitudes toward Iranian politics further deteriorated significantly, with an ever 
more derogatory and dismissive tone coloring every assessment of Iranian events; and 
the motives, actions, and behavior of politicians, personalities, and parliamentarians, 
without acknowledging the irony that British policy was a prime cause of the political 
problems plaguing the polity.   
This era also witnessed significant administrative change throughout the chain 
of British regional policymaking. So long as Iran had been treated as a unified buffer 
state the Minister (or ambassador) in Tehran had been directly responsible for policies 
dictated from London. Once the Anglo Russian Treaty divided the country and the 
south became designated as a sphere of British influence, despite Iran’s nominal 
independence and territorial integrity, the Resident for the Persian Gulf, posted at the 
Iranian port of Bushehr, gained a much greater leeway and status in making decisions 
and setting policy throughout the south of the country52. Percy Cox who held that post 
for most of this period (with the interlude in 1918-1920 when he served as Minister in 
Tehran) carried tremendous authority, and was eventually appointed High 
Commissioner for Iraq in 192053.  Since the Chief Resident in Bushehr, as well as the 
numerous consuls in the south, including those assigned to Khuzestan’s cities of 
Mohamereh, Dezful, Shushtar, and Ahvaz, were all appointed by the Government of 
India, a situation arose where political priorities of India came into potential conflict 
with those of London, and the Minister in Tehran. British diplomatic and military 
officers in the south were colonial officers, steeped in the distinct culture of the Raj. 
India supplied the main body of the British army and paid for it out of Indian taxes54.  
The view from Delhi or Simla often differed from those formulated in London and 
Tehran. After WWI, the chain of British decision-making regarding the region 
became even more convoluted with Cairo becoming yet another competing center of 
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policymaking for the region, with its own set of priorities and urgent concerns55. In 
London, the India Office was under the direct control of the Prime Minister, with 
appointments approved by the Parliament, but their headquarters were housed in the 
Foreign Office, and its lines of jurisdiction and autonomy often clashed with various 
other Ministries responsible for Colonial Affairs and War56. As a result, British policy 
toward Iran became beset with significant contradictory priorities and frictions that, at 
first glance, may not be evident under the veneer of a global superpower 
implementing a coherent unilateral approach to a region and country under its 
effective domination.  
Soon after the 1907 Accord the oil industry in Khuzestan emerged as a new 
vital component in the geopolitics of the region57. The circumstances under which the 
oil complex developed after WWI were directly affected by the geopolitical situation 
discussed in this section, as well as the global transformations analyzed in the 
previous chapter. 
 
WWI and its Aftermath: From Sphere of Influence to Failed Attempts to 
Establish a Protectorate 
 
 The fallout from the civil conflicts ensuing from the Constitutional 
Revolution, and the increasingly brazen interference of Russia and Britain, had made 
the Qajar state effectively unable to govern. The short-lived attempt in 1911 to resort 
to American financial advisers led by Morgan Shuster, to assist in reforming the 
finances of the country was vetoed by Britain and Russia once it became clear that 
Shuster’s sympathies lay with the Constitutionalists, and his attempts to establish an 
effective tax collection system and an independent gendarmerie would challenge the 
sway of the two imperial powers 58. When WWI broke out Iran declared its neutrality, 
but soon its territory became the battleground of rival Russian, British, and German 
armies and saboteurs (see chapter 3). The effects were devastating as chronic 
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insecurity, famine, epidemics, runaway inflation, and rising poverty decimating urban 
and rural populations59. Regular and vociferous bread riots broke out in cities such as 
Qazvin, Anzali, Qom, Tehran, Shiraz, Manjil, Mashhad, Esfahan, and elsewhere; 
marauding armies confiscated food and draft animals; warlordism became a blight on 
settled populations of towns and villages; brigandage and raids disrupted trade, 
transport, and agriculture. During the war staple food prices grew beyond the means 
of ordinary people, with wheat prices rising sevenfold, barley fourfold, legumes 
eightfold, rice sixfold, fodder tenfold, and sugar by 54%60. The apparatus of tax 
collection, such as it was, broke down and the empty treasury was unable to pay 
troops to collect arrears or to ensure the safety of tax assessors and collectors61. Labor 
struggles during this period were often mobilized in objection to food hoarding, bread 
adulteration, and unpaid wages62. 
 Amir Afkhami, who studied the devastating impact of the 1918-1920 
influenza pandemic in Iran concluded that the severe hardships caused by the war had 
especially devastating effects: “Ironically, Iran a neutral power in the war, lost as 
many citizens to war-related catastrophes as belligerent countries lost in the 
trenches”63. He estimates that between 900 thousand to 2.4 million people, or between 
10-22 percent of the overall population perished as a result of food shortages, famine, 
and disease caused by the war related devastation and the political breakdown64. In the 
south especially, the British military activities of the South Persia Rifles (SPR) 
contributed to scarcity, due to their long-term contracts for grain provision with large 
landlords to feed their troops65. There existed no official or systematic means of 
keeping records of mortality or births at the time, until the Tehran municipality began 
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in 1922 to demand body washers in cemeteries to record deaths and their causes66; but 
there are harrowing accounts by Europeans soldiers and travelers of the hardships 
suffered by the general population. Forbes-Leith, an officer on expedition in Western 
Iran recalled the famine in the west of the country:  
“ The country was in a terrible state and the peasantry was in the last stages of 
starvation. Every time I was forced to stop my car, I was surrounded by 
hundreds of near-skeletons who screamed and fought for such scraps as I was 
able to spare. In a single day’s journey of fifty-six miles between the towns of 
Kirind and Kermanshah, I counted twenty-seven corpses by the roadside, most 
of them those of women and children, and the general condition of life 
amongst the peasants was so frightful that I was ashamed to eat my simple 
rations in their presence”67. 
  
 In 1915 hostile tribes (mostly Arab Bawis) in alliance with German 
operatives, sabotaged APOC’s pipelines north of Abadan68. The Oil Company 
suspended royalty payments to the Treasury, accusing the hapless central government 
of reneging on its obligation to protect oil operations69. By 1917 the government could 
no longer pay its daily expenses and it had to rely on further foreign loans to continue 
minimal operations70. To maintain security the British set up the South Persia Rifles, 
made of Iranian recruits under the leadership of Indian cavalry and British officers, to 
enforce security of British interests (see above)71.  
 At the end of the war Iran’s attempt to gain access to the Versailles peace 
conference to voice its grievances was blocked by Curzon. Iran claimed to be a non-
belligerent whose sovereign territory had been violated by invading armies and unjust 
collusion between imperial powers. Despite President Wilson’s support of Iran’s 
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claim Curzon succeeded in blocking its entrance72. There were several motives behind 
this maneuver. As the supremo in the Foreign Office Curzon had become the 
paramount policy setter for the region and he intended to engineer a shift back to 
making Iran a buffer state for India and the Persian Gulf against the new Soviet threat. 
In the following years Britain sent military forces into Russian territory in a futile 
attempt to defeat the Soviets’ attempts to control their southern flanks in the 
Caucasus. Britain also machinated and helped to establish a ring of anti communist 
states to surround Russia in the Balkans, the Baltics, Turkey, Central Europe, the 
Near East, and Iraq. Iran was the last piece in the puzzle. Allowing Iran access to the 
peace conference would have put it formally on a par with Britain, as a fellow 
member state. If belligerents, including Britain were recognized at fault for having 
invaded a neutral country, and were forced by the League to pay compensation for 
war damages they had caused, this could have potentially weaned Iran of its 
debilitating dependence on British financial handouts, and set a bad precedence with 
other aggrieved nations.  
An even more pressing concern had to do with the 1901 D’Arcy Oil 
Concession, and all the other lopsided agreements and concessions Iran had signed 
with Britain or British subjects under dubious circumstances. The fear was that if Iran 
were to gain access as a nominally equal participant to an international forum which 
claimed to establish an ethical set of laws to govern international relations it would 
unveil long held grievances which would undermine British domination there and 
force it to be held accountable. In a letter to Curzon, the Minister in Tehran Percy Cox 
listed the “dangerous” grievances and demands that Iran could potentially raise and 
gain a sympathetic audience73. These included the murky relations between APOC 
and the Government of Britain, the dubious calculation of royalties by APOC, the 
withholding of oil royalties by APOC since 1915; the forced terms of the 1907 Anglo-
Russian Accord; the operations of the South Persia Rifles in Iranian territories; the 
agreement between the Bakhtiyari Khans and APOC hammered out through the 
mediation of British diplomats; the protectorate set up in Khuzestan with Sheikh 
Khaz’al; the objectionable drawing of boundaries with Iraq, Afghanistan, and India 
(now Pakistan) under British, Ottoman, and Russian duress; the continued foreign 
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control of Persian finances, etc74.(See chapters 3 & 5 for further discussion of these 
issues)  
 The question of oil royalties (chapter 3), was particularly onerous and 
overtime became the main flashpoint between the two countries, and eventually led to 
the nationalization of oil in 1951. Since 1912 Britain had become increasingly 
dependent on oil75, and it wanted to prevent as much as possible the intrusion of 
rivals, especially the US, in its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf with its proven 
rich petroleum deposits. Furthermore, the fear of rising Soviet influence and growing 
nationalism throughout the region was becoming a paramount concern. In 1919 
Curzon and Percy Cox, as his trusted envoy to Tehran, devised a policy that scuttled 
the highly controversial 1907 Anglo Russian Accord and aimed to turn Iran 
effectively into an informal British protectorate, somewhat similar to the Egyptian 
model76. They drew a secret agreement in 1919 with a number of leading anglophile 
Iranian politicians, led by the premier Vosough al Dowleh, effectively to allow 
Britain the exclusive control of the country’s financial, military and bureaucratic 
administrations in exchange for a loan of £2 million, on 7% fixed interest. To “grease 
the wheels”, as they put it, they advanced 10% of the loan personally to Vosough al 
Dowleh and his two principle allies77. The accord would have forced Iran to deal 
directly with Britain without the interference of the League of Nations, to settle all 
outstanding claims regarding reparations, royalties, borders, etc. The protection of 
APOC and the oil operations in Khuzestan was one the priorities behind this plan. 
The 1919 agreement would have allowed Britain to prioritize its own interests in 
approving or blocking any development that would be taking place in Iran. For 
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example, Cox and Curzon conceived a strategy to continue vetoing the construction 
of any railroads that could be potentially used by rival armies, and to consolidate their 
continued support of Sheikh Khaz’al as a protected vassal in Khuzestan78.  
 In a short interlude between 1919-1921, a deal that had appeared as a 
masterstroke to its architects backfired spectacularly, leaving Curzon’s Persian Gulf 
and Iran policies in tatters. In the following years Britain, as well as APOC, had to 
scurry continuously to keep up with a rapidly changing landscape in Iran, and accept 
drastic changes to the balance of power there. This reversal also had major 
repercussions for the oil complex in Khuzestan as we shall discuss in the following 
chapters. Several factors contributed to the demise of the 1919 Anglo Persian Accord:  
 First, the unexpected stiffening of resistance by Iranian politicians and 
nationalists once the terms of the secret accord were revealed. The Iranian 
government had been in a state of chronic instability since 1907, and especially after 
the war had started. Between 1914 and 1919 there had been 16 cabinets; but all shared 
the common goals of ending foreign interference, assuring financial stability and 
autonomy, securing international guarantees of independence and sovereignty, 
developing a unified national army, and establishing an effective administrative 
machinery of governance79. Since the outbreak of the war many politicians had 
received support, strategic and sometimes financial, from rival foreign powers. When 
following the incursion of belligerent foreign militaries in 1915 the ruling cabinet fled 
the advancing Russian army in 1915 and established a government in exile in 
Kermanshah, it accepted financial assistance from the Germans to continue operating. 
Many prominent nationalists, such as Taqizadeh, Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, etc. had 
settled in Berlin and conducted their political and cultural activities there with the 
support of the German government. Britain likewise had supported its allies such as 
Prince Farmafarma, Qavam al Mulk, Sheikh Khaz’al, and even Ahmad Shah with soft 
loans, allowances, and handouts. In 1916 it had set up the South Persia Rifles to 
impose its order in the south of the country, in collaboration with sympathetic local 
magnates there. Against this background, the stigma of direct British payment to 
Vosough al Dowleh and his cohort to get the controversial accord approved created 
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such an outrage that any such future dealings became far more risky80. The 1919 
Accord had to be approved by the Majles to gain the veneer of legality. But instead of 
finding its way there quickly as Curzon frantically kept insisting, it was delayed for 
more than a year by reluctant politicians who were fearful of the consequences of the 
popular backlash, and eventually the Majles rejected it out of hand. Curzon blamed 
the incompetence of the new Minister Herman Norman and the reviled corrupt 
Persians who did not recognize the benevolence of the deal on offer, but the fact was 
that the Accord had virtually no supporters in Iran81. 
 The second reason for the collapse of the policy was the deteriorating state of 
affairs in Iran and throughout the region. British military incursions against the Soviet 
Union into Central Asia and the Caucasus backfired spectacularly in 1918. The so-
called Dunsterforce expedition from Iraq to Baku through Iran collapsed in 191882 and 
the subsequent Norperforce (North Persian Force) expedition to shore up resistance 
against the advancing Red Army was equally stalled (1918-1920)83. Radical regional 
movements in Northern Iran, in Gilan and Azarbaijan and Khorasan were gaining a 
foothold and the rag tag Persian military, especially the Cossack Corps, led by 
Russian officers, was unable to impose its authority, partly because it could not even 
pay its troops and had to rely on loans from the Imperial Bank to maintain minimal 
operations. Ironically, the Bank was under orders from Curzon to refuse any further 
funding of the Persian Government in order to force them into signing the 1919 
Accord. In this case, the Bank procrastinated and continued funding the troops84 until 
the tide turned by 1920, Soviet Troops withdrew from the northern territories they had 
occupied, and the regional movements were defeated by a combination of Cossacks 
and British forces. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union discarded the long held Russian 
policy toward Iran and forgave the substantial outstanding loans in exchange for an 
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agreement that would guarantee the absence of any forces hostile to Soviet Union on 
Persian territory.  
The Majles approved the treaty with the Soviet Union, leaving the 1919 
Accord standing out as conspicuously predatory toward Iran. The proponents of the 
1919 agreement at the Foreign Office had been arguing that the situation in Iran was a 
zero sum game, with any gain made by the Soviets being a net loss to British 
influence and a direct threat to India’s security. However, that alarmist argument 
failed to be convincing once Reza Khan, who was given the title of Sardar Sepah 
(Commander of the Army) by Ahmad Shah, had taken charge of imposing a vigorous 
project of centralization and modern nation building, and with the Soviet Union 
content to support his ascent as a ‘progressive modernizer’ standing against the 
reactionary feudal aristocracy. The subsequent developments proved that if there was 
a zero sum game in Iran it was between Reza Khan and Britain over sovereignty in 
Iran, and in particular, in Khuzestan’s oil areas as we shall see below. 
 The third reason was the chronic weakness of the British economy in the post 
war era (see chapter 4) and its inability to maintain an extravagant and increasingly 
costly foreign policy in the region.  The damage to the British economy by the 
devastating costs of the war was not as severe as other European powers, but it had 
left it significantly weakened in comparison with emerging rivals such as the United 
States and Japan. Between 1913-1929 the average annual growth of the real GDP of 
Britain increased a mere 0.7%, compared to the defeated Germany (1.2%), or the US 
(3.1%) and Japan (3.7%)85. The US, in particular, had quickly turned from a war ally 
to a major creditor and economic competitor as soon as the conflict ended86. Britain 
itself had changed from the largest international creditor prior to the war to the largest 
debtor by 1918 (see chapter 4). It had lent heavily to its war allies, but in order to 
continue financing the exorbitant costs of the war it had also resorted to borrowing 
heavily from the US. British debt dependency to the US grew from £62million in 
1915-16 to over £1billion in 1918-19. In the same period overall state deficits 
expanded from £340million to £1.6 billion87. As I have discussed in some detail in 
chapter 4, the overall ability of the British state had come under severe strain due to 
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severe economic malaise after 1918, the rising unemployment among returning 
soldiers, the collapse of the massive industrial demand for military supplies, and the 
new pressures for social reforms and welfare economy that had become impossible to 
ignore in the radical era of mass politics.   
As Britain had shifted to a total war economy the state had been forced to take 
direct control of significant segments of the national economy. Prior to the War in 
1913 military expenditures were 4% of the net national product, but during the 
conflict this had raised tenfold, to nearly 40%88, with some war related ministries, 
such as the Munitions directly owning and operating some 200 war related industrial 
plants and employing a significant labor force89. The aftereffects of the war “… dealt 
the British overseas trade a savage blow from which it never recovered. In 1920 the 
volume of British exports of all kind was only 30% of what it had been in 1913”90. 
This crisis was especially acute for the British manufacturing that depended heavily 
on international trade for nearly half of its products, especially in textiles, machinery, 
steel, and shipbuilding.  
Under the circumstances maintaining a heavy military presence in 
Mesopotamia and Iran was proving beyond the means of the ailing empire. John 
Maynard Keynes who was acting for the Treasury at the time, objected that the £2.5 
million monthly costs of maintaining the Iran policy, not counting the military stores 
being bought inside Persia, was simply not justifiable by the meager results91. The 
escalating clashes of popular discontent throughout the region, in Iraq, Syria, India, 
Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, as well as other parts of the Empire, such as Ireland were 
adding to the complexity of the situation92; as were the rising demands of welfare and 
political reform in Britain itself (see chapter 4). The result was a forced ‘imperial 
adjustment’, which left Curzon’s policy in a precarious situation from which it could 
not recover. 
The fourth reason was the unprecedented discord within the sprawling and 
increasingly dissonant British foreign policy administration. Despite his enormous 
personal prestige, Curzon’s Iran policy was being subtly and sometimes openly 
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resisted and opposed from all quarters. Aside from the Treasury’s concern for the 
costs; the War Office which had to supply troops and oversee the implementation of 
the Accord was strongly opposed on financial and strategic grounds93; as was the 
Government of India, which wanted a policy of conciliation to win back Persian 
confidence and convince them that Britain was not trying to replace Russian 
domination with its own. More interestingly, Herman Norman the Minister who had 
replaced Percy Cox in Tehran became the target of Curzon’s ire because he was 
unable to strong-arm the approval of the Accord in the Majles, nor did he seem to be 
fully convinced that under the existing circumstances the Accord was practicable, or 
the ideal way to move forward.  
In 1921 the Cossacks carried out a coup d’état, and in the process ended any 
illusion that anglophile politicians could get the Majles to approve the 1919 Accord. 
Reza Khan, the coup leader soon deposed his co-conspirator, the anglophile journalist 
Seyyed Zia alDin Tabatabaei. By 1923 Reza Khan was Prime Minister, in 1925 the 
Majles voted to end the Qajar dynasty and in 1926 he ascended the throne as the first 
Shah of the new Pahlavi Monarchy. While there is still some controversy over the 
degree of British collusion with the Coup there is little doubt that General Ironside the 
commander of the British forces in Iran at least knew about it beforehand if he had 
not actually instigated it in the first place; that Norman effectively approved it after it 
had happened; and Churchill the Secretary of War used the occasion as the final 
excuse to evacuate the remaining British troops from Iran as a way of reducing the 
costs as well as the danger of unwanted military embroilment with the Soviets. In 
Olson’s summary “British interests in Iran survived the war, yet not a single policy 
employed between 1914 and 1919 worked as expected, few worked at all, and some 
made matters worse”94. Effectively, the different layers of British administration had 
colluded to undermine the master plan of Curzon, Britain’s greatest colonial Victorian 
authority on “the Persian Question”, in order to accept, if not actively precipitate, the 
rapidly changing situation in Iran95. 
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The last factor to consider is APOC’s position and the Company’s reaction to 
the deteriorating situation after the war, and how it would affect the Company’s long- 
term interests. By 1918 APOC directors had grown increasingly frustrated at the 
apparent lack of any long-term British Government oil policy96. There was intense 
wrangling over the necessity of further capital investments to expand operations and 
improve facilities, and the nature and the extent of government intervention in new 
concessions in Iraq and other potential and promising locations. Lloyd George, the 
wily and pragmatic Liberal prime minister, ironically was insisting that all further 
expansion of oil operations ought to be controlled and subjected to government and 
national priorities and not to private interests, whereas the Company insisted on its 
own commercial focus and its responsibilities to its shareholders, and demanded 
freedom from any government interference in its operations. At issue was whether the 
main concern of APOC should be making profits or insuring the advance of 
geopolitical strategy according to government policies97.  Of course, the ultimate 
irony was that the government was the Company’s majority shareholder, and when 
the Company had been in dire financial straights in 1912-14 it had actively sought 
government investment by presenting itself as an exclusively British enterprise, in 
service of national interests98. But such double standards held little importance in the 
emerging post war era of cutthroat global oil and multi national corporate giants (see 
chapter 4).   
In addition, the Oil Company had begun to read the writing on the wall and 
realized that the question of royalties and the terms of the D’Arcy Concession would 
become a major threat once the Iranian government had managed to put its house in 
order. The details of the protracted negotiations with the Iranian Government between 
1918-1920 have been covered in the published literature extensively99 and it is not 
necessary to repeat them here in detail. The main points of contention were the 
suspended royalties since 1915; the highly questionable accounting practices of the 
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Company which were unveiled by independent consultants100; the fact that the 
concession specified Iran’s royalties as 16% of the net profits of the Company at fair 
market rates while APOC had been supplying the Royal Navy and Army enormous 
volumes of products at guaranteed preset prices; effectively meaning at highly 
subsidized rates101; and that the Company’s subsidiaries outside Iran were being 
excluded from the calculation even though the Concession had made no such 
allowance. The Company’s attempt to settle the differences and reach a final accord 
with the Iranian government while the latter was in a position of weakness and unable 
to negotiate effectively became a bone of contention with the Foreign Office, which 
wanted to use all possible coercive financial leverage against Iran to force the Majles 
to sign the 1919 Agreement. The payment of a lump sum by the Oil Company to Iran 
would have undermined White Hall’s position by giving the Iranian government some 
urgently needed cash, while failing to do so would have put the Oil Company in 
danger of seeing the entire Concession put to question by the Iranian Government. As 
it were, the Company reached a final agreement with the Government of Iran in 
December 1920 and paid a lump sum of £1million as to settle outstanding claims102. 
While the Company was initially convinced that the matter had been settled, the 
Iranian Majles never ratified the agreement, and the bitter question of royalties and 
the terms of the concession remained unresolved, and became the major issue in 
recurring crises that rocked the relations of the Oil Company to the Iranian 
government in 1929-1933 and 1951-1953.  
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Figure 1: APOC Crude Production, Profits, and Royalties Paid to the Iranian   
Governnment 
 
Source: Ferrier (1982), 370, 234, 474 
 
 
The changing political landscape and the transformation of the oil complex 
(1921-1926): 
 
By the end of 1921 the situation in Iran had changed drastically, culminating 
in a ruthless drive toward centralization and state building spearheaded by Reza 
Sardar Sepah and his military followers and civilian allies. Once the momentum had 
been set, this process came to be widely supported, albeit with significant reservations 
regarding Reza’s authoritarianism, by Iranian nationalists, as well as by most but not 
all of the locally posted British diplomats, a significant section of White Hall, the 
Government of India, the Soviet government, and even APOC. They all saw in Reza 
Khan the alternative to what they all feared most – chaos, and what they had come to 
desire above all – order! 
Percy Lorraine, who had replaced Norman as Minister in Tehran, sent a sober 
assessment to Curzon, which set the tone of British diplomacy toward Iran for the 
following five years. In his summary, which is worth quoting at some length, Loraine 
stated that upon his arrival in Tehran at the end of 1921 the ruling cabinet, headed by 
Qavam al Saltaneh, with Reza Khan as Minister of War, was beset by lack of funds to 
conduct daily operations. He had found all Iranian politicians irresolute, cowardly, 
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and corrupt, except for Reza Khan, whose success in suppressing regional revolts in 
Khorasan, Gilan, and Azarbaijan had secured vital provinces bordering the Soviet 
Union.  However, worryingly, he had found “America to be the latest craze” among 
the,  
“Volatile people of this country, who seem incapable of realizing facts unless 
those happen to accord with their own opinions and desires, that salvation was 
coming from America; that America, in a spirit of disinterested altruism, was 
going to develop Persian resources to the immediate and enduring profit of 
Persia and the Persians; that American advisers would come and reorganize 
the country and make mincemeat of the grasping British and other rapacious 
foreigners”103. 
  
Loraine went on to outline the backlash among Iranians to the “obnoxious” 
1907 and 1919 Accords, while being dismissive of those objections, and the positive 
effects of Woodrow Wilson’s unsuccessful attempt to admit Iran to the Versailles 
peace conference. He warned that Britain now faced a completely new situation:  
“In former days, when England was fighting an uphill battle against Russian 
penetration into Persia, a battle which the safety of our Indian Empire and the 
preservation of our general interests and influence in Asia imperiously 
dictated, the struggle had at least the characteristics of a duel between two 
gentlemen who had necessarily some community of instinct and 
tradition…[However] While Great Britain stands for the preservation of order 
and for political and economic stability, Bolshevik Russia cares for none of 
these things, and indeed disorder, unrest, and poverty are the most fruitful soil 
for the seed of communist gospel.”104 
 
The Minister’s greatest worry was the rising tide of nationalism: On the one 
hand there is positive aspect to nationalism, “the cry for education and the efforts of 
the government, however feeble to satisfy it… the craving for western learning and 
technical instruction”, and the negative effects this modernization has on the Shi’a 
clergy. But there was another more ominous side to nationalism, which he feared:  
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“Besides the Russian activities we have to contend with the intrigues of 
Kemalists, Afghans, pan-Islamists and pan-Turanians, all directed against 
Great Britain… In the south, from the vast Indian possessions of the British 
Crown, the stronghold of the whole British position in Asia, where before the 
war the British rule was supreme and unquestioned, the Persian hears tales of 
rebellion, revolution, and riot, of Swaraj, non-cooperation and Gandhism; tags 
of inflammatory literature reach her, and are eagerly reprinted in her gutter 
press, crying out against ‘British oppression’, inciting the Indian ‘nation’ to 
rise and throw off its British chains…No account is taken of the peace and 
prosperity that British rule has brought to India… In the southwest, the British 
efforts to create an autonomous Arab state in Irak are represented as a further 
British attempt to enslave a Moslem population, and Baghdad is regarded as a 
fresh British outpost of colonization which aims at the absorption of Persia 
and the destruction of her independence”105.  
 
Loraine noted that “social nationalism has always existed in Persia: what is 
significant is the rebirth of a political nationalism”. He concluded by a positive note: 
“It is my conviction that in this country, there is no fundamental animosity toward 
Great Britain…Our position in Persia is so inherently strong, and our interest in the 
country so demonstrably legitimate, that I am unable to believe that the temporary 
eclipse that we have suffered in prestige and influence can be of more than transient 
nature”106. 
British diplomatic assessments began to praise the personal qualities of Reza 
Khan and portrayed him as uniquely qualified to transform the situation in Iran107. 
Loraine’s approach turned out to be a radical departure for long held British approach 
to Iranian politics, as he suggested Britain to adopt a low profile and to avoid direct 
exposure and visible entanglement in Iranian affairs as a public relations measure108.  
In the following year the situation became more worrisome as the 
consequences of the centralization drive of the new government were becoming more 
evident. A military column sent in 1922 to Khuzestan was attacked and destroyed by 
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Kuhkiluyeh tribesmen in Shalil. The reaction in Tehran was immense, and the 
humiliating incident tarnished Britain and its allies, Sheikh Khaz’al and the 
Bakhtiyari khans, who were believed as somehow responsible for the outrage109.  As a 
result, Loraine began to realize that sitting on the fence was no longer an option, and 
he leaned toward convincing his superiors of the necessity of throwing Britain’s 
support more decisively behind Reza Khan. In a key report to Curzon in May 1923, 
Loraine pointed out the dangerous situation in the south, in the vicinity of APOC’s 
operations: 
“The preoccupations of the central government [has left] the Lurs, Bakhtiyari, 
the Kashkai under Soulet-Dowleh, the Khamseh Arabs under Kawam al Mulk, 
the Sheikh of Mohammareh and all the petty tribal organizations in the 
hinterland of the Gulf ports in a state, if not of actual insubordination, but at 
all events of practical independence…This state of affairs was seriously 
aggravated by an intense Bolshevik propaganda…aiming at the destruction of 
British influence in Persia, and the acquisition of a dominant position for 
Russia through a process of disintegration of Persia”. The increasing 
imposition of military authority in the southwest after the Shalil incident has 
been a significant development. It “…is in my opinion incontestable that the 
result of these changes has been so far uniformly beneficial to British 
interests. The Persian government as such deserves no credit for what has 
been achieved; it has been entirely the work of one man, Reza Khan, the 
Minister for War…there is a very genuine element of patriotism underlying all 
that Reza Khan does”110.  
 
Loraine argued that Reza’s motives were altruistic, and that his aim was to lift 
Iran out of morass that the drifting and corrupt political establishment had gotten it 
into. Reza had the ability to close the Majles and overthrow the Qajars, but he 
refrained from a power grab because he was not driven by personal ambitions. 
Furthermore, “he has never shown indifference to established British interests”. He 
went on to summarize Reza Khan’s agenda as follows:  
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“Persia will never be really independent and orderly until the whole country is 
brought under a single and unquestioned authority, which must necessarily be 
that of the National Government, and until civilian population has been 
disarmed, so that all physical power rests in the hands of the State. The State 
and not local chieftains &c. must assume the responsibility for protecting 
foreigners and their enterprises… [The State also demands absolute loyalty 
from its national citizens and rejects interference from all foreign enterprises]  
… In the end Great Britain will find it much more easy to and satisfactory to 
deal with an organized Central Government having effective control of the 
country, than with a number of petty local potentates”, who are unable to 
resist the new military without foreign support. The ominous conclusion being 
that “it would be a calamity if Great Britain opposed the logical extension of 
the policy in the south, and such opposition would seem totally unnecessary as 
the [Iranian] Imperial Government does not desire to interfere with existing 
British interests”111. 
 
Loraine concluded his pivotal assessment by acknowledging that British 
diplomacy faced a fork in the road:  “I still incline, however to the opinion that sooner 
or later we shall have to decide whether to oppose the policy of centralization, 
implying the necessity of opposing it by force in the last resort; or to support it and 
endeavor to guide it into safe channels by the judicious use of our support. I am 
myself strongly in favor of the latter course.  It is clear that the whole crux of the 
situation lies in [Khuzestan], and that the test case is the Sheikh of Mohammerah” 
[my emphasis added]. The British Minister then outlined a scenario where if the 
central government were to press Khaz’al for his arrear land taxes and demand his 
future submission, but the latter were to resist, then the current “tranquil” state of 
Khuzestan would be engulfed in military conflict affecting APOC negatively. In that 
case either tribal mobilization against the central government would lead to warfare, 
or Britain would have to step in directly to prevent the military’s incursion into 
Khuzestan, both “calamitous” scenarios.  
“My general conclusions are these: Reza Khan’s policy, if carried out without 
unnecessary friction or disturbance, would relieve us of many responsibilities 
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which we have hitherto borne, and make Persia an altogether more 
comfortable neighbor; the only thing we need be really anxious about are the 
safety of the oil-fields and the special position of the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah”.112 
 
Thereafter the events moved very fast. After the Shalil incident the writing 
was on the wall. APOC tasked Dr. M. Young, the Company physician, who had often 
played the crucial role of negotiator (see chapter 3) with various Iranians in the past, 
to visit Tehran in the summer of 1922 to meet Reza Khan in order to evaluate the 
situation and make a recommendation. Young sided with Loraine’s assessment that 
the Company was better off to cast its lot with the central government and rely on its 
protection113. A year after the coup the central government had informed APOC that it 
considered all its agreements with local magnates null and void114. In November 1922 
Reza Khan had a meeting in Bushehr with T.L. Jacks and Arnold Wilson, who was 
now Company’s director in Mohammareh after having served as acting High 
Commissioner in Iraq, and left them in no doubt that he intended to impose Tehran’s 
authority on Khuzestan. Wilson replied that APOC was only interested in its own 
operations and not in local politics and so long as its security was assured it would 
stay out of power struggles115.  
APOC and British diplomats were still convinced that the status quo in 
Khuzestan was fairly secure, since Khaz’al was assessed to have the command of a 
tribal force of an estimated 30 thousand men, far more than anything the central 
government could muster. Khaz’al attempted to create a coalition of Bakhtiyari, Arab, 
Qashqai and Lur forces to resist the military’s southward incursions. Khaz’al 
extended to Ahmad Shah who had grown uneasy with Reza’s ambitions. He 
constantly reminded APOC and the British envoys of their obligations to him which 
had been renewed in 1903, 1908, 1909, 1910, and 1914, on each occasion pledging 
him their support against the central government (see chapter 3)116. He counted on the 
belief that reneging on those public pledges would irrevocably harm British prestige 
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across the Persian Gulf where numerous Arab magnates and sheikhs had entered into 
similar “trucial” agreements since the 19th century, and he appealed to opposition 
parliamentarians in Tehran in the name of Constitutionalism and against Reza’s 
brazenly authoritarian behavior117. 
 Despite desperate British attempts to mediate, a confrontation became 
inevitable when Khaz’al defied the central government’s demand for the speedy 
payment of his belated taxes, and the added affront of calling into question some of 
the royal land grants bestowed upon him by the late Muzzafar al Din Shah. 
Apprehensive of the outcome Loraine kept asking the Government of India and White 
Hall to commit troops and battleships to Basra as an intimidating show of force to 
deter the Iranian army, but his superiors remained wary of the costs and the risk of a 
potential confrontation until it was too late. In 1924 Iranian army troops broke the 
resistance of Lur tribes and poured into Khuzestan from the north, as well as from the 
south. Reza visited Ahvaz at the head of his troops and Khaz’al went there a broken 
man to submit to his authority. Khaz’al was promised immunity, but soon after he 
was arrested and deported to Tehran to die a few years later in poverty and under 
suspect circumstances 118. His properties were seized and his political court was 
disbanded119. The province was put, for the first time, under the military rule of an 
ambitious officer, Fazlullah Khan (later Zahedi), the army general that later led the 
1953 coup against Mossadeq. Army garrisons totaling nearly 10 thousand troops were 
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posted throughout the province although, significantly, the majority were stationed in 
the north and the west and well away from Company areas, with 5000 garrisoned in 
Shushtar, 3500 in Ramhormoz, but only 130 in Ahvaz, 100 in Mohammareh, and a 
mere 30 in Abadan. The Oil Company’s official record states “Reza Khan achieves 
success without harm to APOC”120. A diplomatic report from Mohammareh to the 
Foreign Office in London stated “The Oil Company is no longer concerned with the 
safety of their operations in the area. The local manager reported that he no longer 
sees any dangers to the pipelines and the oilfields [from tribal forces attempting to 
sabotage them in response to the army’s incursion] as Reza Khan’s army was about to 
bring the tribes under its control”121 
While the changes to the status quo, such as the unceremonious abandonment 
of the old ally Khaz’al, were accepted as the best possible option under the 
circumstances122 nevertheless, there was the cold realization that APOC was now for 
the first time directly subject to the authority of the central government. Given the 
fluctuating political situation in Iran and the region, the fear of the consequences of a 
shift in the central government’s political orientation against Britain and for the 
Soviet Union now suddenly took on a different dimension123. Nevertheless, this risk 
was considered worthwhile by Britain if there was the assurance that the 
economically and geopolitically overstretched Empire could now rely on the authority 
of the Iranian central state to maintain road and transport security, to curtail anti 
British propaganda in the press and the Majles, to impose security on the western 
frontiers of India, and to guarantee labor discipline and general safety in the oil 
areas124. 
By 1925 Reza Khan’s victory in the south seemed complete, at least against 
Khaz’al and the Bakhtiyari Khans, as well as against any residual British unease over 
the radical changes in the balance of power and their long cultivated relations. This 
was a major achievement and he made the most of it in a bombastic style125, and used 
the occasion, literally, as a crowning victory. The same year the Majles deposed 
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Ahmad Shah, and Reza prepared to be crowned as the head of the new Pahlavi 
dynasty in April 1926126. The Oil Company rushed to prepare the ground for the 
dynastic change and a possible royal visit to Khuzestan. But this was to be no 
ordinary official function. A new era was about to begin for the oil complex and 
everyone was acutely aware and apprehensive about the fact that they were stepping 
into an unpredictable and indeed a new and revolutionary situation. APOC went into a 
yearlong preparation to review all aspects of Company operations culminating with a 
planned visit by John Cadman, the Company’s acting chair, to attend the royal 
coronation and to hold direct discussions with the new government about the future of 
Company-State relations.  
Iranian statesmen similarly began energetically to lay the ground for extending 
the fledgling government’s administrative authority over Khuzestan, a province that 
hitherto had lain virtually beyond the direct control of the central government since 
the 18th century127.  These included establishing new administrative institutions such 
as municipalities, police, gendarmeries, border guards, offices for the registration of 
property, contracts, and personal data; and new social services such as public schools, 
and public health and sanitations.  
Very quickly, the circumstances changed and relations between the Oil 
Company, the new Iranian central government and its local representatives, and the 
British government began to sour and deteriorate. Sir Robert Clive who had replaced 
Sir Percy Loraine as the new Minister in Tehran (Clive served in Iran from 1926-
1931; replacing Loraine who had served from 1921-1926) began his Annual Report to 
the new Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain with words that became all too 
frequently repeated in diplomatic reports over the next 15 years: “The year 1926 has 
proved a disappointment. So much was hoped of it, so little has been achieved. Our 
main disillusion has been centered around the character of Reza Shah”128.  
Clive’s narrative painted an altogether different portrait from the one 
presented by his predecessor: It turned out Reza was not ‘enlightened’ as Loraine had 
stressed, but a boor, an opium addict, a military tyrant in the making, an ingrate. He 
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had been ungracious in snubbing Loraine who left the country after years of service 
during which he had proved himself to be “one of the staunchest friends that Persia 
ever possessed”. Iranians had also ignored other gracious acts of British goodwill, 
such as withdrawal of troops from the Persian Gulf. “The internal condition of Persia 
during 1926 has been characterized by friction in almost every organ of the State”. 
There had been several tribal uprisings in the north and western provinces; there was 
constant squabble between the Majles, the Court, and the cabinet, as well as between 
military and civilian provincial governors129. Nevertheless, Clive felt that probably 
this was the best that Britain could hope for since, even if her position and her 
interests had not been strengthened, the Soviets had not made any noticeable gains 
either. Nor had the fearful disintegration of Iran come about. “It is true that the Shah 
has proved a disappointment, but at least he is still there: he may possibly improve; in 
any case he is better than the Kajars, infinitely better than a republic…Although the 
Persians much dislike us, they are still sufficiently afraid of us not to go too far. They 
have attempted a few pinpricks, but they have not seriously endeavored to attack our 
vital interests, the Imperial Bank, the telegraphs, the Anglo Persian Oil Company 
have prospered exceedingly…So long as our essential interests can be maintained 
there seems no real reason why HMG (as distinct from His Majesty’s Legation) need 
be unduly disturbed by the conditions in Persia”130. 
Thus, by 1927 Britain seemed in a relatively favorable situation. Its main 
rivals in Iran and the region had had setbacks. The Soviets had blocked commerce 
with Iran after it had refused the request to grant them exclusive privileges for the 
fisheries on the shared Caspian Sea. The US attempt to gain a foothold in oil 
exploration in the central and northern parts of Iran had also ended in a 
disappointment, as the American combine Sinclair Oil withdrew in 1924 after 
vociferous resistance from APOC and the British Government. The suspicious murder 
of an American military attaché, Major Imbrie, by a mob in Tehran had served as 
final excuse for the Americans to extricate themselves claiming fears for their 
safety131.  
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Another inconvenient rival, Arthur Millspaugh the American financial adviser 
who had been in charge of reforming Iran’s financial machinery, was by this stage in 
a weak position as his contract was coming to an end, and his heavy handed and 
uncompromising manners had managed to alienate the Iranian elites as well as Reza 
Shah. The political elite initially had counted on Millspaugh to attract American 
investment to Iran as a way of reducing the chronic historic dependence on loans and 
financing by British and the Russians/Soviets; and to spur on the much desired 
economic development and industrialization. Instead, Millspaugh had insisted on 
balancing the books and forcing the government to live within its means132.  
This approach did not sit well in an impoverished country that had been 
enduring chronic hardships, famine, epidemics, and violence; with an empty treasury, 
and an elite who saw modernization and financial independence as the only practical 
salvation. The food crises of 1922 and 1925 further tarnished the image of both the 
American advisers, but also the English diplomats and oilmen. Severe hardships had 
not ended with the war, and severe droughts in 1922 and especially in 1925 had a 
ruinous effect on crops and food supplies. This was due to a dearth of pack animals 
that were practically the only means of transportation on unsafe roads that were in 
horrible condition133. Famine devastated the countryside in areas affected by the 
drought, and seriously jeopardized the security of cities.  
The 1925 drought and famine were especially severe and affected Tehran, 
Semnan, Kashan, Qom, Qazvin, and Hamadan. When it became clear that sufficient 
food had not been stored in the cities the population panicked and reacted with fury. 
Food security fell under the purview of the Finance Ministry, which controlled grain 
purchases and regulated imports as a way of balancing the budget. As British 
diplomats gleefully reported, the food crisis reflected badly on the American advisers. 
But the glee was misplaced. The 1922 famine had coincided with Curzon pressuring 
the Imperial Bank against extending any credit to Iran to force the Majles to ratify the 
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1919 Accord. In that case, with “the danger of the complete collapse of Persia into 
anarchy for ready want of money…and the particularly urgent of money to purchase 
grain to avert a famine in Tehran [had] provided a compelling reason to relax the 
embargo”134.  But the resentment against British blackmail had only served to further 
embitter relations.  
The more severe famine of 1925 reflected badly on Millspaugh, but it also 
tarnished the image of APOC and increased resentment about the relative affluence 
and the facilities that were available in Company areas compared to the rest of the 
country, and later on became another grievance held against the Company. To deal 
with the food crisis of 1925 the government decided to import some 250 trucks and 
transport vehicles from abroad, in order to speed up emergency food delivery from 
the India135. The costs were high, at 18million Qran, or 8% of government revenues 
that year. In the process, the undeveloped state of roads and transport infrastructure 
and fuel provision throughout the country was made adamantly clear136. In that 
instance Britain managed to project a more positive image through the sale of grain 
from India and agreeing to extend emergency credit through the Imperial Bank. 
However, the fact that APOC operated some 600 vehicles in its Khuzestan operations, 
and that motor fuel from Iranian oil was amply available there and at the disposal of 
the British military but not in the rest of the country reflected poorly on the claim that 
the oil industry was benefiting ordinary Iranians.  
Millspaugh’s efforts at financial reform also caused friction with the landed 
and commercial elite who resented the newly imposed taxes, or the vociferous 
demands from them to pay their arrear taxes to balance the government budget137. In 
particular, the modern military that Reza Shah was building was devouring around 40 
percent of the annual budgets, compared to a meager 6 percent for the Ministry of 
Interior and 3 percent for the Ministry of Education138. Millspaugh helped devise a 
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consumer tax on tea and sugar, both vital items of popular consumption especially 
among the poor, as an alternative means of financing the historically desired 
transnational railway scheme139. This scheme placed the burden of the hugely 
expensive transnational railroad project on the poor for whom sugar and tea were 
staple foods and a major source of energy in their meager daily diets140. Needless to 
say the measure did not endear the American advisers to the public, but was approved 
by the Majles in 1925. However, the days of American financial advisers were 
coming to a close. By 1927 Millspaugh was offered a renewed contract with 
substantially reduced powers, which he refused to accept.  
Meanwhile, Iranian debts to Britain had been once again on the rise, and had 
reached £4.5 million by 1924141.  As Cox had predicted, once the situation in Tehran 
became relatively more stable after the 1921 coup, the Iranian government began, at 
first cautiously but then with increasing confidence, to suggest that it intended to 
review all existing foreign concessions. The government’s argument was that Qajar 
rulers had granted these concessions during the period of arbitrary rule, but after the 
Constitutional Revolution the Majles had not subsequently approved them to bestow 
constitutional and legislative legitimacy. In other cases the terms of the concession 
had not been honored since the resources had remained undeveloped within the 
agreed timeframe. Although the Iranians assured APOC and British diplomats that 
these legal measures were not aimed at them, nevertheless Britain did not hesitate to 
make counter bluffs about collecting arrear debts, and tried to use a mixture of carrot 
and stick to forestall any such future threat. To appease matters Britain offered to 
reduce Iran’s overall debt by almost half, on the condition that Iran would guarantee 
debt repayments by linking it with its most steady sources of revenue, the oil royalties 
or customs revenues142. This would have meant that any move to question the terms of 
the oil concession would have triggered a demand for immediate repayment of loans 
and blocked the government’s main sources of foreign currency. The issue was 
temporarily postponed, but disagreements remained and mutual resentments kept 
building up around a number of vexing matters that remained unresolved, mainly the 
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nature and amount of oil royalties, debt dependence, border issues aggravated by 
Britain’s relations with the vassal states and protectorates it had carved out in 
Mesopotamia (Iraq) and set up in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the city state 
sheikhdoms), as well as its allies in southern Iran, especially the Bakhtiyari Khans 
and Shykh Khaz’al.   
 
Conclusion: The National Context of the Oil Complex in the Post WWI Era 
The revolutionary years following WWI witnessed an international trend 
initially toward greater demand for the expansion of political representation and 
social justice (see chapter 4). These shifts were manifested sometimes through radical 
revolts, but more often through expanded franchise, parliamentarianism, and trade 
unions. What the rise of mass politics, and especially the labor movements, managed 
to accomplish was to put “the social question” on the political map in a manner that 
could not be ignored by elites and governments. However, by the middle of the 
decade the trend toward pluralism had been blunted, if not reversed by a new 
inclination toward embracing centralization and authoritarianism in the name of law 
and order143 was manifested internationally. In Britain this reaction came to a head 
following the 1926 general strike. However, the reluctant movement toward the 
establishment of welfare state institutions continued there after the Labor Party and 
trade unions had reached a political compromise (chapter 4). In Iran, as we have 
discussed in this chapter, the complex geopolitical calculations, and perhaps an 
exaggerated fear of ‘chaos’ in the form of regional autonomous movements, laid the 
ground for the widespread support among the elite of Reza Shah’s authoritarian 
centralism.  
 In postwar Britain, the state moved toward relative accommodation with 
subaltern classes, but this flexibility at home did not carry over to her colonial 
dominions and her spheres of influence, at least not until 1929 and the passage of the 
Colonial Development Act144.  In the Middle East different authoritarian nationalist 
regimes emerged almost simultaneously in Saudi Arabia (1926), Turkey (1923-1924), 
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and Iran (1921-1926); or were assembled out of the fragments of the Ottoman Empire 
under the proto-colonial patronage of the League of Nations, like Iraq, Jordan, and 
Syria. These ‘new’ nation-states shared similar agendas in ensuring territorial 
integrity, building the institutions of the modern nation-state, embracing programs of 
bureaucratic centralization backed by a unified military apparatus145.  
As a result, Britain had few qualms in abandoning its local allies and long held 
arrangements in southern Iran in favor of supporting Reza Shah’s ruthless 
centralization because it considered the alternatives to be worse and, as we have 
discussed in this chapter, it found its own ability to engineer events and situations 
unexpectedly limited by the strength of the popular and elite resistance in Iran; its 
own economic and strategic weakness; and by the surprising extent of discord and 
disagreement within the ranks of its own policymakers. While the official argument 
was that the unsavory alternatives to Reza Shah were chaos, disintegration, and Soviet 
victory; nationalism, radical egalitarianism, and mass politics were seen as equally 
threatening to British interests. These counter-imperial movements were especially 
worriesome as they seemed to cross-fertilize across borders and contaminate the 
subject populations in the far corners of the empire146. Furthermore, after the 
establishment of the League of Nations and the principle of national self-
determination, a strategic and ideological predilection had emerged among the big 
powers toward the establishment of large scale “viable nation states” under the 
tutelage of colonial powers147. As a result, British foreign policy was relatively at ease 
abandoning its erstwhile regional allies, and committing itself to nationalist 
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centralizing elites so long as they were anti-communist, and even if they were mildly 
anti British.  
This shift toward supporting authoritarian centralization had significant 
repercussions for the local society in Khuzestan, and affected the oil operations there. 
Before a decade has passed after the end of the war the local magnates, the Bakhtiyari 
Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al, who had been closely allied to APOC and the British 
Government were either removed by the central government or had witnessed their 
political sway begin to decline permanently. However, the change was not limited to 
the removal of individual members of the local elite, but had far reaching and 
fundamental repercussions for the social and economic life in southern Iran. The 
pastoralist and tribal social relations and the political economies that were structured 
around these magnates had already been severely undermined by the devastations 
caused by the war and its aftermath. The removal of the tribal leadership, the 
increasing sway of oil capitalism and market relations, and the aggressive 
bureaucratization of everyday life as the central government began to take hold of the 
province, further accelerated the process of decline of pastoral and agrarian tribal 
societies. The institutions and practices of the modern nation state and extractive 
capitalism created new geographic and political economic webs that further connected 
southern Iran to larger national and global flows of capital and the upheavals that 
accompanied it, such as the massive movements of populations, increasingly 
marketized economic life, new administrative and institutional exercises of power, not 
to mention unfamiliar and novel scientific, political, and cultural ideas and practices. 
However, this integration came at the expense of the closure and violent demise of 
existing social and economic connections and indigenous modes of collective life. 
The historical and revolutionary changes discussed in this chapter contributed 
to the transformation of the built environment of Abadan, and fundamentally altered 
the spatial and social relations between the Oil Company, its employees and oil 
workers, the diverse local population, government bureaucrats, and British diplomats.  
By the mid 1920s APOC suddenly found itself confronted directly with the central 
government instead of Sheikh Khaz’al. Likewise, British diplomats saw their sway 
over southern Iran suddenly challenged by the bureaucracy and military 
representatives of Tehran. The populations in the fast growing oil areas such as 
Abadan were a mixture of indigenous people as well as migrants coming there pulled 
by the attraction of wage labor and a commodified economy, or pushed there by 
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destitution and the destruction of their former modes of life. The urban built 
environment of oil in Abadan was ultimately shaped by the practices and the frictions 
between these social actors, which took place in the shadow of larger global and 
national currents during this formative period.  
 
Chapter 3 
 The Oil Encounter in Khuzestan (1908-1921) 
 
Enclosures and the Assembling of the Oil Industry in Khuzestan: 
The Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) was a commercial enterprise; its 
primary purpose was to discover, produce, and sell oil and its byproducts to make a 
profit for its shareholders. As such it had little inclination to be tangled in a thick web 
of social and political obligations to local populations, its employees, or anyone else 
for that matter. Nevertheless, as is always the case with the accumulation of capital of 
any kind, the utopia of a laissez faire operation of purely technical and economic 
nature was just that. While in the 1908-1921 period the Company was making 
alliances with local magnates for protection and for access to territory for oil 
extraction and building infrastructure, the dynamic changed significantly in the next 
decade as the central government cast its authority over the province. Thereafter, 
APOC found it inevitable to become engaged in a widening web of social projects, 
ranging from education to sanitation, housing, and municipal reform, that were part of 
a protracted process of transformative social engineering with profound, and indeed 
revolutionary consequences for local society in Khuzestan. But before the emergence 
of what I call the reluctant paternalism that characterized APOC’s reorganization in 
the 1920s can be discussed (see chapter 5), we need to analyze the earlier period, 
when no such sense of social entanglements were felt by the oil prospectors and 
imperial agents that were busy revolutionizing the social and physical landscape of 
rural Khuzestan. This chapter revisits the early oil encounter between the agents of oil 
capitalism, and the local society in Khuzestan, especially the Bakhtiyari pastoralists 
of Masjed Soleyman and the tribal Arab society of Abadan. 
When the British government became an APOC majority shareholder on the 
eve of WWI, inevitably the Company became integral to the geopolitics of the British 
Empire1. The sway of its power in Khuzestan, coupled with the severe weakness of 
                                                           
1 On the long-term geopolitical connection of AIOC to the British Government and the role of oil in 
shoring up the financial system and Sterling’s global prominence see Steven Galpern, Money, Oil, and 
Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). APOC emerged as a consolidated company in 1909, having gone through 
intricate deals to combine the D’Arcy Concession, the Burma Oil Company, the Bakhtiyari Oil 
Company, and the First Exploration Oil Company. The British Government purchased 53 percent share 
in 1914. The two government-appointed directors to the board were nominally non-directing. In effect, 
Chapter 3 – The Oil Encounter in Khuzestan (1908 -1921) 
 101 
the Iranian central government, made APOC virtually behave like a sovereign 
authority well into the 1920s (chapter 2). The brazen proto-colonial exercise of power 
was exacerbated by the constant concern over German or Ottoman sabotage during 
the War, or by the mounting resistance of local populations. According to the 
Company’s official historian, APOC had imposed a “veiled protectorate in Southwest 
Persia”2, and its operations could not be described as anything but a process of 
creative destruction of the existing local society and geography3. By the end of WWI, 
Curzon acknowledged that “the allies had floated to victory on a sea of oil”; 
petroleum had become an unthinkably important strategic resource4, and the Abadan 
refinery had become a key supplier of petroleum products for the British military and 
economy, especially in the critical theaters of Middle East and Indian Ocean5.  
 
Table 1: Oil Production in Iran (000 barrels) 
1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 
2.5 8.0 12.2 23.6 33.4 61.0 88.5 98.2 118.7 125.6 135.2 158.5 
 
Source: Alexander	  Melamid,	   “The	  Geographical	  Patterns	  of	   Iranian	  Oil	  Development,”	  Economic	  
Geography	  35,	  no.	  3	  (1959):	  201 
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Oil had not been the first force of modern commercial capitalism to penetrate 
rural Khuzestan. Prior to the discovery of oil southwest Iran had been undergoing 
more than half a century of increasingly intrusive penetration of global political-
economic global forces, both commercial and proto-colonial6. The Anglo-Persian war 
of 1856-57 was fought over Afghanistan and coincided with the great Indian Mutiny, 
but it had long lasting repercussions in Khuzestan. To fight Iran’s claim to Herat the 
British military invaded Bushehr and Mohammareh under the command of General 
James Outram, who soon after returned to India to take charge of crushing the 
rebellion there. The Indian uprising of 1857 precipitated a change in British colonial 
policy and modes of governance, as the government established direct rule over a 
formal colony replacing the indirect commercial sovereignty of the East India 
Company. In Khuzestan, the superior number of Persian artillery and troops 
consisting of soldiers and local tribal levies under the command of Ehtesham al 
Saltaneh, Nasser al Din Shah’s senior uncle collapsed ignominiously due to the 
cowardice of their royal commander. The humiliation was followed by the lack of 
punishment of the commander by the Shah significantly undermined the loyalty of 
local tribal leaders to Tehran and the Court. The subsequent establishment of direct 
British military presence and dominance in the Persian Gulf shifted the balance of 
power, giving Britain a commanding voice in shaping the local politics of Southern 
Iran.7   
 From about the 1880s to the 1920s the British Government of India treated 
the Persian Gulf and southern Iran as the natural extensions and integral parts of the 
Empire, and primarily as a buffer zone against incursions by rival colonial powers 
(chapter 2). Under relentless British pressure, the local social and economic structures 
and relations of southern Iran had been increasingly undermined and reshaped by the 
opening up of the Karun river to commercial steam navigation and merchant ships, 
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and the Zagros mountain passes were made more accessible for trade with the interior 
plateau after the construction of a mule tracks trade by the Lynch Brothers Company8.  
These were important economic and social developments: In and around 
Mohammareh (later renamed Khorramshahr) and the river island of Abadan the 
growing flow of money and commerce led to shifts in agricultural patterns and the 
choice of crops. There was a steady growth in cash crops for export, such as palm 
dates, wool (mostly around Ramhormuz), rice (around Howayzeh and Maydavood), 
and opium (Dezful)9. The pastoralists of the mountainous regions of southwestern 
Iran became important suppliers of mules, drafts animals, and horses to British India, 
especially the colonial military there.  The rather decrepit village of Ahvaz on the 
Karun river, once a thriving city until constant warfare and the collapse of dams and 
irrigation works, first in the 9th and 10th centuries10, and further in the 17th and 18th 
Centuries led to its demise (see further discussion below), began to once again expand 
as a result of growing river commerce after the introduction of commercial steamship 
navigation, the establishment of the river port of Nasseri to its immediate south, and 
the completion of the Lynch road linking Ahvaz with Isfahan11.  Raising cash crops 
for export to Basra, India, the Persian Gulf, primarily for British troops and navy; and 
to the Persian interior via the Lynch road had spurred the expansion of a money 
economy, and consequently some degree of independence from the patriarchal tribal 
order by individuals who could take advantage of the growing market activities. 
Farmers leasing land to produce cash crops for sale were hard pressed, but they were 
not as dependent as herders and cash croppers who were much more at the mercy of 
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Sheikhs and landlords. At the same time, with prices being determined by an 
international market, and the subsequent reduction of food crops, farmers and local 
society had become far more vulnerable to price fluctuations. The increasing export 
of food crops from the region curtailed the available surplus, and contributed to 
famines during droughts or other crises that affected agriculture. Amidst these 
developments Khuzestan remained a desperately poor area. The relatively high 
dependence on fragile and decrepit irrigation infrastructure that needed high 
investment and organized maintenance imposed limits on commercial expansion. As 
a result the region was especially vulnerable to harsh climatic fluctuations, natural 
disasters, and devastating epidemics (see chapter 6). 
However, significant as they were, none of these earlier events had as 
transformative a role as the 1908 discovery of oil in Masjed Soleyman, an event that 
roughly overlapped with the 1906 advent of the Constitutional Revolution, and the 
ensuing political turmoil that was further exacerbated by ravages of the WWI 
(chapters 2, 5, 6)12. At the turn of the century oil had been an important, but not vital 
global resource. Its principle uses were for lighting and lubricants (chapter 4)13. As 
often happens in history war was the midwife of a new international political 
economic order, creating a demand for oil that has never been quenched since. As a 
result, Britain’s strategic position toward Iran shifted gradually but significantly, from 
considering the weak and impoverished country as a buffer state for its Indian empire, 
to a strategic asset of immense importance (chapters 2, 4, 5)14.  
Political turmoil across the region and in neighboring countries, and the 
political energies released in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, had 
created multiple centers of power among competing groups, ideologies, and 
provincial regions15. The disruptions of existing pastoralist and agrarian political 
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economies of the southwest by the penetration of commerce, oil capitalism, invading 
foreign armies, feckless and predatory khans, sheikhs, and governors, were 
compounded by drought, famine, and epidemics, to heap untold misery upon the 
ordinary population (chapters 2, 5, 6). As a result, brigandage, raids, and general 
violence had become prevalent. Arnold Wilson warned of the deteriorating situation 
in Khuzestan in 1908,  
“Sixty years ago or so there was regular traffic from Dizful to Hamadan and 
central Persia. Now tribal feuds have made traffic impossible and goods for 
central Persia must go either via the Bakhtiyari road to Isfahan, or via 
Baghdad and Kermanshah.”16 
  
This insecurity was posing a constant threat to the oil operations during a 
critical period where secure and growing supply lines had to be constructed and 
maintained, while the refinery and the shipping and export facilities were being 
established. To maintain the security of its operations in Khuzestan APOC, with the 
help of political British agents, made important alliances with local potentates, the 
Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al of Mohammareh. By the early 1920s, APOC 
and the British government were running Khuzestan as a virtually independent region, 
a situation that began to cause increasing apprehension among urban Iranian 
nationalists. The perception of national impotence and mounting resentment over the 
declining effectiveness of the administrative apparatus of the state flamed resentment 
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among nationalist elites, prompting a search to identify the causes of what they 
perceived as the chronic weakness of ‘the nation’. Thus anything associated with the 
putatively constructed notion of  ‘the traditional’ – such as religion/Islam, the 
clergy/ulama, pastoral tribes, etc. – was identified as a causal problem, and seen as the 
regressive elements of society and of  ‘culture’ that were acting as obstacles to 
scientific modernization along the progressive model of the modern nation state17. 
This notion was articulated unabashedly by Hassan Taqizadeh, one of the 
most prominent constitutionalist leaders and intellectuals, himself a former religious 
seminary student from Azarbaijan, who ended up advocating an unconditional 
acceptance of European models of education, science, and economic and social norms 
and practices: “Iran must become Europeanized, in appearance and in essence, 
physically and spiritually”18. On the other hand, establishing a powerful and effective 
modern central state came to be seen as the solution, and a necessary instrument of 
modernizing the nation and overcoming these weaknesses and resisting exploitation 
by colonial powers or internal enemies19. 
 
Land, Property, and Social Relations in the Bakhtiyari: 
According to Kaveh Bayat and Stephanie Cronin, the period after the 
Constitutional Revolution through WWI and the fall of the Qajar dynasty in 1925 was 
the juncture where pastoral nomads who at the time formed more than a quarter of the 
total population of the country were framed by modernizing nationalists and urban 
Iranians as a ‘problem’ and one of the main obstacles to the progress of the country; 
one that the nationalists believed could be resolved only through confrontation, since 
the tribes were mobile and military forces with a high sense of political entitlement. 
This sense of entitlement was rooted in a political history where the vast majority of 
the royal dynasties that had ruled had pastoralist origins, or relied in some form on the 
                                                           
17 This was a common feature of nationalism in North Africa, and Western and Southern Asia. See for 
example Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993); Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton University Press, 1993); Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000); Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle 
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18 Quoted in Ali Gheissari, Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1998), 41. 
19  Ibid., 13–60. 
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tribal military coalitions to consolidate and enforce their rules20. The solution required 
the eventual elimination of tribes, perhaps not as a population but as social and 
military units, to pave the way for the effective monopoly of coercion in the hands of 
the central state, whose ultimate project was to forge a modern nation state out of the 
heterogeneous population of Iran21.  
The emergence of  “the tribal question” and “the tribal problem” (see chapter 
1 for the clarification of the term “tribal”), and the alliance of various tribal leaders 
with Britain and APOC were among the key motivations for the support that Reza 
Khan received from modernist nationalists in the 1920s (chapters 2, 5,6,7). The close 
relationships, contractual deals, and controversial alliances between the Bakhtiyari 
Khans, Sheikh Khaz’al, and APOC have been well covered by other scholars, so I 
will refrain from repeating all the details and simply provide a brief sketch22. 
However, I will engage in a more detailed discussion of the collective relations of 
production and social reproduction between the Bakhtiyaris and the tribal Arabs of 
Mohammareh and Abadan with the land and their physical geography, and how the 
rise of oil capitalism and the changing property relations that were ushered in after 
1909 affected these.  
The contractual deals between APOC and the Bakhtiyari Khans were centered 
on land transfers in Masjed Soleyman and the Bakhtiyari highlands, and for the 
provision of unskilled labor, as well as guards for the armed protection for pipelines 
                                                           
20 Richard Tapper, “The Tribes in 18th and 19th Century Iran,” in Cambridge History of Iran, From 
Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, vol. 7, 7 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
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21 Kaveh Bayat, “Riza Shah and the Tribes,” in The Making of Modern Iran, ed. Stephanie Cronin 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 213–19; Stephanie Cronin, “Re-Interpreting Modern Iran: Tribe and State 
in the Twentieth Century,” Iranian Studies 42, no. 3 (June 2009): 357–88; Jean Pierre Digard, “Les 
Nomades et l’Etat Central en Iran: Quelques Enséignements d’un Long Passé d’Hostilité 
Reglementée’,” Peuples Méditerranéens, no. 7 (1979): 37–53. 
22 See  Alireza Abtahi, Naft va Bakhtiyari-ha (Tehran: Moassesseh Motale’at Tarikh-e Mo’aser-e Iran, 
1985); Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs: A History of the Bakhtiyari Tribe in Iran; Stephanie Cronin, The 
Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921-41 (London: Routledge, 2003); 
Arnold T Wilson, A Precis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 
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The archival records of British Petroleum at University of Warwick contain the following files 
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and other Oil Company facilities. In exchange, four senior khans were allocated a 
three percent share in the newly established Bakhtiyari Oil Company, along with a 
series of negotiated cash payments and loans, in addition to assurances given to them 
regarding British support for the maintenance of their personal autonomy against the 
central government after the war23. No provision or guarantee from either party was 
made to insure that the sale and privatization of the collective tribal land should 
benefit the entire tribe, and not only the khans and their closest allies and clients. 
When in 1926, during re-negotiations with the central government Arnold Wilson, 
then Company Director in Mohammareh, was asked about the dispossession of rank 
and file Bakhtiyari as a result of this agreement, he replied that back in 1911 the 
central government had been weak and the khans strong. The D’Arcy Concession had 
given some questionable and fuzzy freedom of action to the Oil Company to enter 
negotiations with the Khans, which it had on at least seven occasions between 1905 
and 192524. Not making any distinction between the British government and the 
private Oil Company (after all the key negotiations had taken place interchangeably 
by government agents speaking and acting for the Company), Wilson displayed no 
sentimental loyalty to the erstwhile allies: 
“We had to adapt ourselves to the situation, and pay the khans, but this does 
not negate the government’s claim to the land. Second, our agreement with the 
khans makes them directly responsible to the tribes. If they have not paid them 
it is their fault. We could only negotiate with the khans, not with the entire 
tribe. The Ilkhan and the Ilbeg were in turn responsible to pay the other 
khans”25. 
 
Although the land leased in Masjed Soleyman from the Bakhtiyaris was 
formally “only” 20 square miles of supposedly waterless and arid scrub situated in the 
rugged highlands of Zagros, nevertheless it had a vital role to play in the Bakhtiyari 
collective and pastoral political economy. The adventurer and intelligence gatherer 
Henri Layard, who travelled to the region in disguise in mid 19th century, and whose 
romantic travelogue inspired successive generations of Victorian and colonial visitors, 
wrote of Masjed Soleyman, “There is no spot in Khuzistan [in the original] to which 
                                                           
23 Ferrier, History of the British Petroleum Company, 1:114–128. See also previous footnote 
24 The text of the D’Arcy concession is available in Ibid., 1:640–646. 
25	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so many legends attach as to the Musjedi-Suleiman, and it is looked upon by the Lurs 
as a place of peculiar sanctity”26. Nor was the land as desolate and barren as the 
prospecting oilmen wanted it to be. A brief analysis of the social and legal structure of 
the Il can provide an insight into the frictions that ensued between the Oil Company, 
the Bakhtiyari Khans, and the rank and file women and men of the Il. 
Migrating pastoralists were organized in clans and sub-clans; in the case of the 
Bakhtiyari these were called Tayefeh, Tireh, Tosh; each under white beards (Rish 
Sefid), headman (Kadkhoda), chief (Kalantar), and higher Khans27. Since the 19th 
century the Qajar central state, which was itself of Turkoman tribal origin, was 
increasingly feeble and unable to project authority across its territory. As a solution it 
had adopted and continued the medieval practice of Iqta’, or the bestowal and the 
farming out (pending on the period and context) of territories and regional 
governorships in exchange for tax collection and military levies28. It had also 
continued the Safavid practice of organizing the tribes into confederacies and, in the 
case of Bakhtiyaris, claiming the right to appoint the Ilkhan and the Ilbeg the two 
paramount chieftains, as the means of ruling through proxy by confirming leaders 
who were from among the tribal aristocracy, but through their appointment by the 
state became go betweens, and effectively dependent on it for their status; a situation 
that made them vulnerable to manipulation and internal rivalries fostered by Tehran29.   
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Regarding access to land and territory, the Bakhtiyari system operated along a 
collective system of reciprocity and mutual access to pasture that had significant 
internal variations and geographic flexibility and fluidity built into it. Ilya 
Petroshevsky, the Soviet orientalist who studied medieval land tenure systems under 
the Mongol Ilkhans, describes the system as essentially a hybrid of feudal rules and 
collective patriarchal arrangements where,  
“…Legally pasture, or ‘yurt’ was collectively owned by the tribe and its 
leaders. The use of pasture was collective… migration and pasturing of 
livestock were collective activities. Although the Amir (leader) of the tribe, 
his immediate entourage and lieutenants, and the elders of the Il controlled 
pasture land and exercised authority over it and led the seasonal migration, 
nevertheless they did not dare prohibit their followers from using pastureland, 
or to sell the pasture, or in one way or another transfer its ownership to 
outsiders. These lands were transferred together with the office and the title of 
the leader of the tribe, clans, and sub-sections… this type of feudal 
landownership was integral to the military and political structure, and the 
social organization of the pastoralists. It was also conditional on their 
reciprocal obligations to supply military levies and the performance of other 
Iqta’ duties [to the hierarchy of the Il and also to the central state]”30 
   
In other words, within this general system, which had considerable historical 
and regional variations, the Khans performed a double function, as intermediaries 
between the tribal confederacy (Il) and the central state, as well as a vital role of 
internal leadership and coordination within a heterogeneous and highly diverse, 
martial, and mobile population. The relationship of ordinary Bakhtiyaris with their 
khans was one of mutual dependence, not of pure hierarchy31. At least until the period 
under study the power of the khans depended, especially when it came to internal 
tribal relations and rivalries, on the support they could garner among the rank and 
file32.  
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“I went to see the Bakhtiyari Khans at Ab-bid on the Karun River above 
Shushtar. Big men with big escorts and small minds – but able as no one else 
to keep the tribes they govern from fighting with each other or, to any 
considerable extent, with their neighbors. Their faults are many, but they have 
made it possible for the Oil Company to develop their Oilfield at Masjid 
Sulaiman without a day’s interruption of work. That would have been quite 
impossible anywhere else in Persia, except, of course, Arabistan 
[Khouzestan], where the Shaikh of Mohammerah [Khaz’al] is supreme. My 
only fear is that their ambitions may lead them into courses which they have 
not the strength or inward unity to pursue to a successful conclusion”33 
  
While the Bakhtiyaris were the subject of extensive orientalist studies by 
successive British political agents and scholars from mid 19th century to the 1920s;  
recent ethnographies and historical anthropologies by more critical post-colonial 
scholars, as well as a number of social histories written by the leaders and scholars 
from among the Il itself, have recast the complex internal social relations of the Il into 
a less instrumental and more historical framework34.  A brief summary of the findings 
from this more recent scholarship provides a better general picture of the social 
conditions of the Il when the oil encounter with APOC took place in the first decades 
of the 20th century. 
At the turn of the 20th century, the Bakhtiyaris were divided into two major 
branches, Haft Lang and Chahar Lang, that together constituted the largest tribal 
confederacy in Iran in terms of population. Predominantly pastoralists, they were 
inclined to shun all trades and crafts, nor in general would they inter-marry with 
outsiders engaged in commerce, industry, or urban economic activities. Highly 
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mobile and migratory, their economy depended on trade of wool and meat in 
exchange for other necessities, making it a symbiotic relationship with townspeople 
and settled villagers. This did not mean that Bakhtiyaris did not engage in agriculture, 
as many cultivated separate plots of land in their winter and summer quarters. 
However, since the rhythm of sowing and harvest did not always correspond with 
those of pastures and livestock grazing, agriculture was kept limited, in order not to 
compromise the priority of mobile animal husbandry.  
This pattern changed dramatically under the impact of three major historical 
events: First came the intrusion of oil capitalism from 1909, which privatized 
substantial pastoral territories, undermined and delegitimized the vital coordinating 
role of the Khans in settling disputes and organizing migrations, and created an urban 
wage labor market that increasingly monetized economic relations to the detriment of 
the pastoral economy. Second, came the increasing intrusion of the central 
government, especially after 1922 (see chapter 2), and the subsequent imposition of 
universal military conscription, and the registration of all tribal territory as khaleseh 
or state land. This process culminated in the violent forced settlement of tribes in 
villages after 193335. Last, came the nationalization of all pastures during the White 
Revolution of the 1960s, which effectively forced the remaining pastoralists to 
register their livestock and obtain government permits, a process that excluded those 
members of the Il who had meanwhile settled into permanent agriculture. Meanwhile, 
the developments in transportation, and increased security imposed by the military 
and gendarmerie, had led to the effective disarmament of the Il and a reduction of 
their ability to control territory and their seasonal migratory movements. The 
expansion of an urban economy also posed heavy pressure on their pastoral 
economies as imported meat and wool products forced many to either revert to 
permanent agriculture as a supplement for subsistence, or to seek wage labor or urban 
employment as alternative means of existence36. 
Thus Bakhtiyari economy and society were always influenced by and had to 
adapt to the flow of external factors, and were never as insular as portrayed by many 
orientalists, colonial scholars, and romantic writers of the period. However, this still 
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begs the question of the internal relations of property and economic activity within 
the Il37. The Bakhtiyaris had strict internal rules in place to regulate the number of 
livestock, the use of pasture, and the maintenance of an intricate balance of power 
among various groups and individuals when it came to overgrazing or intrusions upon 
adjoining territories. The role of clan, section, and tribal leaders were essential in 
maintaining political equilibrium, managing disputes, coordinating intricate 
migrations and geographic movements, and preventing frictions from breaking into 
open conflict in a spatially fluid social system.      
During the early years after the discovery of oil APOC officials and British 
diplomats were hard at work trying to determine land ownership patterns and units of 
land measurement to evaluate property prices around the Fields (this was the general 
Company designation for all areas under its control outside Abadan) for oil wells, 
Company buildings and facilities, pipeline routes, pumping stations, telegraph and 
telephone lines, road networks, and a Company railroad, in order to draw up separate 
agreements with the Bakhtiyaris. The Il, on the other hand, had an intricate system of 
property designation in place that did not correspond to the liberal private property 
laws, but nevertheless was integral to the operation of its economy. In 1973 the 
anthropologist Asqar Karimi was granted a rare access to study old property deeds 
and land transfer contracts (Qabalehjat, Bonchaq) in the Bakhtiyari, some dating back 
to the 17th century, that had been the basis of landholdings by groups and property 
transfers between individuals. These contracts are written on paper (not a widely 
available material among the mobile pastoralists), and cite the names of the seller and 
the buyer (first name and the name of the father), clarify the free will of the seller in 
voluntarily undertaking the sale or the transfer, define the characteristics of the land 
(orchard, building, irrigated plot, dry land, fallow, mountain land, pasture, etc.), its 
specific boundaries38, and its size (variable according to local units of measurement)39. 
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The price of land, and the extent of authority over its further disposal are specified 
(“the buyer can sell at will, or retain the property, he [assuming the buyers were male] 
is sovereign”); and each contract is dated and sealed by a mirza (professional notary 
or secretary) or whoever had drawn the contract; as well as the buyer, the seller, and 
the witnesses. 
Of course the notion of “specific boundaries” are very different in various 
legal regimes of property. The present day prevalent Lockean liberal notion of 
absolute private property, based on cadastral surveys, registered deeds, and the 
precise designation of specific and finite boundaries, is very different from the far 
more flexible, yet equally enforced and legally binding, notions of property used in 
non-capitalist agrarian or pastoralist systems40. Here is an example from a property 
title (Qabaleh) issued in 1602 by Ilkhan Imamqoli Khan Bakhtiyari to the sub-clan 
(Tosh) Sadeqi of the Hasanvand clan (Tireh) of the Mouri tribe (Tayefeh) who, at the 
time, did not possess their own pasture:  
“The first boundary is from the outflow of the Water Springs. From there 
proceed from [mountain] ridge to ridge until you reach the Snowline on to 
Tent Pitch Ridge, from there veer right until you reach the trail to the Edged 
Ridge, from there proceed from ridge to ridge until you reach the highland of 
Cotton Planting under Sunlight, from there follow ridge to ridge until you 
reach Do Shouran Sachmeh-ha (where the pellets are double washed [?]). 
[This territory] I am granting for pasture and feeding of livestock to the price 
of 30 Touman. They [the grantees] can sell it or keep it as they wish; the 
proprietor is sovereign”41. 
 
In other words, the locally recognizable and individually named natural 
characteristics of the landscape, especially the more permanent features that are less 
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prone to quick shifts with climatic or ecological change, set the boundaries of 
property claims, and not the geometrically surveyed, mapped, fenced, and visibly 
demarcated straight lines of the cadastral survey that characterize the outlines of the 
contemporary private property of the industrial era. However, the point to emphasize 
is that the Il as a collective claimed the entire Bakhtiyari territory:  
“In both winter (sardsir) and summer (garmsir) territories each tribe (qabileh) 
has its own specific pastures, and pitches its tents there. The boundaries of 
each section have been demarcated with white stones from ancient times, and 
according to established customs moving the stones are prohibited…The 
entire Bakhtiyari territory is demarcated and subdivided among sections, and 
each section has further divided its territory among its members. Usually, the 
owner of specific plots is the person who has brought irrigation and water 
there at his own expense”42. 
 
Contrary to pasture, which was open land that was collectively subdivided but 
had not been improved by human labor, specific plots could become individual 
properties once human labor and capital investment had been expended on their 
improvement, especially by bringing water there. This system of landownership was 
neither permanent nor a-historical, as property relations had been changing 
incessantly through warfare, inheritance, land grants and redistributions, marriage 
alliances, as well as monetary negotiations and exchanges. The relative power of 
individual khans or clans at various historical junctures played an important role in a 
spatially fluid system that was often open to coercive redistribution of claims to 
territory. According to Jafar Qoli Khan Rostami, the clan patriarch (Kalantar) of the 
Babayii tribe (Tayefeh) in the 1970s: 
“From the easternmost winter region (sardsir) of the Bakhtiyari to its 
westernmost summer territory (garmsir) there is not a single “hand-width” 
(vajab) of land without its own property deed (bonchaq), and whose 
ownership is uncertain”43      
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Thus, while on the surface and in the gaze of oil prospectors the Bakhtiyari 
territory seemed desolate, empty, and a wasteland, its boundaries fuzzy or non-
existent, its ownership questionable, and its price nominal at best, in fact this was a 
highly demarcated territory that operated along its own intricate rules and laws of 
property. The territory of each section belonged to the entire section. Within each 
section individuals had claims to specific pieces of territory, which they could trade or 
sell with neighbors and other members of the section, but not to outsiders, unless 
written permission had been obtained from all section members. In other words, any 
transfer of property to outsiders was a collective decision that was documented within 
an established legal framework. Further intricate rules governed internal exchanges of 
land, which were not necessarily based on money changing hands. If someone wanted 
to use another’s pasture they had to obtain formal permission for a specific duration. 
When crossing other sections’ territory during migration the maximum right of stay 
on pasture was a day and a night. In case of emergencies, such as disputes, raids, 
theft, or illness, a migrating group could linger for 2 days and nights, or for one week 
to allow time for the sick to get well. To build a house on somebody else’s land a 
pledge of alliance and cooperative labor was demanded. The redistribution of land to 
those with not enough was common, and was undertaken sometimes in exchange for 
money, other times for a share of the grain, or other arrangements. In the Kouhrang 
region whoever had irrigated land had the right to claim an equivalent measure of dry 
land to go with it44. The permutations were many, the flexibility considerable, but the 
intricate rules and regulations were in place, binding everyone from the tip of the 
social power pyramid to its base.    
 
Enclosures and Oil Capitalism in the Bakhtiyariland: 
The creative destruction that was ushered in with oil capitalism, and the 
construction of the modern nation-state undermined these mutual and collective, but 
also hierarchical, patriarchal, and unequal relations of property, and the balance of 
political power that underlined their continuation. It allowed the senior most khans to 
benefit personally from the privatization of the collective land and resources of the 
tribe, effectively at the expense of their followers. During the reign of Reza Shah 
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some of the Khans were physically eliminated in the 1930s as part of the strategy of 
centralization by destroying competing regional centers of power; but most, and their 
descendants, became ordinary landlords or joined the rising urban bourgeoisie.45 
The right of different clans to specific pastures, and especially the migration 
routes and passages allotted to families and specific clans (tireh) were vital 
components of an intricate, collective, and martial social system that had adapted 
itself to a harsh climate and terrain, by using the land seasonally. In the plains of 
Masjed Soleyman oil fields sprawled across spring pastures and the migratory routes 
of several clans. The pipelines and access roads cut across and disrupted territories 
that were used seasonally. The agreement with the Oil Company called for hiring of 
Bakhtiyari guards to effectively police their fellow tribesmen from resisting or 
disrupting Company operations that were undermining the pastoral economy and 
social structures. At the same time, the employment of wage laborers from among 
male tribesmen began depriving clans at critical times of the year of the manpower 
vitally necessary for seasonal sowing, shepherding, or other seasonal agrarian, 
pastoral, or martial duties (more on this in chapter 7)46.  This issue became more 
pressing especially after 1926, when the Company began the long-term push to 
replace casual, anonymous, and temporary hires with permanent and more technically 
trained workers (see chapters 5, 6).  
The privatization of collective Bakhtiyari territory dispossessed the rank and 
file pastoralists, immiserated many, and undermined the Confederacy’s collective 
social structures. A similar story unfolded with other pastoralists of southern Zagros, 
such as the Bahmayii, Kohkiluyeh, Mamasani, etc. who did not have a contract with 
Oil Company, but whose economies and social military structures were also quickly 
affected by the devastations of WWI; the growing impact of money and market 
relations throughout southern Iran caused by rising demand for opium, pack animals, 
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and grain47; and eventually the incursion of the central state. In the Bakhtiyari 
territories some kalantars (chieftains) emerged as established landlords, or 
consolidated their position by joining the Oil Company as recruiters and labor 
contractors. Others settled, either voluntarily or coercively, became farmers, or joined 
the bureaucracy. A few have continued the pastoral ways to the present. But most 
were proletarianized and flooded into oil towns (Aghajari, Gachsaran, Naft-e Sefid, 
Haftgel), ports (Khorramshahr/Mohammareh, Mahshahr), administrative cities 
(Ahvaz), railroad towns (Andimeshk, Doroud). Many joined the oil company as 
unskilled laborers, guards, and domestic servants swelling the population of Abadan 
and other oil company towns. 
This process was already clear to British agents stationed in Khuzestan at the 
time, like Arnold Wilson, or to insightful Oil Company employees like Dr. M. Young, 
the famous Company doctor, who were instrumental in finalizing the land agreements 
with the Bakhtiyari48. In 1911 Wilson described the pastoral world of Fars and Zagros 
as a fragmented geography where “every valley is a social unit with its own leaders 
and headmen, its own reserves of grain, its own traditions. Civilization here is of 
ancient antiquity”, but he went on to predict its demise. In Fars,  
“The Qavam family [of the Khamseh Confederacy] were no longer in control 
of the Arabs, the day would come when Saulat [Dowleh, the Ilkhan] would no 
longer control the Qashqai. Both tribes were well-armed and not easy to 
control except at the expense of a third party, viz. the villagers. Government 
by tribes and by great families was at an end: the system had broken down. 
What was needed was government by a government – the Persian 
Government.” 
 
Wilson went on to repeat the trope about pastoralists being little better than 
bandits, but in the process captured in his usual incisive way something of the 
political reality that had engulfed southern Iran during the first decades of the new 
century: 
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 “Life for a tribesman was hard and getting harder: Their leaders robbed them 
and were in turn fleeced by more rapacious governors; the tribesmen robbed each 
other, or villagers, travelers or merchants. No one cared to build, or even to sow more 
than he needed, lest he be deprived of the fruits of his labor... In Modern Persia the 
rifle is a scepter and every rifleman is a Shah”49. 
 
Establishing Masjed Soleyman as a Company Mining Town 
 
 From the beginning of the oil industry in 1908, the access and control over 
“the Fields”, which included the proto urban zones and settlements that grew around 
oil wells, pumping stations, and service centers for pipelines and transport and 
communication lines servicing the oil industry, were treated jealously by the Oil 
Company, sometimes to the point of paranoia. When Wilhelm Wassmus, the German 
consul at Bushehr went for an unannounced visit to Masjed Soleyman in 1910 he was 
stopped by the Company’s Bakhtiyari guards, and expelled from the region “looking 
very disconsolate”50. The entire region surrounding Masjed Soleyman was treated as 
simply off limit to anyone, and assiduously guarded as a protected enclave by APOC. 
By the onset of WWI the entire gepgraphy of the region had been transformed at 
breakneck speed:  
“In July 1915 I …visited the oilfields after an absence of a year. I did 60 miles 
by car, a new experience, and the last 30 through the hills on horseback. The 
changes made in a year are astonishing, even to me: the great 8-inch pipeline 
runs over two ranges of hills; a motor road will soon be complete. The cart 
track is far better than before. Houses are being built and store rooms, 
workshops, and new rigs…my friend Dr Young is more than ever the 
presiding genius, with a larger hospital and some good subordinates”51 
 
The agreement with the Bakhtiyaris had been difficult to reach and fraught 
with discord. There were intense internal feuds within the various branches of the 
Bakhtiyari threatening any unified agreement that may be reached52. A number of 
maverick khans who felt left out, objected to the whole deal and resorted to eventual 
sabotage. Parviz Khan Gondozlu who owned the land around Dar Khazineh near the 
landing jetties on the upper Karun,  
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“Prevented the Company from importing grain and straw, requiring them to 
buy from him at exorbitant price. He demanded 80 krans a month for guards, 
which the other Bakhtiyari Khans were prepared to provide for 60 krans, and 
when theft occurred in his district and under the noses of his guards he 
invariably repudiated responsibility”53. 
 
Nor was the deal entirely amenable to APOC and the British government, who 
felt they could have done better. George Reynolds, the head engineer who had 
discovered the fields of Masjed Soleyman, had conducted the initial negotiations in 
1905, during which he had signed an agreement committing the Company to pay for 
“uncultivated land”, despite the terms of the D’Arcy Concession, which made all such 
land freely available. At the time of his prospecting, Reynolds had had very little 
choice, but now he was being blamed for committing the Company to pay more than 
it should have, and he was eventually fired from his position54. Company directors in 
London, and British diplomats in Tehran, who had not been present in Khuzestan 
when the difficult explorations were going on, now that oil had been discovered 
against all odds and amidst great challenges, felt that Reynolds had been criminally 
negligent and naïve by obligating the Company to pay twice the royalties, to the 
Bakhtiyari landowners as well as to the Iranian government55.    
 The greatest frictions came with the central government in Tehran, which 
from the onset rejected the separate deals mediated by Percy Loraine on behalf of the 
British Government between the Bakhtyari Khans and APOC; but it had been simply 
too powerless to do anything about it. Aside from rejecting the legitimacy of the 
Bakhtiyari Oil Company and the land deal between the Company and the Bakhtiyari 
Khans, there was a distinct sense in Tehran that Masjed Soleyman had become 
effectively an occupied territory where APOC was running its mysterious affairs with 
open impunity, and with the collusion of the local magnates56. This resentment 
colored most official reports by the Kargozars (local attachés of the Foreign Ministry, 
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under whose jurisdiction APOC affairs were placed) to their superiors in Tehran 
regarding the goings on in the oil fields; and it left a lasting imprint on how relations 
developed between the Company and the state administration in Khuzestan.  For 
example, in 1911 the Kargozar reported to the Foreign Ministry “The Company is 
installing telephone and telegraph pylons in Masjed Soleyman and Braim. It has hired 
more than 300 Ottoman and Indian workers…it is building roads and a railroad and 
confiscating state land as well as the private properties of Qiri Sadats [emphasis 
added]”57. In 1923 the provincial governor Entezam al-Saltaneh reported to his 
superiors in the Interior Ministry that the Company was acting like a sovereign state, 
controlling who comes and goes to the area: “A number of people from Shiraz have 
asked to be allowed to work and do business in Masjed Soleyman, but the Company 
has refused”58. Five years later, in 1928, the situation hadn’t changed, and the 
Company simply refused to allow freedom of passage to the fields for anyone it 
disapproved59.  
A major controversy erupted in July 1926 when 500 local shopkeepers and 
business owners in Masjed Suleiman brought a formal complaint against APOC to the 
Majles for having set fire to the town’s bazaar. This coincided with similar waves of 
violent evictions instigated by the Company in Abadan during the same period as it 
was trying to build a modern and sanitary bazaar there (chapter 6). The plaintiffs 
claimed the Company had ordered them to evict the area before starting the fire, 
which had destroyed 51 shops and caused 150 thousand Touman damage. The 
attorney for the victims had to plead with the Foreign Ministry to coerce the Company 
to submit to Iranian judiciary rules regarding compensation60.  
Effectively the Company treated Masjed Soleyam as its exclusive enclave, and 
referred to the terms of the D’Arcy concession to justify its claim61. The army’s 
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incursion in 1924 sparked momentary concern regarding the fate of the land contracts 
that had been established between the Company and the Bakhtiyaris and Sheikh 
Khaz’al; but Reza Khan alleviated those fears, at least for the time being. It turned out 
Khaz’al had moved all his Farmans (royal decrees) to Basra for safekeeping. The 
Company obtained copies and made sure they were all in order.  
“The government made no attempt to interfere with the Company’s title to its 
lands, and it was arranged later in 1925 that all rents that were payable to the 
Sheikh should be paid in future direct to the Ministry of Finance…Reza 
Khan’s visit to Masjid-i-Sulaiman and Abadan in December 1924 was a 
complete success and he was much impressed with the Company’s 
achievements and prospects. While at Fields he gave orders for adequate 
security measures to be taken for the Company’s geological parties in the 
Qilab and Khalafabad areas.”62 
  
After its ascendance in the 1920s, and the elimination of the local magnates, 
the central government left the control of security and administration of Masjed 
Soleyman to the Company; although their arrangements with the Bakhtiyaris for labor 
procurement and guard duty was gradually undermined, first by the appointment of 
army officers as security supervisors, and eventually by transferring the entire 
security and policing operations out of Bakhtiyari hands and under the control of the 
military. In March 1926, amidst mounting tensions caused by the resistance of local 
populations to the municipal changes being imposed by the Company in Abadan, the 
central government sent a fact finding mission to Khuzestan headed by an envoy, Mr. 
Nasr, to report on the goings on in the oil areas (see chapter 6): 
“ In Masjed Soleyman some 200 oil wells have been sunk, but only 14-16 
work. There is water nearby, but [a powerful merchant] Hajji Moin alTujjar 
claims ownership - I have not seen his Royal Grant (Farman) to that effect - 
and has made an agreement [to lease right of passage] with the company. 
Masjed Soleyman has ten districts [provides a list] and there are 20 thousand 
Lur and Bakhtiyari workmen. The Company has laid the ground and provides 
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all necessities and stores. In addition there are also two peddling shops that 
belong to an Armenian and an Indian. There is a hospital nearby. The paved 
road is also leased from Moin al-Tujjar.”63 
 
 Nasr was alarmed by the state of affairs in Masjed Soleyman and at the extent 
of the Company’s autonomy, and became suspicious of the collusion of local 
merchants and the Bakhtiyaris with APOC. Regarding the Bakhtiyari guards he 
reported,  
“The Governor of Masjed Soleyman is a Bakhtiyari named Sardar Khan who 
has 50 armed foot soldiers and cavalry, and receives a monthly stipend of 
10,054 Qrans. The Bakhtiyari Ilkhani and Ilbeigi receive annually £2,100 
form the Oil Company for maintaining order. In my opinion these funds 
should be paid directly to the central government now that it is strong enough 
to safeguard the installations of the Company. The Policemen are also 
Bakhtiyari… In addition APOC pays tax to Britain [but not to Iran]”64 
 
 
After the 1921 coup d’état the Bakhtiyari khans became increasingly 
apprehensive about the growing incursions of the central government and the 
objections it was raising to the dividends they were receiving from the joint oil 
company they had established with APOC and the annual £3,000 the Company paid 
for Bahtiyari guards to protect the Fields. The Company paid £900 of this sum 
directly to the Head Guard at Masjed Soleyman, the rest was divided among the 
senior Khans with the implicit understanding that its further distribution among the 
tribe was their responsibility. The four major Khans who were signatories of the 
original contracts with APOC were politically at odds with each other, and all were 
heavily in debt. They had used the revenue from the Bakhtiyari Oil Company to 
establish themselves as urban landlords, thus incurring the resentment and wrath of 
the of the Confederacy and the rank and file members of the Il. Furthermore they 
were old men, and the changing political situation did not bode well for an effective 
generational transition in a highly fragmented and personalized political system.  
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APOC began changing the terms of its contracts with the Bakhtiyaris by using 
the leverage of the heavy debts that the Khans had incurred. It obtained their consent 
to integrate the Bakhtiyari Oil Company within the APOC, thus ending its nominal 
legal status. It then forced the Khans to pledge their company shares as well as their 
dividends as security for receiving further loans. The expenses the Khans were 
incurring for providing lavish gifts for the upcoming coronation of Reza Shah in 1926 
further reduced their bargaining ability. Between 1925 and 1937 the combination of 
arrear taxes, escalating debts, new national laws that declared all customary tribal 
land as state property, and the elimination of the offices of Ilkhan and Ilbeg by the 
new government, which eliminated the authority of the Khans to sell collective tribal 
land to the Company, significantly reduced their remaining authority. In 1933-1934 
Reza Shah moved to physically eliminate all the senior khans, including those who 
had allied with him and were serving his government65. By then, however, the 
political and economic structures of the tribal social order had been so hollowed out 
that the Il could no longer muster any effective collective and unified resistance, 
although local insurrections and regional clashes persisted even after the WW2.   
As for the important function of guard duty for the Oil Company that had been 
a fief of the Bakhtiyaris and integral to the Il’s relation with the Oil Company from 
the onset, for a while both APOC and the Government thread more carefully. For the 
time being APOC kept paying the Khans the annual  £3,000 for maintaining guards at 
Masjed Soleyman.  The Government also did not stir the waters too much, although it 
made its presence unmistakably felt. The 1925 Reza Khan’s visit to the Fields was 
soon followed by the new military governor, Sartip Fazlullah Khan [Zahedi, the 
future leader of the 1953 coup d’état] who appointed his nephew as “military 
observer”, under strict orders not to interfere with the guarding arrangements of the 
Bakhtiyaris. Nevertheless, the nephew proceeded to do exactly that, and in the 
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process “incurred the animosity of the Bakhtiyari Head Guard as he prevented him 
from extorting money from shopkeepers and others”. The outraged Khans appealed to 
Reza Khan, who assured them that “no change was contemplated ‘at present’. The 
Military Representative at Fields was there merely to support the tribal authorities”66.  
However, soon the situation began to change. As the remarkably productive 
oil fields of Masjed Soleyman began to decline in productivity, newly discovered oil 
fields, also located in the highlands of the Bakhtiyari country, were brought online at 
Haftgel and Gachsaran in 1928, and Aghajari in 193867. Guard duty for these new 
lucrative fields was no longer assigned to the Bakhtiyaris, but to the military. 
However, the army was instructed to hire as many local guards from among the 
Bakhtiyari as it saw fit, although under the command of army officers68. “In 1927, the 
fortunes of the Khans were decidedly on the decline”69 and the Government had 
assumed direct control of all provincial affairs, including in Bakhtiyari territory. The 
Company tried to mediate a working solution, especially regarding Masjed Soleyman.  
“During the period of Company activity in Masjed Soleyman the security of 
the area has been entrusted to the Bakhtiyari Ilkhani. A Head Guard from the 
Bakhtiyari Tribe, who resides in Masjed Soleyman, hired local guards from 
various local clans of the Tribe for guard duty, and the Company paid their 
salaries. In the past three years a junior army officer along with a few soldiers 
have also been stationed there, although thus far the said officer has not been 
responsible for the security of the Company operations. Since recently the 
Government has appointed a governor for Masjed Soleyman, and the area is 
now under the direct control of the Central Government, which has expressed 
its decision to eradicate Bakhtiyari rule in Masjed Soleyman, the issue of the 
security of the region must be reviewed. We prose either of two solutions. 
Either the Government should appoint a Military Governor and take direct 
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responsibility for security, or a civilian official should be appointed under the 
Provincial Governor. In either case, it is still necessary to continue the 
employment of tribal guards from various local clans who have the right of 
pasture [emphasis added]”70. 
 
To my knowledge this is the first instance in the archival materials I have 
investigated where the Company relations with the Bakhtiyaris are acknowledged not 
as contracts between two clearly designated individual parties, as in liberal contract 
laws; but where   one of the parties is recognized as a collective entity with customary 
rights to space and to the productive economic activity predicated on that territory. 
However, the dispossession of the Bakhtiyari collective economy had been already 
under way since the initial deals that their Khans had begun making with the oil 
prospectors and the British Government from 1909.  
Later that year (1929) a major tribal insurrection erupted across southern and 
western Iran, which was eventually suppressed by the army71. In 1932 further strife 
occurred among the Bakhtiyaris against their khans who “had failed to pass onto other 
beneficiaries the sums to which they were entitled”. In 1934, after having eliminated 
their paramount leaders, the government abolished the posts of Ilkhani and Ilbeigi 
(the paramount positions within the tribal confederacy), and appointed its own choice 
Morteza Qoli Khan as the Governor of Bakhtiyari. There ensued minor skirmishes 
between the army and rank and file Bakhtiyaris, and in the process some of the 
Company’s installations were sabotaged. In reaction to these developments,  
“The Head Guard [in Masjed Soleyman] was dismissed and the armed 
Bakhtiyari Guards were replaced by a detachment of the Amniyeh [security 
police or Gendarmerie]. This detachment was placed under Jahanshah Khan, 
the son of Morteza Qoli Khan”. Thereafter the Company stopped paying the 
annual £900 for the Guards, although it continued its payment to the 
descendants of the Khans as before72. 
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Oil capitalism and the consolidation of a centralized modern nation state 
transformed the Bakhtiyari society and the geography of the Zagros highlands. The 
accumulation of capital in oil was predicated on the production of a new built 
environment on the ruins of the dispossessed Bakhtiyari society. The process was 
carried out through alliances and contractual deals between the Bahtiyari leadership, 
Oil Company experts, and British diplomats. In the next section we will discuss the 
role of these agents of social and political-economic change before exploring their 
changing position within a global framework of the transformation of capitalism 
during the interwar years in chapter 4. 
 
Photograph 1: Bakhtiyari Man Transporting Oil Drums in Abadan (Circa 1910) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 








Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
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Preparing the Ground in Abadan: The ‘Contract” as Instrument of 
Dispossession 
 
While the land agreements with the Bakhtiyaris were being drawn in Masjed 
Soleyman the Oil Company was also engaged in making a similar arrangement with 
Sheikh Khaz’al the Arab ruler of Mohammareh (Khorramshahr), for leasing a strip of 
land for a refinery on the Island of Abadan. Initially conducted by the Company chief 
engineer George Reynolds in 1908, they became more successful when Sir Percy 
Cox, the foremost British diplomat in the Persian Gulf, entered the process and 
concluded the contract in 1909, once again showing the symbiosis that had been 
established between the British state and the private Oil Company from the onset73. 
The Company leased an area with a 200-yard frontage on Shatt al Arab, with a strip 
of land connecting it to Bahmanshir River on the east, and further strips for pipelines, 
storage, and pumping stations. They obtained from Khaz’al the right to erect 
buildings and shape the built environment within their leased territories, as they 
pleased. The annual rent was agreed at £650, paid in ten-year installments, so the 
Company paid the Ashayer (Tribes) £6,500. In addition, the Company also agreed to 
pay Khaz’al personally £10,000 nominally as a loan, and to hire local guards. Khaz’al 
in turn gained the endorsement of the tribal elders, and the contract was signed74.    
 Throughout its dealings in Iran the Oil Company was obsessed with contracts. 
Its relations with all those it encountered were always contractual. When objections 
were raised contracts were brought out and waived. “The contract” was the legal 
instrument that paved the way for the oil complex to be established in Khuzestan. Of 
course, it was always backed up with the threat of force, implied or explicit, military 
or economic. As we have discussed, Bakhtiyari property relations were also 
meticulously contractual, as they were in the tribal Arab areas of the province’s 
southwest75. Similar to the Bakhtiyari territories the boundaries of contractual 
property relationships in these predominantly Arab tribal societies were not as 
absolute and individualized as they were in liberal private property laws. The physical 
boundaries were fuzzy and in line with ecological characteristics of the landscape, 
seasonal variations, and specific and often multiple land uses by different social 
actors. The rights of alienation and sales were highly curtailed and conditional. Even 
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the abilities of the Sheikhs and Khans to distribute land and resources were not 
absolute or arbitrary, but an extension of their ceremonial and mediating functions 
and their official social role in the collective. As Polanyi would say, these were 
property contracts embedded within an intricate web of redistributive priorities and 
reciprocal social obligations76. Land and territory were on occasion, and within 
specific bounds exchangeable through monetary transactions. They were considered a 
vital economic resource, but tribal lands and pastoral territories were not fully 





Source: Minsitry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
The property transfer contracts pursued by the Company were fundamentally 
different. For one, these contracts were meant to clearly define the boundaries of the 
Company’s absolute sovereignty and clarify the range of activities it could engage 
legally (see chapter 6). Even more significantly, the contracts with APOC served as a 
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prohibitive instrument: They were ultimately used to exclude and deny alternative 
claims to land, to time and labor exchanged for money, and to loyalties. Enormous 
efforts were devoted to draw out contracts, and particular care was taken to make sure 
the other party understood the content, in order to avoid any future claim of 
dishonesty. Arnold Wilson’s description of the negotiations and the signing of the 
contract with Khaz’al are instructive: In May 1909 Cox sailed up the Shatt al Arab to 
Mohammareh in a British gunboat.  
“ He exercised from the onset great influence on the Sheikh of Mohamarah 
but was careful not to press him unduly…It was my first experience of this 
kind of negotiation and of the manner in which high British officials did 
business. Cox was content to sit like the Shaikh on cushions on the floor, with 
his devoted oriental secretary Mirza Mohammad by his side. He attached great 
importance in devising forms of words which should not give rise to disputes 
and invariably drafted a clause in Persian or Arabic, and discussed it in that 
form…His ideal was that the Persian text should prevail, being that of the 
weaker party”77 
 
Seemingly impeccably fair, courteous in appearance, and procedurally 
meticulous as this approach may have been within the classic liberal legal framework, 
where property is defined as a natural right and integral to human liberty and 
sovereignty78, the process overlooked and simply ignored the profoundly different 
notions of property that existed on the ground. Property is a social and historical 
relationship that, among other things, regulates, facilitates, or curtails access to land 
and resources by individuals and collectives. Fundamentally, property is a 
relationship of power and as such is always open to contestation79. Social relations of 
production and reproduction are organized through and around property relations that, 
as a result, come in various overlapping and often contradictory forms. The legal 
                                                           
77	  Wilson,	  SW	  Persia;	  A	  Political	  Officer’s	  Diary	  1907-­1914,	  92–93.	  
78	  John	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government	  (London:	  Hackett	  Pub	  Co,	  1980).	  
79	  Ehsani,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Property	  in	  Post-­‐Revolution	  Iran”;	  Katherine	  Verdery	  and	  Caroline	  
Humphrey,	  eds.	  Property	  in	  Question:	  Value	  Transformation	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy	  (New	  York:	  
Berg	  Publishers,	  2004),	  especially	  “Introduction:	  Raising	  Questions	  about	  Property”	  ;	  Douglas	  
Hay,	  “Property,	  Authority,	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Law,”	  in	  Albion’s	  Fatal	  Tree,	  ed.	  Douglas	  Hay,	  et.al.	  
(New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1976),	  17–64;	  E.	  P.	  Thompson,	  “Customs,	  Law,	  and	  Common	  Rights,”	  in	  
Customs	  in	  Common	  (New	  York:	  The	  New	  Press,	  1993),	  97–184;	  Alan	  Ryan,	  Property	  and	  Political	  
Theory	  (New	  York:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1984);	  Friedrich	  Engels,	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Family,	  
Private	  Property	  and	  the	  State,	  Revised	  (London:	  Penguin	  Classics,	  2010)	  .	  
Chapter 3 – The Oil Encounter in Khuzestan (1908 -1921) 
 132 
systems upholding various property claims may include customary, religious, or 
secular judicial laws. These legal systems may be more or less flexible, 
institutionalized, or open to negotiations and interpretation, but often they are not 
compatible. Jesse Ribot and Nancy Peluso who have studied the enclosure of 
indigenous forest rights in West Africa and Southeast Asia analyze these clashes as 
conflicts of different claims of access to physical resources80. Some of these claims 
are “rights based” (property claims), others are based on relational and collective 
mechanisms of access, or altogether reject claims of legality. But each is predicated 
on sets of social relationships that are historically defined, and require their own 
mechanisms of administration, enforcement, and knowledge (of boundaries, limits, 
and selective inclusions or exclusions). Exclusive private property, for example, in 
principle requires formal records as proof of claim, absolute and enforceable 
boundaries, and universally applied sets of standard rules administered by a single 
authority81.  
Tribal territories in Abadan or Masjid Soleyman were not personal assets 
belonging to individuals to be disposed of as private property by the local magnates. 
As the legal scholar Carole Rose puts it: “’Acts of possession’ are, in the now 
fashionable term, a ‘text’; and the common law rewards the author of that text. But as 
students of hermeneutics know, the clearest text may have ambiguous subtexts”82. In 
this section we will attempt to “read” the new contractual property relations carved 
out in Abadan, that gave rise to an inevitable conflict of interpretations over different 
social texts. APOC’s relations with its local allies, as well as its employees, were built 
on clearly drawn contracts that defined exclusive boundaries of sovereignty over 
space for each party, despite the inconvenient fact that no such uncontested 
institutional arrangements existed anywhere in Khuzestan. 
All parties involved were clearly aware that the contracts just signed were an 
illusion that would be strongly resisted by Khaz’al’s own subjects as well as the 
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central government. Khaz’al signed the contract in order to guarantee British 
protection for his continued personal dominion over Khuzestan, “a country as 
different from Persia as is Spain from Italy. Without a guarantee that we would assist 
him to the outmost of our power in maintaining his hereditary and customary rights 
and his property in Persia it would be suicidal for him meet our wishes. The Home 
Government authorized Cox to give such assurances, and to extend them to his heirs 
and successors”83. The signed contracts then became the basis for displacing what 
existed there before in order to establish the oil complex. 
 
An Empty Land and a People Without History  
In chapter one the functional importance to the discourse and practice of 
modernization of depicting the targeted area for development as desolate and empty, 
and of its population as unproductive and obstacles to modernity, were discussed. 
This framing allows land (and nature) to be presented as a valuable but poorly treated, 
underused, and a wasted resource. Its emptiness invites claims of ownership and 
trusteeship in the name of improvement. Depicting the population as sparse and 
incognizant of the valuable asset they hold frames them as unproductive, lazy, and 
ignorant of the requirements of the forward march of history toward progress. In the 
process they become unworthy custodians of scarce resources that ought to be 
developed for the common good of the modern civilization84. These themes underlay 
the transformation of the built environment of Khuzestan throughout the 20th century, 
first by the advent of oil capitalism, and later on by the claims of the central state and 
of private capital and major transnational development institutions that implemented 
enormous and internationally prestigious projects commercial agribusiness, 
hydroelectric dams, and vast irrigation works, as well as petrochemicals and heavy 
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manufacturing85.  This section will unpack the operation of this discursive practice as 
APOC began to lay claim to the river island of Abadan. 
To facilitate its acts of enclosures, APOC’s narrative about Khuzestan was 
replete with images of empty land and infertile scrub, occasionally populated by 
‘natives’ who were not industrious enough to make the desert bloom. At the time of 
the first discovery of oil Arnold Wilson was a young junior officer who had arrived in 
Khuzestan two years before in charge of twenty Indian mounted soldiers to protect 
the oil fields and pipelines from Bakhtiyari and Arab raids (chapter 1).  He was then 
appointed in 1909 to survey the river Island of Abadan before a square mile of it was 
leased to APOC for jetties and the refinery. He reports an ancient shrine and recounts 
the historical lore about the place of pilgrimage. His detailed diplomatic analyses and 
reports contain only scattered mentions of the Island86, which is regularly portrayed as 
a desolate stretch of sand: During the negotiations to lease the land from Khaz’al Sir 
Hugh Barnes, of the Council of the Government of India, wrote to Cox pressing him 
to obtain the lease on the cheap, “for if it was not only uncultivated, but uncultivable 
such land was free of all cost”. Barnes did acknowledge that, “It may be necessary to 
pay [Khaz’al] something to ensure his cordial cooperation but certainly not more than 
the ordinary market value”87. This begs the question of whether and to what extent 
land was generally treated locally at the time as a commodity , to be bought and sold 
in a property market. Archival sources, Company records, and historical studies do 
not support such a claim. It is fascinating that the official history of the Company 
(now British Petroleum) contains a picture on the opposite page to this statement of 
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the ‘desolate’ “mudflats of Abadan in 1909”, showing a date grove, irrigation ditches 
stretching away, and a continuous line of date groves and trees in the distance!88 
 
Photograph 5: Empty Land? "The mudflats of Abadan 1909" 
 
Source: Ferrier (1982):123; Iran Ministry of Petroleum.  
 
Date groves were the cash crop of southern Khuzestan. Palm dates adapted 
better than grains and legumes to the sandy soil and the sparse windfall, especially as 
the sea tide raised the river water, allowing a simple but practical system of irrigation 
to feed the groves. Since the opening of Karun in late 19th century dates had become a 
major component of the cash crop economy of Southern Khuzestan89. Perhaps the 
newspaper “Asr-e Jadid’s” claim was an exaggeration that “Mohammareh and the 
Abadan Island have millions of date trees owned by small farmers, that are being 
turned into the personal and hereditary property of Sheikh Khaz’al”90, nevertheless 
British diplomatic surveys as well as Company accounts did acknowledge, but then 
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conveniently overlooked and dismissed the significance of a poor but thriving rural 
community that already resided on the Island: 
“Maniuhi: [village and area in Abadan] A stretch of date plantations on the 
western shore of Abbadan [as it is spelled] Island extending fifteen miles 
along the Shatt al-Arab, and containing some 300 mud huts scattered here and 
there in small groups. Annual yield of these plantations is over 50 thousand 
baskets.”91 
 
George Reynolds, the energetic Company chief engineer who had discovered 
oil in Masjed Soleyman, was skeptical about the valuation placed on land. He 
predicted that with proper mechanical drainage and irrigation the land would flourish, 
but at present “Arab apathy renders the ground waste, and Arab avarice will prevent 
you getting it at the price you quote” (see chapter 6)92. The recurring themes of “lazy 
native”, “fair market value of land”, and of “empty land”93 ready to be planted and 
made productive by energetic European agents of industrial progress if only the 
stubborn obduracy of the “natives” was overcome made its dispossession justifiable. 
Getting right the terms and the signature on the “contract”, and paying the “fair 
market value” for the land; land that was “wasteland” and even “uncultiveable”, only 
proved the fairness, honesty, and the immense generosity of the British party of 
oilmen and colonial statesmen to themselves.  
The recurring image of the “empty” and “uncultivated” land was an important 
component of signing of the contracts with the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al. 
For example, Masjed Soleyman was repeatedly portrayed as a harsh, arid, and 
desolate plateau, yet K.C.Scott, the surveyor who mapped the pipeline route from 
there to Abadan later reminisced that in 1910 when he was mapping 3000 square 
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miles of territory, “when rain comes the whole country teems with people, animals, 
sowing, grazing, and migrating birds”94. Much like North America or eastern Eurasia, 
tropical south Americas, or most of coastal Africa, the terrain of pastoral and hunter 
gathering societies is used seasonally, and not permanently. Its geography is not one 
of permanent picket fences, barbed wires, registered deeds, and unambiguous and 
airtight legal contracts95.  Its land use is selective and plural; as some of the features of 
the land are used only seasonally - such as grass, acorn, and brush – while others are 
left alone. This is in contradistinction to the monocrops of commercial industrial 
agriculture, which demands the permanent cultivation of land with the aid of chemical 
supplements (mostly petroleum based), and eradicates alternative fauna and flora as 
pests. However, the enclosure of this common and fluid land use, and its conversion 
to exclusive private property designated only for extraction of surplus capital, requires 
the legal fiction of the contract and its depiction as empty and worthless.   
In early 20th century Abadan was populated, sparsely like the rest of the 
province, by the Nassar Arabs, who were totally sedentary, cultivated dates, plus 
some cereals, flax, and fruits. They lived in adobe houses, and politically were under 
the dominion of Sheikh Khaz’al in nearby Mohammareh96. The copious intelligence 
reports of the General Staff of the British India’s diplomatic and military personnel 
posted in southern Iran provide some of the most detailed descriptions of the overall 
social and geographic setup in Abadan. In 1908 the island was described by the 
Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf in the following terms:  
“The center [of the island Abbadan [as it is spelled] is mostly desert, but the 
margins of the rivers, as far inland as the creeks extend, are cultivated and 
planted with dates; much land is now being reclaimed in the Ma’amareh 
neighborhood near the south end…The inhabitants are almost all Ka’b 
Arabs…the south coast of the island appears to be fairly firm and well 
marked, but there are no fixed villages on it. Total population is reported to be 
about 24,000. The two southern administrative divisions are Maniuhi and 
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Nassar. In each of the villages bearing these names there is a representative of 
the Shaikh of Muhammarah. [my emphasis]”97. 
 
There was also an important regional shrine, the putative tomb of the Prophet 
Khedhr, located on the island, which was a major center of local pilgrimage. The 
presumed “empty land” was in fact populated, sparsely like the rest of the province 
(by the contemporary European demographic standards). Khuzestan at the turn of the 
century was estimated to have had a population of 300,00098, albeit within slightly 
different borders from the present, of mostly agrarian and pastoralist communities that 
made flexible and seasonal use of the land and available resources. British 
intelligence reports were detailed in providing information on livestock, agricultural 
production, and number of “rifles” (as well as ammunition and type of weapons) that 
any social unit could muster at various times: “The fighting strength of the southern 
province was calculated in 1902 to be 54,500 men…They are principally armed with 
a rifle of Martini pattern, of which there are computed to be at least 15,000. 
Cartridges are refilled locally with native power”99; but these were instrumental 
details and “no attempt [was] made to estimate the overall number of the 
population”100 since the information by itself was of little practical use for political 
and commercial purposes. 
The local social structures were tribal, in that real or imaginary kinship was 
the primary but not necessarily the exclusive basis of collective solidarity and 
action101. There was a constant movement in and out of the area of migrants and 
newcomers who worked the land by drawing agreements (contracts of a different 
kind) with the Sheikh, who embodied the corporate interests of the tribal confederacy. 
In the impoverished southern Khuzestan, date farming was a long-term investment of 
considerable risk and hard work. Date groves were not ‘owned’ as private domain, 
and there were a multitude of legal arrangements to take into account irrigation, the 
varying quality of land, its terms of ownership/possession, the contribution of various 
forms of labor (individual, collective, communal labor performed not directly on 
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productive land, but on the means of improving yields, for example in drainage or 
maintenance of irrigation works) etc.102.  
Officially, land in southern Khuzestan was all crown land (khaleseh), but 
given the virtual absence of any real central government authority in the province 
since 1857, land in general was treated as tribal communal property, vested for 
specific purposes on individuals or collective groups, not permanently but for a 
specified time frame, by the living sheikh (so not in perpetuity), without conferring on 
him the right of private ownership or permanent alienation as private property. Of 
course, the boundaries of this form of control of land were rather fluid, and a 
powerful sheikh, like Khaz’al who had ruled for a long stretch (ruled 1897-1925), 
gradually accorded himself increasingly arbitrary powers that could undermine the 
customary limits set on his authority over land and the population. Tribal sections or 
clans were settled on fairly bounded territories, but the boundaries were rather fluid 
and porous. Much like the Bakhtiyari territories, individuals in the Arab Ashayeri 
areas of Khuzestan had no permanent claims to a given piece of land, but claimed 
shares in the collective tribal holdings, or obtained conditional contractual rights to 
plots, pastures, and groves. Access to productive pieces of land shifted as individuals 
and collective labor groups were assigned different plots. This was not a political 
economic system geared toward accumulation and constant growth based on technical 
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Source: Iran Ministry of Petroleum 
 
Although commercial change had been affecting the social fabric of southern 
Khuzestan and Abadan, at least since 1857, it was the sudden appearance of oil 
capitalism in 1911 that radically and irreversibly transformed life on the Island. 
Within a short two decades immigration and the construction of the refinery and 
shipping facilities increased the population to sixty thousand and growing. By the 
middle of the century, according to the demographer Jamshid Behnam, Abadan was 
one of the five “leading cities” in the country, larger than Shiraz, but it was a new 
town “with no links to the past”104. In subsequent chapters I will argue that “history” 
is not such a limited concept as this statement suggests. Abadan certainly had a 
history, and as it became a boomtown, new layers were added to make it the heart of 
the oil complex. However, the constant reinforcement of the myth of “a land without 
people and a people without history” was essential to the processes of dispossession 
that paved the way for the primary accumulation of oil capitalism there. 
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Making Abadan an Oil Town: 1911-1921 
Khuzestan was one of the most impoverished and least urbanized areas of 
Iran, itself a desperately poor country at the turn of the 20th century. “In 1900 Iran 
was a fairly primitive, almost isolated state, barely distinguishable as an economic 
entity. About one fifth of the population lived in small towns; another quarter 
consisted of nomadic tribes, while the rest eked out an existence in poor villages”105. 
Historical cities of Shushtar, Dezful, Ramhormoz, Hoveyzeh, and Behbahan, had 
small populations ranging between 7 and 25 thousand. Ahvaz was initially a large 
village, but it had been turning into a fast growing market town following the opening 
of Karun in 1880s to steamship commerce and the construction of the mule transport 
“Lynch Road” from there through Zagros to Esfahan106. Later on in the 1920s the 
selection of Ahvaz as the new provincial capital as well as an administrative 
headquarter for APOC made the town expand further. Ahvaz’ commercial growth as 
an intermediary city between the Iranian interior and the global market was briefly 
thwarted in the early 1930s when the commercial river traffic effectively ended by the 
imposition of a government monopoly of foreign trade. However, the trend 
accelerated again with the growing rail traffic once the trans Iranian railroad project 
and a major road connecting Tehran to Khuzestan had been completed107. 
On the other hand it is accurate to say that prior to the advent of oil capitalism 
there had been no urban life to speak of (although there had been plenty of other 
forms of social life, as discussed in the previous section) in what were fast becoming 
established oil cities of Masjed Soleyman and Abadan. These oil boomtowns began to 
be flooded by a constant flow of migrants generated by the dismantling of customary 
and collective economies of pastoral nomadism and agrarian historical social and 
political networks. “Our unskilled labour came first from local Arab and ‘Persian’ 
villages. When word of employment and good wages spread from all over came 
“tribesmen”, from areas as distant as Luristan, the Bakhtiyari country, Kurdistan, 
found their way to Abadan. These men were more robust than locals, and were 
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welcomed108”. These migrants had little option but to begin adapting permanently to 
the new urban order increasingly regulated and shaped by bureaucratic rules, sanitary 
regulations, industrial discipline, wage labor, and an economy based on money and 
market exchange109. 
When oil was discovered in 1908 the entire population bordering the Persian 
Gulf was estimated no more than 2.5 million and Khuzestan, one of the most poverty-
stricken areas in Iran, had a population probably no more than two hundred 
thousand110. Mohammareh (Khorramshar) was a town of five thousand, mostly Arab 
fishermen, farmers growing dates and grain, and tending sheep and buffalo111. There 
were some merchants and craftsmen, like ship builders, reed weavers, shopkeepers, 
and jewelers (Nestorians and Jews), but in general, Southern Khuzestan was an 
overwhelmingly rural and agrarian economy. While in the Zagros region and northern 
Khuzestan the Bakhtiyari khans held sway, eastern Khuzestan was the domain of the 
Lur tribes of Kohkiluyeh, Bahmayi, and Mamsani112. In southern and western parts of 
the province Sheikh Khaz’al was the paramount ruler, and his alliance with Britain 
had become close enough that Mohammereh effectively had turned into a British 
protectorate by the time APOC had made the decision in 1911 to build a refinery in 
Abadan by leasing land from him. Britain’s commitment to Khaz’al were long 
standing and primarily strategic: Until the discovery of oil in 1908 the Persian Gulf, 
and especially its northernwestern coast region was perceived by the British as a 
pivotal defensive frontline against hostile designs by rival powers to threaten India via 
the sea routes (chapter 2). In addition, Khaz’al’s dominance in the province helped 
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assure the growing flow of commerce, which by 1900 had doubled to nearly half a 
million Pounds Sterling most of which benefited British commerce113. To reward his 
loyalty and consolidate the alliance Khaz’al was knighted in 1910 (KCIE) by the 
British Government of India, thus cementing a special relationship that assured 
British commitment to his autonomy and the continued rule of his dynasty, until they 
chose to abandon him in 1925, in favor of a new alliance with the emerging central 
government114. 
The separate British alliances with the Bakhtiyari and Khaz’al caused a great 
stir in Tehran, an unease that was reflected in the flurry of telegraphic correspondence 
between the Foreign Ministry in Tehran and its local agent in Mohammareh (called 
Kargozar), the ambassador in London, and a few other officials. The bureaucratic and 
diplomatic chatter reflected the mounting anxiety among Iranian statesmen over 
APOC’s schemes and actions in the distant province, its recruiting policies, and the 
liberties it seemed to be taking in controlling the movements of the population, the 
importing of goods, and the construction of facilities, all without any concrete 
knowledge or seeking the approval of the central state115.  The daily press, limited as it 
was, also picked up the story, especially in 1915 when word of Khaz’al 
rapprochement and meetings with the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Basra reached Tehran. 
Given the current of political developments leading to the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman territories in the Najd, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf; the Tehran 
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newspaper Asr-e Jadid claimed that the meeting that had taken place between these 
British protected potentates was aiming to carve out a separate state from Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire116. This paranoia was not farfetched, as Wilson later admitted that at 
the time British policymakers had drawn a map of an independent Mohammareh, but 
due to the circumstances it [the map!] hadd not survived117. Amidst the armed 
conflagrations of WWI, the effective collapse of central governmental authority in 
Tehran, due in no small part to the interference of rival imperial powers as well as 
mounting calls for autonomy and a greater share of power by various segments of the 
Iranian society, a nationalist discourse was shaped among urban population and 
especially the elite, that was deeply antagonistic to the local autonomy of provincial 
centers of power. Nowhere was this elite nationalist anxiety more pronounced than 
Khuzestan, and especially the areas under APOC’s effective jurisdiction. 
By the end of this period in 1921, Abadan was an overcrowded boomtown, 
badly congested, and a seat bed of social frictions and concentrated poverty. In large 
part as a result of this situation, and the unavailability of infrastructure and adequate 
material supplies for construction on such a massive scale, there were serious debates 
within the Oil Company about relocating all technical refinery operations outside 
Iran118. The general circumstances surrounding the decision against this move became 
the basis of an emergent paternalism that is the subject of chapters 5 and 6. 
Meanwhile, most observers have noted some of the distinct features of these 
industrial cities:  
“Their inhabitants who come from the most isolated and abandoned corners of 
the country without any experience of urban life, find themselves in contact 
suddenly with a 20th Century industrial city. Thus the nomads of the Zagros 
and fishermen of the Persian Gulf made up the population of Abadan without 
having lived through any prolonged phase of transition. These new elements 
which have so recently arrived on the demographic map of Iran, as on that of 
other underdeveloped countries, are the portents of fundamental changes in 
the Iranian Society.”119 
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This story has often been told from the perspective of the Oil Company, the 
Iranian central state, and political activists championing labor rights and interests, but 
seldom from the perspective and the lived experiences of the ordinary local 
population120 who were also integral to this encounter. This silence is partly a result of 
the historical sources used as well as the narrators’ perspective. Thus, the historical 
analyses relying solely on the archives of the Oil Company or the British Foreign 
Office tend to produce a narrative where the APOC is effectively the sole agent of 
transformative modernization121. On the other hand, state-centered historiography 
tends to produce an anti-colonial and nationalist narrative that outlines and highlights 
the Company’s exploitative and abusive practices, and juxtaposes these against a 
narrow interpretation of ‘national interests’ that are taken to be the same as the 
interests of the state122. In chapter 6 I will rely on a range of archival material, 
pertaining to the legal petitions and collective challenges by the local population of 
Abadan challenging the Oil Company’s claims to property, its imposed land use 
patterns, and its segregated and planned urban order, as a means to investigate 
whether and how ordinary people of varying social and economic standings attempted 
to insert their claims in shaping the built environment of oil in Abadan. Looking at the 
oil encounter through the lens of the physical world it created reveals that in spite of 
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significantly uneven relations of power the local population of Abadan were an 
integral part of the new political economy of oil, and not marginal and accidental to it.  
 
Conclusion: From Formal to Real Subsumption to Oil Capitalism 
Abadan’s urban environment had to be carved out of the existing social order, 
by first fragmenting and then reintegrating it into the emerging regime of oil 
capitalism. The assembling and consolidation of this oil complex required its own 
spatial configuration and built environment of pipelines, wells, transport networks, 
ports, residential areas, security perimeters, and spaces of consumption and leisure. 
This process of creative destruction was not only about housing, food, public health, 
employment, property relations, and municipal infrastructure and services; but also 
ideology, culture, laws, novel institutions and, above all, a new spatial order.  
APOC’s archives and publications are replete with exasperated comments by 
company directors and managers complaining about the relentless burden of social 
responsibilities placed on their shoulders as a result of the scale of urban growth in 
Abadan, and the extent of the social disintegration in adjoining areas. Many among 
them thought of themselves as rugged and pioneering agents of civilization, the 
Empire, and scientific progress. Others sought their fortune and a career opportunities 
better than what was on offer in crisis-ridden interwar Britain (see chapter 4). 
The Company’s emergence had coincided with global events that redefined 
the next era, which was almost universally understood to be an important break with 
the world of pre-WWI. Alternatively various critical scholars have called this new era  
“the age of extremes”, “late capitalism”, “imperialism, the highest stage of 
capitalism”, or “the second great transformation”. Michel Aglietta has argued that 
these crucial decades augured a new mode of regulation based on a new regime of 
capital accumulation, while Eugene Weber saw this juncture as the end point of the 
transitional period when peasants were transformed into Frenchmen. Polanyi argued 
that the hundred year piece had come to a crashing close, and the market economy 
had to be either re-imbedded in a web of social and political obligations through 
planning, or collapse into barbarism123. 
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 Certainly this was an especially critical period for the colonized 
world124 marked by the beginnings of nationalist calls for political participation, by the 
masses as well as by the new middle class professionals and nationalist elites. It was a 
new era for the rising class of professionals who became critically important 
intermediaries between labor and capital, and took on an expanding role in the 
regulation of social conflict in the name of universal welfare125 (chapter 4). In Iran’s 
neighboring Russia and Caucasus the 1917 revolution had created a decisive 
historical break. For nominally independent Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, the political 
turmoil as well as the popular possibilities opened up by constitutionalism and the rise 
of nationalism were offset by the untold miseries ordinary populations were to suffer.  
As I have argued in this chapter, in Khuzestan this period augured a 
revolutionary integration into a global126 political and economic whirlwind that 
irrevocably undermined the existing social and political economic agrarian, pastoral, 
and tribal orders. The following decade of the 1920s saw the emergence and the 
intrusion of the central state and its bureaucratic- military apparatus. Oil was central 
to these transformations, and the sum result of the establishment of APOC and the oil 
complex in Khuzestan was the dispossession of customary forms of property and 
social organization.  
Marx in volume one of Capital argues that the subjugation of labor to capital 
tends to begin as a formal process, with the products of labor being what matters to 
the capitalists, rather than who the laborer is and how they work and produce, but 
eventually turns into a real subjugation when capital takes hold of the entire labor 
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process itself, as well as the laborers themselves and their reproduction. Initially 
capital is unconcerned with daily lives and social organizations of those who are left 
with no option but to sell their labor, and even those who buy the commoditized 
products of that labor. However, as competitions and class strife take root, and 
technical knowledge and more intricate division of labor gain more importance, the 
continued accumulation of capital needs to gradually take hold of ever more detailed 
aspects of collective and individual lives in order to continue the work of extraction 
from nature and surplus value form people. At some stage, the formal subjugation of 
labor is transformed into a real subjugation, when those who have to sell their labor 
power no longer have access to an alternative social and economic order, and end up 
with little option but to consider themselves integral to the process of accumulation of 
capital.  
Marx’ reference point was England where by the last quarter of the 19th 
century, the organized laboring classes were no longer targeting industrial machines 
and the factory regime as the enemy, but had begun to negotiate a role within the 
industrial and capitalist order by treating their own labor power as a commodity, and 
pushing for improved material conditions and a greater say in the political society127.  
E.P Thompson noted that this coercive transition was profoundly cultural, and not 
purely material. The embodiment of industrial time and industrial rhythms in lieu of 
agrarian or even merchant regimes of time, based on seasons, knowledge of climate 
and navigation, etc. marked this passage as much as the emergence of the modern 
working class trade unions or electoral politics128.  
I have argued in this chapter that the establishment of APOC in Khuzestan 
was also fundamentally a process of primitive accumulation of capital in oil, the 
commodification of labor and space on the basis of enclosures and the dismantling of 
existing modes of collective social and economic life. The collusion of local 
magnates, tribal leaders, and political elites was pivotal in making this transformation 
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a reality, as were legal contracts and geopolitical maneuvers, backed by the military 
and economic might of the British Empire, that created conditions where ever-
increasing populations were dislocated and had to move to the new urban 
environment that allowed the oil complex to come into existence. The assembling 
(rather than “the birth”) (see chapter 1) of the oil industry was predicated on 
dismantling the existing social order, and gaining exclusive access to land that was 
productive for oil capitalism. This assemblage required safety, certainty, and 
practicality. It had to be constantly maintained and reproduced through relentless 
effort, technical, scientific, financial, as well as political. It had to be defended, and 
made acceptable to those resisting or refusing to serve it. The history of Khuzestan in 
1908-1911 reveals this protracted and highly contested process of real subsumption of 
the existing social order to the emerging oil complex. 
In the following chapters I will demonstrate that the real subsumption of labor 
to capital, began in earnest in the 1920s when the Company had to shift policy due to 
radically changing circumstances. These changes were taking place at all levels- 
global, national, and local- and in various domains: in the place of oil in the emerging 
Fordist regime of accumulation, the transformation of corporate organizations ushered 
in by the rise of multi national corporations, and in seismic global political shifts that 
included the Russian Revolution, the rise of the American prominence, the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and a changed regional dynamic, and not 
least in profound domestic political challenges facing post War Britain and Iran.  
As a result of these shifts at global and national scales, the Qajar dynasty was 
replaced by the nationalist and authoritarian Pahlavi state, whose mission was to build 
a modern and homogeneous nation state out of the heterogeneous population and 
fragmented territory of Iran. Locally in Khuzestan, APOC had to reluctantly adopt 
various forms of paternalism, in the form of municipal welfare, public health 
measures, and rudimentary urban planning. These measures were undertaken initially 
in order to retain and reproduce its skilled labor force, and to placate the rising central 
state, and a mushrooming urban population. As the industry was further consolidated 
the necessity of making a permanent industrial working class, to replace the casual 
and unskilled labor force became an unavoidable priority (chapter 6). 
  
 
Chapter 3 – The Oil Encounter in Khuzestan (1908 -1921) 
 150 
Photograph 7: Bakhtiyari Road Workers with an Indian Foreman (circa 1910s) 
 
Source: BP Archives 
 
At the same time, by mid 1920s, the bureaucracy and administrative-military 
apparatus of the central government had begun to take shape and to lay claim to its 
sphere of sovereignty in Khuzestan. This administrative machinery was not purely 
coercive, since it had to also fill the vacuum left by the demise of Khaz’al and the 
tribal order. In other words, it had to display “the will to improve”129 the general living 
conditions of the growing urban population of Abadan. Elaborating on Foucault’s 
theory of power to analyze the development regime in Indonesia, Tania Murray Li has 
argued that modern governmental power is exercised through three levels of 
sovereignty, governmentality, and disciplinary power130. The discussion in the next 
chapter will show that the governmental machinery, as it was gradually assembled 
and asserted in Khuzestan, operated at these three levels outlined by Murray-Li: It 
ruled and subjugated, it sought to perform and define general welfare, and it set up a 
disciplinary apparatus aimed at shaping the individual. At a micro level, the local 
society consisting of Bakhtiyaris, Arabs, Lurs, men and women, migrants from other 
regions, etc. found themselves dispossessed, materially as well as socially and 
culturally. They were effectively coerced to first adapt, and eventually to integrate 
into the intertwined systems of oil capitalism and nation-state. However, this 
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integration was full of friction and turned out to be a protracted and negotiated 
process.  
The present chapter discussed the contractual relations between the Oil 
Company and provincial potentates in Khuzestan, that effectively prepared the ground 
for the creative destruction of the existing order to make room for the emergent oil 
capitalism. In the next chapter I will focus on the global shifts that took place during 
and after WWI and changed the nature of political power and the rules of 
accumulation in industrial capitalism. In chapters 5 and 6 we will return to the local 
scale, in order to analyze the frictions between the Oil Company, the emerging state 
bureaucracy, and local populations over property relations and the control of land and 
the built environment during the interwar years in Abadan, the heart of APOC’s 
operations in Khuzestan. Land/space was the key resource for all these actors, albeit 
in very different ways. How the power over shaping space was struggled over and re-




WWI and its Aftermath: The Emergence of the ‘Social Question’ and 
its Impact on the Oil Complex (1914-1926) 
 
The New Bazaar of Abadan: Small Case, Big Story? 
 This chapter and the next two are parts of a single story: that of the 
controversy surrounding the building of the new bazaar of Abadan by APOC in 1925-
27. But because the story is highly complex, and takes place over a long and very 
eventful period, in separate and far away locations (England, Iran, Persian Gulf, 
Abadan, to mention a few), I have broken it down into three separate chapters. The 
present chapter takes place mostly in Britain during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century when the question of “the social” was being formulated with great urgency, 
leading to the gradual but unmistakable emergence of the institutions of the welfare 
state there. By the social I refer to George Steinmetz’ formulation as,  
“The space between the economy and political institutions which in the latter 
part of 19th century Europe, and from the turn of the 20th century among 
nationalists elsewhere, began to be increasingly perceived as “the arena of 
collective needs, grievances, and disruptions” against free market and state 
institutions that needed to be addressed in order to avoid threats to the political 
and economic order, and to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
nation state”1. 
 
My contention is that these developments affected the corporate culture and 
the policy directions of APOC and the British state, especially regarding relations 
with labor and subaltern populations, which began to be increasingly mediated by 
professional technical experts of various kind. The next chapters will pick up the story 
in Abadan, and will analyze the oil encounter that contributed to the particular 
formation of new labor relations and state institutions, and the process transformed 
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urban politics and industrial relations. Read together as interconnected parts of a 
unified story, the three chapters attempt to link together the local, national, and global 
dimensions of the history of the oil complex by investigating how its main social 
agents were shaped through these encounters.    
 
‘The Social Question’ and the Reconceptualization of Modern Poverty: 
World War I and its aftereffects was a watershed that affected all spheres of 
life across much of the world. These included the nature of government and its 
relation to society, the attitude of political and economic elites toward laboring 
classes and participatory mass politics, the industrial and corporate organization of 
capitalism and its modes of regulation, the relation of technical and scientific 
knowledge to industrial production and the economy and the position of professional 
middle class experts who embodied its values and practices, the representative 
organizations of popular classes and their modes of engagement in the political 
domain, and mass attitudes toward traditional social hierarchies, gender relations, and 
expectations from material life and entitlement to economic security and having a 
political voice. 
 The list is extensive, the common point being that together these 
developments opened up a new domain, ‘the social’, as the new focus of politics and 
the economy at the heart of which was the unprecedented acknowledgment by 
advocates of reform that modern poverty in its different manifestations was neither 
natural nor simply the result of laziness or incompetence, but a byproduct of laissez 
faire capitalism2.  As a result of poverty being reformulated as a social problem 
caused by the shortcomings of the market economy, ameliorating its considerable 
political and social fallout could no longer be entrusted to the long-standing 
traditional institutions of private charity, the poor laws, and patricians in charge of 
autonomous local governments3. 
                                                           
2 This was a stance adopted by many liberal utilitarians, including the father of neo classical economics 
Alfred Marshall, “Three Lectures on Progress and Poverty by Alfred Marshall,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 12, no. 1 (1969): 184–226; Alfred Marshall, Where to House the London Poor (Cambridge: 
Metcalfe (February, 1884), http://archive.org/details/wheretohouselond00marsuoft . 
3 The debate over poverty, how it is to be defined, and the causes, consequences, and its remedies, are 
at the heart of the modern social sciences, especially sociology, development economics, and urban 
planning. In Britain, the Poor Laws system was finally abolished only after WWII. The 19th century 
witnessed a succession of debates and legal and institutional reforms amending the punitive workhouse 
rules, Speenhamland laws, and poor reliefs. Polanyi and E.P. Thompson correctly pointed out that 
these struggles over relief of poverty through local taxation and charity were as much about 
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Social policies, and the maintenance and improvement of the general welfare 
of the population became a central tenet for the legitimacy of the national system of 
governance, both political and economic. In making social or welfare policies, the 
impartiality of the policymakers from sectarian interests (class or otherwise), and their 
credentials for implementing welfare policies funded by taxation and public resources 
became crucial. Some theoretical/ideological interpretations, notably social 
democratic and progressive liberals, have presented the rise of the welfare state and 
the professional experts implementing its social policies, as a marked historical 
improvement toward greater citizenship4. Marxist critiques have tended to be rather 
divided, some supportive others highly critical of the developments of social policies 
and welfare state institutions. Already in 1875, when the unified German state was 
pioneering some of the key early social policies in a systematic manner, Marx in his 
“Critique of the Gotha Program” insisted against rival wings of the German socialist 
movement, that they ought to remain clear headed about the nature of the bourgeois 
state, and resist the temptation to be co-opted into collaboration by being seduced by 
the reformist illusion that gradual steps taken toward social improvements would 
resolve the fundamental conflict between labor and capital5. 
Later on, some Marxists maintained this critical assessment by pointing out 
that the social policies of welfare states have not led to a systematic diminishing of 
social inequality and economic insecurity since it has been the working classes 
themselves who have had to fund social insurance schemes like unemployment 
                                                           
compassion and avoidance of social unrest as about creating and maintaining a functioning and 
effective labor market. The turning points in replacing private and local charity for the poor with 
publicly regulated (and partly funded) unemployment insurance and social welfare occurred at the turn 
of the 20th century, with the 1905 Royal Commission on Poor Laws, the Liberal Party sponsored 1906 
welfare reforms, and the pivotal Minority Report authored by Beatrice Webb.   
 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, 2nd ed. (Beacon Press, 2001); E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New 
York: Vintage, 1966); Ed Wallis, ed., From the Workhouse to Welfare: What Beatrice Webb’s 1909 
MinorityReport Can Teach Us Today (London: Fabian Society, 2009), 
http://www.fabians.org.uk/publications/from-workhouse-to-welfare/; Margaret Somers and Fred Block, 
“From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate,” 
American Sociological Review. 70, no. 2 (2005): 260-287; Fred Block and Margaret Somers, “In the 
Shadow of Speenhamland: Social Policy and the Old Poor Law,” Politics & Society 31, no. 2 (2003): 
283–323; José Harris, Unemployment and Politics; a Study in English Social Policy, 1886-1914. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Pat Thane, “The Working Class and State ‘Welfare’ in Britain, 1880-
1914,” The Historical Journal 27, no. 4 (December 1, 1984): 877–900.  
4 Social democratic interpretations of the welfare state fall into this category. Most notably see T.H. 
Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto, 1992). 
5 Karl Marx, The First International and After: Political Writings, Vol. 3 (London: Penguin Classics, 
1993), 339–359. 
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benefits or social security, while other policies, such as affordable housing, have been 
generally geared toward benefiting the private sector and the accumulation of capital 
in the housing sector, subsidized by public funds and guarantees6.  
But the range of Marxist assessments of the nature and consequences of social 
policies have had significant variations as they have engaged with the empirical 
context of their formations. For example, focusing on the historical formation of 
nations and nationalism, Hobsbawm saw the expansion of social policies as either 
necessary concessions made at the end of 19th century by ruling elites for integrating 
diverse populations and new social classes, such as industrial wage workers, into the 
emerging nations states; or as integral to the nature of the new political system of 
representative governments7. Gramsci, who died in Mussolini’s prison before the post 
war Keynsian system of welfare state had been institutionalized, provided the means 
of a more subtle understanding of the welfare state through his analysis of Fordism, 
and his concept of hegemony8. While maintaining a critique of capitalism and the 
nation state form, Gramsci’s analysis allowed the glaring question of why the social 
order survived in spite of the exploitative and crisis-ridden nature of the market 
economy to be posed.    
On the other hand, scholars with greater affinity to a post-structuralist 
approach to social questions9, have tended to resist the teleological interpretation that 
                                                           
6 John Saville, “The Welfare State: An Historial Approach,” The New Reasoner Winter, no. 3 (1957): 
5–25.  
7 E. J Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 82–90. 
8 Gramsci framed Fordism as the “inherent necessity to achieve the organization of a planned 
economy” in transition from “the old economic individualism”, through the rationalization of work by 
Taylorism, combined with high wages to generate consent, as well as demand, in a system coordinated 
by financial capital. Gramsci’s central insight was the concept of hegemony, or the uneasy combination 
of consent (managed by intellectuals) and coercion (a credible threat by state institutions) in stabilizing 
a political and economic order. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers Co, 1971), 12–13, 
277–320.  
9 I do not mean to imply a clear-cut distinction between these various theoretical approaches. In fact, I 
think the more insightful literature on the topic is eclectic, theoretically.  I believe the key 
distinguishing factor in the analysis of the welfare state and social policies is the theory of the state at 
the core of the analysis. When the state is framed rigidly as the democratic representative of all 
citizens, or alternatively as the instrument of the ruling class, the possibility of analyzing social policies 
as historically contingent and the result of social contentions and frictions becomes reduced. What I 
mean by post-structuralism is the openness to view state actions and policies as discursive practices, as 
well as regulatory or coercive actions. See in particular Tim Mitchell’s critical analysis of rival state 
theories and his argument about the state being not a ‘thing’ or a coherent set of institutions, but an 
‘effect’. Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in State/Culture, ed. George 
Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 76–97. 
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the advent of social policies was a sign of historical progress; as well as the more 
instrumentalist views that see social reforms simply as ruling class ploys to avert 
revolution and class conflict. Here, the central question at the root of social policies 
such as progressive income taxation, general education, public health, municipal 
services, unemployment insurance, workers’ housing schemes, old age pension, 
workers’ compensation, etc, is no longer what is done for the working people. Rather, 
the central question becomes what do these policies do to the working people and 
subaltern groups, how do they regulate collective lives, discipline and co-opt 
individuals, and shape relations of work, leisure, gender, family, and social class.  
 In Khuzestan’s oil producing areas, the demands for and negotiations over a 
range of social policies became the key bone of contention between the Oil Company, 
the nascent central government in Tehran, and the heterogeneous local population that 
was fast migrating to Abadan under the duress of poverty, warfare, and dispossession; 
or attracted to the lure of the expanding labor market there. Where did the ideas for 
these social policies come from? Who made the demands for what social policies, 
when, how, and why? How were social policies conceptualized and implemented? 
What impact did they have? How were they received? Who paid the costs, monetary 
and otherwise? And what sorts of benefits were gained, by whom, and against what? 
To tackle these questions we need to trace the notions of governance, state legitimacy, 
and social welfare, as they were emerging in the first quarter of the 20th century, 
during the global paradigm shift that culminated in WWI. 
The local oil habitus in Abadan fed on these global shifts and at the same time 
it was an integral extension of these larger transformations beyond the province’s 
immediate geographic borders. By mid-1920s’, when the bazaar controversy in 
Abadan came to a head, the cast of characters making the oil complex – the British oil 
men, oil workers, expatriate employees, the impoverished urban residents and 
migrants, and the Iranian administrators – were very different from the pre-war years: 
Many of the same people were still there, but they had changed, and so had 
circumstances and attitudes, and these local social actors were now functioning in an 
altogether different post war universe that was gradually but unmistakably replacing 
the old ways of doing things. How did these larger global trends affect and shape 
these actors and the local oil habitus of Abadan? What did the social policies aimed at 
maintaining order and improving productivity accomplish?   
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The question of poverty as a universal social concern was first raised in the 
19th century, and especially around the crises of public health caused by epidemics 
and contagions. Since these concerns played a central role in the re-organizations of 
the oil complex in Khuzestan we will discuss them in the following section before 
tackling the impact of WWI. 
 
Contagion and the Politics of Prevention   
 The question of contagious diseases and their root causes became a central 
preoccupation of urban life in 19th century European and colonial cities caught in the 
midst of the largest wave of urbanization in history. The related processes of 
industrialization, the accelerating marketization of economic life, and of modern 
nation state building were among the major causes of this geographic revolution10.  
The population of capital cities like London and Paris grew fivefold during the 19th 
century as waves of destitute rural migrants were forced off the land and moved to 
cities in search of a living. Colonial metropolises such as Calcutta or Bombay grew as 
fast. The more lucky would find work in industrial wage labor, domestic service, or 
the remaining crafts, guilds, in menial tasks in the growing municipal services, 
otherwise they found themselves in poor houses or pushed into the underclass11. In 
this new urban geography, inhabited by different social classes during an era of 
revolutionary political and economic change, contagious diseases became 
increasingly associated with the foremost fears and concerns that preoccupied the 
middle class imagineries. As a result, contagious diseases were linked, explicitly or 
subconsciously, either with delinquencies, especially criminality, prostitution and 
theft; or with poverty; and subversive political radicalism12. The cure for these ills 
became in large part associated with notions of proper sanitation, the application of 
science to improve the social condition, and the role of professional experts and of 
state institutions to regulate social affairs.  
                                                           
10 Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in 
England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 
(New York: Vintage, 1996); Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993); Peter Geoffrey Hall, Cities in Civilization: Culture, Innovation, and Urban Order (London: 
Orion, 1999); David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
11 Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), 130–149; Briggs, 
Victorian Cities; Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity; Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London (New 
York: Pantheon, 1984). 
12 As inflected, for example, in the novelistic depictions of Balzac, Dickens, or Zola. See for example 
Emile Zola, Le Ventre de Paris (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1997). 
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Comparatively, the urban condition of Abadan in the 1920s was not dissimilar 
to large sections of Paris, London, Chicago, New York, or Calcutta, of the mid to late 
19th century to WWI, where destitute migrants uprooted from the countryside or their 
homeland were eking out an existence amidst poverty and disease13. It is important to 
analyze the mentalities and the politics of prevention that emerged out of this history 
in order to be able to frame the dynamics of urban change in Abadan in the 1920s. 
 The severe cholera crises of 1832 and 1849 in Paris book-ended the upheavals 
of the 1848 revolution, and linked the notions of contagions with criminality and class 
conflict as specifically urban pathologies14. The notion of a “sick city, perpetually 
agitated by disturbances, revolts, riots, and revolutions” took the appearance of 
commonsense in exponentially growing metropolises where social classes had to 
cohabit in close proximity15. It is worth quoting Evans’ summary of how contagion, 
poverty, and radical politics came to be associated within the social imaginary of mid 
19th century, because it is a sentiment that still survives in various ways and colors 
attitudes and perceptions to various degrees in class divided societies.  
“Cholera undermined bourgeois optimism by revealing the existence in great 
towns and cities of 19th century Europe of whole areas of misery and 
degradation. Virtually all commentators were agreed from the start that 
cholera affected the poor more than the well off or the rich, and the 
widespread middle class view that the poor only had themselves to blame was 
hardly calculated to mollify the apprehensions of the poor. Early writers on 
                                                           
13 This statement is to highlight the rather a-historical approach of some the social historiography of 
public health in Iran during the Qajar period, which tend to frame the material state of the population’s 
hygiene and living conditions as an unchanging product of its “Islamic” as well as “pre-Islamic” 
cultural practices and forms of knowledge, rather than as an integral aspect of its larger and changing 
historical and geopolitical context. The informative and encyclopedic, but un-analytical and un-
comparative, work of Willem Floor is an example of this trend. See Willem M Floor, Public Health in 
Qajar Iran (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2004).   
For a comparison of the living conditions of the working people in the largest European 
capitals of the late 19th century see Steven Johnson, The Ghost Map: The Story of London’s Most 
Terrifying Epidemic--and How It Changed Science, Cities, and the Modern World (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 2006); Louis Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1973). For a novelistic depiction of Chicago in the same period see Upton Sinclair, The 
Jungle (New York: Bantam Books, 1981).  
14 There were major differences in response to epidemics and managing the dangers of contagion in 
different cities. For example, Birmingham had a far more successful track record in curtailing the 1832 
cholera pandemic due to a combination of fortuitous location away from seaports, uncontaminated 
sources of water (deep artesian wells), and an urban elite willing to take energetic measures to isolate 
and curtail the disease. See Ian Cawood and Chris Upton, “‘Divine Providence’ Birmingham and the 
Cholera Pandemic of 1832,” Journal of Urban History 39, no. 6 (November 1, 2013): 1106–24.  
15 Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes, 11–14. 
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the disease constantly reiterated the bourgeois belief that drunkards, layabouts, 
vagabonds, and the idle “undeserving poor” were those most affected, and 
echoes of this view continued to surface right up to the end of the century. In 
this way confidence in bourgeois society as the epitome of progress and 
civilization was precariously maintained by ascribing the ravages of the 
disease to the uncivilized nature of the poverty stricken masses. By contrast, 
the poor could easily interpret the relative immunity of the bourgeoisie as 
evidence of exploitation, injustice, and even a desire on the part of the rich to 
reduce the burden of poverty by killing off its main victims”16.    
 
Cholera was the most feared disease of the 19th century, carried to Europe 
from colonial India via ever faster and larger merchant ships, through newly 
manmade and shorter routes like the Suez Canal and the expanding railways system. 
It spread in port cities and industrial towns with poor water sanitation and dreadful 
general hygiene and living conditions17. In other words, the increasing potency of 
contagious epidemics in the 19th century was directly linked to, and inseparable from, 
the twin processes of the consolidation of industrial capitalism and the global spread 
of colonialism. In European capitals and ports as well as in the colonies the 
dispossession of agrarian populations was driving them to towns. At the same time, 
the mineral extraction and export of raw materials from the colonies was processed 
through a global network of port cities, linked to the rural hinterlands through 
improved networks of land transportation through railroads, canals, and roads18. In the 
19th century colonial cities acted more as warehouses for the export of extracted raw 
materials, in the 20th century this changed, and they became factories for the partial 
processing of these goods, with Abadan as a typical example19.      
                                                           
16 Richard J. Evans, “Epidemics and Revolutions: Cholera in Nineteenth-Century Europe,” Past & 
Present, no. 120 (1988): 128. 
17 Peter Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
37–122. 
18 Robert Home, Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities (London: E & FN 
Spon, 1997), 64–65. Birmingham was spared the devastation of the 1832 cholera pandemic in part 
because it had not yet been linked through railroads. See Cawood and Upton, “Divine Providence” 
Birmingham and the Cholera Pandemic of 1832”. 
19 William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, Environment and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 153; William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: Norton, 
1992). 
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This urbanization of deracinated populations, interconnected globally by 
demands of capital and colonialism, was fertile ground for deadly epidemics. The 
situation created a conjuncture between sewers, criminality, poverty, and social 
conflict. It led to the emergence of “a politics of prevention” in the second half of the 
19th century where professional experts began to take a more prominent role in social 
affairs in an attempt to address the crisis on behalf of the entire population20. As the 
“sanitary idea” took hold of imaginaries through systematic scientific, parliamentary, 
and journalistic investigations by social reformers such as Edwin Chadwick, Henry 
Mayhew, or John Snow21, a new consensus gradually emerged as to the causes of the 
spread of epidemics; but the means of its prevention remained highly divisive. John 
Snow’s statistical investigation and mapping of London drinking wells in 1854 had 
proved that contaminated water and not miasma was the cause of cholera, but the 
appropriate policies for combating epidemics remained a highly divisive terrain. 
Decades of scientific research, the compilation of statistical reports, and numerous 
commissions of experts followed this discovery without much being done in practical 
terms. The main bone of contention remained how to finance and build a sanitary 
urban infrastructure and to institutionalize universal public health measures to deal 
with the dangers of contagion in vast cities and among fast growing populations.  
For utilitarian liberals, such as Chadwick, who had been at the forefront of 
pushing through parliamentary legislation such as the 1848 Public Health Act, this 
created a fundamental philosophical dilemma. True to their free market ideology 
                                                           
20 Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930, 524–563; Jane Jenson, “Getting to Sewers 
and Sanitation: Doing Public Health within Nineteenth-Century Britain’s Citizenship Regimes,” 
Politics & Society 36, no. 4 (2008): 532–56; Barrie Ratcliffe, “Cities and Environmental Decline: 
Elites and the Sewage Problem in Paris from the Mideighteenth to the Midnineteenth Century,” 
Planning Perspectives 5, no. 2 (1990): 189–222; Anne Hardy, “Public Health and the Expert: The 
London Medical Officers of Health,” in Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administrators, and 
Professionals, 1860-1919, ed. Roy MacLeod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 128–44; 
Somers and Block, “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of 
Welfare Debate”; Block and Somers, “In the Shadow of Speenhamland”; Evans, “Epidemics and 
Revolutions”; Johnson, The Ghost Map; Judith Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, 
Class, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Julia Ann Laite, “Historical 
Perspectives on Industrial Development,  Mining, and Prostitution,” The Historical Journal 52, no. 3 
(2009): 739–61. 
21 Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, ed. David England and Rosemary O’Day 
(Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 2008). See the fascinating critical discursive analysis 
of Chadwyck’s parliamentary report as the basis of reform of the Old Poor Laws in Somers and Block, 
“From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate”; 
Margaret Somers and Fred Block, “Reply to Hicks: Poverty and Piety,” American Sociological Review 
71, no. 3 (2006): 511–13. Marx used these reports extensively in composing the important chapters 10 
and 15 of volume one of Capital on absolute and relative surplus value. On Dr. John Snow and 
mapping the sources of cholera in London see Johnson, The Ghost Map. 
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liberals wanted private companies that already owned the distributions rights to 
improve the water supply, however there were few incentives for private 
entrepreneurs to invest in costly urban infrastructure for the poor22.  
Eventually, the accumulation of statistical and cartographic knowledge about 
contagious diseases, and the failure of a private sector solution to the pressing need 
for sanitary urban infrastructure contributed to paving the way for new perspectives 
on ‘society’, the appropriate role of the government, and poverty and inequality. 
Sociology, as the new “science of society”, differentiated the intimate face to face 
bonds of ‘community’ from the more abstract rules and institutions holding together 
‘society’, bonded within national borders, and conceptualized as an organic body23. 
The poor and the sick were as much part of this social body as the aristocracy and the 
middle classes. The afflictions of contagious diseases among the poor and the 
working classes, if untreated, eventually would infect the entire social body that had 
been amassed in congested cities, and therefore could not be ignored. This new 
conceptualization of society as a collective organism gave impetus to notions of 
‘trusteeship’, and of the responsibility of ‘men’ of science and professions to 
discover, plan, design, and implement reformist sanitary and municipal policies on 
behalf of universal social welfare and progress, disregarding the resistance of narrow 
and particularistic communal interests24. 
In France, the quantifiable data proving that poor urban areas were worse 
affected, combined with the knowledge that epidemics moved geographically across 
national as well as social boundaries and spread through contaminated water, allowed 
a link to be established between epidemics and “the age old accumulation of poverty”. 
The medical knowledge of cholera, in other words, made urban social inequality 
incontrovertibly visible, and turned it into a social problem affecting all25. The size 
and rate of population growth during rapid social change, as well as issues previously 
                                                           
22 Jenson, “Getting to Sewers and Sanitation.” 
23 Mary Poovey, Making a Social Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
24 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development, 2–57; Randall Packard, “Visions of Postwar Health 
and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World,” in 
International Development and the Social Sciences, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 93–118; Frederique Apffel Marglin, “Smallpox in 
Two Systems of Knowledge,” in Dominating Knowledge, ed. Stephen Marglin and Frederique Apffel 
Marglin (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 102–44; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Procacci, 
“Social Economy and the Government of Poverty”; Donzelot, L’Invention Du Social: Essai Sur Le 
Declin Des Passions Politiques. 
25 Chevalier, Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes, 13–14. 
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thought to be purely economic - such as the price of bread, the rates of 
unemployment, the quality, availability and costs of housing, and the causes of 
hunger -- now became recognized as critical and quantifiable factors in controlling 
and preventing the spread of deadly epidemics26. As a result, poverty came to be 
framed increasingly as a social ill affecting all, rather than an indication of innate 
inferiority or personal and cultural failure.  
By the late 19th century a political shift was on the way to make preventive 
public health measures -- such as food security, sewage treatment, the provision of 
safe potable water, vaccination, etc. -- compulsory upon everyone, including the poor 
and destitute, through legislation and direct government intervention. This paved the 
way for legitimizing the direct intervention of states into a widening range of 
compulsory public health measures, such as food regulations and vaccination; and the 
provision of costly urban infrastructure, especially sewerage and piped water, to be 
financed through taxation. The process led to what Jane Jenson has called a new 
citizenship regime, where good citizenship now came to be defined as generous 
public spending on building public works as an indication of dedication to achieving a 
higher civilization27. The process also opened the way for professional and scientific 
experts to take charge of the planning and implementation of these measures. In the 
colonies, however, the urban reform measures were far more drastic, as we shall 
discuss in the following section and in chapter 6. 
 
Sanitation and Segregation in the City  
The politics of sanitation and public health did not create only an inclusive 
and universal dynamic of citizenship entitlement to a healthy and safe living 
environment. They also gave rise to a counter dynamic of exclusionary ‘quarantinism’ 
that led to the spatial segregation of the poor, the “dangerous classes”, and the 
contaminated. The combination of the sanitary idea with the increasing 
commodification of urban space through speculation in landed property and housing 
gave impetus to the increasing social segregation of urban neighborhoods by class, 
race, and social difference. The rich simply moved to safer areas they could afford. 
                                                           
26 Ibid., 30–32, 161–162, 262; David Sunderland, “‘Disgusting to the Imagination and Destructive of 
Health’? The Metropolitan Supply of Water, 1820-52,” Urban History 30, no. 3 (2003): 359–80; 
Procacci, “Social Economy and the Government of Poverty.” 
27 Jenson, “Getting to Sewers and Sanitation”; Marshall and Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class. 
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Technological innovations, such as electricity, commuter railways, and motorcars, 
allowed the more affluent to move away from dangerous and contaminated cities, into 
suburbs that had begun colonizing the countryside. There they could enjoy the 
amenities of urban life thanks to mass produced household appliances without having 
to live in the city, or to pay the heftier property taxes to support the construction and 
maintenance of expensive urban infrastructure28. Even utilitarian social plans such as 
those of Ebenezer Howard for creating unified communities of rich and poor, living 
and working side by side in peri-urban ‘garden cities’, were initially lauded as 
humanitarian and visionary innovations, only to be adopted and turned into idyllic 
and exclusive suburban communities for the rich29. 
Ironically, just as the availability of urban sanitation for all was becoming an 
obsession by the end of the 19th century, the new knowledge of contagious diseases 
also became the basis for new social strife and class conflict. The scientific 
correlation of vulnerability to epidemics with poverty and poor living conditions 
became a political weapon for the urban poor and the working classes to demand 
better living conditions, and to hold the propertied classes responsible for their 
situation; especially as they could now use quantifiable scientific data to argue that 
human overcrowding was not in itself debilitating if material conditions improved and 
there were good jobs and decent wages to go with it30. As for the middle classes, they 
could blame the prevailing “culture of poverty” in urban slums as the fertile ground 
for contagious diseases, and strive to avoid the danger of contamination by moving 
away into their exclusive enclaves. This was the dynamic that turned urban space into 
an intensely contested terrain of conflict and negotiation. 
R.K. Home claims that Britain became the chief exporter of municipalities and 
urban planning measures in its vast colonies31. The primary driving motives, and the 
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vision that defined British-influenced urban planning and municipal reform in the first 
half of the 20 century were the adoption of sanitary measures against contagious 
diseases; as well as the related and parallel idea of racial, functional, and class 
segregations32.  In Abadan the historical and epistemological context of municipal and 
urban improvements emerged partly out of this British and colonial heritage of 
sanitary measures, especially as the urgency of social reforms had become more 
generally accepted after WWI. There are several important aspects of these municipal 
and sanitary practices that I will outline below that are of particular significance to the 
analysis of the urban changes that took place in Abadan in chapter 6. 
First, the accumulation of scientific knowledge about the causes of contagious 
diseases, and the implementation of policies to reduce their risk, required the 
populations to become visible to the scientific gaze33. Congested neighborhoods and 
mobile and anonymous populations were simply not conducive to the production of 
statistical knowledge. The problem was most acute in port cities were soldiers, 
sailors, migrants, casual workers, prostitutes, smugglers, settlers, bureaucrats, slaves, 
tribesmen, and workers came and went, often anonymously and without any records. 
R.K.Home discusses four waves of professional experts that led the assault on 
existing urban fabrics to replace them with a new urban geography characterized by 
individually mapped and registered private properties, wide avenues, sanitary urban 
infrastructures, residential enclaves segregated by race and class, and variations of a 
planned urban grid systems that would make each unit distinct and visible to 
inspection and evaluation. These successive waves of professional experts were land 
surveyors and cartographers, followed by engineers, sanitary specialists, and 
eventually architects and urban planners, who oversaw urban change from mid 19th 
century to WW234. This attempt to re-engineer urban space and to modernize and 
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sanitize it took place almost simultaneously in British cities, as well as in the colonial 
cities such as Singapore, Cairo, Delhi, and Calcutta35.  
Second, the “sanitary syndrome” was the scientific justification and a major 
driving force behind the urban transformations of pre WW2 era. However, a common 
feature of urban spatial re-engineering was the imposition of segregated spaces to 
keep apart and to hierarchically organize the population, including Europeans and 
various classes of the indigenous population. European colonizers tended to blame the 
indigenous population for epidemics; with plague represented as “the filth disease of 
the Chinese”, and India portrayed as “a factory of plague” in international sanitary 
conferences like 1897 Venice, or in the growing number of scientific journals36. As a 
result, their response to sanitary reform and urban improvement tended to be coercive, 
albeit wrapped in scientific justification. As spatial segregation became an integral 
feature of the modern urban design, it generated increasing political and social 
friction and resentment among ordinary people at a time when the ideas of citizenship 
and entitlement to equal amenities were taking hold in the era of mass politics. In 
India, for example, the practice of urban segregation in redesigned cities in the 
aftermath of the 1857 Mutiny, angered the un-represented inhabitants who were 
expected to pay for public works, but were now being displaced to make room for 
modern sanitary improvements and the monumental architecture that was being 
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erected to glorify imperial rule. This resentment fed the rising tide of nationalism 
among people dislocated and forced to live in inferior areas, and without any say in 
how their cities were being planned.  
Colonialism and capitalism had exacerbated fast urbanization and the 
frequency and virulence of contagions, just as they were seeking scientific methods of 
prevention and cure. Grand colonial urban projects were changing the cities in the 
name of improving sanitary conditions, but while affluent and European 
neighborhoods thrived the poor continued to suffer. In the two decades prior to WWI 
more than 7 million people died of plague in the urban slums of India, only 
intensifying the resentment against the ever more visible urban segregation and 
inequality37.  
Increasingly, the idea of spatial segregation became contested by a growing 
array of people, ranging from indigenous elites who felt discriminated, the subaltern 
classes who felt vulnerable and threatened by the inferior infrastructures and 
municipal services that was leaving them at the mercy of killer epidemics, and even 
by European urban planners who questioned the logic of segregation based on 
scientific grounds. A prominent example of the latter was the urban planning pioneer 
William Geddes. After his extensive travels in India Geddes questioned Lutyen’s 
1911 redesign of Imperial Delhi based on racially segregated neighborhoods, by 
pointing out that it simply did not work as intended since plague infested rats merely 
moved from place to place, and the indigenous servants and domestics that were so 
integral to colonial life lived in or had contacts in urban slums. Geddes was also 
highly critical of the monumentality of the imperially redesigned cities in India, with 
their grand boulevards and public spaces built on demolished older urban fabric. He 
pointed out that in these new imperial public spaces all sorts of people mingled 
together, subverting the whole justification for segregation based on sanitary claims. 
He reminded his audience that the same mingling took place in workspaces occupied 
by Europeans and their colonial workers and subjects38.  Geddes also considered the 
large-scale demolition of urban neighborhoods and displacement of poor populations 
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as “one of the most disastrous and pernicious blunders in the checkered history of 
sanitation”39.  
The prominent and influential colonial medical administrator William 
Simpson (1855-1931)40 who had left his imprint on urban transformations across the 
empire, and became one of the targets of the criticism of Geddes and others who 
objected to the segregated landscape of urban colonial modernity. Simpson’s 
proposed remedies, which became accepted as conventional scientific wisdom and 
implemented widely, involved the wholesale creative destruction of the old urban 
fabric of narrow and winding streets and closely packed houses, and their replacement 
with well-ventilated and individualized residential units, good drainage system, 
rigorous waste disposal, sewerage, piped and treated drinking water, open spaces and 
wide avenues. Underlying all these drastic measures was an insistence on residential 
segregation by race, and the imposition of rigid control over the living habits of the 
population41. 
These grand projects and coercive practices had many beneficial results, 
including for the indigenous population, but also proved to be tremendously 
disruptive and costly to the lives of ordinary people as they were intended to act as 
mechanisms to reinforce the colonial political hierarchy. As Geddes pointed out, more 
than anything else these grand schemes empowered the new professional experts who 
were now in charge of planning and implementing them. They secured and made 
safer the lives of Europeans as well as the indigenous elites, while the vast majority of 
the population remained excluded from their benefits, and often found themselves 
worse off as victims of mass slum clearance, or increased congestion and 
concentration of poverty following mass eviction and forced re-allocations. Proposals 
for less disruptive and more cooperative alternative solutions were often ignored or 
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simply dismissed. For example, Geddes argued that much of the traditional systems of 
water provision could have been improved with minor anti malaria measures42. Such 
attempts at improving traditional systems of urban infrastructure were being tried 
elsewhere. For example in Iran in 1906, Dr A.R. Neligan successfully experimented 
with the use of gold fish, ducks, and frogs as natural larvicides in traditional water 
reservoirs43. Egypt’s largest port Alexandria, remained a relatively healthy city during 
the 1899 plague epidemic as colonial authorities acted more sensitively to local 
cultural concerns, and instead of imposing racial segregation and wholesale urban 
displacement and demolition they collaborated with traditional medical practitioners 
and healers, including midwives and women Hakima, to contain epidemics and 
prevent their spread44.  
In other words, as contemporary critiques of the colonial notions and practices 
of trusteeship were arguing, progress and modernity were not necessarily 
incompatible with existing cultural practices and traditional systems of urban 
management; nor was spatial segregation simply a scientific solution to sanitary 
problems, as it claimed to be. Of course, spatial segregation was not exclusive to 
colonial or capitalist modernization. Urban neighborhoods in Iran, or Iraq, for 
example, had been historically segregated, especially along sectarian and religious 
lines. But these had been an occasional and only partial segregations based on cultural 
preferences and discriminations; not justified on the grounds of sanitary and scientific 
rationality45.  
As we shall see in chapter 6, these sanitary and segregationist practices were 
instrumental in shaping the urban built environment of Abadan in the post war period, 
and demonstrate how local, national, and global practices of industrial and extractive 
capitalism, and the new modes of governmentality and social disciplining in the post 
war era of nation states were geographically intertwined.  
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First World War: Total Warfare and the Remaking of Society and Economy 
WWI transformed the world46 by “mark[ing] a true watershed between the 19th 
and 20th centuries”, precipitating a social and economic revolution in all spheres of 
life47.  Continental Europe, Britain, Iran, India, the Middle East, and Persian Gulf 
region certainly emerged as different places at the end of the carnage. The changes in 
Britain came as a result of several factors: the war itself, which was the first instance 
of total warfare, involving entire populations and new technical means of destruction; 
second, the mounting crisis of capitalism (especially after the 1890s) and the 
transition to a new regime of accumulation; and third, the far reaching and slower 
consequences of what has been called ‘the second industrial revolution’48. I will 
discuss each in turn and link them to what took place in Abadan. 
Militarily, WWI was the culmination of the industrialization of warfare under 
mounting capitalist competition and technological development. It brought to an end 
the somewhat ironically labeled “long peace of the 19th Century”, when major 
European powers directly fought each other only on a few occasions on the 
continent’s soil, while constantly engaging in colonial skirmishes and wars 
elsewhere49.  By the end of the 19th century industrial technology had already 
transformed the nature of warfare with railroads, steamships, synthetic chemicals50, 
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and telegraphs, making possible total warfare involving whole populations. Instead of 
long marches or limited troop transport by sailing ships, these technologies allowed 
rapid and coordinated mass deployments of soldiers, and created fronts instead of 
skirmishes and isolated battles51.  
Prussia had initiated the re-organization of its military by professionalizing the 
officer corps and ordinary troops, whose effectiveness were proven in the 1871 
Franco Prussian War. On the other hand Britain received a shocking realization of its 
comparative military and industrial shortcomings during the second Boer War (1899-
1902). Its troops proved unfit physically, and their general level of education fell 
short of allowing them to function as effective soldiers in a modern army52. Its 
advanced military equipment also performed poorly, casting doubt on the quality of 
the national technological and engineering abilities. For example, the army’s optical 
range finders failed to function properly with the artillery losing much of its 
effectiveness53.  Eager to enjoy the spoils of a highly unequal war against the tiny 
population of Boer farmers in resource rich South Africa, British speculators and 
politicians had counted on the post-victory spoils of an easy skirmish that they 
estimated would cost at most £10 million. Instead, the cost of the resulting fiasco 
spiraled to £250 million and created a profound sense of unease and national 
decline54.  
The ensuing malaise established a clear link in political culture between 
national performance in war and social policy. It was felt that the empire’s destiny 
was in the hands of the masses of the people, who needed to be better educated and 
more physically fit55. Schumpeter situates the roots of this malaise in the great 
depression of 1873-1898, when a combination of rapid industrial development and 
rising poverty created a “Paradox of poverty amidst plenty”56. Rapid industrial change 
after the end of American civil war, electrification, the opening of new markets, and 
new trade roots such as the Suez Canal, further accelerated the ‘annihilation of space 
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by time’ that railroads had begun earlier in the century57. Greatly expanded productive 
capacities flooded far away markets, precipitating a crisis of overproduction58. Cheap 
and plentiful American wheat and cotton flooded European markets, causing an 
agrarian depression there (as well as in Egypt, by then the mass supplier of cotton to 
British textile industry)59. The paradox was that the industrial expansion had 
substantially improved real wages, thus creating and entirely new standard of life for 
the masses in western Europe; but at the same time they also caused massive 
dislocations within the existing agrarian, artisanal, and older industrial structures and 
economies everywhere.  
The combination of insecurity caused by the new poverty and destitution, with 
the improved standards of life for those engaged in the new industries caused a 
reaction against the results of laissez faire and free trade. It led to the ‘double 
movement’ of the radicalization of masses, and a general desire for social reform 
among some middle class liberals and utilitarians, as well as significant segments of,  
‘The business class increasingly willing to adapt its enemies’ views and 
compromise, just as the hostile forces were increasing…Economic liberalism 
thus became riddled with qualifications that sometimes implied surrender of 
its principles. Political liberalism, from the 1880s on, lost its hold upon the 
electorates much more rapidly than appears on the surface…In England the 
strength of [their] existing political organizations and leadership was so great 
as to make it possible for them to win victories on radicalized programs [of 
major social reforms]”60.  
   
 However, the moves toward policies of social reform were protracted and by 
no means immediate or straightforward. Improved public health, municipal reforms, 
                                                           
57 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization and Perception of Time and 
Space (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 
1880-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
58 I discuss the impact of the great depression of 1890s on the devaluation of silver, and its significant 
impact on the Iranian economy, and on British-Iranian relations in chapter 2. See also Peter Avery and 
S. Simmonds, “Persia on a Cross of Silver: 1880-1890,” Middle Eastern Studies 10 (1974): 259–86. 
The impact of the global depression on the Middle East, and the subsequent rise of mass politics 
throughout the region is analyzed by Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
59 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993); 
Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 760; Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-
Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 54–121. 
60 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 761, see also 800–802. 
Chapter 4 – The Emergence of the ‘Social Question’: WWI and its Aftermath 
 
 172 
universal education, and various schemes of social insurance were proposed and 
weighed by some segments of the political elite as necessarily measures to address 
debilitating poverty, but without much result61. The hegemony of liberal ideology 
against government interference in the economy and social affairs proved simply too 
entrenched, even though significant breaches were beginning to occur within the 
ranks of political figures as well as intellectuals, activists, and academics. This was in  
part a consequence of the historical organization of state administration in Britain. 
Contrary to France, for example, where local government and social policy were by 
now in the hands of paid bureaucrats accountable to the central state, Britain at the 
time had a polity that can be described as a weak central state, where local 
government was run mostly by an independent gentry62. It is important to note that 
until the turn of the 20th century liberals across the continent envied the British model 
of a decentralized state and autonomous landed elites, supported by a bourgeoisie of 
industrial entrepreneurs, financiers, and merchants. The British model was considered 
highly successful because the hierarchy of the social pyramid seemed to overlap with 
the political hierarchy. Compared to France, for example, landed property and wealth 
in Britain were far more concentrated63. In contrast to France, the institutions of the 
central state administration were more feeble in Britain: at the turn of 20th century 
France had a central bureaucracy of 400,000, four times Britain’s. French liberals 
envied what they saw as the British model of deep rooted and organic connection 
between the gentry and their vested interest in local improvement, contrary to the 
centrally appointed French functionaries who owed their loyalty to the state64. In 
Britain, the autonomous gentry and the economic elite had an inordinate influence in 
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the parliament and law making and felt such costly reforms were best left to the 
existing poor laws and private charity65.  
At the same time the importance of propaganda and molding public opinion 
were becoming evident, as was the conviction that the empire needed to invest in 
military technological innovation. The Russo-Japanese war of 1905 and the 
emergence of Japan as a new rival to British colonial interests in the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, together with German military advances, prompted a costly arms 
race, especially in building new heavy battleships (called Dreadnoughts, after the first 
prototype built)66. Ironically, the tremendously costly battleships never played a major 
role in actual sea battles, but their technological innovations became a major conduit 
for the ascendency of petroleum as the preferred fuel, and of internal combustion 
engines as the new primary means of locomotion. 
 
Oil Versus Coal: Warfare as Midwife of Change of Fuel Source 
In 1911 the United States adopted oil-fired boilers for its new heavy warships. 
Britain also had begun searching for a sustainable way to undergo the conversion. 
Winston Churchill, newly appointed at the First Lord of Admiralty asked his 
predecessor Admiral Fisher to preside over the Royal Commission on Oil Supply for 
the Navy, with John Cadman, a professor of chemistry at Birmingham and the future 
director of APOC, also serving as an influential member of the Commission.  
Churchill asked the Commission “You have got to find the oil; to show how it can be 
stored cheaply; how it can be purchased regularly and cheaply in peace; and with 
absolute certainty at war”67. 
By 1914 Fisher had returned for a second stint as the head of the Admiralty 
and succeeded in getting the British navy to convert all its boilers from coal to oil68. 
The strategic problem with oil was its uneven geographic distribution since, aside 
from the United States and Russia, all the other major protagonists in WWI were oil 
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importers69. As a result, for Britain oil was far more costly (four to twelve times more) 
than coal, especially since the Island had significant coal deposits and was itself a 
major exporter70.  The opportune discovery of oil in Khuzestan in 1908 significantly 
reduced that major obstacle for Britain (see chapter 2) and smoothed the way for the 
eventual conversion to oil71. 
Oil had significant advantages over coal: It weighed less per thermal unit, was 
easier to transport, had twice the thermal energy of coal by bulk, and did not require 
stokers as it could be pipe fed automatically into engines. This released tremendous 
space in battleships, expanded the range of their operations72, and significantly 
reduced labor requirements73. In addition, internal combustion engines were less 
bulky, and more economical than steam power during off-peak use since they could 
be turned on or off with ease. Oil burned cleaner than coal and produced less smoke, a 
major advantage in sea warfare, which relied on stealth. 
WWI became a major conduit for the ascendency of oil as a major global 
strategic resource in large part as a result of these advantages as well as the type of 
decisions made by the wartime British government74. It led to the allocation of 
tremendous resources to, and created a major demand for, the mass production of 
military hardware that operated with the internal combustion engines, such as tanks, 
airplanes, automobiles, and submarines75. These technologies existed before, but as 
exceptions and luxury items of leisure for the affluent. But, partially as a result of the 
                                                           
69 Of course, there were other important centers of production, like Rumania, Galicia, Burma, and 
Mexico. However, aside from the fast dwindling resources of Burma, these were also regions under 
geopolitical dominance of other rival great powers. 
70 David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus; Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western Europe from 1750-Present, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 281. 
71 See details in chapter 2; andMarian (Kent) Jack, “The Purchase of the British Government’s Shares 
in the British Petroleum Company 1912-1914,” Past and Present, no. 39 (April 1968): 139–68; 
Adelson, London and the Middle East, 97–100; Ronald Ferrier, History of the British Petroleum 
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72 That is the range of ship movements, since railroads, privately owned in Europe, were reluctant to 
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advantageous relationship with coalmine owners, who depended on railroads for their marketing. 
73 According to Landes half of naval ship crews were stokers and half of the cargo space was taken up 
for coal storage. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 279–281. 
74 Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49; E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The 
Birth of the Industrial Revolution (New York: New Press, 1999), 150; Ferrier, History of the British 
Petroleum Company. Oil consumption in France, for example, increased 42 fold in the course of the 
WWI. Briggs, A Social History of England, 252. 
75 For example, by 1918 the newly constituted Royal Air Force (RAF) had 30 thousand officers and 
264 thousand other ranks, more soldiers than the entire army had had in 1914 prior to the start of the 
hostilities. See Briggs, A Social History of England, 252. Adelson, London and the Middle East, 171. 
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internal combustion engine’s major impact on the outcome of the war, oil ended up 
becoming one of the cornerstones of the post war economic and economic shift to 
Fordism and industrial mass production and consumption76.    
Equally significant to the ascendency of oil during WWI was the conflict’s 
wider and long lasting social, cultural, and political repercussions. According to 
Giddens, “the meshing of industrial production and military strength is of prime 
importance among the influences that have shaped the modern world… Industrial 
production provided the means for the industrialization of war, but the activities and 
involvements of nation states are at the origin of the phenomenon”77.  In Britain 
especially, with its Victorian traditions of minimal central government involvement in 
the regulation of the economy and social affairs and the strong autonomy of local 
elites and governing institutions, WWI affected the very culture and institutions of 
governance and the relations between state and society78. As the scope of the conflict 
expanded war became the concern of ordinary people and not just elites. Since it 
permanently affected class relations and the attitudes and policies of both business 
and government, and had a direct bearing on the actions of APOC and the British 
government in Khuzestan in the post war era, we will discuss it briefly. 
 
War and the Politics of Conscription, Class, and Gender: 
WWI was a total war, and like no previous military conflict it fused together 
society, economy, and politics. Hobsbawm calls WWI and its aftermath “the age of 
catastrophe” and argues that its destructiveness was caused by its similarity to 
unbridled competitive capitalism, which has no ultimate aim except limitless 
accumulation, acquisition, and global expansion79.  The conflict engulfed the general 
                                                           
76 Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 28. This is not to say that the shift to oil was absolute and 
immediate, despite the significant increase in its demand. Coal remained a key source of energy 
throughout the interwar period but its relative importance declined, especially in the post war era, with 
major consequences for labor and coal miners. In fact, steam power based on coal consumption 
increased tenfold in the last three decades of the 19th century.  However, Britain’s exports of coal 
dropped dramatically after the war, directly affecting labor relations and social conflict. British exports 
of coal went from 20 million tons in the 1880s to a high of 75 mt in 1913, before dropping to 49mt in 
1920s and 40mt in the 1930s. See Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 150.   
77 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, 226. 
78 See Francis Michael Longstreth Thompson, The Cambridge Social History of Britain: 1750-1950, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1990). 
79 WWI was presented as a zero sum game: Previous wars fought for limited and specific 
objectives…WWI was based on international rivalry modeled on economic competition without limit 
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Extremes, 29–30. 
Chapter 4 – The Emergence of the ‘Social Question’: WWI and its Aftermath 
 
 176 
public as conscripts, workers, canon-fodder, and ultimately made them pay for the 
costs of the carnage. But, at the same time and ironically, the very scope of war 
brought with it the expansion of the public sphere and opened up new avenues for 
political participation by the working classes, women, and ordinary people. This 
unplanned expansion subsequently allowed the working classes to enter directly the 
political sphere though a combination of electoral politics, trade unionism, and radical 
collective actions, such as the 1926 general strike. The majority of the general 
population, including many workers, trade unions, and most politicians representing 
them, came around in support of the patriotic effort. But, in exchange for the sacrifice 
of mass participation in war they demanded reciprocal sacrifices by property owners, 
both in material terms as well as political- a new social and political bargain, so to 
say80.  
This important development overlapped with structural developments in 
corporate capitalism (see the sections below on the second industrial revolution and 
the structural transformations of capitalism), forcing the state and large corporations 
like APOC to view labor and labor relations in altogether new perspectives. In this 
new configuration laborers could no longer be seen merely as anonymous producers 
of surplus value, but increasingly as “human capital” and, ultimately, as political 
citizens whose votes and political actions could affect laws and policies. While labor 
had demonstrated that it was able to organize politically to improve its lot and in the 
process to exert some pressure for the redistribution of wealth, and even present an 
existential threat to rates of profit or the capitalist order itself, it also needed to be 
treated as an investment, to be educated and trained to cope with the increasingly 
complex divisions of labor, a more hierarchical and alienating work process, and 
trusted to handle and operate ever more intricate and costly technology81. The 
changing approach of APOC directors to labor and urban issues in Abadan in the mid-
1920s had already begun to be shaped by these wartime changes. In the rest of this 
section I will analyze in some detail several aspects of the social history of wartime 
Britain that will help provide an explanatory context for the later strategic tilt toward 
paternalism adopted by APOC in Khuzestan from the mid 1920s. 
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WWI casualties were staggering, including in the Middle East82. The 
exponential growth of the military had brought about a change in the criteria of 
soldier recruitment, with far reaching social repercussions. The smaller professional 
military and reserves at the onset of the war soon proved inadequate for the scale of 
the conflict, necessitating a new government policy of actively manufacturing public 
opinion through systematic propaganda to present the war as a patriotic affair. The 
initial populist surge orchestrated by the War Secretary Lord Kitchener led to the 
joining of 2.25 million volunteers, but even this proved insufficient and by 1916-1918 
universal conscription had been implemented for the first time, making the war and its 
staggering human and economic costs the concern of the nation as a whole. As a 
result, the army’s ration strength (as a measure of the scale of enlisted manpower) 
increased from 165 thousand in 1914 to 5.4 million in 191883.  
The British public had generally supported the war, but its end brought about a 
cultural break with Victorian conventions, caused by the grief of shattered families 
and communities. The war had affected entire generations with more than 8 million 
having been mobilized, two million wounded, and nearly a million casualties and an 
equal number still receiving pensions in 192284.  However, in addition to conscription 
and its social consequences, there was another paradoxical side to the conflict: the 
war demands necessitated the maximization of production (to feed the war and the 
population), and in the process brought about nearly full employment, for the first 
time in history85. This included women’s employment in dangerous munitions 
factories, heavy industries, and clerical work86.  
                                                           
82 German casualties were 1.8 million, France lost 1.6 million, and Britain more than 800 thousand 
according to Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 26; Briggs, A Social History of England, 258. Total war 
casualties dwarf these figures once we take into account the toll for the other belligerents, such as the 
Ottoman territories, Russia, Austro Hungary, and the non-belligerent nations, such as Iran, who were 
helplessly caught in the grinding wheel despite their declared neutrality. Adelson offers very different 
casualty figures, which brings me to assume the figures provided in the previous references to 
fatalities, whereas the present figures refer to the wounded as well as the dead. None of the sources 
consulted specify the difference. According to Adelson, in 1914-1918 Britain deployed more troops in 
the Near and Middle East (nearly 6 million) than in France (5.5 million). However, overall casualties in 
France were much higher (2.7 million) than (600 thousand).  Adelson, London and the Middle East, 
171. 
83 Briggs, A Social History of England, 252. “Ration strength” seems to refer to the total number of 
rations issued as a way of keeping count of troop numbers in and out of direct conflict. 
84 Ibid., 260–261; A. J. P Taylor, The Oxford History of England. 1914-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1976), 120. Note the discrepancies in various sources regarding war casualties. Compare with footnote 
62. 
85 The discussion in this passage is based on Pat Thane, The Foundations of the Welfare State (London: 
Longman, 1982), 126–130. 
86 Taylor, The Oxford History of England. 1914-1945, 38. 
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Prior to WWI Britain was an overwhelmingly working class country, but with 
a significant portion of the workforce engaged in agriculture and domestic service.  
As ordinary and working people were directly called upon to bear the human and 
economic cost of war for patriotic duty, their reciprocal expectations from the 
political and economic system that was demanding such a sacrifice changed 
dramatically. As able-bodied men were recruited for war, the insatiable demand for 
labor had a manifold effect: It increased the negotiating power of trade unions to 
demand better wages and work conditions and job security. Politically, it created an 
unprecedented space for labor to participate directly at the highest levels of 
governmental and administrative policymaking. This forced large employers to 
accommodate labor and to accept state mediation with trade unions. This new trend 
led to the relative improvement, at least for a short time, of the standard of living of 
the working classes in war related economic sectors.  
At the same time, the costly wartime necessity to accommodate labor, coupled 
with the insatiable war-driven demand, encouraged employers to invest heavily in 
labor saving technologies and to search for new industrial management methods and 
work re-organizations that would eventually contribute to the de-skilling of industrial 
workers and intensify the unemployment crisis of the post-war years87. This was 
especially the case in the large industries and mining sectors that had significantly 
expanded to supply the war effort, most notably steel, shipbuilding, and coal88. The 
following table shows the significant decline in labor strife during the war, compared 
to the period before and after the conflict. 
 
Table 2: Number of British Workers Involved in Strikes Before and After WWI 
     (Thousands) 
1912 1913 1914 1919 1920 1921 
1,462 664 447 2,591 1,932 1,801 
Source: Adelson (1995), 191 
 
However, as the costs of the war skyrocketed the financial situation 
deteriorated, rapidly turning Britain from the world’s foremost international creditor 
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to a major debtor. To deal with the situation Britain had to liquidate much of its 
overseas assets (in the US railroads, primarily), to borrow abroad,89 and to impose 
taxes at home. As a result, by the end of the war the number of taxpayers had 
increased sixfold, and the rate of income tax had been raised up five times90. As taxes 
and prices increased so did labor unrest,91 and the need of the government to respond 
and quell discontent by reluctantly engaging in expanding social policies that were 
anathema to the elite’s dominant liberal free market ideology.  
 
Housing and Urban Politics During WWI and After 
In the predominantly working class Britain the increasingly prominent public 
role of labor and the sacrifices it was asked to make were bound to have larger 
political repercussions. At the turn of the century three quarters of the working 
population were engaged in manual labor, and there were some 1.5 million people in 
domestic service, acting as servants to the numerically small middle and upper 
classes92. Although labor’s wartime average income and job security had improved, 
and patriotic propaganda was according a new respect and social status to working 
people which they had never before enjoyed, nevertheless their general living 
conditions were, by all accounts, appalling. This was especially the case in workers’ 
housing, which rapidly became the focus of major social discontent93. Mines and large 
                                                           
89 Hobsbawm estimates that Britain lost 25% of its global investment, which it had to sell to finance the 
war. The financial costs of the war amounted to more than £500 million, mainly in US railroad 
securities. By 1929 Britain’s debts to the US amounted to more than 150% of its national output. 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 97–98. Before the war, despite its relative decline compared to its 
main rivals, Germany and the US, Britain had done relatively well as a financial power, while its 
captive colonial markets provided an important outlet and supplied it with revenues, with India, in 
particular, financing more than 40% of Britain’s deficit. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 148–149.  
See also Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 363; Taylor, The Oxford History of England. 1914-1945, 
40–42, 124. 
90 Briggs, A Social History of England, 257; Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society, 191–192. The 
social history of taxation during the war clearly has great relevance to the critique of the rentier state 
theory that I have presented in chapters 2 and the epilogue. As the history of wartime Britain 
demonstrates taxation was imposed as an exigency of the total war, with great reluctance by the 
political elite, under complex historical conditions that we have discussed here. The political bargains 
in the form of franchise and social welfare policies that emerged between the state and various social 
classes were not the automatic consequence of taxation, but the result of a protracted and ultimately 
unpredictable social conflict and class struggle.  
91 Taylor, The Oxford History of England. 1914-1945, 39; Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society, 
193–203. 
92 Rondo Cameron, “A New View of European Industrialization,” The Economic History Review The 
Economic History Review 38, no. 1 (1985): 1–23; Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 155–163. 
93 For housing conditions of laborers and the multitude up to the WWI see Burnett, A Social History of 
Housing 1815-1985, 121–187. Mass urban housing (as well as rural and suburban) for the working 
classes and the poor was of critical concern across Europe. See Michael Harloe, The People’s Home: 
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industries such as steel, shipyards, munitions works, etc. that were at the heart of war-
related economy were located in selected and designated regions and urban areas, 
many of which had been moderate sized cities before the War and therefore were ill 
equipped to accommodate the significant influx of newcomers.  
The crisis of working class housing predated the war, and even large industrial 
cities like Birmingham, Glasgow, and London had already been under demographic 
pressure as a result of the first industrial revolution94. The economic depression of the 
1880s, coming in the wake of the Paris Commune, was causing unrest among the 
urban poor and anxiety among the middle classes and the wealthy. Overcrowded 
housing at the heart of large cities like London became a great concern, especially as 
the recurrence of pandemics and anxiety over public health had been associated in 
scientific discourse with inadequate urban infrastructure and lack of access to decent 
drinking water and basic sanitary conditions by the poor. In addition to biological 
contagion, the fear of ideological and moral contamination of the working classes 
living in overcrowded urban dwellings side by side with the ‘residuum’, or the 
criminal classes and the radical political agitators, had become a major topic of public 
debate among social reformers, conservatives, and radicals alike95. The debate was 
shaped around the historically recurring theme of the ‘culture of poverty’ as the 
existential danger it posed to social stability and the economy. Of particular concern 
was the London labor market, dominated as it was by casual laborers who were seen 
as a barrier to the formation of a permanent, dependable, and ‘civilized’ labor force 
(human capital).  
Across the ideological spectrum a range of schemes were proposed to address 
the crisis: Labor unions began to be perceived by employers not as class enemies, but 
as an alternative to insufficient charities and as a solution for stabilizing the labor 
                                                           
Social Rented Housing in Europe and America (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), See in general 
Chapter 1, which compares housing in Western Europe and the US. For Britain see Pp.35–40. 
94 For London see Stedman Jones, Outcast London, especially 215–230. According to Stedman Jones 
London was not, strictly speaking, an industrial city, but an entrepot and home to vast numbers of 
casual workers, artisans, and small crafts. But workers at docks and transport networks were 
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force and channeling the articulation of its demands within the framework of a 
mutually accepted labor market. Various municipal reforms and urban planning 
schemes were suggested by social reformers in the hope of curtailing the power of 
predatory slumlords. These reformist schemes ranged from the idea of Garden Cities 
(in 1901), the construction of affordable working class suburbs accessible by cheaper 
commuter train services, and subsidized rental schemes, some with the eventual 
option for ownership96. The conservatives, on the other hand, proposed the 
implementation of even more draconian and punitive schemes from those already in 
place, such as the expansion of workhouses, the establishment of labor colonies 
within England to forcefully segregate and coercively re-educate the criminal 
elements, or the wholesale expulsion of the subversive elements to the colonies97.  
The onset of WWI exacerbated the housing crisis for the poor and the working 
classes. Even larger cities had difficulty coping with the housing demands of the new 
labor force that was flooding in to occupy the new industrial jobs, exacerbating the 
urban crisis that was cutting across class divisions. It generated a range of responses 
from employers and the state to deal with municipal residential issues that had lasting 
effects and profoundly changed the social and economic habitus.  
It is highly likely that this new business habitus equally influenced APOC, 
which was Britain’s largest corporation, headquartered in London, in its approach to 
somewhat similar challenges in Abadan. In addition, APOC was already planning its 
postwar expansion of fuel and petrochemical supplies throughout the consumer 
markets of Britain and Europe98. As a result, the effective management of labor 
relations, the avoidance of potentially damaging social strife, the state of consumer 
markets, and having in place a strategy of smooth product supply to ward off 
powerful American, Dutch, and other competitors were fast becoming an urgent 
dimension of its long term corporate strategizing (see chapters 2 and 5).    
The housing problem affected many social classes, but was especially acute 
for workers as they faced competition for cheaper houses from the financially pressed 
middle classes who had lost their servants to the army or the new industrial wage 
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labor market, and were now forced to downsize. With private financing and 
construction at a near standstill during the war workers became dependent on 
privately owned and poor quality rental housing in urban slum areas99. Trade unions 
had helped workers gain better pay, but the housing supply crisis was not something 
they could address directly or hope to solve. The housing crisis did not affect only 
unskilled workers, since lower middle classes and skilled workers, clerks, 
schoolteachers, and even shopkeepers also experienced exorbitant rent hikes. The 
shared anger against the housing situation generated a novel type of cross class urban 
politics of solidarity as these different groups participated together in numerous rent 
strikes against slum lords, demanding government intervention for rent control and 
housing aid100. More relevant to our story, the housing crisis led to a serious rift 
between different segments of capital, as large industrial employers actively 
supported government imposed rent controls. They sided with workers and the middle 
class renters against landlords and financiers who profited from rents101. As far as 
large industries were concerned high rents and poor living conditions of the workers 
had adverse effects on the quality and political demands of their own labor force at a 
time of acute labor shortage during the war years102. 
One of the more significant urban protests around housing and rent issues 
occurred in Glasgow, Britain’s second largest city and a major industrial center, and 
set the tone for the urban struggles to come. More than 15,000 people went on a rent 
strike in October 1915, soon another 5000 more joined them, making this “one of the 
                                                           
99 Harloe demonstrates that WWI elevated working class housing to the level of a European wide 
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most important rent strikes in urban history… For the first time in history, housing 
was considered a right for the people, and the state was held responsible for it. Public 
housing was born… It was only when a social challenge appeared at the grassroots 
level that the power relationships were altered and the state was forced to intervene in 
the provision of housing”103.  
However, these urban protests did not lead to lasting solutions, such as mass 
production of affordable rental housing, or the institutionalization of systematic urban 
planning programs aimed at housing the workers and the poor. This was due to a lack 
of unity over policies to adapt between rival segments of the political and economic 
elite, as well as the non-negligible class differences among protesters, and the local 
nature of their struggles, which hindered wider mobilization to tip the balance of 
power in their favor and lead to structural changes.  
Nevertheless, the problem was acute enough to generate several significant 
government acts aimed at lowering the rents and controlling them, to provide 
subsidized mortgages, encourage private investment in affordable housing, and to 
take some measures to improve the existing stock. More significant, and of direct 
relevance to APOC’s changing approach to urban housing issues in post war Abadan, 
many large employers began to actively invest in building company housing for 
workers as a way of lowering their living expenses (and hence their wage demands) 
and to increase pressure on landlords. 
By 1916 it had become clear that the private sector could not solve the 
housing crisis by itself. In 1917 an appointed committee of inquiry into industrial 
unrest acknowledged poor housing to be a major source of public grievance and 
recommended vigorous government action.  In the same year another government 
committee  (under) estimated that at least 300 thousand new houses would be needed 
immediately after the war and urged local government boards to begin stockpiling 
building materials and resources to move ahead with construction. Lloyd George, the 
prime minister, made “homes fit for returning heroes” a cornerstone of his 1918 
election campaign104. 
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Effectively, the housing dilemma had become connected to the very 
legitimacy of the political system. Even if urban unrest over the housing crisis did not 
explode into a revolutionary upheaval, nevertheless the issue remained of great 
concern to political leaders who kept receiving alarming intelligence reports that 
regularly raised the specter of Bolshevism105.  If precarious housing was the cause of 
urban discontent and political instability, the provision of adequate and affordable 
housing, especially in the post war years, was an economic concern to employers. 
Keeping labor costs low in the lean post war years required the negative pressure on 
the permanent workers exerted by the industrial reserve army of the unemployed. 
Housing these casual and precariously employed workers was not economical and it 
would defeat the purpose of exerting downward pressure on wage demands. 
Balancing these political and economic concerns was a challenging task for the 
employers and politicians. It also placed the social provision of worker’s housing 
squarely at the center of public debates, and became the subject of seesaw policy 
experimentations and heated debates over the next decades. 
The unprecedented 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act made local 
governments responsible for assessing housing needs, drawing plans and overseeing 
their implementations106. By 1922 nearly 200 thousand houses were built by the 
private sector using state subsidies under this act and its follow up. However, this 
number proved hardly adequate and the programs primarily benefited developers, the 
middle classes, and the better paid workers who could afford the relatively high prices 
of these subsidized housing stock107. Once the war had ended the climate began to 
change, and the prevailing liberal ideology was back in swing, seeking to curtail and 
reverse the trend toward state intervention in the workings of the free market. After 
1920 more rent strikes prompted the state to pass several further housing acts in 1923 
and 1924. But these acts also fell into the pattern of avoiding state competition with 
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private landlords and financiers, and allocated subsidized mortgages for private 
housing instead of affordable rental units108.   
I have provided a more detailed analysis of the urban housing crisis in 
wartime Britain since the story has both global dimensions, while it also clearly 
overlaps with the rising crisis of labor housing in Abadan during the interwar period 
(see chapters 5 & 6). In the post war era, beset by revolutionary fervor and rising 
labor discontent, affordable housing for the masses had become a key component of 
maintaining the stability of a capitalist system beset by class conflict and facing a 
crisis of legitimacy. The League of Nations had established the International Labour 
Office (ILO) as one of its first acts in 1919, to regulate and manage labor issues. In 
1924 the ILO produced a comprehensive comparative study of labor housing in 
Europe since 1913. The study began by asserting that housing provision before WWI 
had been shaped by Victorian era liberal and laissez-faire economic theories, which 
had already caused a major housing crisis prior to the war. WWI “had [only] 
precipitated the [housing] crisis, increased its intensity, and gave it the specific form 
which make it one of the most serious social and economic problems of the present 
day”109. 
 
Setting Oil Policy After the War: 
As one of Britain’s major petrochemical and primary industrial materials 
producers, the attitudes and praxis of APOC directors and experts were constantly 
being shaped by this wartime experience at home, on a rapidly remapped and 
increasingly competitive global market, as well as in Khuzestan and its other areas of 
its operation. The  shifting geopolitical landscape affected APOC’s policies at various 
levels, in Britain and Europe, as well as in Iran and the Persian Gulf. In 1916, the 
powerful Board of Trade drew up a memorandum for consideration by the Cabinet 
titled “The Future of Oil Supplies”. It was the first indication of the recognition of the 
vital strategic importance of oil supplies not just for the country but also for the 
empire itself110. A protracted debate ensued where two options were considered: To 
establish a wholly British monopoly company, or to amalgamate APOC with Royal 
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109 See International Labour Office, European Housing Problems Since the War 1914-1923. (Geneva: 
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Dutch Shell (RDS) into a jointly owned British-Dutch company. Both were awkward 
options, as the government was uncomfortable with its majority investment in APOC, 
a supposedly private corporation, while APOC and its supporters lobbied hard to 
portray RDS as a foreign concern. The possibility of compelling RDS to become a 
wholly British Company was briefly considered but was eventually abandoned as 
impractical111. John Cadman, the head of the Petroleum Executive (and future APOC 
Chairman), set up the Harcourt Committee in 1918 to draw up a comprehensive 
appraisal of the national and imperial oil problem: “The time has arrived to when it is 
necessary to formulate a policy by which His Majesty’s Government shall be guided 
in all matters relating to the advancement and direction of petroleum industries”112. 
The Committee reported to Cadman that, 
“The present war has demonstrated the numerous purposes for which the 
British Empire is dependent on petroleum and its products, of which 80 
percent of its supply come from the United States…the industrial supremacy 
of the British Empire has been built upon vast coal resources. The Committee 
was asked to consider what steps should be taken to secure control of as much 
as possible of the world’s supply of natural petroleum…the future of the 
Empire depended on a satisfactory solution of its oil problems and that 
opportunities for such strengthening the position exists now which may not 
recur, and no time should be lost in deciding on the policy which will ensure 
to the British Empire adequate supplies of petroleum products”113 
 
What this resolution meant in practical terms was the acknowledgment that a 
strategic shift from coal to oil in industrial and military spheres was now an 
unavoidable reality that needed to be acknowledged and managed. This 
acknowledgment translated into the government encouragement and support for 
APOC to plan for aggressive future involvement in the development of oil resources 
outside Iran (Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia being the first instances), and of the 
expansion of its industrial and consumer market activities in Britain. As for the 
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British government, this strategic outlook shaped its post-war policy toward the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East, as was discussed in chapter 2114.    
In 1918-1922, at the same time as Abadan refinery was in a state of expansion 
and consolidation, APOC began the building of Llandarcy (named after William 
Knox D’Arcy), the first major oil refinery in Britain located in South Wales coast, 
near the Swansea docks. The refinery at its peak employed 2600 people. A company 
town was built nearby with 260 houses, together with a community center, and local 
stores, all owned by the Company115. In contrast Abadan, the heart of the Company’s 
global operations, was altogether on a different scale. By mid 1920s, Abadan had an 
estimated population of 60 thousand, and the housing question there involved massive 
logistic and geopolitical challenges, and the production of company housing and 
designing and maintaining a company town planning would take another three 
decades of protracted and ever expanding efforts to implement (see chapters 5 and 6). 
In the end, urban problems and especially workers’ housing shortages significantly 
contributed to labor discontent during the nationalization era, and the eventual 
eviction of AIOC from Iran in 1951.  
APOC clearly drew important lessons from the wartime housing crisis when 
dealing the urban crisis in Abadan. These accumulated experiences across the 
Company’s vast geographies of operations (in Wales, Khuzestan, Mesopotamia, etc.) 
contributed to shaping the patterns of paternalistic and self-interested interventions in 
the urban life of its workers.  How these experiences were translated into Company 
practices and contributed to the formulation and implementation of social policies in 
Abadan need to be studied in connection to the local dynamics there, as we shall 
discuss in the next chapters. 
 
Pluralism and Planning:  The Impact of Political Franchise and Mass Politics 
In the previous sections I have outlined the impact of public health measures, 
military conscription, the dramatic expansion of the labor market and trade union 
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activity, and the social and material crises such as housing and inflation that affected 
the daily lives of working people in wartime Britain. These issues made a deep and 
lasting impact on the attitudes of the political and economic elites, as well as ordinary 
people, toward the role of government in civil society, the economy, and the social 
responsibilities of large corporations regarding the general welfare.  In this section I 
will turn to the discussion of how these developments affected the political domain 
directly. After a costly and ruinous war that had to some extent brought into question 
the legitimacy of the old political and economic order, what did the enfranchisement 
of working people, women, returning soldiers, and paupers (the poor and the 
propertyless), imply for class politics, corporate attitudes, and government policies? 
How did the political advances made in the era of mass enfranchisement affect the 
post war habitus? 
 The rising social expectations of a more decent life in exchange for the 
sacrifices demanded of ordinary people only added to the malaise resulting from the 
shambolic and mismanaged conduct of the Great War116. The poor performance of 
military and political leaders had disillusioned the general public who were asked to 
shoulder most of the human and material costs. However, side by side with this 
general cynicism, an alternative and far less complacent political imaginary was also 
taking shape. This militant political culture was inspired by the grassroots networks 
build by trade unions during the war and the relative gains in wages and job security 
that had marginally improved workers lives, as well as the utopian horizon of 
possibilities opened by the Russian revolution117. Severe labor shortages during the 
war years had given labor a greater advantage in negotiations over working and living 
conditions, and its share in the political and administrative domains of 
policymaking118.  
                                                           
116 This point is greatly emphasized by Perkin in his social history of the rise of the professional society 
in England. Perkin frames the period as “the crisis of class society” which led to the emergence of a 
“corporate society”, managed by technical and professional experts. See Perkin, The Rise of 
Professional Society, 171–357. 
117 By 1918 trade union membership had increased to 6 million by 1918, as had the funds channeled to 
the labor party. Women were now 29% of the official workforce in factories, offices, and hospitals. 
Briggs, A Social History of England, 262.   
118 Thane, The Foundations of the Welfare State, 127–130. 
Chapter 4 – The Emergence of the ‘Social Question’: WWI and its Aftermath 
 
 189 
Once the carnage ended there was no way back from franchise reform and for 
the elites to ignore the new power of mass politics119. The widespread sentiment was 
captured by the novelist John Galsworthy, who wrote in the aftermath of the 1926 
general strike: “Everything now being relative there is no absolute dependence being 
placed on God, free trade, marriage, consoles, class, coal, or caste”120. 
Britain had suspended elections since 1910. The fear of the revolutionary 
consequences of electoral democracy and voting rights for the common people had 
been a source of great anxiety among the elites throughout the 19th Century and the 
pre war years. Although the franchise had incrementally expanded in the 19th century 
it still did not include women and the propertyless, while the effectively rigged 
system was skewed to favor the propertied classes who enjoyed the privilege of 
having multiple votes121. The 1918 franchise reforms and the accompanying general 
election established for the first time a near universal voting right for all the males, 
and for most women above the age of 30122. The electorate increased nearly threefold 
at one go, from 8 million to nearly 22 million. It included nearly 8.5 million women, 
as well as paupers and returning soldiers, most of who had been previously 
disenfranchised123. This electoral reform severed the long established and 
ideologically enshrined connection between property and citizenship and, at least 
theoretically, opened the parliamentary system to direct representation of the general 
population124.  
The newly enfranchised population demanded secure jobs, better pay, decent 
and affordable housing, improved living conditions and social services. Politically, 
reneging on these new social demands by the working population was risky, but also 
vested capitalist interests were ambivalent about rolling back the preferential 
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advantages they had gained during wartime. Feinstein, et.al., estimate that during the 
war up to 40% of the entire economies of the belligerents had been directly or 
indirectly controlled by governments.  The withdrawal of this demand would have 
caused havoc on the large engineering, mining, chemical, metallurgy, munitions, ship 
building, and engineering corporations that had expanded to supply the war needs. 
These powerful interests were highly weary and opposed the immediate withdrawal 
of public demand for their products. As a result of these intensifying frictions, and the 
significant contraction of the economy, social unrest and class conflict became one of 
the most pressing post war problems, with significant long lasting repercussions125. 
The period 1918-1926 was an era simmering with intense social unrest, but in 
spite of great anxiety about the stability of the ruling order after near universal 
enfranchisement, the 1918 elections returned to power the Liberal-Conservative 
coalition and the franchise did not lead to radical political change126. The main reason 
for this was the depth of social divisions and the lack of consensus among both the 
political and economic elite as well as the laboring masses. There were simply too 
many differences of opinions and proposed strategies to allow any radical consensus 
to take shape, and to bring about a unified and militant change of direction127.  
The 1918 election results should not be interpreted as an indication that no 
meaningful political changes had taken place, on the contrary. But the radical and 
fundamental changes were latent and subtle, rather than spectacular and manifest at 
the pinnacles of social and political institutions, thus creating a new social habitus. 
For one thing, the Empire’s periphery was rocked by the aftershocks of the war. 
General conscription in Ireland had precipitated the Irish political settlement and led 
to the country’s eventual independence. In the more distant colonies, and especially in 
India, which supplied the bulk of the British army128, conscription and mass 
recruitments had contributed to social protests and energized the nationalist 
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movements129. The brutal repression of nationalist and labor protestors in India over 
the question of political representation had direct and lasting repercussions in Abadan. 
Angered by their poor living and working conditions, skilled Indian workers and 
employees in Abadan were further energized by events in India, and went on a series 
of strikes beginning in 1920. The virulence of these labor protests prompted the Oil 
Company to begin expelling the strikers, and to rethink its long-term labor policy 
through a protracted process of replacing Indians with Iranian laborers (see chapters 1 
and 5).  
Within Britain, the more significant political reconfigurations of the exercise 
of power were taking place not so much in the electoral domain as in the proliferation 
of technocratic and administrative institutions that were planning and regulating 
civilian life to an unprecedented degree130. The poor military performance during the 
first two years of the war had paved the way for the emergence of a new system of 
government no longer dedicated to the appearance of constitutional niceties and 
minimal interference in civil society, but intent on establishing an efficient command 
economy focused on winning the war131.  Already in 1915-1916 the government had 
begun regulating an increasing range of issues that had hitherto been considered the 
exclusive domain of the private sector and local authorities, such as improving 
controls on prices, rents, profits, wages, labor contracts, conscription, the recruitment 
of women in the industrial and clerical labor market, liquor licensing, food rationing, 
etc132. These governmental regulations were carried out in tandem with large business, 
although trade unions had also become increasingly involved in mediating labor 
negotiations and exercising a voice in matters related to the working and living 
conditions of their members.  
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As we will discuss in the next section, the coordinators and agents of this 
increasingly interventionist state policy were the new professional classes. These 
were, on the one hand, full time trade unionists and professionalized labor negotiators 
who could stay in command of increasingly complex negotiated rules and regulations 
governing the labor process and workplace relations. On the other hand, they 
consisted of the new professional middle class with formal education and institutional 
accreditation from the expanding universities133. It is ironic that Lloyd George’s 
governing Liberal Party and its Conservative coalition partners presided over this 
shift to a more centralized and planned political economy, making [classical] 
“liberalism a casualty of war”134! 
If the elite were divided over the necessary boundaries of social policy 
reforms135 and the proper extent of government involvement in the economy, so were 
trade unions, labor activists, and the Labor Party136. Labor was deeply suspicious of 
governmental power, which it viewed as repressive and a tool of employers. But 
workers also had a strong sense that they needed a collective countervailing power to 
defend their interests and to check the employers. The Labor Party’s buildup began in 
the prewar years not in the parliament but among the grassroots, where it established 
local chapters and its members entered local government authorities. Asa Briggs sees 
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the first three decades of the 20th century as the formative period in the building of 
“historical organizations that became the scaffolding of the modern labor 
movement”137. The dramatic rise in unemployment after the war caused major 
setbacks and somewhat eroded the negotiating power of labor. But by the mid 1920s 
the political landscape of Britain had changed and labor and its representatives in 
trade unions and the Labour party had become an integral part of the political and 
administrative system, at local as well as national levels. Labor’s electoral gains, and 
the rising militancy of the unemployed and the precariously employed, meant that 
employers as well as the political elite had to take into consideration labor and its 
political representatives in a manner that would have been inconceivable a generation 
before.  
 
The Rise to Prominence of Professional Middle Class Experts and their Impact 
on Corporate Culture and Governmental Social Policies: 
 
When in 1926 APOC undertook the task of re-configuring its operations in 
Khuzestan, the protracted and extensive discussion among its senior directors and 
managers was undertaken in a new language and spirit of comprehensive planning of 
its long term relationship to the new and emerging central government in Tehran, as 
well as to their employees in Khuzestan. At the center of the new approach lay an 
acknowledgment of the necessity of formulating and implementing a set of social 
policies that in appearance had little to do directly with oil extraction, market shares, 
or profit rates. In previous years the notion of the Oil Company committing itself to 
providing social amenities and services for its employees, ranging from education to 
public health, municipal planning, housing provision, recreational facilities and 
leisure amenities for rank and file workers, and so on, would have been considered 
odd. But by the mid-1920s the Company was actively discussing a long-term 
commitment to initiating an extensive and costly range of social initiatives that would 
reshape the daily lives of its employees, as well as the region’s population (chapters 5 
& 6).  
In official Company correspondence and in the energetic propaganda it set up 
to shape public opinion (see chapter 5), these interventionist social policies were 
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always articulated and presented as reluctantly undertaken, generous, and benevolent 
contributions to public welfare. In practice, and forthrightly articulated in internal 
documents, they were aimed at reducing friction with its workforce and the Iranian 
government, and to increase the productivity of operations. These social policies 
became the instruments through which the Company engaged in shaping and 
managing the territory and the spaces where it was operating, as well as the 
populations and the institutions it had to deal with.    
Ironically, most of the Company officials involved in these internal debates 
belonged to a pre-war generation shaped by the colonial Victorian and Edwardian 
culture and worldviews138. However, economic institutions and their constituent 
agents are not formed a priori, but are shaped through praxis and situated within the 
various social and geographic contexts (scales) where they operate. APOC’s new 
corporate culture was simultaneously being formed and performed at various scales in 
which it was operating - local and global – in Abadan, Britain, Basra, and Burma139. A 
new regime of accumulation was emerging out of WWI. This global political and 
economic landscape was ushering in new labor relations that now were being 
managed through professional and technical expertise, and were premised on an 
increasingly regulated economy, and on planned social reforms aimed at mediating 
class frictions.   
   In Britain, the wartime governmental intervention in the civil society, in 
tandem with employers and trade unions, was becoming a lasting feature of the post-
War era. Early on after the war this trend was highly contested both by labor, which 
mistrusted the state as the instrument of employees, as well as the traditional ruling 
establishment which was suspicious of bureaucracy and resented the subversion of the 
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free market and what it saw as the corruption caused by the undeserving poor taking 
advantage of the publicly funded welfare measures140.  As the economic crisis 
worsened throughout the 1920s desperate attempts to return to pre war economic 
policies, like the return to the gold standard in 1925 to shore up the Sterling, proved a 
failure. However, as worsening social conditions began to threaten political stability, 
especially with unemployment staying persistently above a million throughout the 
decade, the proponents of greater regulation of the economy and long term social and 
economic planning gained greater acceptance and began to exert their influence141.  
Despite calls for austerity amidst mounting economic crisis and the ongoing 
debates over the appropriate extent of social policies, the overall trend throughout the 
1920s was toward the significant expansion of the public sector, as a succession of 
Liberal, Conservative, and (briefly) Labour, governments kept steadily increasing 
expenditures for social projects throughout the 1920’s142. By 1930 public spending on 
various social services had increased from virtually nothing to nearly 40 percent of 
overall expenditures, with state contributions to unemployment funds, for example, 
increasing twelvefold, from £3million to £37 million143. Not only the older and 
established means of dealing with social inequality -- such as charities, local parishes, 
and poor laws -- were no longer able to cope with the scope of the post war social 
problems, but also a permanent shift in public culture had rendered these Victorian 
institutions irrelevant. Out of work laborers and the poor were no longer content with 
accepting charity for the helpless; instead they were demanding employment and 
work as a social right. Decommissioned soldiers, women recently employed in 
dangerous munitions works, and hard-pressed families in industrial cities now 
expected more decent living conditions and greater economic security. The question 
of balancing political stability with the pursuit of economy in public expenditures had 
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The Fallout from the 1926 General Strike: 
The social policies that formed the core of the emerging welfare state in post 
war Britain were highly complex to implement, and were intensely contested. In 1921 
a brief attempt was made to cut back expenditures (‘The Geddes Axe’) in order to 
make a return to pre war laissez faire. The social backlash was immediate, with major 
labor strikes and industrial unrest exacerbated by disaffection of decommissioned and 
unemployed soldiers. Avoiding disorder became a major concern for established 
politicians across the ideological spectrum, including labor politicians144. The massive 
1926 general strike was a turning point in bringing about a ‘passive revolution’ in the 
general acceptance of the need for the consolidation of social policies that over time 
would come to form the backbone of what is now known as the welfare state. The 
strike involved more than 2.5 million145 miners, transport workers, and steel workers 
against unilateral wage reductions of 13 percent, exacerbated by the withdrawal of 
government subsidies (effectively further reducing real wages by another 7-10 
percent), in addition to the imposition of longer work hours, and generally worsening 
living conditions. These were the heavy industrial sectors that had greatly expanded 
in wartime, but were now facing dramatically reduced demand, coupled with 
unprecedented international competition during a period of major economic 
contraction. 
Although the strike was defeated without much bloodshed, it had a 
considerable polarizing cultural impact. On the one hand, the general strike mobilized 
significant segments of the middle classes against radicalism, while on the other hand  
it convinced the Labour Party leaders to focus their efforts on accommodation with 
the parliamentary system and demand reformist concessions and favorable social 
policies146.  Among the ruling circles the debate over how to respond to radical social 
discontent was intense. While some, like Churchill (the Chancellor), demanded a 
violent crackdown by the military, others, most notably Stanley Baldwin the Prime 
Minister, adopted a policy of appeasement combined with repression. The state had 
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long prepared itself for the strike. The establishment press helped mobilize the middle 
classes against the strikers by claiming their actions to be a radical assault on the 
social order. Eventually the strikers could no longer sustain their effort and had to 
compromise amidst rising material pressures147.  
Chronic unemployment and persistent labor discontent and social unrest 
during the post war years (1918-1926) eventually tilted the balance toward the general 
acceptance of the need for the implementation of social and welfare policies.  
However, neither bureaucrats nor politicians were equipped on their own to justify, 
conceptualize, plan, implement, and evaluate the performance of the expanding array 
of social policies that were being formulated in ad hoc response to various crises. This 
task fell to the professional middle classes, including by now professional labor 
politicians and representatives148, who had emerged as an increasingly coherent social 
force in the inter war era.  
The ‘social question’ was gradually but unmistakably being defined in public 
discourse as, on the one hand, intolerable problems arising from class conflict and the 
insecurity caused by unregulated free markets and, on the other hand, the subversive 
agitations of political radicals taking advantage of public discontent149. From 1918 to 
1926 chronic unemployment hovering over 1 million, deteriorating wages, and poor 
housing and living conditions, were by far the greatest causes of social discontent and 
the reason behind continued waves of strikes and political protests150. To save 
capitalism from itself the different spheres of the market economy needed to be 
differentiated and regulated in order to modify their combined and spiraling negative 
social impact, and the working population needed to be made stakeholders in the 
political and economic system.  
Influential intellectuals and prominent economists, such as J.M. Keynes, 
argued for the necessity of differentiating markets according to their social impact. 
Labor markets, for example, could not be treated the same as consumer commodities: 
Whereas supply and demand could govern the market for physical goods, a sharp fall 
in demand for labor would have severe political consequences. The same was true for 
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financial markets, as money and finance was the lifeline of the entire economic order, 
and the collapse of currency due to inflation or speculation would disrupt the political 
stability, as it had done in post war Germany151. Solving the crisis required 
authoritative and impartial intervention against individual interests of the employers, 
by insuring full employment, good wages, and economic security for the working 
classes. This would improve effective demand for consumer goods, and create 
economic prosperity and turn workers into stakeholders rather than exploited 
adversaries152.  The trauma of the general strike of 1926 had rendered these arguments 
more convincing.    
Taking on the role of formulating a growing set of social policies to deal with 
rising social crises and class conflict fell to professional experts from the academia as 
well as those employed in the private and public sectors, including urban and 
economic planners, journalists, engineers, civil servants, economists, statisticians, 
medical and public health officials, lawyers, and social scientists among others153. 
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These social policies were advanced as new regulatory laws and institutional 
arrangements, addressing problems ranging from unemployment insurance to poverty 
alleviation, education reform, public health, workplace rules, affordable housing, old 
age pensions, and social security154.    
Historically, during the long 19th century, the drafting and proposal of social 
policies in Britain had been undertaken through parliamentary committees, like 
Edwin Chadwick’s mid-nineteenth century parliamentary reforms of Poor Laws, 
improving factory conditions, and public health and sanitary measures. 
Unemployment in particular, was a whole new category of social crisis that was 
‘discovered’ after 1870, and came to be seen as “the fundamental problem of modern 
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society”155. Great expositions of poverty and social injustice by journalists, 
philanthropists, popular novelists, and social reformers such as Henry Mayhew, 
Charles Booth, Ebenezer Howard, Arnold Toynbee, and Charles Dickens among 
others, had contributed to the social critique of the negative consequences of 
industrial capitalism and laissez faire. These sustained critical discussions by 
prominent academics and public intellectuals had given credence to the idea of a 
“social body”, or to ‘the nation’ as a collective social organism that required nurturing 
and rational guidance in order to improve (evolve and progress), and to avoid 
corruption and disease156. Earlier in the 19th century, these responses to intolerable 
social problems had begun to give impetus to the novel idea of the English 
government as a regulator and manager of social problems, especially when it came to 
dealing with the threats of contagious diseases, as we discussed earlier in this 
chapter157. 
However, to the extent that the government had involved itself in making 
social policy, it had been primarily the domain of elite amateur reformers, most of 
whom were dilettante gentlemen and products of middle class public schools who 
were in charge of effectively autonomous local governmental institutions, while a 
small and permanent corps of civil servants and bureaucrats was managing the 
drafting of related parliamentary acts for national implementation158. Gradually from 
the 1870’s onward, the trend toward the emergence of a new breed of middle class 
intelligentsia and technical experts displaying self-awareness as an increasingly 
coherent group, differentiating their social role from the other main social classes of 
landed gentry and aristocracy, businessmen and industrialists, and working classes, 
became unmistakable.  
At the avant-garde of this spectrum were reformist socialists, trade union 
activists, and other prominent social reformers committed to the improvement of the 
living conditions of the working classes and the urban poor. Most of these reformers 
were associated with the Fabian Society and were shaped under the influence of the 
19th century Benthamite utilitarianism. The Webbs, Bernard Shaw, H.G.Wells, 
Ebenezer Howard, and (later on) Keynes, stood as prominent examples of this 
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trend159. But the major shift took place when the governing Liberal Party itself became 
the main advocate of implementing social reforms and welfare policies, as the means 
of improving the national economy and the productivity of labor, and of averting 
political instability. 
Perkin identifies this as an important moment in the rise of “the professional 
social ideal” in response to the crisis of a segregated class society. This collective 
identity was articulated around a number of key premises: At its core was a critique of 
the irrational consequences of unfettered laissez faire. It was built around a gospel of 
work and productive activity in service to ‘universal welfare’ as opposed to the 
‘idleness’ bequeathed by private wealth (of hereditary landed proprietors) and selfish 
individual pursuits (of competitive merchants and industrialists). According to Perkin,  
“Professional people saw themselves as benevolent neutrals, standing above 
the main economic battles…While all classes try to justify themselves by their 
own concept of distributive justice, the professional class can only exist by 
persuading the rest of society to accept a distributive justice which recognizes 
and rewards expert service based on selection by merit and long arduous 
training… It is the success of such persuasion which raises him (when he 
succeeds) above the economic battle, and gives him a stake in creating a 
society which plays down class conflict…In all its manifestations, liberal, 
conservative or socialist, the professional social ideal consistently applied the 
test of justification by service to society and, in one form or another, of the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, to the analysis and criticism of 
contemporary society”160.  
 
The critical importance of this development for the formation of the oil 
complex in Khuzestan becomes clear when we explore the apparently puzzling 
question of why in the post-WWI era both APOC and the fledgling Pahlavi state 
eagerly justified the expanding range of their social interventions and urban 
infrastructural activities in the name of disinterested service for universal public 
welfare, while they were engaged in actively dismantling existing local social and 
political structures and coercively dispossessing peasant and pastoralist communities. 
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Whereas a generation before, at the onset of the D’Arcy Oil Concession, British oil 
speculators had dealt exclusively with Persian courtiers and local tribal elites (1901-
1921), by the mid 1920s the political irrelevance of the ordinary population could no 
longer be taken for granted. The practices and cultural attitudes of the oil corporation 
and state administrators and policymakers had undergone a significant change as a 
result of these global re-alignments. By the mid 1920s, both Oil Company officials as 
well as British and Persian administrators and policymakers had adopted the language 
and the outlook of professional experts, seeking to justify their actions and policies in 
the name of universal benefits to the ordinary population. The oil habitus in 
Khuzestan had changed, along with the global, national, and local transformations 
that had been ushered in the course of WWI and its aftermath.     
Already prior to WWI middle class expert professionals had played an 
increasingly important role in crafting social policies, especially in sanitation, factory 
and workplace regulation, cartography, and municipal affairs, but not directly in 
industrial and governmental policy-making161.  The pattern was different in the 
colonies, where the ideology of laissez faire and competitive markets and free trade 
were not held as sacrosanct162. Throughout the British and French colonies technical 
experts were assigned a far more prominent role in governance through social 
engineering, surveying and mapping, infrastructure development, urban planning, and 
colonial governance through designing spaces and social life163. Hobsbawm’s 
statement about India holds true for the rest of the empire, despite his exaggerated 
singling out the crown jewel of the Empire as a supposed exception: “India was the 
only part of the British empire to which laissez-faire never applied. Its most 
enthusiastic champions in Britain became bureaucratic planners when they went 
there, and the most committed opponents of political colonization rarely and then 
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never seriously suggested the liquidation of British rule”164. Throughout the 19th 
century the colonies had served as convenient laboratories of social engineering by 
technical and scientific experts in a manner that would have been politically and 
ideologically unacceptable in the home countries. Involuntary evictions and 
reallocations of populations, outright confiscations or the imposition of limits on 
property relations, coercive regulations of workplace habits, personal hygiene, family 
relations, domestic architecture and housing design, etc. were sensitive issues that lay 
at the ideological heart of liberalism and individualism, but were routinely practiced 
without undue moral qualms across the colonies. However, the global crises of the 
first decades of the new century paved the way for many of these techniques of 
governing the economy and society to be implemented in Europe as well, albeit with 
considerable political modifications in order to make them more acceptable.   
WWI precipitated the consolidation of Fordism, the new regime of capital 
accumulation, a central characteristic of which was the close coordination and overlap 
between large industry, centralized government, organized labor, expanded military, 
and universities165. The new political economy was also imposing significant re-
organizations on these institutions, both internal and external. Managing this 
transition to a new regime of accumulation became the domain of professional experts 
and laid the foundation for the gradual but highly visible emergence of the 
technocracy, and its differentiation from civil servants, businessmen, and 
politicians166. The professionalization of philanthropists, reformers, and political 
activists who had advocated social reforms prior to WWI created a labor market for 
the emerging technocracy, allowing them to fill the social spaces between labor and 
capital, and between politicians, bureaucrats and the civil society167.  
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The formalization of this new labor market for the professional class also led 
to the reform of the educational system, especially secondary schools and universities, 
as the institutions that would train and produce the professional classes, and accredit 
their scientific credentials and technical abilities. Since building an educational 
infrastructure aimed at shaping an adequate labor force in Khuzestan’s oil complex 
became a major bone of contention in the 1920s. I will review the relevant aspects of 
educational reform in Britain during this period, to provide a wider comparative 
context on this topic, which will be one of the topics of the next chapter.  
 
Education Reform  
Education reform and the proper role of the state in regulating institutional 
pedagogy had become important concerns across Europe in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, and especially in the later 19th century. Until the turn of the 20th 
century the primary focus of compulsory education reform for primary schools had 
been to teach basic literacy and numeracy, but especially to impose a standard 
vernacular as official national language, and to indoctrinate youth in the prevalent 
nationalist identity and appropriate moral codes168. By the turn of the century new 
priorities loomed for education, beyond turning peasants into Frenchmen, or the so 
called ‘Celtic fringe’ into proper subjects of a United Britain. The main focus now 
was to prepare the next generation of workers, bureaucrats, and expert functionaries 
for a competitive industrial economy. As is often the case, economic malaise and 
warfare triggered the will to initiate major reforms169. 
In Britain, the poor military performances in Boer war and WWI had acted as 
wake up calls about the shortcomings in preparing soldiers and officers, as well as 
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shoddy quality of the military equipment. Intensified military, technological, and 
industrial competition from the US, Japan, and Germany generated further anxiety 
and fueled the conviction for the necessity of educational reform in order to produce 
more competent technical experts as well as better-qualified workers. At the turn of 
20th century full time university students across Britain numbered around a mere 20 
thousand170. The higher education system was selective, and primarily geared toward 
producing recruits for the governing caste. Until the 1890s universities excluded 
professional training and the curriculum, especially at elite universities, was built 
around classics (including mathematics) and instructed though the system of colleges 
and tutorials171. Prestige and social connections were the primary criteria for 
admission as well as the recruitment of instructors. Scientific research and the training 
for engineering and practical applications of science to technical and industrial 
domains was more the purview of guilds, Royal Societies, and professional 
associations that valued practical and hands on apprenticeship rather ivory tower 
accreditation172.   
The decades leading to WWI and the interwar period marked a European wide 
movement to reform educational systems and bring them in line with modern 
innovations in technology and industrial organization. This trend in turn spurred the 
expansion of the teaching profession173 and precipitated educational reform in 
secondary and higher education, as it was generally accepted that comprehensive 
schooling, high literacy, and rigorous technical education were crucial factors 
distinguishing the competitiveness of national economies. However, establishing a 
consensus that educational reform was an integral aspect of social, economic, and 
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industrial improvement and progress was a protracted process and was not 
immediately accepted. Reformers kept up a vocal and public argument to emphasize 
the shortcomings of the existing national educational systems that were perpetrating 
social inequality and allowing the existence of  “islands of modernity surrounded by 
seas of backwardness”174 that simply failed to keep up with advances made in 
countries like Germany, where a comprehensive system of education had been 
implemented at various levels. 
The establishment of what came to be known as ‘red brick’ universities in 
industrial cities, like Birmingham, Manchester, London, and elsewhere, were a major 
hallmark of a new trend intended to coordinate technical education with the 
immediate needs of changing industries175. These new educational institutions were 
intended to compensate for the traditional elite’s disdain of industrial pursuits, and to 
prepare the ground for training formally accredited engineers, industrial researchers, 
chemists, managers, and industrial and scientific researchers whose task was to 
modernize the economy. Birmingham, in particular, became a center of research and 
training for the emerging petrochemical industries. John Cadman, later the chairman 
of APOC in the 1920s, established the petrochemical department and petroleum 
research at Birmingham University, before being recruited by the Admiralty during 
the war to oversee the navy’s conversion from coal to oil176. Similarly, the Imperial 
College in London became the cornerstone of attempts to improve the design of 
precision instruments vital components in modern technological warfare. At 
Cambridge, Alfred Marshall, and later on his pupil Keynes and their colleagues had 
played a major role in professionalization of economics as a ‘scientific’ discipline 
distinct from politics and other social concerns177.  
After WWI the government adopted a more proactive role in coordinating the 
interaction of universities with the industry and resolve the perceived inadequacies of 
the educational system. By 1925 the institutionalization of the procedures for 
establishing research and development programs and formal training courses at major 
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universities with critical government support and involvement had become a fait 
accompli178.  Although the elite nature of higher education was not significantly 
altered until after WW2, the significant expansion of universities, and the extension of 
government scholarships, free place quotas, and the implementation of blind 
qualification examinations paved the way for relatively greater meritocracy in the 
accreditation of professional middle classes179.  
The re-organization of the education system was not limited to universities, 
but involved the labor force as well. Successive military conflicts and the changing 
nature of industrial production since the turn of the century had demonstrated the 
inadequacy of labor training methods in technically demanding and higher skilled 
tasks such as product testing, draughtsmanship, machine tool operations, and so on180. 
Preparations for many of these skills, and for the operation of more complex tools and 
industrial processes, required greater abstract and theoretical knowledge and it was 
felt that it could no longer be left to the care of on-the-job practical training or 
traditional apprenticeship alone.  As a result, the more comprehensive and forml 
education of the next generation of working classes became a greater concern after 
WWI. The 1918 Education Act eliminated school fees for elementary schools. It also 
doubled the salaries of teachers, and increased their pensions threefold. The 
University Grant Committees of 1919 channeled greater government funds to 
universities and increased the funding of teacher training colleges. However, these 
measures were short-lived, as the austerity budget of 1921 led to extensive cutbacks, 
including funding educational reforms181.  
Establishing social welfare reforms, as previously discussed, was a protracted 
process, fraught with political friction and class contentions. By mid 1920s only 13 
percent of all children remained in the formal education system; the rest had to go to  
work to subsidize the family income. Despite waved school fees families often could 
not afford school supplies and uniforms, nor could they cope without children’s 
wages. Despite government subsidies and elementary and secondary school reforms 
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working classes and the poor benefited little, and publicly funded educational social 
policies effectively benefited various layers of the middle class182. 
 
Shouldering the Burden of Social Policies: 
From the onset in mid 19th century, a persistent objection against the 
expansion of social policies was their substantial cost, which had to be funded from 
new taxes, and the question of who ought to shoulder the burden183. In arguments that 
resonate to this day, the main objections against new taxes from the mid 19th century 
were formulated around variations of the ‘moral hazard’ argument and the supposed 
corrupting effects of publicly subsidizing services that ought to be shouldered by 
individuals. In this discourse social policies were supposed to subsidize idleness and 
undermine personal responsibility. They were also presumed to interfere with the 
unfettered workings of the market and to place a burden on the productively 
employed and the deserving rich184.   
It is important to recall that the debate over the significance of taxation 
(income tax, tariffs, and value added tax in particular) occupy a particularly important 
place in the contemporary literature about the relationship of oil and politics185. In this 
section I will discuss some of the relevant aspects of the debates over taxation in the 
period under discussion, and provide a different interpretation of the relationship 
between taxation and the exercise of politics in contemporary nation states.  
The social question and the welfare state institutions that emerged with such 
urgency in the interwar period were premised on the extraction of taxes to fund the 
growing range of their programs. Historically, building an effective fiscal and 
financial machinery of the government had been the cornerstone of the architecture of 
modern nation states in Western Europe186. Initially, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
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growing power of state bureaucracies to extract taxes had served the purpose of 
building modern infrastructures, and fueling the growing military industrial complex. 
The imposition of new taxes, especially on income and revenues accruing from 
market activities, was based on more systematic bureaucratic record keeping, and the 
rule of parliamentary law. Schumpeter maintained that this modern “tax state” was 
based on a historical compromise reached during the wars of religion between 
absolutist monarchs and the bourgeoisie and the gentry that essentially redefined the 
nature of the polity after 16th century. In exchange for the voluntary acquiescence by 
the latter to pay taxes and fund military campaigns and state projects, the decision 
over the volume, the nature, and the manner of the collection and expenditure of taxes 
was taken out of the hands of the monarch and entrusted to the care of elected 
representatives. Overtime, this new social contract changed the nature of the 
patrimonial state, and had served to advance and make acceptable the notion of the 
state as the universal representative of common interests187.  
So long as the franchise was limited to those with status and property, and 
excluded women and other legally marginalized groups, this idea had limited 
purchase as the burden of taxation was simply passed on to the working population. 
In Britain, the extension of universal franchise after 1918 changed this dynamic and 
made the debates over the welfare state and its social policies, and the appropriate 
forms and levels of taxation a matter of more inclusive negotiations. States are by 
definition financed through some form of economic extraction. But various forms of 
taxation, and their associated redistribution, generate very different politics. Whether 
compulsory contributions to the state involve the imposition of levies on persons, 
property, inheritance, income, transactions, or commodities, can engender different 
responses among the targeted segments of population, and establish a range of 
expectations from the state.  
In the modern era of nation states the building of a fiscal infrastructure 
capable of keeping track of economic performance of individuals and other economic 
agents required the setting up of extensive bureaucracies, and the intrusive collection 
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of detailed data, and elaborate record keeping188. The negotiations over tax 
contributions and their eventual allocation became a centerpiece of parliamentary and 
representative politics, especially when it came to financing social projects such as 
education reform, housing programs, unemployment insurance, social security, and so 
on. Schumpeter saw the fiscal system as the heart of the modern state and a primary  
instrument of social engineering: “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all 
misleading ideologies…Our people have become what they are under the fiscal 
pressure of the state…All of this created economic forms, human types, and industrial 
situations which would not have grown in this manner without it”189. Written at a time 
when he was the finance minister of a defeated Austria, Schumpeter warned against 
the fragility of what he called “the tax state”. The exponential increase of the social 
demands heaped on the state in the post war era was a great cause for concern, and if 
tax policy was mishandled it could easily target any hope of economic recovery and 
growth, and lead to the state’s collapse.  
In practice, however, the implementation of taxation for the financing of 
social programs was not simply a matter of developing the proper economic models 
and of delegation of decision making to qualified experts. For one thing, there are 
major differences between public assistance and social insurance; two forms of public 
social security often mistakenly lumped together, even though they are quite distinct. 
Social insurance schemes (such as unemployment benefits, pensions, or health 
insurance) are more codified, and consist largely of contributions related to benefits. 
They modify certain risks within the population and among the working class by 
socializing the costs. Employers and the state contribute to these schemes because the 
continued accumulation of capital within the economy of mass production and 
consumption (Fordism) relies on the continued effective demand for consumer goods 
by the population. In addition, the accumulated financial assets now form a 
substantial segment of the financial system. On the other hand, public assistance 
schemes are often financed through public budgets and administered through 
bureaucratic institutions that impose very selective criteria for qualification. While 
social insurance schemes have become integral to the politics of class compromise 
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that emerged with the welfare state, public assistance schemes (such as welfare for the 
poor) are always in jeopardy and treated as morally suspect190.  
The imposition of new taxes contributed differently to these schemes, and 
political reaction and support for these expenditures have also varied considerably. In 
addition, democratic oversight over these funds, and decision-making over their 
allocations are not similar. While social insurance schemes are more ‘untouchable’ 
and relatively more open to oversight by contributors, public assistance has always 
been subject to greater contention and resistance. 
The implementation of progressive income taxation did lead to some measure 
of social distribution of wealth, but not as extensively as it is sometimes claimed. 
Social security benefits in Britain did increase twelvefold in the first half of the 20th 
century, although from a very low starting point191. But their greatest burden fell on 
the shoulders of working people and not the well to do, thus limiting their actual 
redistributive effects. In 1913 working classes were paying more in taxes than they 
were receiving in services. A decade later, in 1925, they were paying 85 percent of 
the cost of the expanded social services, but they were now receiving £55 million 
more than their contributions. By 1937 this figure had increased to £250 million192. On 
average working class incomes increased between 8-14 percent between 1913 and 
1937, and some small redistribution of income did take place. However, the major 
beneficiary of the changed economy seemed to have been the salaried professionals, 
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Table 3: Share of National Income in Britain Before and After WWI  
(as percentage of total) 
 
 Wages Salaries Profits 
1911 38 14 34 
1924 42 26 25 
Source: Thane (1982): 170 
 
Despite the slight shift in redistribution of incomes, the burden of direct and 
indirect taxation fell mostly on the working population, especially if we take into 
account various obligatory contributions to welfare that were not categorized as tax. 
As a result, most expenditure on social services ended up being a transfer of income 
mediated by the state, via taxation, within the working class. Compulsory 
contributions to social programs, instead of raising taxes, placed much of the financial 
burden on the poor and avoided any significant redistribution of wealth. According to 
Saville “Mostly working classes pay for their own social security benefits by 
compulsory contributions and high levels of indirect taxes”193. 
 
This brings to a conclusion the analysis of the manner in which the ‘social 
question’ was posed with urgency amidst the military and political challenges of 
WWI and its aftermath. This process deeply affected the ethos and the practices of the 
British state, and large businesses such as APOC, toward labor and social concerns. 
As we have seen, the protracted assemblage of the institutions of the welfare state -- 
in affordable housing, education, urban reform, unemployment insurance, public 
health, and so on – were not the result of some mythical and inevitable maturity and 
evolving rational decision making, but of unforeseen circumstances, and a response to 
intensified social strife and class conflicts that were reaching explosive dimensions. 
The movement toward the consolidation of social policies and welfare institutions 
was neither immediate nor straightforward. They were the outcome of political 
struggles, ongoing negotiations, and trial and error aimed at modifying and managing 
class frictions. Equally important, they were the result of calculations aimed at 
improving the performance of the economy and the productivity of labor in a changed 
international arena.  To paraphrase Michel Aglietta, lived history is heterogeneous, 
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and beyond any historical ‘laws’ of evolution. “History is initiatory…we can act in 
history not calculate it”194.  
This juncture was also the turning point for the rise of a class of professionals 
and the accompanying technocratic ethos in managing social welfare policies and 
reforming industrial relations. It coincided with a period marked by the formal entry 
of labor, the poor, and women into the arena of political citizenship, which had 
expanded threefold by the end of 1920s195.  
The welfare state was not strictly speaking a redistributive state. Saville may 
have been oversimplifying in claiming, “The welfare state is essentially a bourgeois 
project… its aim was not redistribution, but ‘self help’ and insurance paid for and by 
the poor. The state now ‘saves’ for the working class and translates the savings into 
social services”196. But he was correct in asserting that the result was that the idea of 
private property was never seriously challenged and in the end the distribution of 
wealth was not substantially more equal than the turn of the century.  
The history of the rise of the ‘social question’ that we have unpacked in this 
chapter had direct repercussions on the dynamics and the development of the oil 
complex in Khuzestan, as the idea of social policies as necessary and unavoidable 
antidotes to labor unrest began to gradually became part of governmental and 
corporate understanding in Britain and much of Europe. But, in the post war era 
simmering with the energies of socialist revolutions, rising nationalism, and the 
establishment of independent and modern nation states, the implementation of social 
policies by emerging bureaucracies also became an integral component of the 
legitimacy of these new states197. In the fast expanding spheres of industrial 
production, such as the oil industry, labor had begun to be perceived in a different and 
conflicted light: no longer as a casual, cheap, and anonymous factor of production, 
but as both a potentially dangerous political agent, as well as a necessary ‘human 
capital’. Raising the productivity of labor in the age of highly competitive rapid 
mechanization and mass production now required investment in the workers, 
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including the provision of specialized training to adapt them to an increasingly 
fragmented and technical labor process. But it also demanded social investments to 
placate the rising political power of the working populations by making 
improvements in their living conditions and to insure the acculturation of their 
children as the next generation of producers and consumers..  
The reproduction of labor power thus became an integral concern of the new 
political economy. As the moderate political representatives of the working classes 
were being integrated into the political system, the consumption habits of the workers 
were also becoming part of the cornerstone of the new economic order of Fordism 
and the mass consumer society198.  
 
In Conclusion: The Social Life of Oil in the Wake of WWI and the Transition to 
Fordism 
By mid-1920’s APOC was re-organizing into a new form of business 
organization, which four decades later David Lilienthal named the multi-national 
corporation199. This re-organization was coming at the apex of what has been labeled 
the second industrial revolution, a problematic term that, nevertheless, highlights the 
fundamental nature of the changes that were taking place. Fordism is an industrial and 
political-economic order that has been built on oil as its primary material, and is 
organized through the vertical and horizontal integration of related economic 
activities within corporate giants with global reach, that combine industrial scale 
production with mass consumption. Its workings are based on both the detailed 
control of the labor process, as well as on sustained and disciplinary intervention into 
the reproduction of labor power. The daily lives, consumer habits, political 
imaginaries, and cultural preferences of workers, their families, and the general 
population, are integral to the functioning of consumer society. Fordism relies on the 
increased commodification of labor power and the expansion of the wage contract, 
and the active participation of laborers and the general population in the mass 
consumer market. The financial system, and the welfare and social policies planned 
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by experts and implemented by public institutions, form the basis of the Fordist 
regime of accumulation.   
 As we have seen in this chapter, the emergence of the Fordism and the social 
policies of the welfare state were not the inevitable outcomes of historical progress 
and rational planning. To paraphrase Aglietta, history has no ‘laws’; it is a creative 
and contentious process. “History is initiatory… we can act in history not calculate 
it”200. The protracted shift to Fordism and the institutionalization of social policies that 
accompanied it, were shaped in large part during the unpredictable conflicts of WWI, 
and then accelerated in the course of social conflicts and global crises that followed.  
As one of Britain’s largest and most strategically important corporations 
APOC’s practices and organization were not insulated from the social and political 
events and processes discussed in this chapter. However, as we shall see in the 
following chapters, this does not imply that practices and forms of expertise shaped in 
wartime Britain and in the interwar years were simply transmitted by the Company to 
its Khuzestan operations. The analysis provided in this chapter sheds light on the 
historical context where ‘the social question’ was posed in Britain with great urgency, 
and the new arts of government that emerged out of it and reshaped the habitus there. 
As we shall discuss in the following chapter, these events had a direct bearing on 
what transpired in the oil complex in Khuzestan; but they did not determine the 
outcome. They contributed to shaping the oil habitus in Abadan, but they did not 
define it.   
 As an industrial leader APOC’s reorganization in the post war era was driven 
in part by the adoption of labor saving technologies, and by its fevered attempts to 
capture and monopolize markets for their mass-produced consumer goods. In Britain, 
APOC began, with significant assistance form the state, to build national networks of 
distribution, gas stations, a major refinery, fund research and development projects, 
initiate the development of new petrochemical products, and so on201. Like other 
businesses it was affected by the convulsions of the era of mass politics and the labor 
strife that ushered in the welfare state. It was also a global company, producing oil in 
far-flung corners of the Empire, for consumption by navy ships, the Royal Airforce, 
military transport, as well as private consumers. It was a majority government owned 
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corporation, even if it was operating in a grey area between the state, the empire, and 
the market.  
Together, these crossed historical ties and global-local forces affected the 
attitude of APOC toward its employees in Abadan, the urban population, and the 
Iranian state. The planned construction of the Abadan bazaar was not an exception; 
but one of the first crucial steps in a strategic change of approach from a corporation 
that was shifting identity from a speculative extractive mining operation to a major 
global industrial business, during a revolutionary period. From this juncture the 
Company began to get increasingly involved in attempting to actively shape and ever 
more directly plan minute aspects of the lives of its employees and their families. 
These social policies were conceived by a new breed of technocrats as the solution to 
the complex political challenges, and the social and class frictions that the Company’s 
operations faced in Iran. These social policies were adopted with great reluctance, but 
always framed and presented as generous and benevolent acts, serving the general 
welfare. The Company had hitherto skirted the claims of social responsibility, 
because they had nothing to do with maximizing profits from oil production. Building 
the bazaar of Abadan, investing in schools, company housing for staff and (much 
later) for workers, public health measures, urban planning and involvement in 
building municipal infrastructure, gradually became the first hesitant steps in what 
soon became a growing repertoire of what can only be called “reluctant paternalism” 
that defined the Company’s new approach 202.    
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Reluctant Paternalism and the Social Question in Khuzestan’s Oil 
Complex in the Post War Era 
 
The 1926 Turning Point: Oil Encounter in Abadan 
The short decade after WWI witnessed the consolidation of the oil industry in 
Iran. The interlude was a revolutionary turning point on many scales during which all 
the main social actors in the making of the oil complex were transformed through 
abrasive encounters with each other, as well as with the larger transnational forces 
that have been discussed in previous chapters. Although the consolidation of the oil 
complex was an ongoing process, I have taken the year 1926 as a symbolic but 
significant turning point when the new trends in the oil complex took a turn toward 
being institutionalized in significant ways. By this date a number of the important 
general outlines of the oil complex in Khuzestan had emerged with some clarity, even 
though frictions and re-adjustments continued and the oil industry kept changing in 
response to the forces of politics, the immense technical challenges bedeviling the 
industry, the vagaries of the markets, shifting geopolitics, persistent labor issues, and 
an ever growing range of practical difficulties and obstacles.  
The year 1926 was the coronation of Reza Shah, and the juncture when the 
Iranian central government began to move more confidently to impose its direct 
sovereignty over Khuzestan. With the increasing retreat of the British government 
from direct interference in southern Iran APOC had to rethink its positions. 
Throughout the preceding months the Company concluded a major policy review of 
its operations in Iran, aware that it was entering a new phase and an unexplored 
territory where it had little options but to reconfigure its relations with the Iranian 
government, its employees, and the local society in Khuzestan. The population of 
Abadan, a growing multitude of bewildering diversity, some local indigenous, others 
migrants from the northern borders of the Persian Gulf and the Zagros highlands, or 
from more distant places like India, the Caucasus, or inland cities of Iran, had to find 
ways of accommodating with each other, as well as the increasingly intrusive 
bureaucracy and the hardnosed Oil Company. They had to devise individual and 
collective strategies of negotiating with the enormous material and social challenges 




they faced in an unfamiliar and hostile new place, with its alien rules and increasingly 
impersonal and money-based relationships. Some had come to work for wages in the 
oil facilities; others had been pushed there following the demise of their former social 
and communal modes of life due to warfare, famine, or the dislocations wrought by 
oil capitalism. Oil was the direct or indirect reason why all of these social actors had 
converged on Abadan, but it was the city itself that was the stage for their encounter. 
The frictions between these social actors shaped the urban space of Abadan; and in 
return it was this built urban environment that reflected and molded the social life that 
oil was materializing there.   
Contrary to the conventional historiographies of the oil industry, the 
institutionalization of the oil complex in mid 1920s’ was not accomplished by the 
sovereign actions of any single actor, regardless of how powerful they were, but was 
the outcome of the difficult, unequal, and conflict-ridden relations between them all, 
set within a transitional global conjuncture. Understood in this way, we may avoid the 
usual pitfall of seeing the social history of oil as one more instance when ‘the global’ 
determines the local; or producing a reverse determinism that believes the local is 
ultimately what matters most. Rather, the challenge is to unearth how ‘the local’ was 
integral to shaping the macro processes that were revolutionizing the world after 
WWI (chapter 1).  
In previous chapters I have attempted to demonstrate that the major actors in 
the drama of oil in Iran did not appear on the scene ‘ready-made’; their historical 
development and the course of their actions were neither predictable nor pre-
determined; and none of them were the sovereign authors of their own history. 
Rather, these social actors and institutions were made through relations that were 
contextual and situated historically and geographically. In this chapter I will continue 
to investigate this history at a local level, by further exploring how the main social 
actors in Iran’s oil complex were made and remade through their frictions and 
interactions with each other, in specific places like Abadan, as well as with larger 
processes at work in the larger world.  This was equally true in the case of the 
colonial superpower the British Government and its Iran policies, as it was for the 
upstart Iranian state, the emerging corporate oil giant APOC, the heterogeneous 
population of oil areas like Abadan, and the local magnates in southern Iran such as 
the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al who witnessed their local autonomy and 
social base rise and then fall during this pivotal era. The fortunes and misfortunes of 




these social actors were shaped in constant relation with each other, through what 
Amitav Ghosh has aptly called ‘the oil encounter’ (see chapter 1).  
The oil encounter in Abadan during the first quarter of the 20th century saw 
the river island go with breakneck speed from an arid agrarian stretch of land in a 
river delta to an oil boomtown at the center of the emerging global economy. It went 
from the hinterland of a peripheral province to a strategic border town between two 
nation states, one of which was a new proto-colonial invention, Iraq1. By mid-1920s 
Abadan was crisscrossed with pipelines, shipping docks, and refinery facilities; but 
also with teaming slums populated by thousands living in horrifying conditions. The 
elimination of the local magnates and the undermining of the social and political 
orders they represented had created a vacuum in managing the rising social problems 
that urgently needed to be addressed. At the same time, the new central government 
and APOC were now confronting each other directly, for the fist time, in the same 
location. Both had to deal with the pressing and completely novel material challenges 
and social expectations of a heterogeneous population, in an unfamiliar territory, and 
through untried ways. For APOC and the Iranian state this new urban population was 
a resource as well as a burden… and even a potential political threat. It was a 
population that needed to be managed, socialized, and assimilated.  
From the perspective of the Oil Company the growing population of Abadan 
was the potential raw material for the production of surplus value in oil. It was the 
necessary reserve army of the unemployed, desperately in need of being hired for 
money, while their numbers kept a downward pressure on wages. However, the 
industrial requirements for time discipline, coordinated work habits, and familiarity 
with technical skills were sorely missing among most of the urban migrants who had 
recently left pastoral and agrarian rural lives on the shores of the Persian Gulf or the 
Zagros highlands. At the same time, the horrid living conditions in the boomtown 
were a barrier to the attraction of the required better-qualified workers from abroad, 
as well as from elsewhere in Iran. Deadly epidemics were a constant threat, there was 
no public social life to speak of, and poverty and destitution created fertile ground for 
political discontent and subversive resistance, not to mention devastating epidemics. 
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Having created the oil boomtown, the Company was also aware of the repercussions 
of the negative public image that the horrid material conditions were projecting both 
inside Iran, as well as internationally2.  
APOC’s response and its justification for its lucrative oil concession, one that 
it repeated regularly, was to eulogize its part in creating a global industry that was 
bringing tremendous wealth to Iranians. However, neither its financial dealings with 
the Iranian government, nor its labor hiring practices, or the living conditions of 
actual Iranians living in the areas under its control provided convincing evidence that 
this was the case. By the middle of the decade, APOC, a nominally private 
corporation that was majority owned by the British Government, and which always 
claimed that shareholder dividends and market performance were its priorities, had to 
shift reluctantly toward accepting responsibilities and commitments to a range of 
‘social’ issues that nominally had little to do directly with the business of oil 
capitalism, such as public education, housing, public health, retail provisions, social 
entertainment, public relations, leisure activities, urban amenities, municipal 
infrastructure, and urban management.  
I refer to this shift toward the adoption of a range of social policies by APOC, 
as well as by the government bureaucracy, as ‘reluctant paternalism’, because of their 
top down authoritarian approach to urban and social improvement that were 
eventually adopted with hesitation, plenty of haggling, and a desire to press the 
burden onto someone else. These social policies were explicitly programs of social 
engineering, intended to undermine the dangers of political discontent and subversion, 
but to also create contended and loyal employees, as well as patriotic and docile 
citizens. As we saw in the previous chapter this engagement with the social 
reproduction of labor power was not exceptional to Abadan but was integral to the 
wider global transition to Fordism and to the adoption of social welfare measures by 
states, professional classes, labor activists, and capitalist corporations in the interwar 
era. In the same vein, the emergence of reluctant paternalism in post war Abadan was 
both an extension of this wider trend toward accommodating labor and managing 
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social conflicts, but also a response to geopolitical shifts in the region, and the 
specific challenges emerging in the oil geography of southern Iran.    
The social question in Abadan became an equally pressing issue for the 
Iranian state. While Reza Shah’s modern army was devouring the meager annual 
budget and putting down regional resistances, eliminating provincial magnates, 
undermining local autonomies, and enforcing its authoritarian modernization, it was 
also discovering the need of a nominally “constitutional state” to acknowledge certain 
novel public expectations that had been irrelevant to the absolutist Qajar state. The 
centralized nation state that was being erected under Reza Shah intended to mould 
and shape the heterogeneous populations as its modern and homogeneous Iranian 
citizen-subjects. Toward that end it began its work by establishing new institutions of 
education, with Persian as the obligatory national language. It moved to formulate a 
new territorial imaginary of the nation-state based on he historical reconstructions of 
pre Islamic Imperial Persian grandeur, aided by recent discoveries in the new 
discipline of archeology. It erected modern governmental institutions of census 
taking, public health, tax collection, standardized bureaucratic record keeping, 
policing, municipal management, the registration of individual vital data as well as 
properties and commercial transactions, etc3. It imposed uniform dress codes for men 
and women to force them out of traditional garbs and into modern European style 
attires, fabricated in national textile factories. It began to force pastoral nomads to 
settle, and attempted to eliminate the autonomous political and military power of 
tribes and landlords by declaring communal land as exclusive state properties4. The 
coercive intrusions of the bureaucracy into everyday life, and the militarized 
integration of populations in the border regions were justified in the nationalist 
language of belonging to a common motherland.  
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4 Hoochang Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor’s New Cloths: Dress Codes and Nation Building under 
Reza Shah,” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3–4 (1993): 209–34; Patricia Baker, “Politics of Dress: The Dress 
Reform Laws of 1920s and 1930s Iran,” in Languages of Dress in the Middle East, ed. Nancy 
Lindisfarne Tapper and Bruce Ingham (Richmond: Curzon, 1997), 178–92; Rudi Matthee, 
“Transforming Dangerous Nomads into Useful Artisans, Technicians, Agriculturalists: Education in 
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The paradoxical reverse side of the coin was the unavoidability of ignoring 
certain public demands made in the name of patriotism, citizenship, and national 
belonging against purported abuse by foreign outsiders. As a result, when the 
population of a city like Abadan would call upon the state to protect them from 
destitution or injustice caused by the foreign owned Oil Company, to ensure that 
employment in oil would go to Iranians and not to foreigners, or to intercede on their 
behalf for improvements in their dire living conditions, the state had little choice other 
than to respond, even though it was itself partly responsible for the dislocations that 
had forced people to move to Abadan in the first place.  
 The flurry of social activities in Abadan caused friction between the Oil 
Company and the central government and its local administrators and representatives, 
who felt that the company was indeed responsible for assisting in improving social 
conditions. Their rational was that Abadan had been erected as an urban place to 
serve the Oil Company, and therefore it had to take responsibility to improve the 
town’s state of affairs. At the same time, and paradoxically, state officials felt that the 
decision-making power and the management of urban affairs ought to fall within the 
purview of the central government: What would be the point of establishing 
municipal bureaucracies if the Company continued to remain in charge? In 
Khuzestan, in particular, with its long history of British intrusion and domination in 
southern Iran through its local allies, the issue of who ought to be responsible for and 
in charge of social matters had great political sensitivity, especially for the central 
government who remained always suspicious of separatist plots on its borders, and 
particularly so in Khuzestan. This ongoing struggle over the boundaries of 
sovereignty between the bureaucracy and the Oil Company played a defining role in 
shaping the oil encounter in Khuzestan; and to this day characterizes the dynamics of 
the oil industry in Iran. 
For the new central government, the oil operations in Khuzestan represented a 
major source of financial revenue and a strategic asset, but also potentially an 
existential threat. Reza Shah’s rule, as was discussed in Chapter 2, was consolidated 
within the complex historical dynamics of Anglo-Iranian relations and the strategic 
balance of power between Iran and its neighbors. From Tehran’s perspective 
Khuzestan was always one step away from British-instigated separatism, similar to 
Kuwait or to Bahrain, an Island that Iran dubiously claimed as its own territory; or to 
Iraq, a newly patched together nation state that Britain had created on its western 




border. Iran refused to recognize Iraq well into 1920s over continued border disputes, 
especially regarding the Shatt al-Arab river and the ownership of water resources and 
oil deposits in the border areas. Other major bones of contention included the status of 
Iranians who had been long residents of Mesopotamia, the fate of Shi’a holy places, 
the citizenship of Arab tribes straddling the now rigid national borders5, and the 
legitimacy of Faisal as an imported monarch. The bloody repression of Shi’a 
rebellions in southern Iraq after the war, the emergence of ‘the Kurdish question’, and 
the significant continued British military presence in Iraq kept relations tense and 
Tehran highly concerned with the situation in its southern provinces and border 
regions6.   
Under these circumstances, all APOC activities in Khuzestan were treated as 
highly suspicious, while at the same time the state was keenly aware of its own limits 
in funding social works or mustering the manpower and expertise to manage it. 
Furthermore, as the analysis in this chapter will reveal, there was gradually a growing 
awareness among all parties involved that social improvements were in fact acts of 
social engineering; or to paraphrase Foucault, they represented a symbiosis between 
the management of territory, populations, and security, with successful governance 
and improving productivity7. Taking charge of these social projects was tantamount to 
educating and molding the loyalty of the population and insuring their usefulness and 
docility. Social projects were costly and required professional expertise and long-term 
institutional commitment, but they were also invaluable for the development of the 
desired human resources. As a result the social and urban arena in the oil complex 
became a political battleground between the Company, the government, and the local 
population. This tug of war shaped the particular geography of Abadan. 
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Creating Enclaves; Setting Boundaries: 
The Oil Company, in particular, tried to carve out exclusive geographies by 
effectively denationalizing territories over which it could exercise its own rules, 
without government intrusion8. By mid 1920s, as the central government institutions 
began to be set up in Abadan and throughout Khuzestan, APOC reacted by beginning 
to create exclusive company areas, or company towns, where it would create a built 
environment according to its own requirements and commands. These exclusive 
geographic enclaves encompassed the refinery and its associated facilities, but soon 
the Company also began to develop, build, and expand a range of social amenities and 
urban infrastructure in response to mounting social pressure. However, these social 
commitments always sat uneasily within the Company’s corporate culture and its 
financial calculations as a private enterprise. It accepted its social role with great 
reluctance, and at every step it tried to negotiate with the Iranian state to convince it 
to shoulder a greater share of the burden, while at the same time it strove jealously to 
maintain absolute control over its own built environment. But in the turbulent postwar 
era this ideal arrangement was no longer a possibility. Neither would the state accept 
it, nor did the sheer scale of a fast growing Abadan allow it. Abadan never became a 
typical company town, simply because it was already too large by the end of the war, 
and once Sheikh Khaz’al was overthrown and the central government had stepped in 
to stake its claim it was not willing to cede back total sovereignty over municipal 
matters and spatial control back to the Company. Meanwhile, the new Abadanis, the 
heterogeneous population who had settled in the boomtown, had begun to stake their 
own claims to this growing and novel urban space9.  
The Company’s housing projects for its employees was a case in point: 
Initially, prior to 1920s, when there were less than a hundred Europeans in Abadan 
(see table 2), the Company had only built a permanent bungalow in the Braim area for 
the Abadan manager Mr. Thompson. This bungalow was mostly made of tin, but was 
later rebuilt with stone, and a few other Spartan temporary shelters were added for the 
other Europeans. By mid 1920s a number of permanent barracks and lanes were 
constructed to house skilled and semi skilled artisans and workers, mostly Europeans 
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and Indians. These were called appropriately the Sikh Lane, Indian Quarters, and 
Bungalow Area. After the extended crisis with the central government over royalties 
and the “Persianization” of the labor force that eventually led to the renegotiated 1933 
agreement (see chapters 1 and 7), more extensive urban development and housing 
projects were funded for semi skilled workers, the staff, and artisans, including 
Iranians10. However, mounting urban tensions, industrial necessities, and political 
realities eventually forced the Company to begin a commitment to far more extensive 
labor housing projects by late 1930s11. This trend accelerated after the end of WW2, 
in the 1940s, when rising labor militancy and deep-set social resentment over the 
hardships suffered during the occupation led to the vast expansion of urban housing 
projects in Company areas of Abadan and Khuzestan, this time for manual workers12.  
Last, the local population of Abadan gradually moved toward forging new 
webs of solidarity and place-defined identities in part as a negotiating mechanism 
with the larger forces that had altered their lives and brought them to this place. The 
population of Abadan in the 1920s consisted of a growing hodgepodge of indigenous 
Arabs, small merchants, casual workers, artisans, and shopkeepers from Bushehr, 
Isfahan, Shushtar, Behbahan, Ramhormoz, Shiraz; oil wageworkers from India, 
Azarbaijan, and the Bakhtiyari; women sex workers from we don’t know where; 
along with many other as yet anonymous migrants who had made the boomtown their 
abode. In Abadan they encountered soldiers, household servants, clerks, and skilled 
industrial workers from the Indian subcontinent, British Company staff, Canadian and 
Polish technicians and mariners, and many others itinerants from other unfamiliar 
places. In collective labor actions that led to strikes and open confrontations in 1920, 
1922, 1924,and 1929; but also through daily acts of resistance and negotiation on 
occasions like the Bazaar incident, company employees as well as urban residents 
tried to consolidate and improve their harsh working and living conditions. These 
quiet and not-so ‘quiet encroachments of the ordinary’, as Asef Bayat has called the 
gradual formation of collective urban acts of claiming a growing share in social rights 
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over space13, came to a head during 1924-1927 with the unexpected resistance of local 
residents of the Sheikh neighborhood of Abadan against their forced relocation in 
order to build a sanitary bazaar (chapter 6). This was a novel form of collective 
struggle to claim “the right to the city”14, in a place that was not in any sense ‘a city’, 
yet, but a sprawling boomtown of industrial filth and teaming poverty15. It was 
through the experience of industrial wage labor, but also through these collective, 
place-based struggles, that new bonds of solidarity and identity were forged by new 
urban neighbors who were migrants and settlers, but now gradually had begun to 
identify with this new geography and social settings, and started referring to 
themselves as “Abadani”16. In the rest of this chapter we will investigate the frictions 
and interactions between these social actors in order to reproduce a social and 
geographic history of oil during this pivotal period, as a set of social relations.   
 
Labor and the Social Question in Interwar Abadan        
 As APOC’s operations kept expanding exponentially throughout the war 
years, the challenge of recruiting and maintaining an adequate labor force took on 
greater urgency. Once the initial phases of oil exploration and extraction had been 
successfully completed, the subsequent stages of expansion posed an even greater 
challenge. Some of these new challenges were scientific and technical, for example 
mastering techniques of handling the heavy Persian crude and adjusting refining 
techniques to extract new chemical derivatives from the petroleum and its byproducts. 
The main products from Abadan were lubricants and fuels for internal combustion 
engines and lighting (see table 1), items urgently required by the military during 
wartime, and after the war for mass consumer products, transportation, and aviation.  
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Table 4 Abadan Refinery Main Products, 1912-1931 (000 tons) 
YEAR* BENZINE KEROSINE FUEL OIL TOTAL** 
1912-13 5 8 20 33 
1914-15 24 33 178 235 
1916-17 108 38 330 476 
1918-19 161 118 644 923 
1921-22 394 163 1138 1965 
1923-24 223 125 1334 1682 
1925-26 363 197 1970 2521 
1927-28 531 228 2137 2896 
1929 1053 359 2676 4078 
1931 1166 370 2631 4167 
Source: Ronald Ferrier (1982): 278 ,671,673, 674 
* Calculations based on Persian calendar year, by APOC. The practice changed to single 
   Christian year after 1929 
** Calculations based on the products listed 
 
Aside from labor recruitment and maintenance there were other challenges of 
a different practical nature. These involved the exponentially growing investments in 
the development of fixed assets and infrastructure, such as the completion and 
expansion of the all important networks of roads, pipelines, a local railroad, shipping 
and loading docks, the storage and refinery structures at Abadan, as well as the vast 
array of the necessary social and administrative facilities without which the oil 
business could not function. The latter included hospitals, dispensaries, and public 
health measures, housing for staff and clerks, office buildings, company stores, jetties 
and unloading docks, schools and training facilities, guards and security measures, 
etc17. Meeting these challenges required substantial inputs of expertise, material, and 
manpower, not to mention growing capital investments, all of which were in short 
supply during the war years, and even more so after. In Abadan and the Fields most 
material had to be imported from elsewhere, creating an additional logistical 
challenge of its own.  
“No commodity of any kind is produced in the fields: all food stuffs, wines, 
clothing, and other necessities of modern life have to be imported form home 
or India…Something like 15,000 people have to be fed and clothed from these 
stores, so it may be imagined what quantity of stocks has to be held…Fresh 
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meat and vegetables are rarely obtainable, but one heard very little of the 
monotony of subsisting on tinned foodstuffs. Anything within reason can be 
purchased, and the Company takes great trouble in this most important 
department…the prices were most reasonable in this out of the way spot”18.  
This was equally true of basic construction material for housing and facilities, 
such as brick, steel, etc. as well as all machinery, and technical supplies. All repairs 
had to be done on the spot. George Thompson, one of the first APOC employees to be 
sent from Burma Oil Company to Abadan around 1909 recalled, “Abadan was fine 
for the refinery but had no sand, stone, lime for construction purposes”. Labor supply 
was also a major problem as there were no skilled workers available locally. There 
were plenty of unskilled labor in the area, “but of very low quality”. The supply of 
material and labor were crucial priorities. Bricks had to be manufactured and 
imported from Basra; stone, sand, lime, gypsum (gatch) from Bushehr and Kuwait, 
delivered by riverboats19.  
For the Company provisioning its employees was a challenging task, but in 
the boomtown, the maintenance of teh supply of food and living materials for the 
teaming population not employed by the Company was a nightmare. While the 
Company took care to supply its European staff with imported tinned food and wine 
bottles, its workers had still to find accommodation, pay rent, find food and safe 
drinking water in a place that did not readily supply these basic necessities locally. 
Inflation, speculation, and shortages could easily lead to eruptions of urban protests, 
or induce workers to go elsewhere (see below), resort to criminal activities such as 
smuggling, or be drawn to radical subversive ideas.      
 The scale of the expansion and the constant intensity of activities meant that 
the vital question of reliable availability of adequate and sufficient labor power 
remained a paramount concern for the Oil Company. As the war came to an end this 
issue took on even greater urgency. The Company classified its labor force in broad 
categories, as skilled, semi skilled, and unskilled; a practice that continues to date in 
the Iranian oil industry. The non-manual employees included clerks, managers, and 
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staff, had their own sub categorizations. In the early years the semi skilled workers 
were by and large recruited from the Indian Subcontinent, the casual unskilled 
workers were mostly Iranian, and the senior staff and management were British, 
together with some Europeans and North Americans. Table 2 shows the total range of 
Oil Company employees before nationalization: 
 
Table 5: APOC/AIOC Employees in Iran by National Origin (1910-1950) 
YEAR IRANIANS INDIANS EUROPEANS OTHERS TOTAL 
1910 1,362 158 40 146 1,706 
1915 2,203 979 80 187 3,449 
1920 8,447 3,616 244 35 12,342 
1925 15,820 4,890 994 7,201 28,905 
1930 20,095 2,411 1,191 7,549 31,246 
1935 25,240 954 1,035 119 27,348 
1940 26,484 1,158 1,056 15 28,713 
1945 60,366 2,498 2,357 240 65,461 
1950 72,681 1,744 2,725 34 77,184 
Sources: Ferrier (1982): 276, 401; J.H. Bamberg (1994) 
 
The figures clearly indicate that wartime productions during both World Wars 
had significant impacts on the scale of production and employment. Other significant 
junctures were 1920 and 1922 when strikes by Indian skilled workers and some 
Iranians led to the preparation for their long-term replacement of these with Iranians, 
although this was a protracted process (see below). The dynamics of employment and 
production were often affected by fractuous negotiations with the Iranian central 
government. This occurred especially during the periods of major political transition 
that were coupled with labor strife, such as 1920-1922, and 1925-1926, and during the 
testy renegotiations of the oil concession that lasted from 1928-1933 (as we shall 
discuss in the following pages). One of the recurring demands of the Iranian 




government was a tangible increase in the Iranianization of the employees. APOC 
was reticent to heed this increasingly nationalist demand, partly due to its latent racist 
corporate culture, but also for practical calculations that had to take into account the 
necessity of remaining competitive while dealing with the vagaries of the 
international oil business and the global economic trends that the Company could not 
control, such as the adoption by Britian of the gold standard in 1925 and its impact on 
Sterling, or the shockwaves of the Great Depression of 1929-1933. These global 
economic shifts affected Company performance, and shaped its business decisions 
and employment practices.   
 
Table 6: APOC/AIOC Employees in Abadan and Khuzestan (1910-1927) 
Employed in Abadan 
YEAR 





1910 471 80 76 5 632 1706 
1913 1827 865 111 22 2825 4035 
1916 1137 1202 50 53 2442 3925 
1919 806 2499 38 36 3379 6784 
1920 1080 2687 35 71 3873 12342 
1921 1608 3313 51 99 5071 14040 
1922 4941 2679 1048 100 8768 26156 
1923 7336 2654 379 220 10589 26970 
1924 6521 2782 454 303 10060 24501 
1925 6862 3001 4405 402 14670 28905 
1926 7946 2161 1442 428 11977 26493 
1927 10171 2062 1273 527 14033 29223 
Source: Ferrier (1982), The History of the British Petroleum Company, 401, 659 
  
The major centers of oil activities were Abadan, Ahvaz, and the “Fields”. The 
latter initially consisted of Masjed Soleyman, as well as the geographies carved out 
and claimed for the crews that explored for new deposits, laid pipelines, built roads, 
pumping stations, maintained transport and communication links, or stood guard. 
Gradually new urban centers grew around newly tapped oilfields in Haftgel, 
Gachsaran, Aghajeri, Lali and Naft Sefid. Once it was decided to build a refinery at 
Abadan in 1910, settlements and installations on the Island grew exponentially and it 




became the most significant center of industrial activity not only in Khuzestan, but 
throughout Iran, as well as a major shipping outlet to the outside world (see table 6).    
 The building of the refinery and the storage and shipping facilities required the 
direct involvement of a significant number of people in production, ranging from 
manual and semi skilled workers to skilled technicians, engineers, chemists and 
scientists, office workers, accountants, and managers; but it also required an equally 
significant number of support staff to make possible the reproduction of those 
working in production, such as servants, cooks, drivers, guards, storekeepers, nurses, 
etc. The result was the exponential growth of Abadan where by 1925 there were at 
least an additional fifteen thousand newcomers who were directly employed by the 
Oil Company (table 6).  
Formal figures such as Oil Company employees, inform us little about the 
actual scale and the composition of the fast growing population of the Island, or about 
the more complex social dynamics taking place there. For example, all these company 
employees were men, but how many had come there with their families? Company 
records at this period only account for European and especially British employees 
with minor, almost negligible personal and specific details. More recently some effort 
has been made to shed light on Indian migrant workers in Abadan20. But the records 
remain silent when it comes to the Iranian (the eponymous Persian) employees, who 
were routinely depicted as anonymous aggregate numbers. This silence affected even 
some of the Europeans who worked there. For example, in 1918 the Company asked 
the British Depute Commissioner in Basra to grant an exception on wartime travel 
restrictions for “Several married men whose wives have been out there 4 to 5 years, 
and quite apart from being overdue for home leave their general healths are 
affected”21. Personal reminiscences also mention a meager social life for “the tiny 
European community”22. But aside from these snippets there seem to be scant further 
details that have yet come to light about the lives and experiences of these Europeans, 
and even less about the lives and experiences of the far more numerous indigenous 
populations.    
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Iranian state archives also provide little information in this regard; nor to my 
knowledge are there any published memoirs or oral histories from this era that reveal 
the intimate experiences of the thousands of Iranians who came to work in Abadan 
during this decisive period. Why did they come to this place to sell their work for 
wages? Were they attracted to the prospect of industrial work and wages, or had they 
no other option but to uproot and move there involuntarily? Had they come alone, or 
had their families and kin accompanied them? Once in Abadan did they fit into 
existing communities there, or did they have to struggle on their own? The term 
“Iranian” or “Persian” is itself vague, especially in this period when a coherent and 
homogeneous national identity had not yet been more systematically institutionalized 
through the uniform practices of mass education, conscription, mass media, 
bureaucratic individual documentation, and patriotic propaganda. As a result, the 
geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and kinship ties of these employees remain relatively 
vague. What manners of connections did they maintain with their communities of 
origin? How did these newcomers link the emerging urban life of Abadan to their 
original communities? This information would provide an important insight into the 
spatial linkages between the city and the countryside, the province, and the varied 
national spaces beyond the borders of Khuzestan.  What sorts of webs and 
connections were linking Abadan to these other places via the social and personal 
networks maintained by these employees? Equally important is the question of 
gender, especially in a place that seems to have been mostly populated by males: 
workers, expatriates, soldiers, bureaucrats, shopkeepers, smugglers, and the 
precariously employed. What were the roles of women in this city? Who were they, 
and where had they come from? Did they work for money? If they kept house what 
sort of household did they run? As in all frontier boomtowns there were sex workers 
in Abadan, but the existing records reveal very little about the political economy of 
the women who were part of the market economy. Precious little is available on 
brothels, pimps, landlords, police attitudes and regulations of the sex trade, Company 
attitudes, the circulation of money in the sexual economy, and the women who had to 
sell their bodies as a commodity. As is often the case, the history of the oldest 
profession is rendered invisible through a mixture of moral denial or condemnation, 
patronizing compassion, and intentional and uncomfortable silence23.  
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Photograph 8: Building the Abadan Refinery (circa 1920s) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum Iran 
  
Photograph 9: Arab Oilworkers Lining Up for Work at Abadan Refinery  
 
Source: IISG Archives 
                                                           
of relevant local archives stored in the city, such as police and customs records. Many of these records 
were not duplicated for the provincial and national headquarters. Thus far I have been unable to locate 
relevant records. Oral interviews have also proved difficult and of little value thus far, as there is 
general acknowledgment of the significance of sex workers, but little else in terms of substantial 
ethnographic information (see footnote 26 below). 




Many of these pertinent questions about the everyday lived realities of Iranian 
oil workers and Abadanis during this formative period remain as of yet unanswered 
by the material I have managed to excavate24. Even the growing literature of popular 
and academic local histories of urban and provincial Khuzestan are regrettably silent 
about these crucial social and geographic details when it comes to the interwar 
period25. The unavailability or the absence of any significant government records of 
personal and individual data, such as birth, marriage, and death certificates, or of 
conscription records, property registration, individual tax records, criminal police 
records, or any official census material only add to the blank picture26. This heavy 
silence has its own significance, like the Isac Dineson story “The blank page” about 
the framed snow white sheet hung in public on the morrow of the nuptials27: In its 
silence the blank page inadvertently reveals its own story about what was deemed 
irrelevant to the gaze of those tasked with recording the course of events. But it also 
opens the possibility of imagining and conjuring our own reading of what the 
available information can tell us. 
 The significant silence is not limited to the social lives of Oil Company 
employees outside their place of employment, which would provide a window into 
the reproduction of labor power; it also involves the urban life of Abadan Town, a 
congested sprawl on the margins of the refinery and the shipping docks, but crucially 
also the setting for its continued operation since that was where most workers lived 
                                                           
24 I have made several research trips to the BP Archives at the University of Warwick (2000, 2002, and 
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1944); Kasravi, Tarikh-e Pansad Saleh Khouzestan; Lorimer, GPG; Mahmoud Daneshvar, Didani-ha 
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26 It must be added that the physical destruction of the city of Abadan and Khorramshahr during the 
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) are an additional cause of this absence, although many of these documents 
ought to have been duplicated as official correspondence, and be available in provincial center, Ahvaz, 
or the Capital, Tehran. My attempts at accessing such records or verifying their existence thus far have 
been unsuccessful. 
27 Isak Dinesen, Last Tales (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 99–105. Dinesen’s short story is about a 
visit to an aristocratic palace where the bed sheets from the wedding night of each heir are framed and 
displayed on the walls as proof of the consummation and continuity of the legitimacy of the bloodline. 
One frame contains a snow white and unstained sheet. Appearing like a blank page, unlike all the 
others, it is not a story of predictable continuity, and has its own mystery to tell. 




and all social life revolved around work, at least for the Iranians.  As for the 
Europeans, the scanty early reminiscences reveal a life of hard work, of 12 hour 
workdays, year around, often including weekends, with little social activity except 
informal and periodic organized events. A tennis court was built sometime after 1912, 
but given the dire shortage of material and labor during wartime no club was built 
until the completion of the refinery28; an austere life indeed.  
There are no reliable figures for the total population of Abadan in mid 1920s, 
but existing estimates put the number at somewhere between 40 - 60 thousand, by 
then probably the largest concentration of population in Khuzestan29. Yet, in the 
absence of more detailed information we face a challenge in producing a thick 
description of the urban life of Abadan during this period, and of necessity some of 
our conclusions will remain deductive for the time being.  
 With the sudden growth of the town myriad urban issues became pressing 
topics of concern, and with them came the attentive gaze of professional experts 
whose task was to manage and modify the challenges that faced life in Abadan and its 
refinery. In 1925 the Oil Company had invited J.M. Wilson, a Scottish architect and 
urban planner based in Baghdad and London, to visit Abadan and the fields to offer 
suggestions regarding the rising problems of housing and sanitation for the 
Company30. The central government of Iran instituted a new law in 1926 to establish 
municipalities, and one of the first was established in Abadan. J.M. Wilson returned 
soon after, this time permanently employed as chief architect and urban planner for 
APOC to plan a more comprehensive expansion of the Company areas in Abadan and 
the fields31.  
Public health had been a major area of concern, and one of the earliest and 
most urgent nodes of social policy making. Epidemics were a major threat to 
operations, and the insalubrious living conditions deterred not only Europeans but 
also Indians and Iraqis from seeking work there. Furthermore, establishing pubic 
health institutions and practices were becoming a major tenet of modernization and 
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state building in Iran, as they had been in Europe, and government bureaucrats came 
to consider sanitation as one of the key measures of state accomplishment and 
progress32 (see chapters 4 and 6).  
Regarding labor relations, by mid 1940s the Oil Company had to resort to 
employing a specialist ‘Labor Attaché’ to deal exclusively with increasingly 
challenging labor management issues33. The Iranian government, likewise, had come 
to legislate labor laws, mainly in response to the growing frictions in the oil industry 
and their potential subversive spread elsewhere34. Public education became a primary 
concern of social policies, especially as it was linked to the mounting pressures for 
the ‘Iranianization’ of the labor force in the Oil Company. Without proper training 
and basic education the Oil Company would have faced continued difficulty in 
finding adequate recruits to work in the increasingly sophisticated refinery and 
oilworks, and to handle the hazardous and technically complex work details. More 
significantly, the Company gradually but unmistakably, began to view education as 
an investment in ‘human capital’35. With the shifts in the organization of industrial 
production, the advent of mass consumer society, and the rise of mass politics, 
workers were beginning to be conceptualized less as simply raw material or as cheap, 
anonymous, casual, and temporary inputs (chapter 4). Investing in properly training 
workers capable of handling more sophisticated and hazardous chemical and 
industrial operations was becoming an urgent business necessity for large coporations 
like APOC. Furthermore, education and training were exercises in disciplinary power 
intended to shape docile and loyal, as well as productive and efficient, employees36. 
They would prepare the next cohort by training the workers’ children to create a 
multigenerational repository of corporate culture. Furthermore, according to article 12 
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of the D’Arcy concession, “The workmen employed in the service of the Company 
shall be subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, except the technical staff such as 
the managers, engineers, borers, and foremen”37. Although the replacement of all non-
managerial wageworkers by Iranians did not take place prior to nationalization in 
1951, nevertheless it entered Company policy, just as it became a major bone of 
contention with the central government. As a result, public education became part of 
the repertoire of social policies adapted with considerable reluctance by APOC in 
1926. 
In conclusion,  ‘the social question’ emerged in Abadan in the interwar years, 
much like it had in post war Britain, in response to the transformations of the new 
regime of accumulation of capital, and against the background of the political 
premises of the nation state and the rise of mass politics38. These issues came to head 
during the pivotal years 1925-1926, and set the tone for the long-term development of 
the oil complex in Iran. In the rest of this chapter I will discuss this rise of the social 
question in Abadan, and the bazaar controversy that lay at the symbolic center of this 
historical shift. 
 
Labor Troubles in an Expanding Boomtown   
 Labor recruitment was a major challenge facing APOC, especially in the first 
two decades of its operation in Iran. The Company had to cast a wide net 
geographically to attract all sorts of workers and employees willing and qualified for 
the diverse and increasingly complex tasks across its expanding operations, especially 
in Abadan. According to George Thomson, one of the earliest oil experts who had 
settled in Abadan around 1911, the initial artisan laborers were hired from Burma’s 
Rangoon Refinery. Soon a growing nucleus of skilled workers began to be recruited 
from India. Unskilled workers in Abadan were hired from the surrounding local 
“Arab and Persian villages”. “Once word of employment and good wages spread they 
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came from all over. Tribesmen from areas as far distant as Lurestan, the Bakhtiyari 
Country, Kurdistan found their way to Abadan. These men were more robust than 
locals and were welcomed”39. In this early period the skilled workers were mostly 
British or Indians; but they also included drillers, machinists, and mechanics from 
Poland, Canada, the US, and elsewhere in Europe, as well as across the border from 
Mesopotamia.  
During the war Abadan had grown rapidly to supply the Admiralty with fuel, 
as well as the enormous military machine assembled in Mesopotamia and the Middle 
East (see table 1). After coming online, the refinery had supplied on average two 
thirds of Royal Navy’s fuel, in addition to nearly 200 thousand tons of refinery 
products to the other British forces in Mesopotamia40. Wartime military demand were 
enormous: At its maximum strength the British war machine had assembled nearly 
450 thousand troops in Mesopotamia alone41, mostly recruited from India. This 
increasingly mechanized war machine had created an insatiable demand for the 
Abadan refinery output, as there were some 6400 motorized transport vehicles 
(running on internal combustion engines) and 45 airplanes deployed there. However, 
in addition to petroleum products, the British war machine was also absorbing most 
the manpower throughout the region, by employing nearly 900 thousand people 
during wartime42.  
To the extent that a local and regional labor market had come into existence it 
was being nearly monopolized by the military apparatus, leaving little for the Oil 
Company and other commercial operations in the region43. Wartime needs were such 
that the military did not shirk away from gang pressing workers into service, or 
deploying prisoners and indentured laborers from India44. The military also paid 
higher wages and when necessary prohibited APOC or other private firms from 
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pilfering those in its employ, especially in neighboring Basra45. As a result APOC 
faced a severe and unequal competition for recruiting its much-needed manpower. 
The Company dispatches during the last two years of the war emphasize the range of 
its frantic activities, and the pressing need for qualified personnel to deal with them. 
These tasks were in response to the need for the expansion of physical infrastructure 
that included storage, port facilities, fields electrification, technical staff to deal with 
extraordinary “line losses” (the loss of oil in pipelines as it was dispatched from the 
fields to Abadan through pipelines), the establishment and maintenance of telephone 
and telegraph systems, tank farms, road constructions, fire controls at wells and the 
refinery, housing constructions at Fields and in Abadan, and so on46.   
Furthermore, the oil business was booming everywhere during wartime, 
leading to the recruitment office in Mohammareh complaining to London in 1917 that 
“With Pennsylvania crude at a phenomenal $3.25 and great activity everywhere it is 
going to be hard to get good drillers”47. However, the devastating impact of the war in 
Iran had created a negative image that was not easy to overcome. Forbes-Leith, and 
officer serving with the wartime British expeditionary forces in western Iran recalled 
his harrowing experience:  
“The invasion had very seriously depleted [the western] part of the country of 
its stock of grains, and many of the farmers had been drained by the armies to 
such an extent that they had been obliged to eat their seed corn in order to 
avoid starvation. In the year 1917 they had nothing left to sow. To add to their 
misery in the winter of 1916-1917 there was an exceptionally light snowfall 
and the resultant spring drought. This caused the breakdown of their irrigation 
system and in consequence most of the crops in the line of march [of invading 
troops] failed…Famine conditions naturally bring diseases in their wake, and 
typhus, cholera, smallpox, and the influenza epidemic ravaged our force in 
spite of what I feel was the almost perfect technique of our efficient army 
medical service. I lost my friends and my men from all kinds of foul diseases, 
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and under such conditions it is little wonder that many of my brother officers 
regarded Persia as a veritable hell on earth”48.   
 
The Company needed not only drillers and oil experts, but also all manners of 
specialists. With war coming to an end the Company anticipated decommissioned 
military personnel in the neighboring Mesopotamia to become available for 
recruitment, but it was repeatedly frustrated in these attempts49. The Company sought 
electrical communication specialists to take over managing their “first class facilities 
with no one to maintain [and operate] them”. The General Manager in Mohammareh 
repeatedly complained about the shortage of expert labor, and pleaded for more 
energetic attempts to get reliable men from the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, 
and for “Competent European military personnel to superintend telephone and 
telegraph operations with efficiency in teaching and handling signals ”, but with 
limited success50. The reasons for these difficulties were primarily the uncompetitive 
and relatively lower wages and salaries the Company offered, the inadequate 
recruiting networks, the hellish working conditions, and the equally poor and 
hazardous living situation in Khuzestan and across the Company areas at the time.  
We shall discuss these issues in order to get an insight into life and work in Abadan at 
this juncture. 
APOC did not offer adequate compensation to be an attractive work option for 
skilled recruits, even among decommissioned and now unemployed men who had 
served in the difficult conflict in Mesopotamia. This poor reputation had been true 
during wartime as well. In 1916 the APOC General Manager complained to Arnold 
Wilson, then stationed in Basra, “We suffer from labor leaving us from Abadan for 
higher pay at Basra. Our clerks can draw abnormal pay at Basra”. He cited three cases 
of Iranian clerks who had simply moved to Basra for pay increases of up to 50 
percent51. Indian skilled workers and personnel also sought the more favorable terms 
across the border in Mesopotamia52. It seemed the Iranian employees had set up 
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informal networks for finding better pay elsewhere, when they could. There was the 
case of a certain Mirza Kazem,  
“Who had worked well and was discharged honorably”, but was now 
“Enticing labor away to Basra. He has high influence with workmen at 
Mohammerah, and is in position to promise temptingly high wages for 
[British] government employment [in Iraq], denuding us of our local staff. As 
it is we have for months felt the pinch consequent upon desertions to Basra”53.  
However, the problem was not limited to the all too rare and valuable Iranian 
clerks and staff, but also involved unskilled Arab “coolies” as well as the skilled and 
better trained Indians. There was delight when a highly skilled technician was found 
in India, and seemed willing to commit to work for APOC:  
“We are very pleased that the electrical expert has sailed, and also that you 
have instructed him to engage whatever experienced native labour he requires 
before leaving India. This is a wise course, as the labor we receive through 
various agencies is very indifferent. Really good men are receiving high 
wages in India, and the rates we offer are no inducement…we are working 
with a minimum staff and with not a man to spare”54.  
 
The Company had engaged a number of labor recruitment firms in India, but 
there were complaints regarding their reliability to continue supplying the skilled staff 
needed55. There were dire needs for surveyors and telegraph operators, but it was felt 
that “Indians get either ill or leave”. The Company began technical training classes in 
Ahvaz from 1916, hoping to prepare pupils at the English school it had helped 
establish there, “but despite inducements when standard proficiency is reached our 
efforts did not meet success”. Apparently the trained pupils would just pack up and 
leave for Mesopotamia and even as far away as West Africa, “which are crisscrossed 
with telegraph lines and there is great need for Indian telegraphists”56. It seemed 
“skilled Indians draw high wages and return to India after one year”. There were also 
suspicions about their possible subversive attitude at a time when anti colonial 
nationalism was on the rise: “The Indians are highly independent minded”; and they 
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were seen as disloyal and opportunistic: “A good many of our men are anxious to get 
away from Abadan to work in Basra for higher wages. Our wages to skilled Indians 
are good…and we are eager to keep [them]”.  
By the war’s end the labor shortage had reached critical dimensions, and the 
manager there wrote Wilson, “Our staff at Abadan is barely sufficient to keep the 
refinery running. We are seriously feeling the shortage of chemists”.57. 
As for unskilled Arab employees, they also bolted for greener pastures in 
Basra or elsewhere, at a time when borders were porous and the British military 
exercised sovereignty across the region. The manager at Abadan and Mohammerah 
complained to Arnold Wilson, the Deputy British Commissioner in Basra,  
“We have all along been having the greatest difficulty retaining coolies at 
Abadan… Matters have worsened recently and we are 1,000 coolies under 
strength. We have done all we can with the Sheikh [Khaz’al], Haji Raiis, 
Sheikh Mousa. All say they can’t do anything on the account of urgent 
demand and high wages being paid in Basra. Last payday some 200 men 
cleared out [at Mohammareh]. This morning Abadan have rung up to say a 
similar number went yesterday. Steamer loading and discharging is suffering, 
and the tin shed output is reduced from 4 to 2 thousand tins per day, which is 
only half of various government departments’ demand for kerosene and 
petrol…We cannot stop Mohammerah Arabs leaving for Basra, unless 
coercion is applied to make them work at Abadan… [He then asked Wilson 
whether it was possible to arrange (press gang) a regular labor corps under 
government control, to supply us up to 800 collies from Basra], “but even 300 
would do”58.  
 
Basra tried to cooperate by imposing some limits on labor movement, and 
defended itself by claiming wages in Basra were not higher than Abadan59. It was 
becoming clear that other factors were at work. By summer 1917 it had become 
evident that famine was as much a cause of labor shortage as wages, and Company 
correspondents began to admit that destitution and hunger were equally behind labor 
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flight as wage opportunism60. The constant warfare, chronic insecurity, drought, and 
vast military acquisitions of food crops, labor power, and draft animals were wreaking 
havoc on the population (see chapters 2 and 3). Wilson received an urgent request for 
famine relief in northern Khuzestan, and had to scramble some emergency supplies of 
flour, grain, and straw (as fodder) there to avoid a disaster.61 
To the extent that people had to resort to selling their labor for wages they 
were not doing so voluntarily to join the forward march to modernization! Rather, the 
restless movement between Basra, Abadan, Kuwait, and elsewhere seemed to have 
been a desperate attempt to survive the social disintegration that warfare, political 
insecurity, and oil capitalism had imposed on the local population.  
It must be added that uncompetitive wages were a detriment not only to 
APOC, but also to the other major British firm in Iran at the time, the all-powerful 
Imperial Bank, which held a monopoly of banking and minting currency in Iran until 
1928. Like APOC the Imperial Bank suffered from a high staff turnover and a general 
inability to retain its employees62. There were many similarities between the corporate 
cultures of both firms, some of which had to do with working and living conditions in 
Iran at the time, but also with the colonial Victorian attitudes that pervaded both 
organizations, as well as the type of professionals these firms preferred to recruit, 
mostly young men from middling public schools. “The first university graduates 
joined the Bank after WWI”; but neither the old staff nor the new recruits felt 
compatibility as the university-trained employees felt frustrated by the mediocrity of 
the senior staff above them. Geoffrey Jones provides a description of the recruitment 
process at the Imperial Bank, and how the personnel manager described the ideal 
types they sought to employ: 
“By 1930s the majority of the staff were school leavers from minor public 
schools, without prior work experience...The public school man was held to 
possess character to survive in the East, and the confidence to represent the 
Bank, and to assume authority over the local staff. The majority of the staff 
were recruited therefore [based on this type of recommendation given for] a 
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17 year old boy at Cheltenham College: “Keen on cricket, tennis, rugger. 
Nearly 6’ in height, healthy, cheerful, fairly good looking, pleasant manners, 
easily led, character undeveloped. Is anxious to go abroad, especially if riding 
would be possible” ” 63. 
 
While work for APOC required more technical qualifications, the social 
background of its British staff were similar to those of the Bank (see chapters 1 and 
3). Like APOC, the staff at the Imperial Bank complained about low salaries, poor 
social lives, and dire living conditions; significant problems that affected employee 
loyalty among these expatriates. Between 1909 and 1926 the Imperial bank had 
opened branches across Iran, including Khuzestan’s oil towns Abadan, Mohammareh, 
Ahvaz, and Masjed Soleyman; in order to benefit from APOC business64. The Bank 
faced serious personnel problems, with health issues and high mortality rates among 
its employees being a cause for concern. These were due to epidemics and disease, 
but also from depression, alcoholism, and psychological crises. Europeans, whether 
bankers or oilmen, found themselves highly isolated in these stark, alien, and isolated 
areas. They had no social life to which they had been accustomed, and given their 
public school education and their upbringing in institutionalized colonial racism, they 
systematically avoided meaningful social contact with the indigenous population on 
principle. This abhorrence of the racial contamination caused by any intermixing went 
so far as to make the Bank dismiss one of its employees, E.B. Soane, for the audacity 
of marrying an Iranian woman65. Later on Soane became British Consul in Dezful, as 
his stint was highly effective, and he was instrumental in mediating local disputes, 
especially over water rights, making him not only an influential and successful 
administrator during a trying period, but also highly popular among the local 
population66.  
Alcoholism was rife, and so was depression67. Leisure activities were minimal. 
Those who were accompanied by their wives suffered equally, as their spouses had 
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little to do and did not even benefit from the relief of challenging employment and 
long work hours. Illness and disease were a constant threat; especially as sanitary 
amenities and public health measures were minimal. This was especially the case in 
Abadan, where no sewerage or sanitary infrastructure had yet been put in place to 
cope with the huge population increase (see chapter 6)68. Waterborne diseases, in 
particular, were a serious concern where drinking water caused typhoid on a regular 
basis, a deadly disease prior to the invention of antibiotics. APOC physician Dr 
Young worked continuously to improve the supply of water in the Fields through 
various schemes. These involved attempts at building distillation plants, piping water 
from the brackish river Tembi, or considering the option of piping water all the way 
from Abadan, constructing filtration plants and so on. Eventually the inspiration was 
taken from a chlorination plant built in Ahvaz for the military (British) personnel. A 
water elevator was built at Tembi, with a pumping station and 30 kms of pipeline via 
Godar Landar to feed a chlorination plant at Masjed Soleyman. In the process “all 
native huts had to be removed from production areas” to make way for the water 
scheme69.  The records do not contain any further details about the ‘native huts’ and 
the evicted people. 
The provision of drinking water was vital for the survival of operations and 
“to keep labor at fields in summer”70.  Working conditions were indeed infernal. 
Work was backbreaking and incessant, 9 to 12 hours a day, 6 or 7 days a week71. 
Temperatures were grueling during the long summers, and freezing in winter; 
humidity was at times unbearably high. In some ways work was a substitute for the 
near total absence of social life, at least for the Europeans.   
“The heat of the eight months summer ranges between 100 and 125 degrees in 
the shade (55C); the loneliness of the life, the almost total lack of social 
intercourse, and the absence of most of the ordinary social amenities of life 
make work a necessity as a relief from utter boredom. They do work”72. 
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Industrial time meant continuous work hours, regardless of season or climate, 
an unfamiliar practice to ordinary local workers, pastoralists and peasants whose 
whole mode of life was built around adjusting to the seasonal rhythms of nature73. But 
here they had to adapt to an altogether different universe, even in the highlands of 
Masjed Soleyman. The oilfields were a place of deafening noise, mortally dangerous 
conditions, and great pollution. Percussion drills pounded constantly at 40 beats per 
minute creating a deafening sound that echoeded in the mountains. Water and 
chemicals were pumped into boreholes and the spewed out waste was dumped. The 
workplace was highly dangerous as highly flammable oil and gas were released under 
great pressure. Then there was the pervasive smell of gas: “the oil is held in the rock 
under great pressure, and its discharge is heavily laden with gas. In its early days this 
was allowed to escape naturally, with resultant danger to the workmen; so much so 
that men who could not return to their huts by sundown had to remain where they 
were for the night, as the gas, being heavier than air, hung in the low lying ground and 
formed an impassable barrier; several lives were lost in that way”. The author of these 
words was an aviation squadron leader who had served during the war and had been 
based in Iraq (1921-1924), and was now reporting to the Royal Central Asian Society 
during one of the increasingly common propaganda events held for APOC at colonial 
scientific venues.  
Explaining that he was contributing to “writing the romance of the fields”, 
Squadron leader Cooper went on to allay fears by mentioning that by this time the gas 
was no longer simply released, but was being flared. He described poetically and 
without irony the effect of tall pipes permanently spewing flames, heat, and smoke 
into the air as “ a wonderful site at night time” that “would have given Dorée a 
wonderful inspiration for an illustration to the ‘inferno’”! However, he went on to add 
“the smell of gas is a permanency in the fields; in some places it is worse than others, 
but you are never quite free from it; it brought back many unpleasant war memories, 
and at night it was difficult to refrain from instinctively reaching out to make sure 
your gas mask was round your neck”74. This alarmed the APOC chairman, John 
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Cadman, who interjected in the public meeting to contradict the Squadron Leader by 
emphasizing how clean, safe, and hygienic the operations were: 
“Anyone who has visited oilfields in different parts of the world, mostly 
controlled and carried on by foreigners, will have been struck by the dirty 
slovenly appearance of the spot from which oil is obtained. You do not see 
that in the Persian field. You see no oil and as I say, you smell no gas. All you 
see or hear is a busy hive of industry”75. 
  
In Abadan the smell of gas was not as acute, but working conditions were 
equally dangerous, as demonstrated by the devastating fire at the refinery in 192276. 
Work was extremely demanding, and harsh; while living circumstances were if 
anything much worse for tens of thousands who lived in temporary shelters and in 
filthy circumstances. New neighborhoods were informally named after the temporary 
industrial refuse used to erect shelters, such as Kaqaz Abad (Made of Paper), Halabi 
Abad (made of Tin Drums), or Hassir Abad (Made of Reeds), Chador Abad (Made of 
Tents)77. Conditions were terrible, especially for the workers and migrants; but they 
improved considerably for the Europeans and the artisans and skilled workers, with 
visible dualism of the segregated city creating seething resentment. Manuchehr 
Farmanfarmaian, reminisced about the appalling conditions in the 1950s “In winter 
the earth flooded and became a flat, perspiring lake…[in summer] the dwellings of 
Kaghazabad, cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat, into sweltering ovens…In 
the British section of Abadan there were lawns, rose beds, tennis courts, swimming 
pools, and clubs; in Kaghazabad there was nothing – not a tea shop, not a bath, not a 
single tree”78.  
Since virtually everything had to be imported, including basic food items, 
economic life on the island was organized through market relations and money 
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exchange, where everything had a price. Under these circumstances it was not 
surprising that labor recruitment was a major challenge for the Company during these 
early years and in the aftermath of the war.  
The negative image of APOC and apprehension about working conditions in 
the oil industry in Khuzestan are evident in the following list of questions from 
successful job applicants who had been offered a position in Iran. The Company’s 
London Office forwarded these queries to Khuzestan, as the potential recruits were 
demanding further clarification before accepting the job offer. The questions reveal 
the foremost concerns among qualified recruits who were weighing whether to accept 
the position of oil well engineer: The inquiries were about the state of health in 
Khuzestan, death rates, average temperatures, social conditions, the number of white 
people, prospects for advancement, salaries, vacations, costs of living, prospects for 
savings, if the company provided free servants, whether individuals had to cook for 
themselves, had to eat in a general mess, or were going to be provided with personal 
cooks and servants, and so on79. The realization of the significant impact of its 
negative image in recruiting employees of various skills became one of the major 
inducements for the Company to evaluate the necessity of improving the working and 
living conditions in the oil areas, in order to create a less harsh environment where 
attracting employees would not be such a major challenge.   
 
Soon after the war the nationality of the workforce became a politically 
sensitive topic, mainly for geopolitical reasons. The changing global landscape had 
began to effect the oil habitus in Abadan as political events beyond the local confines 
of Khuzestan affected the attitudes of workers, the Company management, the local 
population, and the political agents of the Iranian and British governments alike. 
While labor requirements in each job category had their own specifics dynamics, 
nevertheless a number of preferential treatments began to be observed, often 
informally. Initially, the prejudices were professional. For example, Canadian drillers 
began to be seen in a negative light as they kept having frictions with Iranians and 
others on the job80.  After some clashes between the Canadians and Iranian workers in 
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1919, a follow up note a month later concluded that, “We should exercise a 
preference for men with experience in the east”81. 
But more was at stake than practical colonial knowhow in eastern settings. 
Regarding skilled workers and staff, the Company as well as the British 
Government’s preference in the postwar years shifted toward excluding non-British 
nationals, especially the Americans, in light of heightened international rivalries and 
Britain’s attempts to consolidate its exclusive sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. 
Attempting to coordinate APOC policy with the interests of the British Government, 
Cadman (APOC Chairman), Loraine (Ambassador in Tehran), Chamberlain (Foreign 
Secretary) and Oliphant (his senior adviser) discussed how to counter Iran’s deep 
distrust of Britain, and the rising danger of the US as a rival. They were not above 
using Iran’s foreign debt, its long coveted railroads project, and the benefits and 
social programs initiated by the oil industry as pressure points to cajole or bully Iran 
back into British arms (chapter 2). In particular, they were apprehensive about the 
role of Arthur Millspaugh’s financial reforms mission, and the danger that his 
“Pressure to interest the US in the revival of Persia means the balance will be tilted in 
favor of the American industry”. They agreed to wait until Millspaugh was gone, and 
then the Iranians would have no option but come around to Britain82.  
APOC moved to reduce its dependence on American personnel and 
technology. Cadman wrote to Loraine to emphasize that the Company was doing its 
patriotic job by helping Iran build the strategic Dezful-Khoramabad road, “without 
any profit to the Company” (he enclosed an estimate of costs of surveying and 
construction), “to extend cheap petrol products in Northern Iran to counter Soviet 
influence”. He also highlighted the Company’s commitment to “education works in 
Khuzistan” by building two primary schools in the oilfields, maintaining the school at 
Ahvaz, adding a secondary school there; supporting the hard pressed government 
schools in Abadan, Mohammareh, and Ahvaz; and even selecting a few students from 
Iran and sending them to Britain for University training in petroleum sciences and 
engineering83.  
                                                           
81 BP 70146; “Letters Regarding the Fields and Pipelines, to and from Mohammerah and London”, 
July 31, 1919; 21 August 1919 
82 “Loraine to Chamberlain”, 14 January 1926, “Oliphant to Cadman”, February 1926, BP 71183 
83 “Cadman to Loraine” 8 May 1926, BP 71183 




Of course, there were severe limits on the strategy of keeping rivals out of the 
Iran market. International power rivalries had to be accommodated, nationalist 
feelings had to be acknowledged, and the severe financial limits of post war Britain 
had to be managed, especially as it came to the US which had become Britain’s 
largest creditor as well as competitor (chapter 2). Thus Italian workers were allowed 
to be hired in several Trucial States84 to accommodate Italy’s demand as wartime Ally 
for a share of the spoils; in Iraq APOC had to accept shared ownership of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, later Iraqi Petroleum Company, after the Germans and 
Ottomans had been expelled and replaced by Shell and Americans; and in Saudi 
Arabia APOC had to accommodate the American demands for a significant presence 
there85. However, in the case of Iran, by far the largest and the only proven producer 
of oil at the time, APOC accepted no such compromise, and the pressure was on to 
exclusively recruit British nationals and professionals for staffing the higher echelons 
of the oil operations.  
Nevertheless, as we shall see, Iranian politicians and nationalists continued to 
exert pressure for the greater ‘Iranianization’ of the Company, including among the 
higher ranks. For the next six decades, until the 1979 revolution, the issue of greater 
participation and management by Iranian nationals over the hierarchy of oil 
operations remained a major ingredient of official Iranian nationalism, a dynamic that 
was very much shared with elite resource nationalism in most of the other post-
colonies and developing nations that were producing raw materials for the global 
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market under the tutelage of multi national corporations86 (see concluding section of 
this chapter). 
 As for unskilled workers, both the necessity of accommodating local allies, 
such as the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al, as well as the terms of the D’Arcy 
Concession, compelled the Company to hire Iranian workers. In the early years, 
hiring large numbers of unskilled tribesmen and pastoralists in work gangs that were 
subcontracted through tribal intermediaries was acceptable for the kind of manual 
labor involved in building the infrastructure of drilling, transporting rigs and 
pipelines, setting up drill towers, building pumping stations, and the equally 
backbreaking manual labor of road building, laying pipelines, and building the ports 
and the refinery87.  
“The local laborer is well paid, but has to pay something to the head of his 
gang, and the head of his village, who in turn has to pay the tribal chiefs. It is 
rough and ready and very cheap system fo taxation, not so harsh as to 
discourage enterprise…it is much cheaper [and less troublesome and 
resentment-creating tan our Indian system] – no officials, no pensions, no 
paper.”88  
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Photograph 10: Payday with Bakhtiyari Workers (1910) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
Photograph 11: Bakhtiyari Oilworkers Leaving the Refinery 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
 




In these earlier years the transitory and impermanent nature of unskilled 
workers was an advantage to the Company. So long as work-gang captains supplied 
the numbers and maintained discipline the fact that nomad and peasant recruits were 
treating the wage work as a temporary and seasonal source of monetary revenue, and 
would return to their agrarian lives of sheep herding or planting and tending their 
fields during the migration or harvest season, was not a major concern and 
conveniently fit into and reinforced the convenient stereotype of the ‘lazy native’:  
“Food is so cheap that the Oil Company must, paradoxically, pay higher 
wages to get people to work at all. Men’s needs are few and they are ‘lazy’. In 
other words, their standards of living includes a large element of leisure, and 
who shall blame them?”89 
 
The Company appreciated the cheapness of the casual labor, and the freedom 
to avoid any social obligations that risked to further burden it, such as providing 
housing, healthcare, or other costly demands and services that a more permanent labor 
force would require. In their arrangements with local magnates all such social 
obligations fell on the shoulders of Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al. The 
Company would simply pay them and expect them to supply, support, and discipline 
the workers through their own internal arrangements90. 
However, as soon as the initial stages of building the infrastructure were 
completed and the operations were in full flow, the labor situation began to change 
and the necessity of planning for a more permanent workforce could no longer be 
ignored. There were a number of even greater issues at stake: In 1908 when oil was 
first discovered in Masjed Soleyman, the global petroleum industry was in relative 
infancy. By 1918 this was no longer the case (See chapter 4) as oil was now a major 
global industrial, economic, and chemical enterprise that was fast becoming 
intertwined with the entire fabric of the Fordist regime of accumulation. As the scale 
of operations in Khuzestan expanded and became more sophisticated technically and 
scientifically, the nature of the ‘unskilled’ labor force required for carrying out the 
operations also changed. The Company could no longer afford to rely only on 
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temporary workers and illiterate peasants and nomads to handle dangerous and 
expensive material, and to carry out sophisticated work processes. Nor could it afford 
to train workers only to see them disappear at harvest time or during the migration 
season. Workers in the new industry had to be time and motion disciplined. They had 
to become reliable for the industrial hierarchy and the fragmented and minute division 
of labor that characterized the new industrial relations. They needed to become solely 
dependent on wages and dependent on the market, so that alternative economic and 
social modes of existence would not offer them relative autonomy from the labor 
market. 
The imperative to treat laborers as social beings, or as ‘human capital’ in the 
present day corporate parlance, rather than an anonymous and interchangeable mass 
of precariously employed raw material, was gradually emerging in the interwar years 
not only in Britain and Europe, but also in the colonies and semi colonies (chapter 4). 
Frederick Cooper in his study of changing labor relations with the dockworkers, 
miners, and railroad workers of Mombasa in the 1930s and 1940s91 investigated the 
marked shift of attitude among large employees and colonial officials toward labor 
relations, in response to the surprising emergence of labor radicalism and waves of 
strikes.  
Employers and colonial officials were caught off guard when confronted with 
the consequences of creating an anonymous mass of casual and cheap workers, 
together with floating populations in towns. The expectation among employers and 
colonial officials that this reserve army of labor was too atomized to act with unity 
and discipline was dispelled with shock, fear, and grudging admiration after the strike 
waves of 1939 and 1947. In Kenya, casual labor was seen as the culprit, and in 
response a process began to abolish the practice of daily hiring and replace it with an 
established core of regular workers. This change was accompanied by the increasing 
bureaucratization of labor relations as a way of regulating work conditions, giving an 
outlet to grievances, and generally alleviating class tensions and increasing 
productivity by giving a greater stake in society to workers. These adjustments were 
accompanied by municipal reform policies, to improve the urban social life of the 
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floating and anonymous masses by creating an orderly, contended, and hard working 
city free from the dangerous masses92. 
These 1930s and 1940s processes and reactions that Cooper investigates were 
not exceptional to colonial Africa; much earlier they had begun to enter the repertoire 
of corporate and governmental practices in wartime Europe and Britain (see chapter 
4), and soon after they came to affect and shape the oil habitus in places like Abadan 
and Khuzestan. The 1929 Colonial Development Act had already recast the approach 
to labor and commodities markets in the colonies as an extension of the domestic 
British economy, rather than a mere source of surplus extraction93. However, local 
conditions have a habit of imposing their own imperatives and, as we saw in previous 
chapters, the questions of the boundaries of political sovereignty, and the ongoing 
frictions between the central government, local social dynamics in Khuzestan, and Oil 
Company needs and practices, were interacting to shape conditions in Abadan.  
The process of turning Abadan from a chaotic boomtown into an orderly city 
began under these circumstances. It started with the Oil Company’s realization that 
attracting adequate workers and employees would only get harder if the urban and 
living conditions continued as they were; and that the “dangerous masses” populating 
the island could no longer be ignored due to pressing public health hazards, and the 
potential political threats posed by intensifying class tensions, urban discontent, and 
political friction with the Iranian government. Oil workers living on the Island or in 
Masjed Soleyman were vital to the Company operation, yet they needed to be made 
reliable by proper training to acquire better skills, permanently accepting wage work 
and industrial discipline, and developing more solid loyalty to the Company rather 
than continuing the hybrid patterns of mixing occasional wage work with agrarian and 
pastoral lives that were sustained through tribal and kinship networks. The central 
government on the other hand, was coming to realize that it could wrest control and 
sovereignty over its border territories and populations only if it committed to 
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providing the minimal kinds of civic protections and social services that national 
citizenship claimed to provide. Workers and urban citizens of Abadan, who had to 
negotiate their difficult deracination from their former social lives with the new 
relations of urban proximity, industrial discipline, wage labor, and market relations, 
had to build new forms of urban solidarity in order to be able to stake a claim in the 
new city.  
 
Having discussed the labor issues that emerged after the war, I will continue in 
the following sections to investigate several other key aspects of the changes that took 
place in the urban life of Abadan against the larger background of events that were 
outlined in the former chapters and the previous sections of this chapter. I will first 
investigate the public relations machinery set up by APOC as part of the attempt to 
improve its corporate reputation, in today’s jargon to ‘rebrand’ itself, by inventing a 
new and more positive public image of the oil industry. This was not done purely 
through propaganda; it had to be accompanied by tangible actions toward improving 
actual conditions before it could become convincing. Next we will investigate the 
public education policies adopted and implemented by the Oil Company with the 
intention of creating modern citizens and workers. Public education was a double-
edged sword, as it was also the prerequisite for complying with the intense political 
demands of the Iranian government and the public for the greater ‘Iranianization’ of 
the oil complex. The next chapter will continue the investigation of public health and 
sanitation measures as prerequisites for creating a safe and attractive city, and a 
healthy and productive population, and link these trends with the struggle over the 
bazaar of Abadan, as the competing visions of creating a safe built environment and a 
modern productive population came together with the aim of setting the stage for the 
future development of Abadan.  
      
Mending a Blemished Image: Company Propaganda, Social Amenities, and 
Improving Material Conditions 
  
APOC suffered from a poor image in the early years of its operations, and this 
caused problems with recruiting and retaining employees, not to mention with public 
opinion in Iran and the new political elite in the capital. While Britain had treated Iran 
as a sphere of influence, and so long as the southern parts of the country had been 
effectively controlled by British-organized militias like the South Persia Rifles and by 




local allies like the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al, this poor image had not 
been of great concern (See chapters 2 & 3). The Company operated under the direct 
protective umbrella of the Empire, and enjoyed adequate cooperation and support 
from the Government of India. However, as we saw in the previous sections, the war 
had put strain on labor supplies, and the pervasive war-induced insecurity and severe 
hardship in Khuzestan had increased the Company’s logistic difficulties. APOC was 
Britain’s largest investment abroad, and it was playing a highly public role in 
wartime. But as a private corporation (even though it was majority owned by the 
British Government) it had to rely on the labor market for its recruitments. Already in 
1910 and 1914 there had been some notable labor clashes in Khuzestan. The first 
instance occurred when workers reacted to abuse by European foremen; the latter 
when two workers were killed and the Company refused to compensate the families 
adequately and to improve safety conditions. In 1914 the Company relied on Skeikh 
Khaz’al to put down the strike94. There were other clashes following workers’ abuse 
by foremen, or local pastoralists reacting to Company encroachment on their 
territories. In 1915 several Arab clans cooperated with German agents to sabotage 
Company pipelines and disrupt oil flows95. The Company’s relations with local 
populations remained highly contentious96. In 1920 and 1922 there were two major 
strikes, this time in the refinery and by skilled workers and artisans, and not out on the 
fields by unskilled casual laborers. Indian skilled workers went on strike in 1920 over 
poor working and living conditions, low pay, and persisting complaints against racial 
discrimination and abuse. Some Iranian workers also joined (see below for further 
discussion). These labor confrontations, as well as urban clashes such as those that 
occurred over the forced evictions to clear the way for the construction of modern 
bazaars in Abadan (1924-1927) and Masjed Soleyman (1925, see chapter 3), rattled 
the stability of operations and made the Company conclude that these labor and social 
issues needed to be treated more seriously. As part of the solution APOC moved 
toward a systematic effort to improve its public image.  
Even though the Company had a contract for protection by the Bakhtiyari 
Khans, the latter’s hold on their clans and subsections became increasingly tenuous 
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and the Khans began to be perceived as self serving and their legitimacy began to 
wane (chapter 3). The Company had dealt exclusively with the Khans, paying them 
through the Bakhtiyari Oil Company, and leaving the compensation of rank and file 
Bakhtiyaris to their leaders, being fully aware that they would pocket the payments 
and lose tribal legitimacy in the process97. As we saw in previous chapters, the policy 
of bypassing the central government and dealing directly with local magnates was an 
extension of the shifting geopolitics of Britain toward Iran, as well as the local 
circumstances there. However, as Mahmoud Mamdani has analyzed in his study of 
colonialsm in Africa, the policy of reinforcing “traditional local rulers” as direct 
partners against the central governmental authority was part of the well established 
repertoire of British colonialism implemented across the empire, in India and 
especially in Africa98. Tribesmen regularly targeted company surveyors and geologists 
while out on the fields because they saw them as agents preparing the ground for 
military operations against themselves99. These were not isolated incidents; rather 
they demonstrated the hostility that marked the Company’s relations with local people 
as it impinged on their territory, enclosed their common properties, disrupted their 
economies and migration patterns, recruited their valuable labor power, and co-opted 
their Khans.  
The Iranian government was equally suspicious of Company intentions. From 
early on the telegraph reports (1908-1929) by the local representative of the Foreign 
Ministry (called Kargozar) in Khuzestan, effectively the main central government 
agents in a practically autonomous province, were replete with complaints, alarms, 
and expressions of frustration about perceived Company abuses and violations against 
Iran’s territorial sovereignty, national laws, Iranian workers, its refusal to respect the 
terms of the Concession by hiring foreigners, and its suspicious dealings and 
perceived intrigues with local magnates against ‘national interests’100. After the 1921 
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coup d’état and the eventual change in the strategic relation between Britain and Iran 
(chapter 2), this predominantly negative image became a major obstacle and even a 
threat to the Company’s successful operation.  
In response to this predominantly negative perception, during the 1926 re- 
organization the Company made the improvement of its image a priority. But the 
effort went beyond mere propaganda and a concerted effort at conducting better 
public relations; it also involved major investment in improving the social life of its 
employees as well as the general conditions in the oil areas, in particular Abadan. 
APOC also began to aggressively and systematically respond to any and all criticisms 
of its activities, whether by the popular press, by employees, private citizens, or 
statesmen and politicians. Its tone was belligerent and defensive; its responses were 
relentless and often abrasive. They revealed a mentality that considered any 
objections to the Company as malicious and unfounded, and undertaken with morally 
and politically questionable motives. This defensive inflexibility did not win it many 
friends, however its major efforts at expanding social services, and its relentless use 
of propaganda to publicize its efforts and actions did create a more positive image of 
its accomplishments and operations.              
As cinema was becoming a major medium of public entertainment as well as 
propaganda, APOC commissioned a film in 1921 to depict its operations in a positive 
image. However, the film was only edited in 1938 and finally released under the title 
“Anglo Iranian Oil Operations in Iran”. Its next venture fared better, and was titled 
“The Persian Oil Industry; the Story of a Great National Enterprise”, a 98 minute 
silent documentary made by one J.D. Kelley in 1925. It provided flowing views of the 
fields, the refinery, pipelines, and the workers’ good lives101. Hamid Naficy, in his 
comprehensive social history of Iranian cinema highlights the close collaboration 
between APOC and Reza Shah’s central government in the production of cinematic 
propaganda that would fit and enhance both the image of grand state-sponsored 
projects, such as the transnational railways, as well as the oil industry. Oil films and 
railroad films in the interwar years projected an epic image of modernization, partly 
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by juxtaposing these grand industrial ventures against the existing lives of Iranians, 
and by framing the latter as ‘traditional’, ‘backward’ and trapped in a timeless and 
repetitive cycle that negated any historical progress102.  
The epic film Grass, made by the Hollywood director Merian Cooper before 
he made his blockbuster King Kong, was the counterpoint to the APOC film, both of 
which were made in the same year (1925)103. While “The Persian Oil Industry” 
depicted the epic modernity of the oil complex, Grass exoticized the ‘primordial’ 
seasonal migration of the Babayari branch of the Bakhtiyaris from Chahar Mahal to 
Khuzestan, over the nearly 4000m high peak of Zardeh Kouh. Cooper probably 
exaggerated when he claimed there were 50 thousand people and half a million 
animals making the grueling seven-week long trek in the snow and over rushing 
rivers104. His spectacular film framed the Bakhtiyari as a people standing outside 
history, a “timeless people” struggling heroically against nature to eek out an 
existence against all odds. Both films orientalized the local population as a “people 
without history” (chapter 1)105, a theme that had been repeated since the 19th century 
by a string of British and European travelers, spies, and adventurers106, and was now 
accepted as self-evident. Although Grass depicted the Bakhtiyari as noble and heroic 
savages, nevertheless, the audiences viewing the two films in cinemas in London, 
Tehran, as well as in Abadan, Masjed Soleyman, and Ahvaz, could not help but 
wonder at the gulf between the two, and how the spectacular smokestacks of Abadan, 
its snaking pipelines, the grand jetties and modern tankers, were spearheading the 
primitive region into the future. The combination of the two films evoked King 
Kong’s final tragic scene atop the Empire State Building as the mighty beast 
succumbs to the power of airplanes and machine guns.  
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Naficy notes that APOC established its first public film-screening program in 
Abadan in 1926, and projected its film in Abadan before it built a film theater in 
London107. This implies that some of the likely film audience in Abadan included 
Bakhtiyari workers who were witnessing their own reification in this cinematic 
juxtaposition of tradition versus modernity. In Europe the APOC film was released 
under a different title, “In the Land of the Shah”, and was viewed by a million people 
in theaters, and copies of it were sold in 9.5mm format for home consumption108. The 
film was released to coincide with Reza Shah’s coronation, and the changed title was 
to highlight the new monarch’s role, rather than make the film appear as corporate 
propaganda. 
Cinematic propaganda was not the only venue where the Oil Company tried to 
improve relations with the Government. The Company prepared special guest 
quarters in Abadan and the fields and began to host all official and influential visitors, 
including journalists and writers, with organized tours and lavish hospitality109. 
Sometimes the public relations efforts were embarrassingly sycophantic, such as the 
large monument of Reza Shah, designed and built by the Company architect 
J.M.Wilson, and installed in Ahvaz in 1930110. A year later on the anniversary of the 
coronation the monument was officially unveiled by the Provincial Governor in 
Naseri Square in the presence of 200 invited guests and 2,000 soldiers standing guard. 
Company Manager E. Elkington made a public speech, emphasizing that the bronze 
statue’s base was made of local stone from Khuzestan, and dedicated the bust to Reza 
Shah’s first visit to Khuzestan as a monarch111. Overall, the effort was made to present 
to the public as well as to policymakers a consistently clean, modern, and progressive 
image of the Company, and to emphasize its modernizing effect on the people and 
landscape of Khuzestan and Iran. 
Cinematic propaganda suited the government and the Oil Company alike. 
Both followed calculated scripts with instrumental agendas. John Taylor, a director 
hired by AIOC  (Anglo Iranian Oil Company, as APOC had been renamed after 1935) 
to make the first propaganda sound film Dawn of Iran (1937) recalled later that he 
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was given a list of subjects by the Iranian government that he was forbidden to film, 
including camel caravans and carpet weaving, because they would depict Iran as 
primitive. The film crew was assigned a police officer that accompanied them across 
the country as they filmed, and checked every shot through the camera before 
allowing them to proceed112. However, the rosy and modernist propaganda films were 
not universally accepted. In 1927 the newspaper Ettela’at published a harsh critique 
of the original APOC film by someone named Khouzestani who wrote,  
“ In Tehran they show you the beautiful films of the oil operations in the 
south. Of course they tell of the enormity of the Company’s buildings and 
facilities and of the importance of the oil pipelines, and naturally you and your 
journalist colleagues enjoy them and perhaps think this Company is serving 
and benefiting Iran. But have these films ever shown the wretched lives of 
those lowly Iranian workers who for three Qrans a day toil in highly 
dangerous conditions and in really heart wrenching manner? Have these films 
ever shown you the manner in which in the southern oil regions a group of 
Indian workers are made superior to, and rule over, Iranian workers in their 
own homeland? Have these films ever shown you the dictatorial manner in 
which the [British] managers govern your fellow citizens and push and shove 
them around and stifle those who raise the slightest complaint?”113 
 
Photograph 12: Cinema Hall (late 1920s) 
 
Source: BP Archives 
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Cinema as entertainment, an effective social venue, and a powerful 
propaganda tool was incorporated into the 1926 reorganization of APOC. A proposal 
was made by Company directors to circulate and screen films in different locations 
across Khuzestan based similar to the military and the YMCA114 model. The 
Company had already set up a “Neilson Cinema” and a Staff Club earlier, but now it 
proposed to replace the obsolete projectors and improve the screenings115. New 
projectors cost £50 each, but the Chairman John Cadman enthusiastically sanctioned 
their purchase and took personal responsibility for seeing to their delivery and to 
ensuring the regular supply of films. It was proposed to establish a cinema at the 
Fields Central Hall in Masjed Soleyman and to organize either daily performances or 
regular visits by the permanent projectionist from Abadan. Initially only senior staff 
would have had access to film viewing in the Fields, but soon cinema was to become 
a general form of entertainment116.  
The scope of the Company’s efforts at improving its image went well beyond 
cinema. It also involved publishing a regular journal with glossy graphics, along with 
regular newsletters. Establishing a wireless (radio) station proved to be probably the 
most effective way of improving moral. The Company also began to systematically 
plan the building of social clubs and libraries, organizing sports teams and orchestras, 
and building entertainment halls and gymnasiums. It proposed to open a restaurant. It 
was felt that the current 4-member orchestra of Indian musicians were “incompetent”, 
so Cadman suggested hiring musicians from Rumania or Poland instead. All these 
amenities were intended for Europeans. A few were made available to senior Indians; 
none yet to the ordinary workers and Iranians, although Cadman suggested that the 
Company should make an effort “to get Persians more involved”117. [Iranian] 
Armenians already had built a club and now “Persian Clerks” were asking for one of 
their own. Cadman strongly supported the idea118. However, when Iranian workers 
tried to organize their own athletic club in 1928, and obtained a permit from the 
Cultural Office of the Provincial Government, they were shut down by the police with 
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the urging of the Company, because they feared the club would be used for trade 
union organization and become an autonomous place for the propagation of 
subversive political ideas against the Company119. 
The Company magazine that began publication was initially called APOC, and 
later renamed Naft (Oil) and contained up to date news, photos, and articles in 
English. It was intended to forge an “imagined community” among all those working 
for the Company, across its widespread geography. The magazine provided news and 
photographs about Company activities in Khuzestan as well as London or Basra. 
Senior staff reminisced about the early days of their “pioneering endeavors”120. There 
were reports and news about the “ladies” activities, sports events, scientific advances, 
official visits, etc. Later on there appeared photo essays about housing 
accommodations and married couple’s bungalows. Regular news of sporting events 
and competitions were published. The magazine created ties between scientists, 
engineers, managers, technicians, administrators, and workers; it relived somewhat 
the suffocating sense of isolation, while offering potential job applicants a glossy 
picture of a vibrant and pleasant working and living environment. The wireless 
(radio) however, seemed to have been highly prized:  
“Recent scientific improvements in wireless have indeed proved a boon and 
blessing to the men working some 160 miles from any civilization, and one 
can imagine the feeling of hundreds of young men from home, many from our 
universities and public schools, listening to the Savoy band playing the latest 
dance music.”121 
   
The organized sports activities and social clubs were among the most 
important policies affecting employee morale. They were meant to create a spirit of 
teamwork, discipline, and competitiveness; and to reinforce a sense of identity and 
belonging122. However, much like organized sports and social activities in highly class 
segregated and class conscious Britain and its colonies, these social activities were 
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almost completely organized around rigid racial, national, and status lines. In Masjed 
Soleyman there were four social clubs by 1926, “extensively used especially in the 
summer”. Saturday afternoons had been dedicated for athletic activities and clubs. 
Clerks had their own clubs, including, “Two good clubs for Indians, and one more 
humble type for Armenians”. It seems there were some Iranians who had gained 
membership to the Indian clubs, and were now asking discreetly to form their own. 
“Every effort was being made to encourage sports among them…unfortunately they 
show no interest in games, but this might be developed later…[their desire to form a 
club] is good to bear in mind for purposes of effect in Tehran and on Persians 
generally”.  
There was no official policy requiring employees to seek membership in 
clubs, but there was peer pressure to join. Newcomers were given an application upon 
arrival, but the “40 or 50” who had not joined stood out as awkward exceptions. What 
was interesting in Masjed Soleyman was the aversion to introducing open class 
distinctions within social clubs, at least among the Europeans. Reporting on the 
popular Gymkhana Club, the Fields’ Manager stated, “it is desirable that it should not 
develop into a private club, as this would introduce class divisions, which at present 
are non-existent in Fields”123. However, this egalitarianism among the Europeans in 
the dangerous and rugged “Fields” did not last, and all social clubs were eventually 
segregated as a way of keeping races separate, and enforcing rank consciousness 
among employees.  
The Company’s proposed libraries created some tension. A discussion had 
started with the McKenzie Bookshop in Baghdad to establish a bookstore and library 
in Abadan and the Fields, and also to manage the club library at Abadan. However, as 
soon as subscription rates of 1 Rupee/month had been imposed the membership in the 
fields had dropped from 250 to 100.  In addition, racial segregation became a point of 
tension as a certain Mr. Armstrong, presumably in charge of the library, denied Indian 
clerks who had asked to be allowed access because “I feel this might prevent some 
Europeans from using the library”. He went on to suggest, “…A separate, smaller 
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library may be established for the Indians, and supplied by used and discarded books 
from the main library”124.    
Improving the image of the Oil Company among the public in Iran and 
abroad, the prospective job applicants from Europe, and the Iranian government, was 
a centerpiece of the Company’s post war reorganization. APOC hired a professional  
“Welfare Officer… to organize social activities of clerks, artisans as well as 
Europeans”125, making this probably one of the earlier instances of a multi national 
corporation establishing a specialist public relations office to shape and improve a 
corporate brand. The Company also tried to create a strong internal corporate culture 
and to strengthen employee loyalty to the Company by establishing social facilities 
and launching a set of organized social activities and entertainment programs 
intended to alleviate boredom and the sense of isolation, while improving 
productivity, competitiveness, cohesion, and a desire for upward mobility.  
However, these efforts also revealed an ingrained institutional racism within 
the corporate culture of APOC, a feature that was an integral attribute of its colonial 
links. This was by no means unique to APOC or to British overseas businesses, as 
Vitalis’ study of SoCal/Aramco has shown in the case of American oil companies in 
Saudi Arabia126.  The fallout from this institutional racism would later come to haunt 
APOC and cause continuous friction with its employees, the local population, and the 
state bureaucracy. It was a contributing factor in stirring the so called ‘resource 
nationalism’ in Iran, or of the nationalist political sentiments formed around several 
demands: First, the demand for greater national sovereignty over natural resources by 
increasing royalties or even wresting ownership; second, for the equal treatment of 
Iranian nationals working for the oil complex; and third, for increasing tangibly the 
control exerted by Iranian nationals over technical and managerial operations. As a 
result, ‘resource nationalism’ and calls for greater ‘Iranianization’ of the oil industry 
became one of the major bones of contention between successive Iranian 
administrations and multinational concerns that controlled the oil complex; first 
APOC/AIOC until 1953; followed by the Consortium of multinational oil 
corporations until 1973 when the oil industry was formally nationalized (with 
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multinationals kept on as “consultants”); and eventually the 1979 revolution when all 
foreign national corporations were expelled from the Iranian oil industry127. 
APOC’s decision to improve its corporate image would not have carried much 
credibility if it were not accompanied by a meaningful commitment to improving 
living and working conditions. Initially these efforts were targeted exclusively to 
benefit European employees, along with skilled workers, artisans, and technicians. 
The latter categories included Indians, as well as some Iranians (including Iranian 
Armenians). The masses of casual and unskilled workers were completely excluded 
from these improvements (until after WW2 in the 1940s). However, as class frictions 
mounted successive layers of subaltern workers and residents of oil cities succeeded 
in wresting concessions from the Oil Company and the Iranian government to extend 
the circle of these social benefits and municipal amenities. This expansion of social 
services was gradual and highly uneven. Thus, the provision of a number of sanitary 
and public health improvements, such as safe drinking water, the building of latrines 
and a sewerage system, access to Company hospital and public health facilities, etc. 
initially began as services for the permanent employees within Company enclaves, 
although Company hospitals and dispensaries did treat the indigenous population in 
separate wards. However, once the process had started, the extension of these social 
and municipal services to a wider urban public became increasingly unavoidable due 
to public pressure and for practical reasons (see next chapter). Likewise, the support 
and subsidizing of formal schools and technical education began as exclusively 
Company affairs, but were soon extended to the larger urban public (see next section).   
By mid 1920s APOC had made some progress toward improving its hitherto 
abysmal image. In this rebranding the Company was aided by politicians and senior 
soldiers who used scientific venues such as the Royal Central Asian Society to extol 
the virtues of the Company and wrap it in a patriotic veneer. Sir Harry Brittain, a 
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conservative MP, told his audience that he had just returned from a 35,000 mile 
pilgrimage of the British Empire which had included a visit to Khuzestan:  
“This is not only the finest oilfield that I have seen, but it is absolutely beyond 
all praise from the point of view of organization…some people [talk about] 
the decadence of the British Empire, [I would] suggest that if they want a 
tonic they should get out to Southern Persia, and see what Englishmen and 
Scotts in cooperation can do together… [People at APOC] work, and work 
hard. But I do not think it is right to say that they have nothing else to do and 
no relaxation. When I arrived at Christmas day there was a very first-class 
race meeting…in this appalling looking region. I found in my tour round this 
district everything in the way of tennis, polo, athletics, even a regatta on the 
miserable little pond you saw by the first pumping station… [In this venture] 
the British Government has got one of the finest investments it ever made.”128 
 
Photograph 13: Sailing on the "Miserable Little Pond"  
 
Source: BP Archives 
 
To these remarks Admiral Richmond added “[APOC] must not be looked 
upon as a purely business proposition. It is of the greatest national importance…not 
only as giving work at home, but from the point of view of imperial defense it is a 
matter upon which too much importance cannot be laid”. He went on to emphasize 
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“the great care that was taken in Abadan by the Company to look after all its 
employees…every effort is made by the Company to make their people comfortable 
in every way. It is a beastly place in itself. But everything done is truly on a lavish 
scale showing that the Company have the interests of their employees at heart and are 
not afraid to spend money on making them comfortable (Applause)”. Anthony Eden, 
another conservative MP and parliamentary secretary to Austen Chamberlain at the 
time, highlighted the Company’s hospitals as a great public relations factor with the 
local people, and because of it “the Company is not only a great business enterprise, 
but a great humanitarian agency in Southwestern Persia (Hear, hear)”. Eden continued 
to extol the great sense of national pride generated by the scale of APOC and the great 
economic benefit it was generating through “a very large measure of employment to 
be given directly and indirectly, through manufacture of appliances and stores of 
every kind, to tens of thousands of British workmen”.129 
It will be recalled that this was the year 1926, with unemployment and labor 
strife reaching a boiling point in postwar Britain, that would explode in the general 
strike three months after this lecture was delivered (Chapter 4). These presentations 
wrapped the oil venture in Iran in the flag of patriotic pride and the grandeur of 
industry and empire, all at the same time. They presented APOC as a grand 
humanitarian venture, and a great contributor to the British economy and its working 
class suffering from unemployment and poverty. They framed Khuzestan as an 
abysmal place, which was being rescued by the civilizing mission undertaken by 
APOC. This combination of a sense of moral mission and material opportunity 
framed Khuzestan as a great place to work and to live comfortably. The Chairman of 
the event, Sir Michael O’Dwyer, the former Lieutenant governor of Punjab (1912-
1919) who had presided over the Amritsar massacre in 1919 before being relieved of 
duty, concluded the proceedings by framing Abadan as a tourist destination for 
“Gentlemen from Baghdad, when they want a weekend holiday, go to Maidan-i 
Naftun [Masjed Soleyman]. When they go there they find excellent shows going on, 
races where they can back a winner…and in fact the amenities of civilization in such 
abundance that in a year or two Maidan-i Naftun will draw people like Algiers or 
Egypt. We are all proud of this great outpost of civilization in the East”130. 
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By mid 1920s APOC was hard at work rebranding its corporate public image 
and the perceptions of the living and working conditions in Khuzestan. Corporate 
propaganda associating large industrial and commercial companies with patriotic and 
humanitarian accomplishments had become an integral part of strategic planning by 
large businesses during WWI (chapter 4). But after the war the advent of Fordism, the 
rise of multi national corporations, intensifying mass politics, labor radicalism, and 
nationalist and revolutionary fervor, further consolidated this trend. APOC badly 
needed this boost in public image to improve its recruitment drives, and to reduce and 
ward off criticism. To get this boost it relied on the magic of the seventh art, cinema; 
it mobilized politicians, military veterans, journalists, geographers, and technical 
professionals to praise its accomplishments in respected scientific settings closely 
associated with the Empire; it published a glossy magazine, and set up a public 
relations office to refute any and all criticism, disseminate information, and shpae 
public opinion in its favor. 
However, without some real commitment to improving the abysmal working 
and living conditions in Khuzestan it is unlikely that any of this extensive propaganda 
and rebranding would have produced the desired results. Consequently, aside from 
technical and managerial changes in the workplace, and the acceleration of its 
international marketing and explorations, what came to define APOC’s post-war 
restructuring was its newfound reluctant paternalism, as it found itself obligated to 
commit to dealing and engaging with ‘the social question’ in Khuzestan’s oil 
complex.    
 
The Making of Skilled and Permanent Iranian Workers: Education, Discipline, 
and ‘Iranianization’. 
 
In the interwar years mass education of Iranian workers and their children 
became a pressing concern for APOC, and it entered its repertoire of reluctant 
paternalism.  On the other hand, Iranian nationalists and the state came to 
conceptualize and to measure the extent of national sovereignty over natural 
resources, national territory, and the oil industry, in terms of the Iranianization of 
those working in the oil industry, and especially the number of Iranian nationals in the 
managerial and upper echelons of the Company.  Given the almost completely 
undeveloped modern national education infrastructure in the interwar period (see 
below), the establishment of basic education as well as technical training to qualify 




Iranians for employment in the oil industry became an inevitable policy priority and a 
highly sensitive issue in Khuzestan.  
As for the local population, once the local socio-economic structures had been 
significantly undermined gaining permanent paid employment in the oil industry 
became their preferred, sometimes the only, option. Once the established system of 
tribal work gang levies established between APOC and the local magnates131 began to 
wane, job applicants increasingly had to seek work at the Company as individuals 
rather than as members of a community. They faced competition from skilled Indian 
workers and artisans, as well as other qualified Iranians. Consequently, gaining 
formal education and accreditation over time became a significant social and 
economic strategy among the local population. Needless to say, the gradual 
establishment of modern institutions of education had profound socializing impact; 
especially in the urban centers where Company sponsored schools were established to 
teach literacy, technical training, some English, modern sciences, technical knowhow, 
and an almost military discipline and modes of regimented behavior, to the boys who 
were preparing to work for the oil industry or for the growing bureaucracy and the 
private sector. 
The Company had established a technical school in Ahvaz in 1916 to train 
skilled adult workers. But now it began investing in the establishment, funding, and 
managing a growing number of elementary as well as technical schools and 
apprenticeship programs across its areas of operation, but especially in Abadan, 
Ahvaz, Mohammareh, and Masjed Soleyman. There were several reasons behind this 
commitment by a private corporation to a social program that historically and 
conventionally had fallen within the purview religious establishments, but since 
1870s, and especially in the post war era, was being taken over by the central states132. 
First, the technical and organizational shifts in modern industry demanded workers 
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with different skill sets and the ability to work under a more detailed and atomized 
division of labor (see chapter 4)133. Second, the chronic labor shortages during 
wartime and in its immediate aftermath discussed in previous sections led APOC to 
make a strategic decision to bring casual and unskilled Iranian workers up to the 
standards of Indian and some European skilled workers and artisans to alleviate this 
chronic shortage. Third, and more significant still, were the political calculations 
behind this decision. The terms of the D’Arcy concession required all manual labor 
and non-managerial employees to be Iranian134, and the continued hiring of Indians 
and non-Iranians (including Iraqis) was increasingly becoming a major bone of 
contention with the Iranian government, as well as with local people migrating to the 
growing oil towns, and demanding some tangible benefit from the industry that had so 
affected their lives.  
Prior to the 1921 coup d’état the Company could safely ignore these 
complaints, but once the paternalistic control of Khaz’al and Bakhtiyari khans had 
been diminished or removed and a strong central government with a nationalistic 
agenda had been established, APOC found itself under increasing pressure to comply 
with the letter of its contract. Another political concern was the implicit subversive 
threat of rising nationalism in India, a factor that worried APOC officials that work-
related grievances by Indian employees could be also radicalized by this political 
backdrop. Fourth, was the quandary of the absence of any modern educational 
infrastructure in the country, and especially in Khuzestan: In 1918 there were only 45 
modern elementary schools and 11 high schools throughout Iran. By 1925 the 
numbers had increased to 648 and 86 respectively; with 2,260 pupils graduating from 
elementary schools and 110 from high schools. In 1925 there were some 1,301 
traditional schools (maktabkhaneh) across the country, run by 1,500 religious scholars 
(ulama), and training 29,000 pupils in literacy and basic religious subjects. There 
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were also 282 religious seminaries, training nearly 6,000 pupils (tollab) in advanced 
religious instruction135.  
The plain fact was that at that stage the upstart Iranian state neither had the 
financial means nor the institutional wherewithal, or the personnel to provide 
adequate educational instruction on a large scale. As we saw in chapter 2, the political 
priorities of the new political regime also lay elsewhere, with the bulk of the annual 
budget after 1921 geared to developing the military, with education being a paltry 3% 
of the meager budget (chapter 2)136. Heavy national debt, post war chronic poverty, 
and the fact that the central government had virtually no significant institutional 
presence in the autonomous province until 1925, put APOC in the unenviable position 
of reluctantly shouldering the responsibility of funding and managing educational 
institutions, albeit with the explicit intent of gearing all training toward eventually 
serving the needs of the Company. Although the Company kept pressing the central 
government to shoulder more of this responsibility Tehran resisted, and while it did 
not reject its responsibility outright it kept insinuating that since the flood of migrants 
population to the oil towns of Khuzestan was being caused by the oil industry the 
Company ought to shoulder partial responsibility for social services, such as 
education, municipal services, and public health137. In 1926, before leaving for Iran to 
preside over the reorganization of APOC, John Cadman the Company Chairman told 
an audience in London at the Royal Central Asian Society:  
“One other phase of the oil-field I wish to speak of, and that is the human side. 
It is the conversion of a fairly crude material in the form of the Persian laborer 
into the skilled artisan. The schools which the Company have set up have 
introduced a method which would be difficult to implement in this country, I 
will admit; but the pay of a workman is dependent upon his capacity to pass a 
test, and the schools are so developed that a man passes into the schools and 
back to the works, and by that means he can only get his increase of pay by 
increase of efficiency. The operations, such as boiler work, done by what 
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appears to be quite crude natives would astonish a Scotch dockyard skilled 
workman, It is remarkable how these people can be got to work by proper 
training. It is all done by carefully thought out plan.”138 
 
The decision to bring Iranian workers up to standard by establishing training 
programs and formal schools was in part precipitated by the Indian labor strikes of 
1920, 1922, and 1924. In 1920 the future of Abadan as a refinery was still uncertain. 
Despite its critical importance during the war the management and the technical 
conditions of the refinery were very poor. “The state of the refinery was very 
unsatisfactory, caused by inadequate management struggling to bring new plans into 
operation, whilst coping with a backlog of imperfect maintenance…the role of the 
chemist was virtually neglected and so the performance of the refinery suffered in 
consequence… In 1922 there was a disastrous fire…the plant was suffering from 
exceeding deterioration with an adverse effect on performance”139. In addition, the 
Company was uneasy over the terms of the D’Arcy Concession, the perceived 
instability of Iran under the perceived ‘the Bolshevik threat’, and its ongoing frictions 
with the government of Iran over royalties (chapters 2 & 3). There were serious 
debates among directors to relocate the refinery to India, where labor was cheaper, 
and far better infrastructure and a ready market were available.  
Once the decision to remain in Abadan was made on technical grounds140 the 
city inevitably became the primary industrial and shipping center of the oil industry 
where, at any time, between one third to one half of all APOC employees in Iran 
worked and lived (see table 3). In the early 1920s some 2700 Indians made up 70% of 
all those working for oil in Abadan; their work was vital to continued operations, and 
consequently their protests and strikes had significant repercussions for APOC. Many 
scholars have connected the 1920 strike, spearheaded by Sikh artisans and skilled 
workers, to the Amritsar massacre of 1919. Although without a doubt this was an 
important factor in the politically charged post-war era, the fact remains that living 
and working conditions in Abadan were abysmal141 and solidarity with fellow 
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Punjabis was in all likelihood a catalyst but not the primary cause of the strike. Indian 
strikers were joined by Iranians, demanding improved wages, reduction of working 
hours, overtime pay, better sanitary conditions, and an end to mistreatment and 
humiliation by staff. The Company director H. Nichols who had just arrived for a visit 
quickly agreed to their demands and increased their pay by 80%142.  
The compromise ended the strike, but it had become clear to Company 
directors that “a comprehensive solution was required”143. Arnold Wilson, ironically a 
profoundly Victorian personality who had been hired as Company Manager in 
Mohammareh after having served as acting Viceroy of Iraq, now called for 
reorganizing the management structure in favor of  “a modern approach, to break with 
the 19th century management practices”144. The comprehensive corporate restructuring 
was accompanied by a reluctant commitment to erecting a paternalistic and 
hierarchical social welfare structure. The structural reforms of management, 
operations, administration, and the reluctant limited commitment to what amounted to 
‘urban’ social welfare were the main components of the comprehensive solution upon 
which APOC settled in the interwar years.  
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Photograph 14: Indian and Iranian Workers in an Abadan Workshop (1920s) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
As discussed in the previous section, this reorganization included improving 
public relations, housing accommodations, married quarters, public health and 
medical services, leisure amenities, establishing company stores as a way of 
controling inflation and assure food safety, and investing in a growing program of 
training and educating Iranians eventually to replace Indians.  When a second strike 
by Indian workers occurred in 1922, the Company was more hardnosed in its 
response and refused to compromise. It called on Sheikh Khaz’al to suppress the 
strike, and once that was accomplished it evicted the strikers to India145.  The strikers 
again had demanded better accommodation, decent latrines and cooking facilities, 
more humane work hours, improved pay, and an end to racial abuse and humiliation 
by Europeans. By then, although the overall number of Indians had remained the 
same (table 3) and their work continued to be crucial, they formed a much reduced 
30% of the total labor force in Abadan. Another Indian strike occurred in 1924, but it 
was suppressed more easily. The Company decided to keep Indian employees as 
clerical staff, cooks, orderlies, and household servants; but “by 1925 Persianization 
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was a major concern for APOC management”146, and the commitment to the long term 
process of Iranianizing the industrial labor force had started.  
Initially the Company devised an education plan in 1925, after consulting Isa 
Khan, the provincial Director of Education147. In addition to the technical school that 
had been built in Ahvaz in 1916 the Company built a new apprentice training center 
in Abadan to train, test, and grade enough qualified fitters, drivers, firemen, 
mechanics, turners, electricians, and other skilled personnel to replace departing 
Indians.  Soon the construction of a number of elementary schools in Mohammareh, 
Abadan, Ahvaz, Masjed Soleyman, and Shushtar were added to these initial efforts. 
Some of these were technical schools, for example Masjed Soleyman, where 50 boys 
between the ages of 10 and 18 trained as artisans. Other schools were hybrid 
organizations, combining elementary education using the formal textbooks and 
curriculum of the Iranian Ministry of Education, in addition to lessons in English 
language and technical instructions. The Hamidiyeh and Khayam schools in Ahvaz 
were among these, with 142 pupils. The Company supplied the boys with uniforms, 
and hired an army sergeant to teach sports, physical training, discipline, and football. 
In some cases the Company subsidized the government schools, as in Mohammareh 
where it paid 100 Touman to keep the local public school open. In Abadan the 
Company estimated that the Danesh Pahlavi School had the potential to double its 
enrollment to 300. It also funded the Stuart Memorial College in Isfahan for training 
more advanced technicians and engineers, by providing an initial investment of 
£3,000 and an annual subsidy of £500. Altogether the Company was investing £3600 
annually in education, but it was willing to substantially raise that figure to £10 
thousand/ year148. 
 
                                                           
146 James Bamberg, History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 94. 
147 Dobe, “A Long Slow Tutelage in Western  Ways of Work: Industrial Education and the 
Containement of Nationalism in Anglo-Iranian and ARAMCO, 1923-1963,” 37. 
148 “Dossier 5: Education in Khuzistan”, 15 February 1926, BP71183 




Photograph 15: Abadan Technical School 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
Photograph 16: Military Style Public School 
 
Source: BP Archives 
 
However, direct Company involvement in education was a double bind: It 
could potentially become a political minefield, as well as being a major public 
relations boon. The Iranian state from the onset had always objected to the 
Company’s hiring practices and demanded greater ‘Iranianization’ as an indication of 
the Company’s compliance with the terms of its contract. In 1909 the Kargozar in 




Mohammareh alarmed the Foreign Ministry by reporting about the hiring of Ottoman, 
Indian, and Chinese workers, and the building of a railroad, jetties, and a brick 
factoring in Abadan and Mohammareh (29 September). The Foreign Ministry (11 
October) asked the Ministry of General Welfare to post its own agent to the province 
and to demand APOC to appoint an attorney in Tehran to answer the governments’ 
concerns about hiring foreign nationals as well as “importing trucks, hot air balloons, 
building permanent structures in Ebbadan (Abadan) and Mohammareh”. It also asked 
Sadiq al-Saltaneh, the Iranian ambassador in London, to inquire APOC about these 
“violations of the contract” (14 November). The Ambassador replied that “ the hiring 
of Portuguese, Australian, and Ottomans by the Company was due to the shortage of 
equivalent Iranians, and the building of permanent structures was within the terms of 
the 60 year concession” (11 December)149. 
Nevertheless, the tone of suspicion and mistrust were set, and these diplomatic 
and bureaucratic frictions were to become a permanent feature of Company-state 
relations. The Kargozar expressed concern about the Company dealing in landed 
property with local magnates (June 1909). Clearly there was concern over territorial 
sovereignty and the powerlessness of the central government to do anything about it. 
“The British consul must be made aware that they need to obtain the approval 
of the Kargozari before they deal directly with the local population…This is a 
report on the vast authority that the British consulate is exercising in its 
dealings with [Khaz’al]… It is necessary to establish Kargozaris in Masjed-
Soleyman, Shushtar, and Abadan in order to control the Company’s behavior, 
especially regarding their actions in arresting, trying, punishing, and 
incarcerating Iranian nationals” (Winter and Spring 1911).  
 
The mounting concern about the loss of sovereignty extended to the 
Company’s labor practices and the intermediary role played by local magnates: 
“There are repeated meetings between the British consul and [Khaz’al], they are 
plotting against the Bakhtiary Tribe and Sheikh Farhan…We report on the excellent 
relations between the British consul and [Khaz’al] and their reliance on his support in 
hiring Iranian workers”.  
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The Foreign Ministry was incensed and reprimanded the Kargozar of 
Khuzestan for “remaining passive and failing to object to the punishment of Iranian 
workers by the Oil Company, and to the latter’s establishing of a criminal court” (20 
April 1911). The Majles inquired (14 November 1909) about the “building of 
railroads and steam engines on the Braim Island without government permission”. 
This was before any construction had actually begun in Abadan, and revealed the 
profound lack of knowledge in the capital about local geography and the actual 
goings on there. On the other hand, as we saw in chapters 2 and 3, the suspicion and 
paranoia seemed not to be unfounded. On 11 April 1911 APOC informed the 
government about its progress, and the appointment of Dr Young as intermediary for 
negotiations with the Bakhtiyaris. It also insisted on its right to continue to hire 
skilled foreign workers until Iranians had been adequately trained150.  
These encounters from the early days of the oil industry show the extent of the 
deep-seated suspicion by Tehran and its handful of local agents in Khuzestan about 
British and APOC intentions and activities in the south. The Oil Company had been 
acting like a sovereign state on Iranian territory, shielded by the British military 
might. At the same time, the central government had become acutely aware of its own 
impotence when it came to exercising any authority over the Company, the local 
magnates, or its own territory. Its near total lack of reliable and systematic first hand 
knowledge about the region itself, its populations, and the goings on there only 
highlighted this weakness and added to its suspicions.  
To Iranian nationalist and the central government the Iranianization of the 
Company’s workforce appeared as a tangible measure of exerting sovereignty over 
the country’s most important and modern industry. However, the education of the 
next generation of Iranians under the tutelage of the Oil Company, was a paradoxical 
issue, and highly sensitive for a central state intent on imposing universal education as 
an instrument of homogenizing national identity by instilling an official nationalism 
and patriotism among a highly diverse and heterogeneous population. 
APOC was aware of this sensitivity and thread carefully. H. Nichols, the 
Company Director, was conscious that when the Prime Minister Reza Khan had first 
visited Abadan in 1924, he had not seen a single Persian employed in the refinery151. 
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The building of schools and educational facilities in Masjed Soleyman were speeded 
up but there were disagreements over where to build and what the curriculum should 
be. The Company policymakers feared objections would be raised over religious 
grounds if the curriculum were not purely technical. Should Armenians be allowed to 
participate next to Muslims? Who should pay for the education of Iranian children? 
Should they build secondary schools as well? Ultimately, another question was also 
raised implicitly, but left hanging with some resignation and even resentment: Why 
should a private corporation get involved in public schooling of children and young 
adults in Iran?     
As the political situation in Khuzestan became more wrought with the intent 
of the central government to challenge autonomous local magnates once and for all 
becoming unmistakably clear, the Company became more aware of the risks that its 
problematic public image would pose, especially when it came to the hiring of Indians 
and other foreigners in lieu of Iranians. Director Nichols suggested the Company was 
not getting enough credit for hiring Iranian contract laborers, and proposed a number 
of book keeping modifications as a strategy of improving their public image. These 
included the issuing of monthly instead of quarterly personnel reports, changing the 
labor classifications to include the casually and precariously employed in the 
permanent roster of the Company, and classifying employees under general national 
categories – ‘Persians’, ‘Indians’, ‘Europeans’, ‘Others’.152  
The continued discontent of the central government was evident in Cadman’s 
meeting the following year with the cabinet, including the Prime Minister Forouqi,  
Finance Minister M.Q. Bayat, the American Financial Tsar Arthur Millspaugh, Davar 
the Minister of Public Works, along with Cadman, Jacks, and Dr Young, representing 
APOC. Davar set the tone for relations in the new era by stating that Iran’s two major 
grievances were the low royalty receipts, and that still after nearly twenty years of 
activity in Iran there were not enough Iranians employed in the oil industry. Forouqi 
the Premier also echoed the complaint about low royalties, and added that Iranians 
were not receiving enough benefits from their national oil resources, and the 
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Company was not devoting enough attention to the general welfare of the public in 
the areas it was operating. Cadman replied that APOC was not predatory and did take 
Iranianization very seriously. As to the other objections, he replied that D’Arcy had 
taken a risk over many years with his capital investment and the current Company’s 
success was a just reward for that early entrepreneurship as well as hard work. At 
present 80% of employees were Iranian, and there would be more in the future as the 
education program would start bearing results153. The dicussions proved inconclusive, 
as will be seen in the next chapter. Nevertheless, by 1926 it had become clear that 
Company commitment to developing the education program in general literacy, 
formal primary schools, and technical training were essential to the continued 
operations of APOC in Iran.    
However, there were disagreements as how to proceed. Resident Director in 
Tehran, T.L. Jacks, believed that “Opening up of primary schools at Fields is essential 
because the 140 children of local employees have no facilities… The sympathy and 
appreciation of the Persian Government must be insured. The Company should 
control [the educational] expenditures, but also adopt the [formal government] 
curriculum and give the direction to the Ministry of Education…The Government 
must bear the pressure…but we might as well perform our duty”. Dr Young 
maintained that the Company ought to build a secondary school in Ahvaz; however 
Arnold Wilson strongly disagreed, arguing that secondary schools were of little 
interest to the Company and they would only irritate the government154.  
As formal education was becoming a centerpiece of modern nation state 
building how schools were operated would become increasingly politicized. In the 
government run Danesh Pahlavi School in Ahvaz teachers expressed a desire to leave 
public service and get hired by APOC for better pay. Alarmed by the possible 
implications of how this might be misinterpreted by the Iranian governemnt, the 
Company refused and instead offered to subsidize the school with 100 Touman/month 
to maintain it as a public institution. Overtime the Company was approached by the 
government, or volunteered itself to subsidize teachers and schools, offering them 
company housing and access to some Company supplied amenities and services, as a 
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way of keeping good relations, but to also continue supporting the training of its 
future labor force and employees.     
However, the issue of educating the next generation of Iranians continued to 
remain politically sensitive. Arnold Wilson proved to be astute in his warning against 
Company commitment to secondary education, as the socialization of high school 
students and their curriculum would prove to be a highly sensitive issue for the state. 
Over the next 15 years the increasingly authoritarian central government would issue 
decrees and launch a series of cultural and educational programs intended to 
modernize the Iranian public through pedagogy, education, indoctrination, as well as 
through coercive cultural policies, such as the obligatory national dress code155. 
Formal school education was a central tenet of this program of authoritarian 
modernization. In 1930 the government established the first modern university in 
Tehran, and began sending students abroad to study engineering, natural sciences, 
medicine, modern agriculture, and law. There were nearly 150 schools in Tehran, 
with an enrollment of 19 thousand boys and 10 thousand girls. By 1936 there were 
nearly 260 thousand students across the country, studying in 5,340 schools and 
colleges. By 1939 the government formally Iranianized/nationalized all schools and 
closed down all foreign run educational establishments, with the intention of 
establishing a firm grip over the acculturation of all pupils and students156. However, 
APOC’s reluctant engagement with public education, technical training, organized 
sports and embodied disciplines, proved an important step toward gradually preparing 
the ground for more qualified skilled Iranians to join the ranks of Company 
employees, even if its resistance to open its more senior ranks to Iranians remained a 
major bone of contention until 1951 when Iranian oil was nationalized.          
 
Conclusion: A cautionary note on the paradoxical politics of ‘Iranianization’  
This chapter explored the context of the rise of the ‘social question’ in 
Khuzestan from the perspective of the Oil Company and the fledgling central 
government. This important paradigm shift did not take place in a vacuum, but was a 
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consequence of global, national, and local changes taking place in the interwar years 
(chapters 2,3,4). At the end of WWI the oil complex in Iran faced a turning point 
where much was at stake. First, there was the changing relation of Britain with the 
post coup d’état central government in Tehran. At the same time Britain and APOC 
were intent to ward off of powerful global competitors, especially the US, from 
encroaching on a strategic monopoly resource. Meanwhile, the considerable threats of 
labor radicalism and of socialist and nationalist anti imperialist sentiments to consider 
were being felt at all levels of the Company and the British government. More locally, 
there were even greater challenges to deal with, ranging from handling the 
consequences of the social and political vacuum left by the demise of APOC’s local 
allies the Bakhtyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al, to the strategic questions of where to 
locate the world’s largest refinery, how to maneuver the new regional geopolitics of a 
sensitive borderland, and above all, to manage the massive growth of boomtowns 
with teaming populations of destitute migrants deracinated from their social and 
economic lives and forming new place-based bonds of solidarity in the urban spaces 
created by oil, and making increasingly vocal demands for tangible improvements in 
their lives.  
The Oil Company’s poor public image and its growing need for a permanent, 
qualified, and docile workforce could no longer be ignored. The central government’s 
desire to impose its sovereignty on the national territory, populations, and resources 
was irreversible. The realization by the growing populations of the oil boomtowns 
that their lives were now permanently tied to the transformations imposed by the 
rising nation state, and oil capitalism generated a new range of social expectations 
that amounted to demands for what Lefebvre called “the right to the city”157. This 
chapter analyzed the dynamics behind the comprehensive re-organization of APOC in 
the post WWI decade, by investigating the dynamics behind the efforts by APOC to 
improve its public image, to reduce its reliance on foreign workers, to train and 
educate permanent Iranian workers and employees, as well as their children, and to 
provide social an leisure amenities that would make life and work more tolerable. 
These efforts were not made in isolation, but through the recurring encounters and 
constant frictions with other key social actors in the oil complex. The result was the 
transformation of what I have called ‘the oil habitus’ in Khuzestan. The next chapter 
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will analyze the dynamics of urban change in Abadan by investigating the 
contestations over making Abadan a ‘sanitary city’ through the adoption of public 
health measures and municipal reforms, and the resistance of the workers and the 




    
Chapter 6  
The Making of an Oil City (1924-1927) 
 
Abadan; Building a Sanitary City 
Reza Khan concluded his important military campaign against Skeikh Khaz’al 
in 1924 with a formal visit to Abadan and the Fields. During the visit APOC officials 
asked the Prime Minister for his assistance for the reconstruction of sections of 
Abadan. The Company pointed out a neighborhood adjacent to the refinery, called 
“Sheikh” as a desirable site for building a modern sanitary bazaar for the growing  
boomtown. They highlighted the accomplishments of the oil industry in turning “a 
desolate wasteland” into a hive of modern industry that was employing 25 thousand 
“native” workers1. The need for improving general sanitary conditions in the teaming 
boomtown was highlighted to the Prime Minister. The Company had recently asked 
Sheikh Khaz’al to sell them the land for the purpose, and he had agreed also to 
oversee the eviction of the current residents. Now Khaz’al was effectively out of the 
picture, and the Company was becoming concerned about dealing with the 
increasingly sensitive issue of property transfers in a manner that would avoid 
alienating the central government. The designated land was adjacent to the refinery 
and by then it had become a densely populated maze of shops, teahouses, hovels, and 
shanties where workers and migrants were renting rooms or had found a place to live.  
The issue seemed straightforward. Abadan was a filthy boomtown, 
overflowing with destitute migrants and devoid of the most elementary public 
infrastructure such as latrines, cleans water, safe and sufficient food supplies, and a 
minimum of decent housing for the general population. Two major epidemics of 
cholera and plague had devastated the twin towns of Mohammareh and Abadan, 
adjacent to each other across the river Karun, and other epidemics and diseases were 
also a recurring scourge in the region (more on this below). The closely packed 
population, and the dreadful living conditions as good as guaranteed the fast spread of 
contagious diseases, with potentially devastating effects on oil operations. Since the 
War, recurring famines had weakened the population considerably, as had endemic 
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poverty caused by the endless warfare and the demise of existing social structures. 
The massive movement of military recruits and soldiers from India, Europe, and the 
Persian Gulf region through Mesopotamia and Southern Iran had significantly 
increased the dangers of epidemics. Pilgrims on their road to Hajj, or to and from the 
holy cities of Iraq and Iran were another major carrier of epidemics, as were the 
practice of transferring corpses cross borders for burial in these holy cities2. Dr. A.R. 
Neligan, the influential British physician working at the legation in Tehran and 
serving on Iran’s Sanitary Council said of the situation in Abadan :  
“In the early days of the rush of native labor and shopkeepers to the island 
huts and bazaars sprang up on no definite plan on land outside the Company’s 
control, and on which it was not allowed to interfere. When, therefore, plague 
was imported into Mohammerah in 1923 and thence spread to Abadan there 
was a sharp epidemic. The Company has taken most energetic measures since 
then.”3 
   
Displacing the population did not appear to be a major obstacle. The residents 
of Abadan hardly had any political influence to oppose their eviction since, by and 
large, they were poor migrants from the Persian Gulf Coast, indigenous Arabs, or 
Bakhtiyaris and Arab tribesmen from the province; scarcely the political constituency 
of Reza Khan or the nationalist modernizers in Tehran who were intent on patching 
together a uniform and modern nation out of the heterogeneous population of the 
country. Furthermore, few issues were more commonly shared among Company 
officials and Iranian modernizers and politicians as public health and sanitation. The 
topic embodied everything that was positive about ‘modernity’ and progress, and 
highlighted all that was abhorrent in unscientific and superstitious ‘tradition’4. In 
addition, collaboration between Britain and Iran over sanitary policies and disease 
prevention had a long precedence from the early 19th Century5. Therefore, Reza  
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Photograph 17: Reza Khan Visits Abadan, with Officers and APOC Officials 
(1925) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
Photograph 18: APOC Bazaar in Masjed Soleyman (1925) 
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Khan’s approval of sanitary improvements in Abadan and Masjed Soleyman by the 
Company seemed a foregone conclusion and was readily given.  
However, the issue proved more controversial than appeared initially. First, 
urban residents put up significant resistance against their eviction and demanded 
better compensation than the Company was willing to provide. Without Sheikh 
Khaz’al there to crush the resistance, the army keeping its presence to a minimum 
near the Company areas (see chapters 2, 3, 5), and with the Company itself threading 
cautiously, the neighborhood defiance had a chance to solidify. Soon the intensifying 
urban resistance prompted local bureaucrats and politicians in Tehran to question the 
unanticipated political implications of the proposed spatial measures, to evaluate the 
emerging role of municipal policies, and to come to terms with facing an 
unprecedented political demand by a newly emerging social actor, the urban citizens 
of Abadan who were insisting on their “right to the city”. This collective urban 
resistance and negotiation by residents over their forced displacement and the terms 
and conditions of their reallocation became part of the repertoire of the ongoing urban 
politics in Abadan. The provision of sanitary urban infrastructure was accompanied 
by the re-engineering of the built environment of the city. This spatial re-organization 
gave rise to a number of fundamental questions: whom should it serve? (European 
expatriates? the more skilled echelons of Company employees? all Company 
employees? all urban residents?) How should it be paid for and managed? The 
question of who would be entitled to what amenities of urban living, and how the 
responsibly should be distributed and decisions made, became part of the abrasive 
dynamics of municipal and urban negotiations that lasted until mid century and the oil 
nationalization movement, and in the process shaped the built environment of 
Abadan. 
     
The pressing issue of the provision of social amenities, especially housing and 
public health measures, fit within a larger political picture: that of the effective 
disappearance from the scene of Sheikh Khaz’al and the political and social order he 
had embodied. The new political context meant that the Oil Company and the newly 
arriving central government bureaucrats faced a social and political vacuum which 
had to be filled by new institutions of municipal governance and social services that 
in most cases existed only in name and now had to be assembled from scratch.  While 
initially the topic of urban planning, municipal services, public health and the general 




improvement of sanitary conditions, appeared as straightforward and mutually 
acceptable to all parties as universally lauded progressive and scientific measures 
benefiting the general welfare, in practice they proved to be controversial and imbued 
with significant consequences for the changing relations of power in the oil complex. 
The reasons were simple: These measures directly affected the intimate everyday 
lives of residents and individuals, and imposed on them changes that were drastic, 
highly personal, and often very costly. They lay at the core of a new regime of 
disciplinary power that sought to re-engineer in minute details the spatial 
arrangements, collective lives, the bodily behaviors, and the mentalities of the 
inhabitants, in order to transform them into safe and productive extensions of the oil 
complex, as well as docile and contented subjects of a modern nation state. The rest 
of this chapter will investigate the micro history of the emergence of the social 
question in Abadan during the interwar period, and how the issues of public health 
and sanitation, urban planning, and property relations shaped the built environment of 
the city, the working population, and of the oil complex. 
 
It is safe to say that few issues concerned the APOC management as much as 
the sanitary conditions in Khuzestan. As we saw in the previous chapter, horrid living 
conditions, and the poor reputation of Iran, Khuzestan, and APOC were a major 
deterrence when it came to recruiting skilled employees and even unskilled workmen 
in the early post war era. The Oil Company took the matter very seriously and had 
invested heavily in the construction and maintenance of two major hospitals in 
Masjed Soleyman and Abadan, and 12 dispensaries throughout the Fields. The 
hospitals were the best equipped in the country, in particular the one in Masjed 
Soleyman managed by Dr M. Young, was reputed to be “better equipped than are the 
majority of hospitals of a like size in India”6. The 1924 APOC report to the Sanitary 
Council showed:  
“What a large amount of free medical treatment the company was giving to 
the natives, but also showed that a very excellent sanitary service had been 
built up…the fact which, however, impressed the Sanitary Council above all 
others, was that the Company in spending £40,000 in a single year on its 
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medical services, as opposed to its sanitary section) had considerably 
exceeded the total sanitary budget for the whole of Persia”7. 
  
The claim was no exaggeration. The Sanitary Council (Showra-ye Sehhi), 
initially a consultative body set up in 1874, was made into a permanent body in 1904, 
and had been assigned the task of overseeing medical affairs and public health in Iran. 
However, given its restricted financial and institutional resources, most of its reform 
policies were concentrated in Tehran, and its annual budget for the entire country was 
no more than £27,000, which was still a marked improvement from the annual £5,000 
it used to receive prior to WWI for combating epidemics8. Furthermore, given the 
state of the national economy, and the fact that the lion’s share of the state finances 
were regularly being funneled to the new army, even this meager annual budget was 
constantly in arrears for months. The Majles had tried to impose a tax on transport 
vehicles in order to fund vaccinations and public health measures, but the tax 
collection was a practical nightmare and did not produce many results9.  
The provision of medical services in Khuzestan was a pressing necessity, but 
also of great value in terms of public relations. From the 19th century western 
medicine had been a less politicized and more successful avenue of western 
penetration into Iran10. Aside from American missionaries, and highly influential 
court physicians like the famous Frenchman Dr Tholozan who had been instrumental 
in establishing a medical school in Tehran and organizing the Sanitary Council at the 
end of the 19th century as the first serious efforts toward western medical practices11, 
the British legations were also known to provide medical care and medicine to the 
public. The Ahvaz Legation, for example, on average treated a hundred patients per 
day12. The APOC physician, Dr M. Young in particular, had amassed great credit 
among Iranian politicians, Bakhtiyari Khans, his colleagues at APOC, as well as 
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among the general public, for the medical services he had been rendering as well as 
his outstanding administrative skills13. But, as we have seen (Chapters 3, 5) his 
medical position also had placed him in a situation of acting as a skilled political 
negotiator at the highest level, and one who had exercised great influence on behalf of 
Britain and APOC on the course of events in Khuzestan since 1910. However, the 
tremendous resources that were being spent on medical treatment were a significant 
burden for the ever financially prudent Company, and it was clear that the prevention 
of diseases and epidemics had to take priority as the means of reducing risks, as well 
as cutting costs.  
 
The fear of disease and contamination was one of the major concerns deterring 
European recruits from accepting employment in Khuzestan in the post war period 
(Chapter 5). The apprehension was well grounded. The 1918 Spanish Flue pandemic 
had cut a global swath of death14, and southern Iran had been badly affected. In Fars, 
Percy Sykes estimated that a third of the population of the Qashqai pastoralists 
perished in 1918, as did a tenth of the urban population of Shiraz15. Afkhami, who has 
studied the trajectory of the pandemic, estimated that up to 22 percent of the total 
population of the country perished by 192016. The deadly effect of the pandemic was 
exacerbated by the endemic warfare of marauding armies and warlords (chapters 2, 
5), famine, drought, and debilitating poverty especially in the west and the south of 
the country. Nor had British troops been spared (especially the Indian infantries)17. In 
southern Iran, especially, the overall casualties were devastating; in Mohammareh 
alone 6,000 had been afflicted out of an estimated population of 20 thousand, with 
240 officially recorded deaths18. 
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If the influenza pandemic had been a global phenomenon, there were other 
widespread maladies in Iran that made living conditions in a congested place like 
Abadan equally hazardous. Although plague rarely originated in Iran and was often 
brought in from India and Mesopotamian through the ports of the Persian Gulf, Shatt 
al-Arab, and the long border with Ottoman Mesopotamia (Iraq), nevertheless it had 
deadly effects when it struck. From the 19th century seven major deadly plague 
pandemics had struck Iran19 with devastating results. Since the outbreak of WWI 
plague had been recurring yet again in southern Khuzestan, erupting into a 
particularly bad outbreak during 1923-1924, when it afflicted approximately 1000 
reported cases in Abadan and Mohammareh, with more than half fatalities20. 
Discussing the period of 1914-1924, Dr Neligan, the British representative on Iran’s 
Sanitary Council and physician to the British Legation, reported:  
“…In spite of the regular appearance of plague on her frontiers the name of 
only one place in Persia recurs with any frequency (Mohammerah)…It used to 
be said that plague was always imported from Basra only 25 miles higher up 
the river Shatt al Arab, with communications by land as well as by water. It 
has been suggested that plague by now is endemic in Mohammerah town, but 
the facts are, on the whole, against this supposition. Abadan town, on the 
island of that name, six miles down the stream from Mohammerah, has, 
however, come to cause anxiety. The name appears in the years 1923 and 
1924 only, and yet some 700 cases have occurred there. The explanation is 
that between 1909 and 1912 the APOC set up a refinery on the island, and 
that, instead of a few huts, there is now a considerable town and several 
villages, with a total population of some 50,000 souls [my italics]”.21 
 
Persian Gulf and the Iraqi border were particularly vulnerable areas, more so 
than the inland plateau that was hard to reach over the Zagros Mountains. Percy 
Loraine, the Minister in Tehran reported: “next to the littoral of the Gulf, the Perso-
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Iraqi frontier is the greatest cause of anxiety to the Persian authorities”22. Indeed, since 
the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, with its fast and direct route linking the Indian 
Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, “the health of the Persian Gulf had 
become a matter of concern to the shipping of the world”23. Britain controlled most of 
Iran’s border quarantine stations along the Gulf and the Iraqi borders until 1927, when 
the notion of British and Indian officers regulating and controlling the bodies of 
Iranians on the national borders became intolerable to nationalists24. In fact, the border 
stations’ quarantine system were the first instances of the kind of racial segregation 
that began to color preventive practices and create great resentment at the visible 
inequality.  Floor’s description of the British controlled quarantines stations on the 
Gulf and Khuzestan makes clear that these not always operated rigorously, and 
sometimes they were highly discriminatory, letting Europeans pass without serious 
inspection while interring Asians, including Iranians, in a ‘purgatory’ state, under 
poor conditions, for extended periods, which caused great resentment among the 
travelers25. The failure of the British run quarantine system in the south to prevent the 
devastating plague and cholera epidemics of 1923-1924 contributed to the resentment. 
The 1923 Annual Report of the British Minister in Tehran was as always defensive in 
tone, but could not fully justify why the epidemics had come from a British colony, 
via ships flying the British flag or regulated by the Government of India, to territories 
under the effective command of the British military (Khuzestan and Iraq), through 
British operated quarantine systems.  
“The [quarantine] service has continued to perform its important duties in its 
quietly efficient way, and has successfully prevented the introduction of 
plague and cholera, except at Mohammerah, where – it must be understood – 
the quarantine officer is responsible for the Port only. A good deal of criticism 
has, however, been leveled at our administration, most of it uninformed…The 
local Kargozars apparently under orders from Tehran, have begun to report on 
sanitary matters, and indeed criticize medical officers. There have been 
difficulties too in the way of getting the Persian authorities to pay their share 
of the expenses…On the whole, the impression left by the events of the past 
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two years [1921-1923] is that of a purposeful mobilization for an attack on the 
service, and its replacement by a Persian service”26. 
 
There were other equally deadly contagious diseases that plagued Iran. 
Cholera was “a much more anxious problem for Persia than the plague”, especially in 
port cities like Abadan and Mohammareh27. The particularly deadly epidemics of 
1850 and 1852 devastated Mohammareh28. Earlier in 1822 and 1833 Dezful had been 
equally devastated by cholera and the plague29. These towns were again hit by 
successive epidemics over the course of the 19th century.  Mohammareh was again 
struck hard by a major cholera epidemic in 1910-1911, just as the oil industry was 
getting off the ground. Initially 23 cases of cholera were detected in Mohammareh in 
December 1910; by the following year this had turned into a severe epidemic, killing 
several Europeans as well as uncounted indigenous people.30 This was in spite of the 
efforts of Arnold Wilson, acting consul in Mohammareh at the time, whose “main 
concern was to ensure it did not spread to Ahvaz or get among the Company’s 
imported labor at Abadan”31. The town was hit by another wave of cholera in 1917, 
but the 1923 epidemic was on another scale, especially as it was accompanied by the 
killer plague (see above). It came, as usual, via ships from India:  
“Cholera broke out at Abadan on the 3rd of August. At Basra on the 6th of 
August, and at Mohammerah on the 21st... The epidemic at Abadan quickly 
assumed big proportions. There were, for instance, 553 cases with 528 deaths 
between the 10th-16th August. The Oil Company and the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah did all that was possible to prevent the epidemic extending. 
From Basra, however it spread up the Tigris and reached Baghdad at the end 
of August.”32 
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The previous month the plague had already affected 481 people, killing 409 in 
Abadan33; highlighting the critical state of the sanitary situation there:  
“The question of Abadan is a new and serious one. It appears that there is 
overcrowding in the considerable native town which has sprung up, and that 
sanitation is indifferent. The Oil Company’s representatives were closely 
questioned as to the measures adopted when the epidemics broke out, and 
were able to report favorably. The town, however, and Iraq generally, are a 
menace to Persia.”34 
 
Cholera and the plague recurred in Abadan and Khorramshahr over the 
following years prior to WW2, in 1927, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1939; but by then more 
rigorous preventive measures were being put in place and the outbreaks although 
worrisome and deadly, were not causing as many fatalities35. 
Malaria was “the chief cause of death and ill health in Persia”36, infecting 
nearly all the rural population according to most contemporary reports37. Neligan 
believed it not to be very prevalent in Abadan, Khorramshahr, or Ahvaz; but surveys 
conducted in 1925 revealed that both Khuzestan and the northern provinces of 
Azarbaijan and Gilan were hyper endemic foci for malaria38. Smallpox, typhus, 
typhoid, anemia, tuberculosis, were some of the other rampant diseases prevalent at 
the time. Skin diseases, trachoma, and other afflictions caused by contamination and 
poor hygiene were widespread, and afflicted some of the more established historical 
towns in Khuzestan, especially Shushtar and Dezful39. According to one estimate, 
between 20 to 40 percent of the country’s urban population in 1925 suffered from 
some form of venereal diseases40. 
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In all these cases the main culprit in the tremendous vulnerability to epidemics 
and diseases was poverty and political disarray; and not an inherent cultural defect or 
racial deficiency, as many European observers maintained at the time. The answer 
must be sought in the turbulent political and economic history of Iran since the 17th 
century, riddled with recurring drought and famine, political insecurity, endemic 
poverty and destitution, inept and inadequate political leaders, and deficient 
knowledge of preventive hygienic and medical practices, which disproportionally 
affected the working population and the poor. The appalling state of the general 
standards of hygiene and public health, and the decrepit and undeveloped social 
infrastructure of waste treatment, food safety standards, decent housing, and basic 
health care were a result of this poverty and insecurity, not the cause of it.  
 
Contagions and Sanitary Practices in Iran: 
In chapter 4 we discussed the history of sanitary public health reforms and the 
innovations in municipal policies and urban practices that were formulated by a range 
of technical experts in response to the fears of contagion and disease in the colonies 
and Europe from mid 19th century. In particular, chapter 4 explained how the 
conceptualization of spatial strategies of defense against contagion overlapped with 
class and racial exercises of hierarchic power, and led to the scientific justifications 
for the implementation of spatial segregation in cities on scientific and sanitary 
grounds. Post war urban developments in Abadan were very much part of this crossed 
history of social reformist practices, as we shall discuss in this and the following 
section.  
The Sanitary Idea was not new to Iran. In fact, social reformers and some 
among the political elites had conceptualized modernity and national progress as 
intimately connected to sanitary improvement and the adoption of modern European 
medicine since the middle of the 19th century41. Dar al-Fonun (the Polythechnic), the 
first modern western style school established in 1851 by Amir Kabir, the modernizing 
Vazir, included a curriculum of medical instruction. Amir Afkhami argues that from 
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mid 19th century the growing Iranian nationalism was intertwined with a sense of 
shame about the state of the population’s health and of government responsibility to 
improve the situation42. As an indication of this trend he cites the formation of a series 
of administrative boards and consultative bodies that did little more than hold 
meetings for a number of years, but eventually culminated with the establishment of 
the permanent Sanitary Council (Showra-ye Sehhiyeh) in 1904 on the eve of the 
Constitutional Revolution. Reflecting underlying social concerns the Sanitary Council 
began to take a number of public health measures, such as vaccination against 
smallpox in some cities, and setting up more quarantine stations on national borders. 
However, these efforts remained limited amidst the chronic economic and political 
crises of the first two decades of the 20th century (chapter 2). Nevertheless, the 
sanitary idea played a prominent role in shaping the growing secular middle class 
reformist culture, especially the constructivist Lamarckian notions that associated 
progress with the improvement of the quality of the population43. For these reformers 
the population was the source of national power, on which depended the progress of 
the nation. A diseased, impoverished, and uneducated population was unable to work 
and to be productive, making it into an impediment to progress44.  
For Iranian reformers and modernizers, steeped in this Lamarckian discourse 
of biopower, there was little redemption in the existing patterns of urban life or the 
medical “quackery” of traditional healers. By and large they agreed with the drastic 
measures in municipal renovation and coercive public health measures that the state 
began to adopt under Reza Shah. Like many of their western counterparts, 
modernizing Iranian reformers embraced the notion of trusteeship, which provided 
them with positions of authority, as well as a market position, and allowed them to 
implement often-aggressive administrative measures to reform social conditions 
through correct education and the provision of modern sanitary infrastructure.  
 
Sanitation, Segregation, and the Politics of Property in Abadan:   
In February 1926 APOC medical director Dr. M. Young provided an 
assessment of the sanitary challenges facing the urban situation in Abadan: 
                                                           
42 Amir Arsalan Afkhami, “Iran in the Age of Epidemics. Nationalism and the Struggle for Public 
Health: 1889--1926,” PhD Dissertation, Yale University (2003). 
43 Schayegh, “Hygiene, Eugenics, Genetics.” 
44 Ibid. See chapter 4 for the emergence of parallel and similar ideas in Britain about poverty and the 
poor quality of military recruits following the Boer War. 




“Even with the construction of our new lines [company housing for Indian 
skilled laborers] and with such modern sanitary measures as we may have 
taken, the position from the point of view of the outbreak and spread of 
disease cannot be effectively remedied unless we have the complete 
cooperation of the Persian authorities in Abadan Town…We must turn to the 
Municipality, which the Persian authorities are most anxious to develop…At 
the moment, the Municipality consists of individuals with no knowledge or 
experience of the proper conduct of municipal affairs, and with no financial 
means to support the municipality. I can see no good result from their work 
unless assisted by us with definite control behind the scenes, and also with 
funds. We cannot assume open control of municipal work as it is invariably 
misinterpreted in Tehran as interference in their internal affairs. The fact 
remains however, that by putting the Municipality here on its feet, we would 
provide the essential stimulus, and so hope in time to withdraw to our correct 
capacity of advisers and nothing else”45.  
 
 The awareness that the oil company by itself was incapable of implementing 
effective sanitary measures and create a safe city had become evident, and so had the 
necessity of threading cautiously in dealing with the boundaries of sovereignty 
between the Iranian government institutions and the Company. The ‘target’ of 
concern was the “native town” of Abadan, the boomtown that had grown quickly to 
an estimated population of 40-60 thousand. The military language and imagery (as 
will become evident) often used in describing sanitary and municipal policies 
reflected the attitudes of both state institutions as well as the Oil Company. Given that 
the built environment of oil in Abadan and the Fields was already highly segregated 
and was on its way to becoming more so, the belligerent language simply reflected 
the militarized geography of oil that was taking shape in Abadan and throughout 
Khuzestan.  
In 1909 APOC had leased the refinery land as well as the adjacent village of 
Braim from Sheikh Khaz’al, for £1/jerib (Chapter3). In 1914 they leased more land 
for the same rental46. Braim, initially known as “Bungalow Area”, was upwind from 
                                                           
45 Extract from Dr Young, “Memorandum”, 16 February 1926, Pp.58-59, BP 71138  
46 “Percy Cox to A.T.Wilson” 1 September 1918, BP 68779 




the refinery. The local villagers were evicted, and initially a simple structure was 
erected made of tin to house the handful of Europeans preparing the ground for the 
refinery and shipping docks. Soon after this structure was replaced by a brick 
bungalow (later named No.1 Bungalow). As the refinery came on line during WWI 
three other bungalows were added. The imported skilled laborers, mostly from 
Rangoon and India, lived and slept in tents and mat houses47. By the end of WWI 
most of Braim had become an exclusive expatriate community, separated from the 
indigenous population by the vast refinery to the south, the Shatt al-Arab River to the 
west, and stretches of land increasingly evacuated of population on its east flank. The 
European village also had an exclusive access road that was used during the 1929 
labor strike to secretly transport the arrested labor strikers out of the island:  
“ The English had a special road called the “Braim Road”. Nobody was 
allowed to use it except the English and those who worked for them and they 
trusted. A large number of soldiers and policemen who had entered the island 
[to crush the labor strike] used this road to transport the prisoners in the 
middle of the night to Mohammareh and then onto Ahvaz”48.  
  
By the end of the war the Company constructed some housing for its Indian 
skilled workers in equally segregated areas to the east of the refinery, that came to be 
known as Sikh Lane and Indian Quarters (see Figure 1). The Company also had 
entered negotiations with Khaz’al in 1918 to take hold of a village called Bawarda, 
situated on the riverfront49. However, there had been difficulties in negotiations since 
suddenly land, which previously was a collective resource but not an exchange value 
with a market price, had now become a scarce commodity with a rapidly rising price, 
although the Company refused to see it that way. Percy Cox, the British Resident in 
the Persian Gulf, reacted to this marketization of land in 1918:  
“Thanks for letting me now about the purchase price of land on the right bank 
of the river, at £100 - £150 per acre. This is too much compared to the lease 
we already have from the Sheikh of Mohammareh on Abadan [refinery land], 
                                                           
47 George Thompson, “Abadan in its early days”, Naft 7:4 (July 1931),14-18 
48 Yusof Eftekhari, Khaterat-e Dowran-e Separi Shodeh, ed. Kaveh Bayat and Majid Tafreshi (Tehran: 
Ferdows Publishers, 1991), 141. 
49 “The land we wish to take up is situated a little below a place called ‘Barwairda’; one square mile; to 
set up a jetty and extension to lead dangerous oil away from the refinery”. A.T.Wilson to Percy Cox, 2 
June 1918, BP 68779 




which is £1 per Jerib (1909 and 1914 agreements). In 1914 we got additional 
land for the same rental”50.  
 
Map 1 Abadan in 1925 
 
Source: British Library; Modifications in Atabaki (2014)  
 
This was disingenuous since Cox was well aware, as were other political 
officers, APOC managers, and local people, that since 1908 and the advent of oil 
capitalism land in all the oil areas of Khuzestan had become a scarce commodity with 
its monetary value rising exponentially. When Arnold Wilson was presented in 1911 
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with a 4 volume printed version of the Intelligence Reports that he had collected and 
authored, titled “SW Persia”51 he felt that the information had already been outdated:  
“What was said to me then [by local Khuzestanis] as to the ownership and 
value of land and crops is more likely to be true than what is said now, when 
the advent of the [Oil] Company has trebled and quadrupled prices.”52 
 
In fact the Company was actively trying to designate and quickly take hold of 
all the land it wanted to acquire for its operations, in Abadan as well as in the Fields. 
Up to this point its agreements had been struck with the local magnates. The 
Company had established contracts with the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al 
according to the terms of concession, which stated that uncultivated land should be 
given to APOC for free, and cultivate land sold at local prices. But, how these vague 
categories of property and land-use were to be applied to pastoral territories that were 
used seasonally, to populated riverside areas where land was of shifting and mixed 
use, or to dry-land areas left fallow for long periods or used as collective source of 
fodder and brush fuel, remained highly contested. Access to these lands was exercised 
through customary rights, and their enclosure was putting strain on local communities 
and creating anger and resistance53. Furthermore, once land had become commodified 
following the emergence of the oil industry and the urbanization that had followed in 
its wake, the notion of a fixed price for vacant land had become a fiction, especially in 
areas where massive numbers of migrants had settled, hoping to enter the wage labor 
market, and having to pay for housing, food, and other necessities.  
In 1926 Arnold Wilson reported, “To date 20 square miles have been 
purchased [in Masjed Soleyman] for the period of concession at £48 thousand, and a 
further 4 square miles at £14,500 are shortly to be bought”54. The price of 
‘uncultivated land’ in ‘unpopulated’ Bakhtiyari country had increased from £2,400 to 
£3,625, or by 66 percent. However, by 1926 the issue of the Company purchase of 
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land had become highly contentious as both the central government was claiming 
ownership of all land, and rank and file Bakhtiyaris and local Arabs farmers and 
tribesmen in Abadan were angered at being cheated out of their collective access to 
their territory and vital resources (chapters 3, 7). 
As the Company was carving out its exclusive enclaves on the island, the 
teaming areas variably called “Abadan Town”, the “Traditional Village”, or “Shahr” 
by the locals, stayed beyond the control of both the Company and the central 
government, especially now that the political order embodied in Sheikh Khaz’al had 
disappeared from the scene. The prospective purchase of Bawarda, and the planned 
eviction of the so-called “Sheikh Village” on the immediate southern border of the 
refinery became focal points of an urban struggle that was fought in the name of 
sanitation by the Company, and the “right to the city”55 by the heterogeneous 
population of the city. 
By all counts the living conditions of the population of migrants, oil workers, 
casual laborers of various kind, and the indigenous population in the “Shahr” were 
appalling. There are virtually no detailed personal or ethnographic accounts of the 
period that I am aware of, with the noted exception of the memoirs of the socialist 
labor activist, Yousef Eftekhari, orally collected (in 1988) by Kaveh Bayat and Majid 
Tafreshi. Eftekhari had gone to Abadan in 1927 in order to organize and unionize oil 
workers, and stayed there until he was exiled in 1929, after having organized and led 
the oil workers’ strike. Originally from Azarbaijan, Eftekhari was trained as a 
professional labor organizer in the Soviet Union. He made his way with considerable 
difficulty to Abadan in 1927, via Boushehr and a sea voyage to Mohammareh. He 
managed to visit Aghajari, and eventually found work in the Oil Company’s 
Technical Workshop in Abadan (chapter 5). Initially he helped organize a short-lived 
demand by Iranian workers to establish their own sports club, which they had named 
“Kaveh Club”, but the Company was alarmed and shut it down after a few weeks with 
the help of the police56. By 1929 Eftekhari had mobilized nearly 50 workers to form 
the nucleus of an organized trade union57. Their call for a strike was met with 
widespread support in 1929, not only by oil workers, but also by their wives, as well 
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as a wide array of townspeople from Abadan and Mohammareh, turning the initial 
labor action into a more widely based urban protest movement58. Eftekhari’s sketchy 
and brief descriptions of life in Abadan are one of the few documents that provide a 
first hand voice from the perspective of a migrant worker (and a political activist and 
professional union organizer) to the refinery city, and of the living conditions under 
the Oil Company rule:  
“The English had their exclusive neighborhood in Abadan, called Braim, 
where nobody was allowed to enter. If an Englishman married an Iranian 
woman he would be shunned and expelled from there. Truly they had built a 
paradise in the middle of that island where everything was available to them – 
swimming pool, clubs, and beautiful houses. There was another neighborhood 
called Bawarda, where Arabs lived, but the English wanted to grab it out of 
their hands. Most Arab dwellings were made of reeds; and the English set 
them on fire on numerous occasions, and forbade people from rebuilding or 
repairing what they had destroyed.  There was another neighborhood called 
Ahmadabad…it was the filthiest place I have seen in my life. There weren’t 
even any toilets and people just squatted next to the water [ditches]. Abadan 
was generally filthy, but they [?] had dug some ditches that would wash away 
the filth with the [river] tide. Ahmadabad did not even have these ditches… 
nor did it have any drinking water. Epidemics usually started there… Other 
workers had made temporary shelters near the Shatt al-Arab…the most 
miserable workers in the world were those working for APOC. They never 
had enough food and clothing, or decent shelter. Some simply lived their bitter 
lives in open air under palm trees; others had made temporary shelters out of 
reeds, where in each room several households lived together…The Oil 
Company had constructed a few, no more than 150, workers housing for those 
with more experience and skills. In those each married family had two rooms, 
while single workers lived 6 to one room.59 
 
Abadan had become a highly segregated town by the middle of the decade, 
and Company officials intended to consolidate that segregation based on sanitary 
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principles, with the help of Iranian government institutions that they hoped to control 
discreetly. Arnold Wilson, APOC Resident Director in Mohammareh, supported Dr. 
Young’s plans by highlighting the indigenous population as the culprit for the 
abysmal sanitary situation: “As Dr Young points out, the crux of the problem in the 
control of epidemic disease in Abadan lies, now that our own house has been put in 
order, in the Persian Town itself”. However, the awareness that no degree of racial 
spatial segregation could avert the dangers of contagion was now being admitted: 
“The areas controlled by the Company and the Persian Government are so 
dependent upon each other that the isolation of one from the other is an 
impossibility. We are thus faced with the necessity if we are to protect 
ourselves and if we are to reap the benefits of improved housing and 
sanitation…of compelling the local Persian authority to take definite steps to 
organize a municipality capable of dealing efficiently with public health”60. 
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Wilson corresponded with Harold Homan, an American assistant to 
Millspaugh, who was acting as Provincial Director of Finance for Khuzestan, to offer 
Company financial assistance of an annual £2,500 for shoring up a functioning 
municipality in Abadan61. It was clear from the proposal of financial and practical 
assistance that it was conditional, and the Company expected to have an active say so 
in setting the parameters of urban change in the city. Foremost in their list of 
conditions was for the Government to confirm the Company’s acquisition of a 
significant neighborhood adjacent to the refinery for building a modern bazaar, as 
well as its extensive plans to take over significant new parcels of land on the Island 
for developing exclusive Company areas. 
Since the virulent epidemic outbreaks of 1923 the Company had resolved to 
confront the sanitary situation head on. It had brought in professional rat catchers 
from India, who managed to destroy 12,000 rats between April and July 1924. It 
began building brick and steel huts for its “10,000 permanent workers”62 (mostly 
skilled Indians) in India Lane and Sikh Lane, isolated well away from “the native 
Town”. The challenging problem of drainage in the waterlogged island, where subsoil 
water stood at 2 feet below surface began to be addressed by pumps. A piped water 
supply was being completed for the new Indian workers’ quarters from the river 
Bahmanshir, 6 kms away. The water was transported to a large reservoir to be treated 
chemically and piped to standalone pumps in “the [Indian] workers’ village”, or the 
area that became known as the “Indian Quarter”. “The Company is also planning a 
site for a new town, and the inhabitants of the old are being encouraged to remove to 
it. A piped water supply has been led to this site also. Everything possible is, 
therefore, being done to keep out cholera as well as plague”63. Garbage disposal was 
another area rigorously attended to, “with large number of sweepers temporarily 
employed to keep Company areas well swept”. In Masjed Soleyman,  
“Owing to the strictest sanitary discipline and constant supervision and 
inspection by trained sanitary squads, both European and Persian, the 
incidence of disease has been small. One of the reasons for this is the 
abundance of incinerators for destroying garbage and refuse. Scattered all over 
the fields one finds lengths of 17 inch piping, into one of which the refuse is 
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tipped, and at the other a very large jet of gas… Squads are employed in 
nothing else but this, and the incinerators are constantly at work, complete 
destruction of rubbish taking about 15 minutes” 64.  
 
However, few of these measures, publicized by Dr Neligan in the medical 
journal The Lancet, or Squadron Leader Cooper at the Royal Asiatic Society, had 
been actually aimed at improving conditions in the so-called “Persian Village” in 
Abadan, “… aside from the erection of 7 water points”. The purified piped water 
supply was for the Braim, the hospital, and the segregated living quarters of clerks, 
shift engineers, artisans, and Chittagonians (skilled Indian workers from Burma)65.  
The same held true for the critically important sewage system. In Braim “all 
programmed sewers are working…each bungalow has a septic tank. Six water flush 
native latrines will be built in the area”. A rigorous plan was in place for “the new 
village” being erected for skilled workers to “convert all latrines to water flush 
system. Collecting tanks have been constructed, and the outlet pipes laid, and pumps 
arranged. The system needs electricity to start. As this is a matter of urgency the 
electrical department have arranged to give a temporary line within the next month”66. 
The fact that the water flush sewage system carried the untreated filth to the river 
where the rest of the Island, as well as the indigenous population downstream along 
the delta relied on the river for irrigation and drinking water was not considered 
relevant. 
The Company was not unaware that ignoring the indigenous city was highly 
risky and planned to add more water points and piping, and to build a bridge over the 
creek that separated the Shahr from the refinery to facilitate access for workers 
coming to work at the refinery. However, the Company’s plan also involved major 
projects to clear out the population from several strategic areas in order to remake a 
cordon sanitaire that could be more easily monitored and controlled: “Other 1926-
1927 proposals include…building a roadway through the center of one of the most 
unsanitary areas…connecting the proposed bazaar site to the proposed customs 
site”67. 
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Oil capitalism had created a new built environment in Khuzestan for the 
accumulation of capital in oil, by the dispossession of the local agrarian and tribal 
societies. This process had transformed the geography and social lives of the local 
population and created nightmarish urban landscapes of destitution, immense 
inequality, and industrial and human filth. Company officials were blaming the 
victims for the unhygienic conditions that had accompanied this new political 
economy, and constantly reminded themselves and anyone who cared to listen of the 
civilizing work they were undertaking: “… it [should be] realized that 10,000 natives 
are employed in the fields alone, and that not one of these has even an elementary 
knowledge of the principles of sanitation, the danger from infections and contagious 
diseases is very great”68. 
 
Photograph 20: Abadan - Market in Ahmadabad (1920s) 
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
As we have discussed (chapter 4, previous sections of this chapter), the 
sanitary concerns over public hygiene and urban congestion had come to pre-occupy 
professional middle classes, corporate employers, colonial officials, and policymakers 
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in the interwar era. In Britain, the pressure of mass politics and working class 
mobilization were leading to negotiations over the establishment of a range of welfare 
institutions and municipal improvements.  In the colonies like India or large parts of 
Africa, the sanitary measures being adopted had a more explicitly coercive and racist 
slant (chapter 4). Reflecting on the draconian 1920 anti-vagrancy laws aimed at 
controlling the effects of sanitary conditions and labor radicalism in Nairobi, 
Frederick Cooper remarks:  
“In trying to build cities on the basis of cheap migrant labor states have had to 
face the different questions of what kind of urban order they were likely to 
create. They built mining and railroad cities, but not as they would have liked. 
The society that resulted was not a social category known as ‘urban’…having 
helped build a society in which Africans might choose to live in an outhouse 
or a shed, the colonial state forbade them to do so”69.  
 
In a non-colonial and yet highly dependent context like southern Iran, where 
APOC was a powerful private corporation faced with a new central government that 
was increasingly and jealously laying claim to its sovereignty over territory and the 
population, the biopolitical challenge of making a sanitary city had to be negotiated in 
a different manner, both with the state as well as with the indigenous population. For 
the local population the new and unfamiliar categories such as ‘garbage’ and ‘sewage’ 
were the byproducts of the alien industrial landscape70; paying for access to filtered 
and chemically treated piped water was an amenity well beyond their means or 
capabilities; and observing the unfamiliar codes of urban sanitation was a novel 
practice that would have been more readily embraced had it not been imposed as 
obnoxiously and intrusively by a highly disruptive oil capitalism, or an authoritarian 
central government. Consequently, the draconian proposals of urban sanitization that 
involved massive displacements for the population and coercive attempts to regulate 
their bodies and their everyday lives were received with considerable skepticism and 
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resistance, since they felt to be unjustly the targets and victims, and not the 
beneficiaries, of these grand schemes.   
Again, Eftekhari’s recollections are disturbing, as they reveal the sense of 
daily humiliation experienced by the population in their interactions with Company 
officials or abusive government bureaucrats. What constituted “garbage” from a 
Company perspective was often a vital “resource” in the lives of destitute migrants. 
The evidence of poverty was a reminder for the expatriates of their superiority, and 
affirmed their “civilizing mission”, but it only enhanced the resentment of the 
residents who felt humiliated by their objectification: 
“The scenes of working women using the oil sludge were heart-breaking. 
Workers’ wives would fill oil drums with that black liquid and carry it on their 
heads to use as cooking fuel for baking bread and filling the bellies of their 
naked kids living in those reed shacks. These women wore a long piece of 
ragged fabric that only partially managed to cover their bodies. The black 
sludge they carried on their heads would slosh all over their faces and bodies. 
The English and their well-dressed wives would stop these women, who were 
the real owners of the oil wealth, in order to photograph their misery… These 
were humiliating photographs of skeletal and emaciated women and workers. 
Anyone would be outraged, but unfortunately these scenes were the source of 
amusement for the English. For the workers, these humiliations were harder to 
tolerate than their nakedness, hunger, and the wretchedness of their lives; it 
made them resentful and furious, and mobilized them against the Company”71.      
 
The Company Director T.L. Jacks reported to his Chairman John Cadman, 
expressing his concerns: 
“We have demolished the old village and built a new one for Company staff 
under controlled conditions. The value of this will be lost unless similar 
control is imposed in the Abadan Township proper. Now the Municipality is 
inadequate, with no Government of Iran budget for its ‘correct maintenace’, 
[creating]… the danger of epidemics spreading throughout the Company 
controlled areas, which is a grave menace to the Company’s operations”72. 
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Jacks was referring to company housing built for artisans and clerks (Indians 
and Europeans). These plans were costly and well behind schedule. The Company 
had planned to complete 95 buildings for artisans to accommodate nearly 2,700 men 
(including 380 married couples), but only 89 had been completed (costing £51 per 
person). Housing for clerks was even more costly, with only half of the 67 buildings 
planned for nearly 500 men completed, at £277 per head. The urban infrastructure for 
these projects was estimated to be 20 percent of the overall staggering anticipated cost 
of £177,00073. 
The cooperation of the Iranian municipality and government institutions had 
become crucial for the whole scheme to proceed, and the Company was offering to 
finance and assist the bureaucracy to accelerate the process. However, this offer of 
assistance was being questioned within the Company and, were it to be followed 
through, it could become a double edged sword, as it would delegate the power over 
the chaotic and abysmal urban situation to the municipality, and run the risk of it 
failing to cope with the considerable challenges involved. In the margins of the 
minutes of the meeting between Jacks, Cadman, and other senior APOC managers the 
following hesitations and conditions are jotted down in handwriting: 
“- Do we give active and financial aid to municipality?  
- Unemployment and starvation is the responsibility of the local municipality, 
who should act with our guidance and financial support 
- Cadman: Financial aid should be linked to Government of Iran contributions 
“so long as it functions in a proper manner” 
- Need for formal arrangement with Ministry of Interior detailing procedures, 
detailed budget.  
- Involve the Governor, keep low profile. Have issues raised by local 
authorities and not the Company”74. 
 
 To provide a perspective on the situation, while the Company was planning to 
allocate  £177,000 for housing 3,200 employees, it was offering £2,500 to the 
municipality to deal with the nearly insurmountable issues facing a boomtown of 
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more than 50,000 destitute migrants and local people, in the aftermath of devastating 
epidemics and famine. The government budget at the time, it will be recalled from 
chapter 2, was under severe stress, much of it allocated to the military or beholden to 
debt repayments. Although oil royalties had increased in 1924-1925, other major 
crises had put a severe strain on the budget. The devastating famine of 1925 had 
incurred heavy debts from emergency loans; the military operations against Sheikh 
Khaz’al, and the subsequent political disturbances over the change of dynasty had left 
little room for financial maneuver. The share of the Ministry of Interior from the 
budget was a paltry 6 percent of the government expenditures75, and little of it trickled 
its way to areas such as Abadan or Masjed Soleyman that were considered frontier 
regions, and under the tutelage of the Oil Company. The limited municipal budget, at 
the time, was supplemented by provincial taxe revenues from state land (khalesehjat), 
a portion of the provincial customs revenues, and a consumption tax on alcohol. 
Given the intense disputes over land between the central government and local 
magnates, and the generally unstable situation in the province that adversely affected 
agricultural production, these were hardly secure or sufficient sources of revenue for 
the scale of work that was being discussed. 
“State lands” (khalesehjat) were a highly disputed category (as the central 
government was in the process of reclaiming land formerly controlled by the local 
magnates) and wielding little income due the poor state of agriculture and the 
continuing insecurity in the province. On the other hand, the newly imposed ‘banderol 
tax’ [fees charged for the government seal on individual liquor bottles] on bottled 
alcohol had become a major source of contraband and smuggling, with the systematic 
collusion of ill paid border guards and policemen in the frontier towns of Abadan and 
Mohammareh, leaving little reliable surplus for funding municipal projects76.   
 However, the Iranian state bureaucrats were not ready to turn down the 
financial offer of assistance by APOC, nor could they afford to refuse their 
responsibility for municipal and sanitary improvements since these were the spheres 
of authority that the new state institutions were jealously claiming from the former 
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local elites and the Oil Company. Hence, the Company’s conditions and proposed 
plans were  accepted. The proposal letter from APOC to the Ministry of Interior is 
worth quoting in some detail (my translation): 
“The Public Health of Abadan requires a municipality…There have been a 
number of serious outbreaks of epidemic diseases over the past two years. The  
Company as a result was forced to build modern housing for several thousand 
workers at great expense to itself, in a new neighborhood… the maintenance 
of public cleanliness is expensive and requires adequate personnel, 
organization, and professional management to control waterborne diseases… 
As for the welfare of the 25,000 people of Abadan who live next to us, little 
has been done for their sanitation by the municipality [I assume this figure 
refers to the posrtion of the local population who were not directly employed 
by the Oil Company]. They mostly live in dwellings made of reed and face 
grave danger, as there are no sanitary facilities or adequate sewerage. 
Regardless of what the Company does in its own area the danger of epidemic 
outbreak in the Bazaar and the Town is constant… [The situation creates the] 
need for the municipality to provide electricity, sewage, housing, waterways. 
The Company is willing to help with financial assistance until the 
municipality can stand on its own”77.  
 
The letter proceeds to offer a detailed proposed budget for the municipality, 
probably drafted by the urban planner and architect J.M. Wilson, who had been asked 
to consult on the situation. The Company suggested that it was willing to subsidize a 
70 percent raise in the salary of the director of the municipality to 100 Touman, and 
offer further assistance free of charge for the construction of free public toilets; 
garbage collection, incineration, and landfills throughout the city; fire stations; 
quarantine centers for those afflicted with contagious diseases; and an annual subsidy 
budget of 2,000T “until the Municipality can stand on its own, but only if the 
government commits to make up the rest [of the required budget], and the funds are 
allocated exclusively to municipal issues”78.  
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The built environment of the oil industry and the reproduction of its working 
class began to take shape in a conjuncture that was intimately linking the global with 
the national and the local. On the one hand the transnational concerns and 
requirements of corporate extractive capitalism had begun to be guided by the lessons 
in social reform, governance, management, and the scientific discourses of sanitation 
and professional urban planning. These scientific praxes were not politically neutral, 
as they were shaped by, and reinforced the notions of segregation by race and social 
class that underlay class conflict in the west and racial domination in the colonies. 
New modern nation-state institutions taking shape in Iran, such as municipalities, 
public health authorities, schools, individual record keeping, and property 
registration, were deeply influenced by the interaction with these global practices in 
Khuzestan’s oil industry; as they were by the increasingly vocal pressures from a new 
subaltern social actor, the urban residents and industrial working classes in Abadan 
and across the oil industry in Khuzestan. These heterogeneous subaltern social actors 
had to invent collective ways to negotiate and struggle to improve their lot in the 
novel urban setting where they found themselves. The frictions around the remaking 
of the urban space of Abadan embodied these scalar dynamics, and contributed to 
shaping the built environment of oil there. 
 
The Bazaar of Abadan:   
 Prior to 1925 when the new central government institutions began to be set up 
in Khuzestan, APOC would routinely take drastic coercive measures to evacuate and 
expel squatters or settled populations out of the way of its projects with the help of its 
local allies. In Masjed Soleyman and Bawarda it set fire to reed houses and shops and 
demolished huts to clear the path for oil installations or company neighborhoods (see 
above, and chapter 3). When necessary it relied on the assistance of local magnates to 
enforce its projects. These actions were justified on two bases: first, the recurring 
theme of “empty land” which presented seasonally or collectively used territories as 
uncultivated or dead land and; second, the contractual deals with the local magnates, 
as well as the legal clause in the D’Arcy Concession, which gave the Company the 
right to obtain uncultivated land free of charge, or to purchase cultivated land at the 
established local price from its owners (chapter 3). Since these contractual property 
categories were vague, incongruous with local realities, or highly disputed, they 
created resentment among the dispossessed, which were left with few options but to 




move to the urban spaces created by oil in search of wage labor or some form of 
livelihood on the margins of the oil industry. 
 The handful of central government officials stationed in Khuzestan also 
resented these Company actions, not so much out of sympathy with the plight of the 
local population as for the contempt toward their own nominal authority, as shown by 
this report of the Kargozar in 1923: “ The Company acts as it pleases with Iranian 
citizens. There are no government agents at present to deal with complaints, except at 
Mohammareh. To monitor the Company we need offices in Masjed Soleyman, Naseri 
[Ahvaz], and Ebbadan [Abadan]”79.  
However, with the fear of Sheikh Khaz’al gone, the remaining residents of the 
Bazaar neighborhood resisted intimidation when the Company tried to evict them. By 
May 1925 the Company had destroyed some 140 dwellings, but demolitions and 
evictions ground to a halt when the rest refused to move or be intimidated. The 
residents were from all over. At least 20 of those demolished dwellings housed 
Indians who had come there from Mesopotamia. Others came from Bushehr, Shiraz, 
Kazeroun, Isfahan, and elsewhere, mostly it seems from southern Iran, as evidenced 
from the names of signatories on the petitions. The Kargozar in Mohammareh 
received 57 written complaints demanding justice and protection80. The Company was 
refusing to pay compensation and threatened to take matters to Tehran81; but the 
conflict was becoming politicized, with some “troublemakers” urging residents to 
resist eviction:     
“The Company is asking the government permission to build a bazaar in the 
so-called Sheikh area. Previously, the Company and Sardar Aqdas’ [one of 
Khaz’al’s tiles] agents had demolished the houses there. Whoever does not 
have a compensation contract from the Company can get paid according to the 
type of room they had: Brick room 175 Rupees, Mud brick 88 Rps, Mud 55 
Rps. There are some troublemakers involved. The Company persists. It has 
held multiple meetings and refuses to acknowledge any claims, stating that 
they have already purchased the titles [to the land], and if they agree to pay 
anything it will be only out of goodwill”82. 
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 The oil workers living in the neighborhood were intimidated and did not 
appear to be willing to confront the Company openly, fearing for their jobs and 
livelihood. The Kargozar arranged a meeting, but in spite of official invitations by the 
Company for them to participate oil workers and Company employees kept a low 
profile:   
“A final meeting was held with the Company on the 20th of May. Some of the 
plaintiffs are employees of the Company, and thus refused to appear in the 
commission, in spite of multiple invitations from the personnel office. It was 
determined that the Company has to pay an additional compensation of 
18,000Rupees, or 6,000Touman to those displaced”83. 
 
“An atmosphere of fear and surveillance reigned in Khuzestan, and especially 
in Abadan”84. At the same time, Company public relations and propaganda was 
lauding the place as a pleasant and safe destination for visits, and a great place for 
Europeans to work (Chapter 5). However, things were rather different from the 
perspective of migrants and unskilled workers:  
“My difficulty was how to travel in Khuzestan because the English had put up 
barbed wire everywhere and forbade anyone from entering [any of the 
Company controlled areas]…wherever you went you would be interrogated: 
Where are you going? Why have you come? Who are you here to see? ... I 
wanted to go to Aghajari, but it was all fenced in and there was a guard at the 
gate. The place was in the middle of the mountains…In Khuzestan everything 
was forbidden.  Iranians couldn’t start a club, a cooperative, or any 
associations. We received permission from the Abadan Cultural Office to 
establish a sports club for Iranians…The English immediately put us under 
surveillance…we had only athletic activities, but the club became very 
popular and the whole town was participating, so the Provincial Government 
shut us down after two months… Things were very difficult for migrants and 
newcomers to Abadan and Masjed Soleyman. Masjed Soleyman was all 
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fenced in, and you couldn’t enter without government permission. Abadan 
was equally bad.”85 
  
APOC was creating fortified enclaves by enclosing its areas with fences, 
behind which the business of accumulation in oil capitalism could operate according 
to its own rules of social, spatial, and economic behavior. In these de-territorialized 
spaces carved out by the Company those higher up the corporate hierarchy had a 
different experience of everyday life than the masses of casual unskilled workers and 
urban migrants. For some the fences and barbed wires represented a sense of safety 
and comfort behind defensive fortifications, for others they evoked fear, alieanation, 
and incarceration. However, they all had to live by the rules being imposed by the Oil 
Company. Marx drew attention to the stark contrast between the geographies of 
market exchange versus the domain of production when labor is commodified under 
capitalism86. We can broaden this geographic contrasts and think of Company towns 
as corporate extensions of the disciplinary power exercised in coercive work spaces 
into the everyday urban spaces of reproduction:   
APOC was attempting to carve out an isolated, enclosed, militarized, and de-
territorialized geography of oil extraction to contain and defuse the frictions caused 
with labor relations, national laws, and popular resistance87.  In isolated locales, such 
as Masjed Soleyman and Aghajari, which were in fact mining towns with a limited 
life span and utility beyond the productive phase of the oilfields, the Company had 
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greater freedom of action to create company towns under its more or less exclusive 
disciplinary control88. However, the sheer scale of Abadan, and the fact that as a city it 
was becoming many things at the same time -- an industrial city built around the 
world’s largest refinery, a strategic border town, a major port, a city of desperate 
immigrants, expatriate employees, and of increasingly desperate indigenous 
population witnessing the dismantling of their customary rights and familiar social 
structures -- simply limited the ability of the Company to completely hegemonize the 
spatial order. Furthermore, the frictions with the emerging state institutions and the 
teaming local population, not all of whom worked for the Oil Company, were to force 
the Company to negotiate more than it had anticipated, and shaped the built 
environment of Abadan in a highly contested dynamic89. 
Although oil workers may have been too intimidated to participate openly in 
negotiations over their eviction from the “Sheikh Neighborhood”, their neighbors and 
others did; forcing the Kargozar in Mohammareh to form a committee to address the 
losses incurred by “Iranian citizens”. The Company claimed its actions were 
humanitarian, and refused to enter into any formal negotiations since it considered its  
dealings to have been proper and contractual. The Grievance Committee set up by the 
Kargozar was informed y the Company that the evicted people had signed a contract 
and been compensated; their signatures had been witnessed by the Municipality, and 
that concluded the deal. Any further action on the part of the Company would be 
purely voluntary and undertaken solely on humanitarian grounds90.  
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Map 2: Abadan in the 1930s 
 
Map 3: Abadan in the 1960s 
 
Source for Maps: Lawless and Seccombe (1987), 49, 50.  The shaded area southeast of Braim was 
designated for the new Bazaar of Abadan.  
  




Meanwhile trouble had reached the capital and Teymourtash, the powerful 
Minister of Agriculture, Trade, and General Welfare inquired from his counterpart at 
the Foreign Ministry “whether or not the rights and privileges of the Government and 
of citizens had been respected according to the article 3 of the D’Arcy Concession”91.  
It was clear from the message that the primary concern was the dignity of the 
Government, and whether the Company had ignored its sovereignty. The Kargozar 
was asked to provide a full account to his superiors, who were becoming uneasy. His 
report is an important document worthy of quotation, as it reveals the views and 
anxieties of state officials, especially at the local level: 
“Shaykh Abdollah and the Company have demolished a number of houses 
situated in the so-called “Company Area”. In fact Abadan has two 
neighborhoods, respectively called ‘Company’ and ‘Sheikh’. Most houses and 
shops are in the latter, which are left to their own, although people are 
constantly trying to improve things. In the Company area homes were 
demolished and people were forced to sign consent forms. The Company’s 
motives in demolishing houses is unclear. Some believe they intend to expel 
all Iranians from Khuzestan, others think they want to dig a canal to separate 
their buildings and factories from the city. In your servant’s opinion they 
intend to turn Abadan into something like Masjed Soleyman, where they own 
everything and nobody else has any authority… They intend to replicate that 
situation in Abadan and undermine the current city, as once the bazaar is 
completed the Company will control all transactions through its own lackeys. 
We should resist allowing the situation in Abadan coming to resemble that of 
Masjed Soleyman. On the other hand, since the municipality has some 
revenues and is under the control of the government it needs to work hard to 
pave roads and keep the city clean in order not to give any excuses to the 
Company”92. 
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The Kargozar was alarmed about the absence of any tangible government 
authority in Masjed Soleyman, which appeared to him as occupied territory. He felt 
the Company had similar plans for Abadan, and his primary concern was to impose 
government sovereignty over the city and to check the mysterious and questionable 
machinations of the Company. The fate of the evicted population did not appear to 
overly concern him. However, he was clear that if the government were to exercise 
any authority it needed to work hard to perform certain social tasks, such as building 
and maintaining an urban infrastructure, and to insure that sanitary concerns were 
being addressed. “The state” as such was not an institutional presence in the city, but 
to make a state and to claim sovereignty over the territory and the population required 
performing certain social tasks that were now being defined as general welfare. The 
Kargozar followed his report with a further note, this time providing a historical 
background to the conflict, and framed the frictions with the Company within the 
changing political situation of the demise of Sheikh Khaz’al and the new order being 
imposed by the central government in Khuzestan. Again, it is an important historical 
document worthy of full quotation: 
“Last June (June 1924) The Company warned some home owners to vacate 
their premises to clear way for demolition. We have objected to the Company 
and to the [British] Consulate [in Mohammareh] that the Company had no 
right to so threaten the residents. We demanded to know how the Company 
intended to proceed with the evictions if residents ignored the warning? For 
now they say they do not intend to be unjust, and they will wait while [their] 
workers look for alternative housing. Meanwhile the revolution had begun in 
Khuzestan. Sheikh Khaz’al was openly challenging the government. The 
Company took advantage of this situation and without informing this office or 
the Foreign Ministry asked Sheikh Abdollah who, at the time, was Khaz’al’s 
appointed governor in Ebbadan [Abadan], to demolish the houses and transfer 
the land to the Company. They employed the services of a Company secretary, 
a certain Mirza Hossein Shushtari, to give a veneer of legality to these 
proceedings. When I objected to this, Sheikh Abdollah showed up at the 
Kargozari with a number of Arabs and threatened me not to interfere. The 
houses were demolished. Residents were complaining in secret but we 
couldn’t do anything. We held seven meetings with the Company. Finally, 
[the General Manager in Mohammareh, T.L.] Jacks agreed to pay 




compensation, but [APOC Chairman Charles Greenaway] his boss refused and 
insisted the issue must be resolved in Tehran [my emphasis].”93 
 
The accusation of threatening and intimidating government officials did not sit 
well in Tehran, nor did the impression that the Company was acting like a state; 
although a confrontation could be avoided by blaming Sheikh Khaz’al and his rogue 
agents acting with impunity; and now that a “revolution” had taken place and Khaz’al 
had been removed by the army and Reza Khan, everything would be different. The 
conflict with Sheikh Khaz’al had focused public attention on Khuzestan, by 
highlighting the state of Iranian oil workers and the details of the oil concessions in 
the growing national press at a time when nationalist sentiment was running high 
following the rejection of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement by the Majles and the 
increasing centralization of the state under Reza Khan (Chapter 2). The newspaper 
Tajadod published a series of seven reports titled “Naft” [Oil] that reviewed the 
history of oil concessions granted to the British and Americans, and how Iranian 
statesmen had handled these agreements94. The newspaper received a critical reply to 
its coverage, titled “About Oil”, which it published, and then proceeded to publish a 
longer series of more critical assessments titled “The history of the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company95. Bad publicity in the nationalist press, at a time of transition when the 
British Government and APOC were trying to reconfigure their long term strategy 
and felt highly threatened by Soviet influence, American competition, and the 
radicalization of the masses was a headache that the Oil Company wished to avoid. 
July 1925 became a pivotal month in the struggle over the Abadan Bazaar and 
the evictions planned by the Company. The Prime Minister, his cabinet, and the 
Majles received a series of telegraph petitions from “Ruined Abadanis made 
homeless” (Khaneh Kharaban-e Abadan), which declared their patriotism and 
claimed, “The Company intends to demolish our homes and has caused us 150 
thousand Rupees of damages. The former Kargozar was useless and refused to carry 
out serious investigations or make accurate reports. We plead for your assistance”. 
Other telegraphs arrived complaining, “We have been made homeless for more than a 
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year. Please investigate and follow up on this complaint”. The pleas were signed by a 
coterie of people whose names indicated they were immigrants from other cities and 
regions (Hassan Shirazi, Mohammad Javad Qomsheyi, Seyyed Mohammad Shirazi). 
Some of their names indicate a degree of literacy, carrying the title Mirza which 
means secretary/notary (Mirza Jani, Mirza Hossein Isfahani); many petitioners were 
shop owners (Qahvehchi ). It is unclear if any were employees of the Company, since 
this was the era before the universal compulsory registration of individual 
information, the adoption of formal last names, and the issuance of birth certificates96. 
But since the Kargozar’s reports highlighted the residence of many oil workers in the 
neighborhood, and their intimidation by the fear of retribution by the Company, we 
can surmise that this was a collective neighborhood movement, publicly fronted by 
those individuals who felt less vulnerable to direct Company intimidation.    
Petitioning authorities for justice in the name of loyalty and patriotism had a 
long tradition in popular politics during the Qajar period. It was one of the few ways 
that ordinary people could seek justice against abusive officials by petitioning higher 
placed members of elites and pleading for their protection; but now the strategy had 
begun to become part of the repertoire of the new wage working class of the industrial 
proletariat and urban subalterns in industrial towns97.Teymourtash, who was 
becoming Reza Khan’s right hand man, was alarmed by these mounting frictions and 
demanded an investigation by the Foreign Minister98. At stake were the potential 
political repercussions stemming from the unexpected resistance of local residents, 
the bad publicity in the press during a critical period of uncertainty and crisis, and 
concern over the actions of the Company that was acting like a sovereign 
government: 
“The Majlis has received numerous complaints from shopkeepers and 
residents of the so called “Company” neighborhood of Abadan against the 
demolition of their property. At present a commission made of the 
representative of the Provincial Military Government and the Cabinet of 
Ministers is negotiating for adequate compensation of the residents. What is 
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alarming is the collection of the so-called public health taxes by the Company. 
This seems to be the same as municipal taxes that the Company was collecting 
and spending until recently due to the absence of a municipality in Abadan. 
You ought to establish a regular municipality as soon as possible in the city in 
order to end this irregular state of affairs, which is contrary to the national 
regulations. Until this happens it will be impossible to resolve the disputes 
between the Company and residents”99. 
 
 On 24th July 1925 matters came to head and the whole region erupted. After 
the military had displaced Khaz’al the Arab populations of Mohammareh, Abadan, 
and southwestern Khuzestan were apprehensive and resentful of the humiliating 
manner in which they were being treated by the government soldiers and bureaucrats. 
The non-Arab migrants were initially glad to be rid of the oppressive yoke of Khaz’al, 
but soon discovered that the new government agents and soldiers had little leeway 
with the Company to offer them effective protection; or were equally abusive as 
Khaz’al and the Company lackeys. The notion of the Company funding the 
Municipality’s budget, building schools (chapter 5), subsidizing the wages of mayors 
and school teachers, etc. did not exactly give credibility to the autonomy and 
impartiality of government officials:  “The Iranian Police Department in Khuzestan 
was very weak…and because they were funded by the Oil Company and were their 
lackeys, they were busy intimidating and extorting the wretched people of 
Khuzestan… the Oil Company supported the Police Department only to intimidate 
and suppress any opposition”100. Eftekahri, who was trying to organize the oil workers 
in Abadan in 1927-1929 felt the only significant threat against the secret nucleus of 
labor activists he had managed to set up came from the Company’s own secret police, 
and not from any intelligence gathered by the thuggish and ineffective Iranian 
police101. 
 When the military government of Khuzestan refused to pay compensation for 
requisitioning food and pack animals, and began to impose a new tax on date trees, a 
major tribal insurgency ensued among the rural Arab population (see Chapter 7). The 
British Minister Percy Loraine, as was to be expected, claimed that a sinister 
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conspiracy was at play: “they were further agitated by the intrigues and incitement of 
the agents of the parties whose interest is to create trouble for the Central Government 
or to provoke disorder that would affect British interests and Anglo-Persian 
relations”. However, he did concede that, “circumstances were, on the whole, 
favorable to such a general uprising”102. In spite of this, a “general tribal uprising” did 
not materialize because in the absence of the unifying power of Khaz’al some of the 
insurgents broke rank and acted prematurely.  The Company and the army had been 
alerted by, 
 “ The isolated and premature outbreak of a band of 400 hungry 
Arabs, who broke into Mohammareh on the 24th of July, temporarily 
immobilized the small garrison and had possession of the town for a few 
hours. His Majesty’s consul was isolated and unable to enter into 
communication with the APOC, whose senior official, Sir Arnold Wilson, 
considered that the seriousness of the situation justified a direct request for the 
urgent dispatch of a gunboat of troops from Iraq for the protection of the 
Company’s interests. At the same time, he placed his [APOC’s] transport at 
the disposal of the Persian military authorities for the transport of 
reinforcements from Ahvaz. These arrived with commendable promptitude 
during the night, and had so far restored the situation before the arrival of 
troops from Iraq that it was found unnecessary to disembark them”103. 
 
 This event catalyzed a significant change in the provincial dynamic (see more 
detailed discussion in Chapter 7). It made the Company more convinced of the 
“efficacy of Persian methods in tribal warfare” and came to trust that the Central 
Government could effectively impose security and safeguard Company operations. It 
formalized the Company’s change of alliance with the government against its 
erstwhile local allies, the Arab tribes. The use of motorized transport revolutionized 
the logistical geography of the region, as Iranian troops were transported within hours 
to confront the popular protests instead of taking days to arrive on foot and horseback. 
It also signaled how oil, or more precisely fuel oil for motorcars, produced in Abadan 
refinery, was facilitating new political alliances and the application of modern 
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technology to engineer a whole new built environment of access roads and rapid 
transportation and communication. Last, it alerted the Oil Company as well as the 
provincial junta of the simmering danger of popular discontent, and the necessity of 
preventing further insurgencies, especially in congested and destitute urban areas with 
a teaming population of anonymous and desperate denizens. 
 In Mohammareh a new attaché replaced the former Kargozar, Haj Mirza 
Moqaddam, who was re-assigned to Tehran, thus conveniently annulling all the 
provisional agreements he had drawn out during his mediations between the residents 
and the Company:  “The former Kargozar had several friendly meetings with the 
Company, which cannot be acknowledged as formal agreements”104. By insinuating, 
perhaps unfairly, a lack of integrity in his predecessor, the new Kargozar reported, 
“The Company claims all negotiations with the former Kargozar were 
informal and merely a good-will gesture, since the plaintiffs had all signed 
over their property titles to the Company. Report #295 claimed that APOC 
had agreed to pay a compensation of 18 thousand Rupees [indicating the 
Indian currency was more prevalent in the province and widely used by the 
Company instead of the Iranian national money], but they now deny this. Nor 
do we have any document proving the Company had ever agreed to pay such a 
sum. It may be appropriate to ask Hajj Mirza…Moghaddam, the former 
Kargozar, whether he has any legal proof in support of his report”105 
 
The situation in Abadan had stayed relatively calm during the July events, but 
simmering anger now threatened to spill over into open confrontation in the highly 
tense city, as former allies and subjects of Sheikh Khaz’al felt betrayed and their 
anger added to an already confrontational situation:  
“Approximately a hundred evicted people gather on a daily basis to pressure 
the Kargozari. Some local thugs, who used to be formerly in the pay of the 
Company, are now causing trouble and agitating. A few days ago Seyyed 
Jaani Shirazi, a leader of Ebbadan [Abadan] thugs, attacked Mr… [illegible] 
the Company’s head of operations with a stone. The latter was almost killed, 
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but managed to escape. The military government has made several arrests, but 
the situation is unruly”106. 
 
 In spite of the tense situation, and encouraged by their newly established 
cooperative alliance with the government and the dismissal of the over-critical former 
Kargozar, APOC decided to dig in its heels.  They informed Tehran that they had 
legally purchased these properties from their former owners with their signed consent, 
and paid a fair price that according to the terms of the concession was not to exceed 
the local fair market value of similar land107. It was conveniently overlooked that land 
prices had changed since 1921, when a “fair market value of land” had been last 
agreed with Khaz’al. The Acting Director F.C. Greenhouse met Teymourtash at his 
house in Tehran to hammer out a resolution. 
“Following the 2nd of August meeting of the committee investigating the 
situation in Abadan at your home we arrived at the following conclusions: 
- The demolition of buildings in the Company area of Abadan was deemed 
necessary and was carried out for the general welfare of the population and 
according to the recommendations of the Company physicians and public 
health professionals. 
- Concerning the demolished houses that had been previously compensated it 
is unnecessary to carry out any further investigation. Beware that the same 
troubles that are being created for the Company in its small area may soon 
bedevil the Government in the city of Abadan 
- The refusal of some Iranians in the Company Area to pay rent or Sanitation 
Duties. Company does not make any profit on these dues, and they are all 
spent on sanitation expenses. 
- The new and large bazaar of Abadan: The area had been previously 
delineated and cleared by Khaz’al and the Company was supposed to build a 
bazaar for the Sheikh. To insure safety and sanitation it is best to complete the 
construction before the start of the rainy season”108. 
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 The remainder of 1925 and 1926 were the short-lived period of honeymoon 
between the British Government, APOC, and the Central Government of Iran. By 
1927 relations became testier, eventually breaking down during the acrimonious re-
negotiations of the D’Arcy Concession between 1928-1933109. In the above cited 
summary of his meeting with Teymourtash, Greenhouse made several claims: That 
the whole idea of the Bazaar and the subsequent evictions had been the work of 
Sheikh Khaz’al and not APOC; that the Company’s sole aim was the improvement of 
the general welfare and public sanitation, based on the recommendations of scientific 
and sanitary experts. He implied that the plaintiffs demanding redress were 
opportunists out to extort the Company, which had already paid fair compensation. 
He warned that opening the Pandora’s box of compensations for confiscated property 
would be just as harmful to the Government that was now busy reclaiming all 
customary held land and properties as state land. He eased the Minister’s mind by 
implying that the Company was not acting as a political authority by collecting taxes 
which, he acknowledged, was the purview of the government only, but merely 
charging rent and sanitary fees within its own area to maintain and improve the 
generally beneficial infrastructure. The urgency in Greenhouse’s missive was evident, 
and he followed it up with another pressing request a month later when the 
government stayed cautious and did not act quickly enough: 
“[We had made an] arrangement last year (1924) to build a new bazaar in 
Abadan town at the request of the Shyakh of Mohammerah…The need for the 
bazaar is very urgent in the interest of the public and of the good sanitation 
and hygienic control…The Company would consent to build the bazaar if the 
government so wishes…It is suggested that the shopkeepers displaced by the 
recent demolitions be given first refusal of shops, and permission be given to 
the Company to lease out these shops at a rent to be agreed with the military 
governor sufficient to pay the cost of electric light, water, sanitation, and 
administration plus 10% per annum to cover the original cost of construction. 
The bazaar is designed for the sale of foodstuffs…and is almost as important 
as the provision of a good water supply”110. 
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The Politics of Food: 
The Company’s claim about food supplies being of vital importance, on an 
equal par with clean water, housing, and sanitation were not off the mark. As long as  
Mohammareh had been a “dirty little village”111 and Abadan, its rural island 
hinterland, food supplies were not yet a vital concern. As the oil industry was taking 
shape food supplies of Europeans were imported in tin cans by the sea, or as grain 
purchased locally or from Iraq. However, by mid 1920s, with post war conflicts, 
droughts, epidemics, famines, and the substantial growth of the population, the 
quantitative supply of basic foodstuff, as well as its quality, had become of vital and 
strategic importance. Khuzestan had been the historical grain basket of Iran and 
Mesopotamia until the 9th and 10th centuries (see chapter 1), but land degradation, 
water-logging due to lack of proper drainage, and political crises had drastically 
reduced the region’s agricultural production, making it prone to recurring famines 
(see Chapters 2, 3, 5, 7). The problem of famine did not affect the Europeans as much 
as workers and the local population who were unable to afford market prices.  
Since the opening of Karun to commercial shipping in late 19th century, much 
of the local food crops were exported to more lucrative markets. Ella Sykes in 1901 
recorded 15 prominent merchants in Basra who controlled the date trade, and 
exported wool and wheat from Ahvaz. She also noted the drastic ecological changes 
that had taken place all along Karun, comparing Henry Layard’s description of the 
thickly wooded banks of Karun with the “totally deforested” landscape she saw in her 
visit: “no gazelle, or even a hyena, let alone a lion”112. No shooting for Lady Ella! The 
combination of the voracious requirements of the oil industry for brick kilns and 
energy prior to the completion of the refinery, and the growing needs of the local 
population for cooking fuels had put great pressure on the already fragile ecology of 
the region113. 
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Arnold Wilson during his military service in Khuzestan had been very active 
in identifying potential irrigation schemes for large-scale food production in 
southwest Khuzestan114. The logistical awareness that the growing oil industry, as well 
as the British military, would require a secure, substantial, and sufficient, supply of 
food was already evident prior to WWI. Even the Qajar state had become aware of the 
commercial agrarian potential of the region after the noticeable interests of European 
prospectors in the late 19th Century115, and sent Najm al-Molk, an able engineer, to 
Khuzestan in the 1880s, to assess the possibility of rebuilding broken irrigation dykes 
and waterworks on Karkheh and lower Karun (see Chapter 5). In 1904 a Major 
Morton was dispatched by the Government of India to investigate the feasibility of 
establishing a commercial irrigation scheme around Ahvaz116. In 1909 alarms rang 
when the British Legation learned that a Dutch syndicate had obtained an option for 
developing an irrigation scheme on the Karun, and warned off the Iranian government 
from considering the scheme because “A project of the character above stated is 
evidently calculated to produce a very considerable change, both commercial and 
political, in the existing situation on the Karun”117. Sheikh Khaz’al became interested 
in soliciting British help to develop such a scheme himself, and in March 1909 Sir 
Wiliam Willcocks, “a great engineer from Egypt”118 arrived to assess the regional 
potential for irrigated agriculture on a large scale. 
Willcocks was impressed and claimed that rebuilding the dam at Nahr-e 
Hashem on the Karkheh that had fallen into disrepair in mid 19th century would 
unleash the agricultural potential of 1.5 million acres, especially in northern 
Khuzestan, but would cost an estimated £500 thousand to develop. While Willcocks 
felt that better natural drainage and soil quality made Khuzestan’s commercial 
agricultural potential greater than Mesopotamia’s, he also warned that any such 
scheme would adversely affect date gardens downstream, around Mohammareh, 
which relied on siltation and downstream water flow119. What the European 
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prospectors, as well as the engineer Najm al-Molk who had made similar assessments 
four decades before, all shared was the conviction that the land was a wasted 
resource, left negligently underdeveloped by ‘the natives’:  
“[Karkheh] is the finest site for a dam I have ever seen. It has of course been 
used in the long distance past and was unsuccessfully repaired some 50 years 
ago. Now a great vested interest has grown up in the marshes [reference to the 
Arab tribes inhabiting the wetlands] in which the river wastes itself. A little 
rice, a little maize, and thousands of miles of reed beds are all that the river 
serves. It might water 50,000 acres of wheat, and still leave plenty for rice 
fields.”120 
   
The following year a Russian national also obtained an irrigation concession 
on the Karun, this time prompting the British Foreign Office to step in directly and 
apply pressure on the Shah to put aside, once and for all, the idea of granting any 
foreign concessions for irrigation works in Khuzestan121.Wilson felt frustrated and 
blamed the mistrust between Tehran and Sheikh Khaz’al for the failure of any attempt 
to develop the full agricultural and food potential of the wasted land and water. 
However, his insightful comments demonstrate the awareness that this was not simply 
an issue to be resolved among political elites and governments. Wilson already 
foresaw in 1911 that local people and collective social structures would resist their 
dispossession if drastic changes in landownership, irrigation systems, and agricultural 
development, were implemented at their expense instead of for them: 
“This country is evidently easy to irrigate and would be extremely fertile, but 
the obstacles are many. The land is in communal ownership, and a redesigned 
system of agriculture would benefit one tribe and community at the expense of 
another. It is harder to deal with communities than individuals. The 
government is an alien government, i.e. of Tehrani Persians. If their authority 
was supreme here they would get all the revenue and spend it elsewhere. 
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Irrigation works need organization, honesty, and steady outgoings on 
maintenance. None of these are to be expected in Persia”122   
 
 However, none of these modernizing agrarian and irrigation schemes for 
commercial food production on a large scale came to fruition, and the quantity as well 
as the safe quality of food in Khuzestan remained primary concerns, and directly 
linked to political stability. In 1926 Arnold Wilson urged APOC to approach the 
Iranian Government and ask it to entrust the Company with building irrigation 
schemes and large scale food production projects, by offering the added incentive of 
funding the project with a loan, to the tune of £100-£150 thousand, at a “low interest 
rate of 6%, as long as the construction is entrusted to us. This would benefit the 
Company by reducing food prices, and increase tranquility of the area, and create a 
steadier labor market”123.  
The inevitable reliance of Abadanis on the market for food supplies was a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand the dispossessed peasants, pastoralists, and 
migrants became a reserve army of cheap and interchangeable labor, congregated in 
town, and eager to get hired for low wages to feed themselves by purchasing all their 
necessities in the market. On the other hand, food insecurity, coupled with epidemics, 
chronic poverty, and social dislocations, created a cauldron of resentment and 
potential insurgency. Yousef Eftekhari, who managed to get hired at the Technical 
Workshop in Abadan, one of the pet educational schemes of the Company for training 
skilled Iranian workers (chapter 5) recalls his wages, and his living and working 
conditions as permanently precarious: 
“My wages were 8 Touman, which eventually increased to 10T. Rahim 
Hamdad [his comrade] also received 8T. Together we rented a house for 
ourselves [as a safe house] for 4T. The two of us had to live on the remaining 
14T for the whole month. We were truly under duress… Back then a bag of 
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flour alone cost 5T in Abadan. Workers couldn’t pay in cash and had to get 
credit; and the unscrupulous shopkeepers charged them 6T for a bag of 
flour…  Casual workers couldn’t afford anything besides bread. Most of them 
never had warm food, tea, fruits, let alone any meat…Life in Khuzestan was 
nearly impossible without ice and water, especially in summertime, and for 
those who had to work more than eight hours under the blazing sun. The 
Company did not provide any water; let alone ice…the luckier workers 
managed to get hold of a clay pot or a canvas bag. This helped filtrate the 
murky water a little bit, and also to keep it cooler. If you weren’t so lucky as 
to have a clay jar or a canvas bag you ended up having to drink water that 
tasted like oil and was hot”124.  
 
However, food provision was not a problem only for the poor, but even 
affected Indians and Europeans. “The local community pays any price for high 
quality vegetables… [one of the main reasons why] the cost of living is increasing”125. 
In the days before container refrigeration or climate controlled railroad and truck 
transport made possible the transfer of large quantities of relatively fresh food126, the 
absence of fresh produce, dairies, and normal food was a major issue affecting the 
quality of life, even for Europeans. In the late 1930s, long after a modern bazaar had 
been finally built in Abadan, the problem of safe and sufficient food supplies 
persisted. To assess the rising costs and mounting discontent a food and nutrition 
expert by the name of William Jardine was hired to provide an assessment of food 
conditions in Abadan and the Fields. His report concluded that one of the major and 
recurring complaints by “the staff” was about the quality and unpredictability of the 
supply of bacon, vegetables, and meat. “The complete lack of choice, combined with 
low quality and low standards of cooking affects the physical and mental condition of 
the staff…the lack of other amenities and the climate are badly enhanced by food 
problems” 127  
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The Company had established a dairy farm “to supply the staff continuously 
with milk. Jardine was asked to evaluate the dairy farm and make suggestions for 
improving the situation, since “the irregularity of food quality and quantity enhances 
abnormality of life in Iran”. Jardine concluded that given the location of Abadan little 
could be imported from outside the province, “some fruits perhaps, but no vegetables. 
Meat is a problem that cannot be remedied locally, but frozen meat [packed in dry ice, 
before refrigerated containers] can be imported…butter can be produced locally, same 
with pigs”. Jardine’s suggestion was to solve the food problem by improving local 
supplies, by employing an agrarian specialist, and insuring the maintenance of 
“disease free areas…taking precautions against diseases… and the threats of 
contamination”. However, all this required an increase in the supply of local grains, 
maize and barley.  
The logistic of food demand and consumption intertwined the Company areas 
and the indigenous communities, as did epidemic viruses, and work in the refinery. 
As it were, “the Company is obliged to operate for itself and its employees a 
comprehensive food supply scheme”128. The considerable expense and the practical 
difficulties entailed in these schemes were an irritating inconvenience for a 
commercial oil company. In 1937 APOC had to import some 32 tons of bacon, ham, 
butter, cheese, lard, cream, and jams; together with 36 thousand tins of canned milk129, 
not a negligible expense during a period of economic stringency.      
 
Militant Particularism in Abadan: 
The Company’s plan to evict residents and merchants, paying compensation to 
those who had some form of official property title (it is unclear how many did, and 
from what authority) based on outdated property values, and then to charge them rent 
for re-admitting them as Company tenants, under its own strict supervision, did not sit 
well with the residents. These were the same “unscrupulous shopkeepers” that 
Eftekhari pointed out were fleecing workers with high interests. But the common 
struggle over threatened shared urban space was creating momentary common 
alliances, in what David Harvey calls “militant particularism”130. It was true that the 
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new bazaar would offer many new amenities, such as electricity, water, a clean and 
modern space; but it was doing so on Company terms, after it had dispossessed and 
evicted the people who lived there, and it was unclear who could afford the transition 
once they had lost what they already had. Some of the shopkeepers and merchants 
found an attorney in Bushehr to plead their case. They put together a petition and sent 
it not only to the Majles and the Cabinet, but also to the newspaper Iran, which 
published it:  
“Once again the Company intends to demolish houses and evict the miserable 
population in the name of making a street. Two years ago they destroyed a 
major section of Abadan and despite numerous petitions and complaints they 
have not paid any compensation. Now they are at it again. We implore you to 
stop this injustice that is destroying Abadan’s urban fabric (shahriat-e 
Abadan) and preventing its development”131. 
 
The petition was signed by a score of residents and merchants, some of whom 
cited their trades as clockmakers, cloth makers, grocers, coffee shop owners, urban 
landlords, bakers, merchants, etc. Again, from the geographic and ethnic attributes of 
their names we can surmise many were immigrants from mostly southern parts of Iran 
adjacent to the province (Isfahan, Kazeroun, Shiraz); others came from nearby towns 
in the province itself (Behbahan, Ramhormoz). A number of them had explicitly 
Arabic names (Khezr-e Arab, Fahd Qawab Arab, Seyyed Abdollah Arab, etc.). Many 
simply cited their name, so it was unclear what they did, or where they came from; 
simply that they were part of the common cause of laying claim to their shared urban 
space. The struggle moved to the Cabinet and Reza Khan, in one of his last acts as 
Prime Minister  before ascending the throne in December, signed the following 
cabinet ruling: 
“The APOC’s plan to build a bazaar will subsequently improve Abadan. 
Therefore the Cabinet approves their plan under the following conditions: 
- The land belongs to the Government, who shall be party to the transactions. 
- The Company shall build the Bazaar at its own expense 
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- The Government ought to approve the plans for the bazaar. To speed things 
up the Military Governor of Abadan can inspect the plans 
- The Company shall pay the property (Mostaqellat) taxes on shops leased by 
it 
- To maintain price control rents shall not exceed 7% profit on capital 
expended together with expenditures on repairs, government charges, and 
water, electricity, and sanitation charges, which are to be borne by the 
Company 
-Foreign subjects are forbidden to own property and real estate, yet as all 
Company’s institutions under the terms of Concession revert to the 
Government this permission is granted to the Company as an exception132 
 
APOC management was unhappy that its intentions to take full control of a 
strategic section of the city had been frustrated again. The Company intended to clear 
out the undesirable elements in order to design the area according to its own 
specifications. It felt this was necessary to maintain exclusive control and impose 
discipline. The Company justified the venture in commercial terms, and calculated 
that the rents and fees it intended to charge would cover the costs. But these plans 
now seemed in tatters, since the Government wanted a piece of the action and 
intended to impose its own oversight over the whole process. Greenhouse wrote an 
exasperated letter to Teymourtash: 
“Tardy correspondence has yet again delayed the completion of the bazaar 
until 1926. In view of the urgent need to provide accommodation for the 
poorer classes of shopkeepers – the sellers of meat, fish, and vegetables – our 
offer was made as generous as possible, and for this reason no mention was 
made of the heavy capital cost of the construction which will become the 
property of the government in a few years time [once the D’Arcy Concession 
expired, in 1961]. It is regrettable that our offer has been refused.”133.  
 
Greenhouse went on to make a detailed reply to the Cabinet decree, the main 
points of which were: first, a refusal to pay ground rent to the Government on the 
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ground that “the charge of ground rent by government on wasteland is opposed to the 
terms of Concession”. Second, he accepted to pay commercial property (Mostaqellat) 
taxes, but, third, it wanted to know why no mention had been made in the Cabinet 
decree of how APOC should recoup their “capital costs of £50,000”? Last, he 
emphasized yet again the urgency of the situation and the vital need for the project to 
proceed as quickly as possible134. In order to show some flexibility, Greenhouse made 
a slightly more generous offer a week later: “At great sacrifice to Company, and in 
public interest, we agree to restrict the rent to be charged on bazaar shops to 8.5% of 
capital expended on construction, electricity, filtered water supply, sanitary & 
miscellaneous services supplied by Company at cost (from 10%)”135.  
Teymourtash tried to placate the Company, and informed the Foreign Minister 
that he was willing to support the idea of the government to mediate the conflict with 
the residents so long as the state became the sovereign authority over legal 
transactions, tax collections, and the ultimate landowner: 
“A meeting was held at my house to deal with the issue [with Greenhouse 
present]. It was decided that the Military Government of Khuzestan should 
look into this affair and, first, collect land rent from Iranians residing in the 
Company areas on behalf of the Company, after confirming that all the legal 
documents are in order. Second, the agents of the Ministry of Interior [the 
Municipality] will collect the public health/sanitation taxes from the residents, 
in order to reimburse the expenses that are currently being paid by the 
Company out of pocket.”136 
 
However, even the powerful minister’s missive was difficult to accept for a 
fledgling bureaucracy that was suspicious of the extra territorial powers of the 
Company, and felt highly insecure during a time of transition under the arbitrary and 
authoritarian scrutiny of Reza Shah. The bewildered responses of various institutions 
showed that the deceptive appearance of what Tim Mitchell calls a “state effect”137, 
concealed the reality that interconnected and institutionalized state machinery simply 
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did not exist at that stage.  The Ministry of Justice, in charge of redrawing property 
laws, sounded baffled and ignorant of what had transpired previously and inquired 
“what does the Company intend to do?” At the same time the Foreign Ministry was 
confronted with a continuing stream of ever more elaborate telegrams and messages 
from its local attachés and Abadan residents denouncing “the Company’s illegal plans 
to make streets and to demolish homes and buildings”138. Meanwhile, the new 
Kargozar seemed to be far more sympathetic to the Company’s position, and filed the 
following report: 
“The Company is refusing to pay the 130 thousand Rps’ compensation 
demanded by the evicted and displaced population. There is a big difference 
between what the residents ask and what the Company is willing to consider. 
The demolished houses are of two types: Some have been demolished in the 
Company area [Braim, Refinery], others in the so called “Sheikh” 
neighborhood by the government of the time (Khaz’al) in order to build a 
bazaar for Sheykh Abdollah. At present both groups of population are mixed 
together. The Company’s dealings’ with the residents seems to be fair, but 
their demands are too high. Nevertheless the Company is willing to help.”139 
 
It now appeared that people evicted from different areas - Braim, the Sheikh 
neighborhood, and the Shahr - were making common alliance to resist their 
dispossession, and to demand at least proper compensation. The central bone of 
contention was becoming the issue of the legal ownership of what, by now, had 
become urban land.   
 
The Politics of property in interwar Abadan:  
 Who ‘owned’ this urban land? What was the meaning of property under these 
changing circumstances? Chapter 3 discussed the incongruence of different notions of 
property when APOC was making its land deals with the Bakhtiyaris and Khaz’al. In 
the process of its negotiations APOC had relied on the liberal and Lockean notion of 
private property as a natural right insured by a free contract, which had led to the 
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privatization of the collective territories of the Bakhtiyari following the collusion of 
their khans with the Company. The D’Arcy Concession had given APOC the right of 
free possession of dead (mavvat) and uncultivated (bayer) land. None of these 
categories applied to Abadan since it had become a boomtown after 1912.  
“In the Fields population centers had developed in isolated areas. There the 
Company performs the municipal duties. Abadan is somewhat different. There 
were some cultivators in the vicinity of the refinery area, but villages and a 
rapidly expanding town came into being, adjacent to but outside the Company 
area”140 
 
As a result, the Company’s repeated references to residents having signed over 
their properties in exchange for fair compensation begged the question of what kind 
of documents had been signed over, who had obtained these titles, from whom, and 
under what circumstances? From Eftekhari’s memoirs and the petitions of residents 
we know there were many people renting their residence at a significant share of their 
meager wages. These renters, in all likelihood most of them oil workers, were also 
being displaced with little alternative shelter available in the highly congested 
boomtown. Their claims for a “right to the city” did not figure at all in the contractual 
game of compensation for formal titles. It was most likely that any titles had been 
purchased from the patriarchal authority of Khaz’al, who had held control of the 
Island until he was deposed. But the Central Government had never recognized his 
authority over what it called “state land” (khalesejat), and now that Khaz’al had been 
deposed all his legal dealings were considered moot. Consequently, the claim of the 
Company that it had paid fair compensation for a title issued by Khaz’al met a 
sympathetic ear from government bureaucrats. 
In any case, these titles in Abadan were no longer about agrarian land of any 
sort, so the categories specified in the Concession could hardly apply to them; nor did 
the clauses referring to the fair local value of cultivated land, since migrants and 
indigenous people had transformed these areas into urban residential land. Having 
been dispossessed once from their customary and collective geographic resources to 
make room for the primary accumulation of extractive oil capitalism, the now urban 
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migrants were being again dispossessed to make room for the built urban environment 
of oil that would facilitate the accumulation of capital in the industrial processing of 
oil capitalism. The Company was willing to compromise its desire to take full control 
of the urban space, and was glad to delegate the politically charged task of evicting 
and dispossessing the population to the government, so long as its specific 
requirements for creating a segregated sanitary city were implemented. The state, on 
the other hand, was faced with the dilemma of citizen demands for fair treatment, 
justice, and protection, during a period of momentous transition when the institutions 
and the governmental practices of a new centralized nation state were being erected, 
legitimized by a nationalist claim of representing the interests of the nation and 
improving people’s material lives.  
The deadlock following these confrontations put the politics of property in the 
city at the center of the consolidation of the oil complex in the interwar years. Given 
these mounting frictions, and the generally unstable political situation, the Company 
decided to withdraw its proposal and bide its time141. 
 
Illusions of Segregation: Servants and the Politics of Domestic Households 
 As it turned out Greenhouse’s urgency in the autumn of 1925 had not been 
misplaced. The climate and major political events conspired to postpone the whole 
affair. The rainy season came and made large-scale construction impractical. The 
Majles voted to depose the Qajar Dynasty and appoint a new monarchy, headed by 
Reza Shah Pahlavi. The political transition was so momentous that it put the whole 
affair on hiatus as far as the central government was concerned, but not for the 
Company, who faced the double urgency of addressing critical sanitary conditions, 
coupled with the desire to take exclusive control of urban space.  
In 1926, the Company prepared itself for a long-term re-organization given the 
new circumstances (Chapter 5). The discussions and meetings between directors in 
London, and field managers in Iran were arranged around John Cadman’s official 
visit for the coronation in April 1926. Arnold Wilson highlighted some of the 
essential matters up for review during Cadman’s visit. Chief among these were:  
“The new market and the main gate are essential features of the sanitary and 
housing improvement…the selected site aims at moving [the new] bazaar 
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away from insanitary lower section of the Sheikh’s village and to fit it into the 
sites where new villages are being erected... Sewerage (waterborne) will be 
extended to these new villages.”142 
 
 Once again the themes that dominated Company plans were erecting gates, 
segregating space, creating exclusive sanitary conditions, and providing an urban 
infrastructure (waterborne sewage) only for these Company areas. The fact that 
dumping the human sewage from Company areas into the river where it would infect 
the water intake of the rest of the “native city” a few hundred meters downstream was 
an inconvenient fact that was often acknowledged on scientific grounds, but ironically 
did not undermine the segregationist plans (It will be recalled that at this stage only 7 
piped water public outlets had been established for the entire Shahr, which Company 
correspondence estimated to have a population of 25 thousand).  As we have seen, on 
numerous occasions Company officials had stressed the fact that urban sanitary 
prevention measures had to be inclusive and universal, otherwise they simply would 
not work. Europeans, skilled Indian workers, and casual Iranian workers shared the 
workspace of the refinery and had to physically interact on a quotidian basis. For 
another thing, European expatriates were heavily dependent on domestic servants for 
cooking, cleaning, disposing of garbage, gardening their lawns, washing their cloths, 
carrying their goods, attending and caring for their children, etc. These routine 
everyday physical interactions simply undermined the scientific justification for racial 
and class spatial segregation, and revealed them for what they were: The urban design 
of a built environment for the maintenance of unequal relations of power and 
dominance based on racial and class differences. 
Although there is more material available for the post-WW2 period, I have not 
come across specific information regarding servants and domestic workers during this 
interwar years. Nevertheless, through routine and casual references found in archival 
materials over the years, we know that servants and household domestics always 
formed significant numbers in Abadan. In the last years of the AIOC operations 
before nationalization there were more than two thousand servants working for 
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Europeans in Company areas143. Many servants lived in the Shahr, or routinely 
interacted with people there. Initially many domestic servants were Indians, especially 
cooks from Goa were highly appreciated. After the re-negotiated 1933 Oil 
Agreement, the Company committed to replace Indian workers with Iranians, but as 
in 1920 and 1922 when the striking Indians had been expelled (Chapter 5), this new 
attempt to replace Indians did not create problems only in the workplace, but also in 
households where skilled cooks were deemed essential for domestic comfort and 
culinary satisfaction:  
“Lack of good cooks depresses men further…Iranians are bad cooks, but eager 
to learn…they have no experience of a varied diet and do not present food in 
appetizing form. They only know how to fry and boil… Even if the cookery 
schools train many, they can’t get to serve 500 bungalows. A man can’t be 
expected to go home and prepare or supervise his own food…the cook’s 
position is perhaps today the most irritating factor in the food position at 
Abadan... [Given that by late 1930s Abadan had many married couples in 
residence it was important not to take things too far:] It is not suggested, at the 
moment, that the lady inhabitants of Abadan should actually do their own 
cooking in the cookhouses attached to the bungalows. But they can supervise 
the preparation of food and control the cook”144.  
  
 This report is rich on so many levels – and one does wonder about the 
statement by an Englishman about bland cooking - but more significant are the 
politics of gender, the division of household labor, and the perceived role of the 
“lady” of the house, topics of great significance that will be analyzed elsewhere (in 
chapter 7 I touch upon the politics of household in the Company enclaves, but a fuller 
treatment of the topic will be undertaken in a future study). However, what we need 
to emphasize here is that the notion of spatial segregation justified on the grounds of 
sanitation was merely an illusion, obfuscating and reinforcing the underlying unequal 
relations of power in an industrial city. To the extent that fresh food was available it 
had to be produced and purchased locally, which was one of the reasons for the 
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urgency of building a modern bazaar. Servants purchased food and prepared it in the 
European areas. They cleaned, kept order, and did the laundry. Even in married 
couples’ quarters there were routine and physical everyday interactions with domestic 
workers, who may have appeared invisible when crossing the rigid fences and gates 
raised around the Company areas to keep out contamination. Consequently, the 
illusion of ensuring protection from epidemic hazards by enforcing and maintaining 
spatial segregations with the indigeneous population did not jibe with practical 
realities.  
 In the aftermath of the 1933 re-negotiated oil agreement, Iran’s insistence on 
the further Iranianization as part of the new Concession led to significant changes in 
the built environment, as the provision of housing and urban amenities for Iranian 
employees became a new requirement. JM Wilson, the Company architect and urban 
planner, proposed the development of an “Abadan Garden City for the mixed 
population of first, second, and third class employees”. As the explicit exclusion of 
Iranian nationals from Company benefits was becoming politically untenable, 
hierarchical distinction by assigned employment grade became the new norm for 
access to urban amenities and living conditions. The idea of “the garden city”, it will 
be recalled, was initiated by Ebenezer Howard at the turn of the century, as a utopian 
utilitarian solution for overcoming the urban malaise of class strife, inequality, and 
unsanitary living and working conditions, by creating garden cities in the countryside, 
combining workplace and living quarters by employers and employees side by side145. 
As quickly as it was conceptualized, the idea had become the inspirational basis of the 
rising urban planning movement in the era of social reform, but not as Howard had 
intended. The idea was adopted as the basis of residential suburbanization for the 
middle classes in Britain and the US; and of planned exclusive areas in the colonies146. 
The original idea of organically combining work and everyday life in the same self-
sustaining green geography was dropped. Women, in particular, became highly 
isolated and alienated in these posh spaces where they were relegated to domestic 
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work only or, as was suggested above, to the task of overseeing servants doing the 
household tasks according to prescribed middle class standards147. 
 J.M. Wilson was a Scottish architect who had served as assistant to Edwyn 
Lutyens during his reconstruction of Delhi. The most prominent architect of the turn 
of the century, Lutyens had been among the first to implement a gentrified version of 
Howard’s garden city idea for building middle class suburbs around London’s 
Hamspted Heath. He then implemented the concept on a much vaster and imperial 
scale to Delhi by creating exclusive enclaves148. His assistant, JM Wilson, was later 
hired to design buildings in colonized Iraq after WWI, building the Baghdad train 
station and the university there. He was then engaged in 1925-1926 to oversee a much 
grander project, not for an Imperial employer, but for a private corporation APOC, to 
develop long term urban development plans for Abadan. This was one of the largest 
company town projects in the world149, excluding the equally massive projects that 
were taking shape in the Soviet Union during the 1930s150. 
The idea of designing new urban areas for “a mixed population” of Europeans 
and elite Iranian employees sat very uneasily with the Company directors. The plans 
were for the development of Bawarda and additional parts of Braim into major 
housing estates for clerks, staff, and higher skilled artisans. D. Jameson, the General 
Manager, objected to Wilson’s proposal expressing his fear of contamination:  
“We will encounter great trouble for that area in case of epidemics, since there 
is much communication there that are not under Company’s control… it is 
preferable to have the European staff isolated from others. In other eastern 
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countries Europeans live apart as they don’t have the same immunity to 
disease as natives do”151. 
  
Bawarda, in particular, was considered with hesitation due to its proximity to 
the Shahr: “Bawarda is not ideal for a European area, as when cholera broke out it 
would be all around there, and many inhabitants of the ‘new colony’ would be 
carriers of typhoid and dysentery”. Elkington, the General Manager at Abadan, was 
particularly concerned that “the large number of servants already in the Bungalow 
area (Braim) are probably already carriers”. 
However, with the new agreement imposing “Persianization” on the 
Company, avoiding the risk of contamination to Europeans could no longer function 
as a scientific justification for maintaining the racial and class system of power that 
kept being reinforced through spatial segregation. Jameson remarked, “One of the 
greatest difficulties in the future would be that every Persian who could read or write 
would imagine that he was a first class employee.” Brewster reassured him that some 
degree of segregation would always be maintained: “Even if the whole Company 
were completely Persianized, there would still be class distinctions, and the 
executives would move to the present Bungalow Area (Braim)”, an accurate 
prediction of what transpired in the following years152.  
The sanitary idea continued to act as justification for spatial segregation, and 
became a permanent feature of the built environment of oil. While maintaining 
explicit racial segregation became increasingly untenable due to political 
circumstances over the following years, other forms of spatial hierarchy by rank, 
employment status, and social class persisted and became ingrained into the urban 
fabric of the refinery city and imbued its habitus. We will now return to our story of 
the decisive period of transition in 1926-1927, to close the story of the bazaar and see 
how the urban frictions and struggles developed and shaped Abadan in its aftermath. 
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Photograph 21: Abadan - Braim 
 
Source: BP Archives 
 
The Honeymoon of 1926: 
  In the winter of1926, after Reza Shah had ascended the throne, the 
government re-opened the case of the Bazaar. Now the terms of the inquiry had 
become the legal ownership of urban territory, as a review of the case by a 
government ministry stated: 
“The Oil Company planned in 1924 to build a bazaar in order to improve 
sanitation. They prepared the plans and the building material, but had to stop 
due to rainy season. Now they ask, first, if the designated land is considered 
state land, then it should be transferred to the Company free of charge…. 
third, they pledge to control prices by keeping the rents they will charge for 
shops not to exceed 8.5% of profit on expended capital. Last, the Company 
undertakes to collect all additional charges that are due to it for services such 
as lighting, purified water, sanitation, and public order; as well as the 
government duties, from the tenants”153.   
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Having realized that under the new political and local circumstances the 
Company’s insistence on obtaining exclusive control over a public area such as the 
Bazaar would only make the government more suspicious, Arnold Wilson came up 
with an alternative scheme of recruiting a local Iranian merchant, a Mirza Hossein 
Movaqqar, who was also the Majles deputee from the area, to take charge of the new 
bazaar project and to build and operate it according to Company plans and with its 
considerable assistance. Wilson arranged a meeting in Tehran between Cadman, 
Homan, The American adviser in charge of Khuzestan’s finances, Movaqqar, and 
senior Company directors, to hammer out an agreement to have Movaqqar front the 
project in order to avoid objections by the government and local protesters.  An 
agreement was made for the Company to draw up and submit a plan based on 
“sanitary concerns and controls”, and to extend a loan of 75,000 Rps, at a low interest 
rate of five percent, for Movaqqar to build the bazaar on 4 blocks, with the provision 
of further expansion as soon as the situation became more favorable. At the meeting 
Homan was urged to obtain the approval of the provincial governor for the scheme 
and to make sure the crucial issue of a final transfer of property rights would take 
place154. 
However, the Company was already planning further expansions, and had 
come to the decision to acquire significantly greater stretches of urban land for its 
projected urban and industrial operations, just as the government was imposing new 
property laws and setting up land registration institutions. At a meeting between Dr 
Young, Cadman, and Jacks, it was decided that while the Company should keep a low 
profile, they ought to ask the government for the grant of some 500 ha of land in 
Abadan (1,300 jerib)155. Included in this land request were some 66 ha north of the 
refinery to Bahmanshir River, 36 ha to the west of the refinery for recreational space, 
and 45 ha between the village of Bawarda and the Sheikh Village (the site of the 
proposed bazaar). The Company was designating all this as “uncultivated land” and 
intended to demand the government for its free transfer.  
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In a demonstration of the continued fluidity of the political situation, it was 
decided at the meeting to keep active contact with Sheikh Khaz’al, who was in exile 
in Tehran, in case he returned to power156. Dr Young visited Khaz’al in Tehran to 
assess his situation. Instead of a possible political player who could make a comeback 
and again become a force in the province he encountered an old, impoverished, and 
broken man who asked Young for assistance: “The old man is of course very 
downhearted. He has no means and he is in need of a loan, but I told him that at the 
present moment we did not consider it in his own interest to borrow money from us”. 
He advised Khaz’al to throw himself on the mercy of Millspaugh, and even if the 
government would not restore all his property perhaps they would at least provide 
him with an allowance to live out his days157. 
Realizing that the old political arrangements were well and good in the past, 
there was now real concern among Company directors about the numerous old 
agreements signed with the Bakhtiyaris and Khaz’al coming under serious 
government scrutiny and reconsideration (see chapters 3, 7). The Foreign Ministry 
had asked the Finance Ministry to make a ruling about the legal status of khalesheh 
(state) lands in Abadan, and were told that, “This bazaar is not part of the Concession, 
and needs to be renegotiated”158. 
An apprehensive Cadman told Foroughi the Premier, and Davar the Minister 
of Public Works, that the Company was not to blame for the deals it had had to make 
with the local magnates. Given that until very recently the Government had had 
neither land registration offices in the provinces, nor a tangible institutional presence 
to enforce its rules, the Company had had no option but to deal with the local 
magnates. Cadman also made an implicit threat by reviving the old wartime disputes 
when APOC had suspended royalty payments after German sabotage of its pipelines 
in 1915, and hinted that APOC could ask for compensation from the government for 
failing to protect it as the concession demanded (chapter 2)159.  
However, these fears proved ungrounded, and a meeting with Millspaugh at 
the end of April had somewhat allayed the Company’s fears regarding future 
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government claims for the land deals made with the Bakhtiyaris and Sheikh Khaz’al. 
Millspaugh went further and offered the Company an immediate allocation of the 
desired “uncultivated land” in Abadan that they were requesting160.  
During these pivotal meetings with the Cabinet, Cadman discovered that the 
primary concern of the Iranian government was not so much local popular discontent 
about its treatment by the Company, but the Iranianization of the labor force, and the 
terms of the concessions regarding royalties (see chapter 5). The state was willing to 
be flexible regarding the spatial arrangements and land confiscations the Company 
was asking in Abadan, so long as they did not impinge on the ultimate formal 
sovereignty of the government and its representatives. 
In Abadan also the negotiations had proceeded regarding the Bazaar. Harold 
Homan, the American provincial financial director was following up the scheme of 
making Movaqqar the front man for the Bazaar project 
“This office has entered negotiations with Mirza Hossein Movaqqar who is 
currently a Majles depute, to build a large bazaar on state land (khaleseh) in 
Abadan. This decision was made when complaints began to be received from 
residents of Abadan against the Company’s [excessive] demands. An 
agreement has been reached between Movaqqar and the government, and 
approved by the Company, to build a bazaar according to plans approved by 
this ministry and the Company’s engineer, to charge rents not above the 
current rates, and to respect all prevailing laws regarding state lands 
(khalesehjat). 
In addition, I must bring to your attention that there is much unused land 
adjoining this bazaar, but there are very few Iranians with the wherewithal or 
the willingness to undertake such construction, with the exception of 
Movaqqar [my emphasis].”161 
 
 In effect, the state was embracing the proposal offered by the Company and 
confirming the whole urban modernization scheme, so long as a member of the 
Iranian new political elite was prominently involved. The notion of “Iranianization” 
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was becoming a catchphrase for Iranian elite nationalists as a substitute to any real 
renegotiation of power that would also involve the local population, and the 
acknowledgment of the collective rights of urban citizens.  The Company’s claim that 
the areas it already occupied, as well as those further territories it was now demanding 
were unused and unoccupied wasteland surrounding the oil works in Abadan was 
being accepted by the state, in spite of vociferous objections and pleas by local 
residents, as well as the reports of the local government Kargozars. In March the 
government sent an envoy to the province, Mr. Nasr, in order to get a first hand 
assessment of the situation in a region that was still clearly an unknown territory to 
the new state actors. Nasr provided a detailed intelligence report, providing alarming 
information about the extent of Company monopoly control in Masjed Soleyman 
(chapter 5). Regarding Abadan, Nasr reported as if from a foreign country, about 
which he was providing original reconnaissance: 
“Abadan: This is a region for the refining of petrol. I have submitted to you all 
the maps of this region, which I have secured with great pain. In these maps 
you will find that besides the refinery installations the Company has many 
other buildings and constructions, such as dwellings, shops, mosque for 
Indians, and movie theaters. There are 16 thousand workmen. 
The Persian workmen live in wicker huts or under tents outside the Company 
areas, but the Indians and Chinese dwell in constructions erected by the 
company or under good tents. The Company has its own police department as 
well as a municipality. The local Iranian police have no authority at all. The 
Company collects taxes on land, property, and sanitation. As regards the 
health of the workmen the Company has taken good measures” 
 
 The year 1926 was the high point of good relations between APOC and the 
central government. Pivotal agreements were reached, and the relieved Company 
finally launched into its coveted urban planning projects. But citizen resistance had 
not ended by simply being ignored and dismissed, and soon after the frictions 









After the Honeymoon was Over: Urban Strife and the Social Question in post 
1926 Abadan  
 
Most histories of this period have depicted the reasons behind the increasingly 
turbulent relationships between APOC and the Iranian Government between 1928-
1933 as caused by the disputes over the royalties and terms of the concession that 
came to a head following the Great Depression of 1929 and culminated in the highly 
contested 1933 oil agreement162. However, both global circumstances, as well as 
urban tensions in Abadan, and the continued resistance of workers, residents, and 
local population also played an important role in exacerbating frictions and forcing 
adjustments by the state and the Company.  
In the proceeding years certain patterns were set, with the Company constantly 
demanding and expecting more from the government to shoulder the social 
responsibilities of expanding and maintaining the urban infrastructure and to suppress 
local resistance; while the state felt it was the Company’s responsibility to maintain 
and develop the built environment of oil, and felt aggravated by the heavy handed 
actions that were alienating the local population.  At the same time, on the 
international scale, labor strife and mass politics were casting a heavy shadow over 
corporate perceptions about the vital importance of “the social question” for political 
stability and more smooth labor relations. The 1926 General Strike of miners and 
transport workers in Britain was a watershed in enforcing a rethinking of industrial 
relations among the employers (see chapter 4). In Iran the brutal program of the 
disarmament and the forceful settlement of tribes, coupled with compulsory universal 
conscription, and intrusive cultural laws enforcing a universal national dress, created 
a major backlash that resulted in the general tribal uprising of 1929163. In the spring of 
the same year a major labor strike occurred among the oil workers of Abadan, 
organized and led by Yousef Eftekhari. The turbulent political situation would prove 
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that the restlessness and discontent of the subalterns, the working classes, and the 
urban populations, could neither be ignored permanently, nor simply fenced in behind 
gates, barbed wires, and fortified enclaves.   
 As Company plans to develop new parts of the city began to be implemented 
after the summer of 1926 more local complaints kept flooding the Ministries in the 
fall and winter of the following year. People being evicted to make room for 
boulevards, ditches, and streets, were told that their complaints were pointless 
because, “The Provincial Government of Khuzestan has been ordered to allow street 
making in Abadan only after it has been discussed in the Provincial Administrative 
Council and after owners have been satisfied with the just compensation they have 
received for the buildings being demolished”164. However, when the Company began 
digging canals and ditches all over the island the government agents were highly 
alarmed and the Kargozar asked, “The Company is digging canals around Abadan. 
The cost is paid out of oil revenues, where the government is a shareholder. Has the 
government permitted this? Is the Company’s intention to stifle the expansion of the 
city?” The response of the head of Abadan Municipality was highly interesting and 
worthy of being quoted in detail: 
“The ditches and canals were dug before I came here; on the east side in 1923, 
and in 1925 on the west side, both without the government’s permission. Most 
of the population in Abadan work for the company, and the city has a 
population of 60,000. The ditches have curtailed the city’s expansion and the 
high density has made the population miserable. There is conflict and even 
murder over each zar’ [Dehkhoda: zar’ = 2m2] of land, and families of 20 live 
in utter misery huddled in a 50 zar’ [100 m2] patch of land. Now the Company 
has also taken over this side of Haffar (name of canal), which used to be part 
of Abadan, where they have occupied acres of space, and are preventing 
people from building shelter, housing, or shops. Something has to be done for 
the welfare of this miserable population. Either they should be relocated and 
compensated so they can build something for themselves, or the Company’s 
expansion should be curtailed, and the open side of Abadan adjoining 
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Khorramshahr [to the north] should be allowed to expand and allow people to 
build houses for themselves.165 
 
 Once an agreement with the government was put in place in 1926 the 
Company had moved energetically to launch a program of urban development for the 
expanding areas under its control. Its sanitary projects of sewerage and drainage 
ditches were at the same time acting as new fences and fortified barricades to contain 
the displaced population in an increasingly carceral landscape, that was designed by 
professional experts in urban and municipal planning and sanitation.   
In 1925 APOC hired the consulting engineering firm F.C.Temple to work on 
sewerage and drainage. The following year the experienced Scottish urban planner, 
J.M. Wilson, with extensive colonial experience in India and Iraq, was employed to 
oversea the city’s transformation over the coming years, and until nationalization in 
1951166. In 1936 other prominent firms, N. Porteus and D.M. Watson, were brought on 
to further expand and develop sewage and water works. Richard Costain, the largest 
British home construction firm was contracted in 1938 to oversee the Company’s 
massive housing programs, under the planning direction of JM Wilson167.   
Until 1930s all housing and urban development programs were geared toward 
European staff, and the skilled artisans. After 1933 housing skilled workers and 
Iranianization of the labor force also became part of the agenda. It was only in the 
1940s that the Company was confronted with the inevitability of accepting a role in 
assisting with the housing crisis and urban conditions of ordinary laborers. The 
political changes in the post WW2 era when labor mobilization, socialist activism, 
urban struggles, and nationalist sentiments were reaching an explosive point, finally 
prompted the Company to begin addressing the horrendous housing conditions of 
ordinary laborers: “Many of the labor houses built during wartime have no internal 
water, light or latrines. There are one water point for 16 quarters, and one communal 
latrine per block for 8 quarters. However, they are rapidly being updated to peacetime 
standards”168. 
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While the Company did offer aid with important urban amenities for the Shahr 
area, it never committed to significantly improving conditions there; leaving the 
dilemma for the central government to handle. Meanwhile, the major land clearings 
across the island, and especially around the refinery and the Company areas, that had 
began in 1927 were intended to clear space for streets, housing estates, and large 
excavation works for the building of canals and sewerage and drainage ditches. As a 
result, all the vital Company areas -- residential estates, the refinery, roads, tank 
farms, the port, the new bazaar, administrative offices, clubs, expanding port 
facilities, the airport, etc. – were surrounded by defensible open spaces that could be 
easily monitored, policed, and kept under surveillance. All these projects were 
displacing massive numbers of people, as the Municipal Director reported with 
dismay, and pushing those evicted into an ever more condensed Shahr area. The 
sewerage ditches, the sanitary canals excavated to carry the human refuse to the river 
were at the same time acting as new physical barriers to enforce spatial segregation, 
and to defend the new exclusive enclaves carved out by and for the Company with the 
consent of the state.   
 Almost immediately the new urban works created a strong backlash, 
especially as the demographic pressures were mounting in the increasingly congested 
city. The new government appointed municipal agents began to object. Hossein 
Sami’i, who had been placed in charge of Abadan’s municipal affairs, warned that, 
“Abadan’s population is annually increasing because of Company affairs. There is no 
justification for limiting the expansion of the city, and for the population to suffer 
because of a useless ditch”169.  
The latest dispute was over a major ditch for berthing large boats coming up the river: 
“The Company has dug a 300 zar’ canal in East of Abadan to allow ships to 
dock at high tide [zar’, it seems, indicated both a unit of length as well as 
surface, pending on the context]. A year and half ago (1925?) another canal 
was excavated that separated the Company from the west of the town. It 
appears the only intention [of these projects is to further] separate the two 
[Company areas from Shahr]… These actions curtail the expansion of the 
town since the areas beyond both canals are [also] occupied by the Company, 
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and the town cannot spread in those directions, nor to the south where it 
borders the Shatt (al-Arab River). However, there are lands to the North as 
well as some unused land within the existing city [for the growing population 
to settle]”170 
 
 The popular resistance against increasing evictions continued and added to the 
pressure cooker of urban discontent. Petitions to the Majles and authorities, reports to 
newspapers, and complaints to local officials, continued and became more vocal, as 
evidenced by the following petition that reached newspapers and the Court, 
prompting the Monarch to look into the situation. The petition was penned by “Your 
humble servant Mehdi Reza, also known as Abdollah Atiq al Hossein, acting as 
attorney for the plaintiffs, “My clients, the residents of Abadan”, and giving his 
address as “Next to the Turks’ Mosque, by the Cloth Shoemakers’ Market [Bazaar-e 
Givehkesh-ha]”:  
“Regarding the homes demolished in1924 by the Company in Abadan: We 
sent a telegram to the Majlis, all the ministries, and all well known 
newspapers. In Mohammareh we had meetings with the Kargozar, the 
Company representative, and the British Consul, and they all agreed and drew 
a tally of 24,000 Rps compensation to paid, but thus far my clients have 
received naught. Please clarify whether the Company has not paid, or have 
they paid the government (but not us), how do they intend to pay people?”171 
  
Reza Shah’s office made an inquest to the Company regarding the ongoing 
complaints, but the Company dismissed the whole affair as opportunism by the 
plaintiffs, and urged the government to move on and draw a line under the affair: 
“We did pay some compensation for the illegally built huts and cottages built 
on Company property [?!]. This demolition took place several years ago with 
the consent of government officials who acknowledged them to be the source 
of sanitary danger and epidemics and felt it necessary to demolish them. At 
the time government officials determined the amount of compensation, which 
was paid. You ought to inquire from Mohammareh officials about this. Of 
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course acknowledging claims years after they have been cleared will only 
cause further trouble”172. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The post-WWI era was a pivotal period that shaped the oil complex globally, 
as well as in Iran, within the context of revolutionary transformations that were taking 
place at various scales (chapter 4). The transformation of the built environment of 
Abadan reflected these processes, but also was the spatial setting for making them a 
reality: Without places like Abadan and Masjed Soleyman there would not have been 
a transition to Fordism of mass consumer production and consumption that was built 
on the foundations of cheap and plentiful petroleum, nor the possibility of democratic 
mass politics based on notions of publicly provided social welfare.  
This urban geography was shaped by a host of social and political relations 
that contributed to its taking shape: The sanitary ideas of public health, coupled with 
the apartheid practices of racial and class segregation justified on scientific grounds 
but implemented as exercises of power and domination, mediated and implemented 
by an emerging class of middle class professional experts. In this chapter we 
investigated the micro processes of “the state effect”, by analyzing how the nascent 
state institutions actually took shape on the ground, and came to define their 
governmental functions and jealously tried to carve out spheres of sovereignty over 
populations and territories for the exercise of their authority. To the extend that 
sources are available, we tried to excavate the social and historical agency of 
subaltern classes and urban denizens as they had to adjust to their new urban 
conditions after having been deracinated and dispossessed of their customary and 
collective modes of economic and social life. They carved out new urban solidarities, 
and founded new urban identities, in order to collectively resist their further 
dispossession and to struggle for their right to the city.  
Our analysis of the urban transformation of Abadan showed how the coercive 
commodification of urban space and everyday life created the material basis for a 
labor market, as well as a market for the basic necessities of everyday life. This urban 
built environment was thus the setting for the creation of a permanent wage laboring 
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class, where one did not exist before. The precarious conditions of life eventually 
made cheap casual labor too expensive, as the relentless resistance of the urban 
population to its living and working conditions, as well as their ongoing dispossession 
eventually culminated in open insurgencies such as those that occurred in 1925, 1929, 
culminating in a general tribal uprising and the oil workers’ strike, that drew some 
major concessions from the Oil Company and the Government (see Conclusion). 
 The detailed micro history of the Bazaar of Abadan presented here 
encapsulates much larger global, national, and local dynamics that, I will argue, were 
paradigmatic in how the oil complex was shaped in Iran. I have tried to demonstrate 
through this thick description that the oil complex was shaped, in practice, by the 
constant frictions and struggles between social agents that were vastly unequal, but 
nonetheless had no choice but to contest and negotiate as they played their part in the 
assemblage of the oil industry. In the process of these contested relations, taking place 
in the urban setting of Abadan, these social agents - APOC, the Iranian state, and the 
local population of Abadan - strove to shape the city to fit their interest; and were in 







Conclusion: Abadan and Oil Workers in the Interwar Years  
(1926-1941) 
 
 The previous chapters explored the social and geographic history of the 
consolidation of the oil complex in Khuzestan during a pivotal and revolutionary 
period for Iran, Khuzestan, the Persian Gulf region, as well as for Britain. Our 
historical analysis situated the social history of oil within the longue durée of the 
British-Iranian relations (chapter 2), the WWI, and the paradigmatic changes brought 
about by Fordism, and the rise of mass politics and state involvement in regulating 
social conflict through welfare measures (chapter 4). The remaining chapters 
provided a micro history of local social change as the oil complex began to take shape 
by altering the existing social, political, and physical landscape of the province 
(chapter 3, 5, 6). By linking together these different geographic scales of analysis the 
social history of the oil encounter in southern Iran was presented as part of a 
relational Global Labor History (chapter 1). The period covered in these chapters 
traces the assemblage of the oil complex in Iran from the granting of the D’Arcy 
Concession in 1901 until 1927 and the relative consolidation of the main social actors 
and institutions that were used as the main units of analysis in exploring this historical 
oil encounter.  
In this concluding chapter I will briefly analyze the large contours of the 
period leading to WW2, which culminated with the occupation of Iran by the allies 
and the forced abdication of Reza Shah. This dissertation sets the groundwork and the 
theoretical and comparative framework for a subsequent book project that will 
analyze the social history of labor in the Iranian oil complex up to 1953, when a 
military coup d’état ended the oil nationalization movement, which had the oil 
workers as its backbone.  
 
Taking Stock of the State of Knowledge, Evaluating Sources, and What Remains 
to be Done:  
The previous chapters have been heavily focused on the largely overlooked 
but formative early period of the assemblage of the oil complex and the industrial 
working class in oil, especially as far as the role of ordinary people has been 




concerned. The relative obscurity of the social history of this earlier period has been 
the result of two factors:  
First, the dearth of primary and even secondary sources produced by 
subalterns and ordinary people themselves, who were pulled in one way or another 
into the historical drama of the oil encounter. This silence was due in part to the 
mediums of collective expression in Khuzestan, and the operative forms of 
knowledge and local historical record keeping. Literacy was of little practical utility 
and almost non-existent among ordinary pastoralists and agrarian and tribal 
populations; there were no newspapers or other forms of mass media in the province 
until the late 1920s, and even the slim urban intelligentsia of notaries, administrators, 
secretaries, and men of religion have not left behind much in the form of conventional 
written historical, personal, financial, and legal records, that can help to paint a 
thicker portrait of the social everyday life as oil capitalism was being assembled in the 
province1. To compensate for this dearth of primary materials, in addition to archival 
Oil Company documents and British and Iranian government records, I have made 
use of petitions, newspaper reports mostly published in Tehran, property transaction 
records, legal contracts and treaties whenever pertinent and available, ethnographic 
studies, and a geographical analysis of the built environment of oil and the rural, 
urban, regional, national, and global dynamics within which the oil complex was 
embedded. However, there is no way to deny that for the time being more direct 
voices expressing the lived experiences of ordinary local populations are by and large 
missing from the story. As a result, my aim has been to focus on fleshing out the 
social history of that earlier formative period as much as possible by using the scant 
available sources.  
Aside from these scant primary sources we do have access to some histories 
written by the local political elite and prominent historians; and in recent years an 
increasing number of local histories are being published, which are greatly welcomed, 
but by and large they continue to remain within the realm of “folk history”, and all 
too often rely on already published secondary sources when it comes to delving 
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deeper into the subject2. While I have made wide use of archival sources that provide 
invaluable primary sources for this period, as we have seen in the previous chapters 
even the extensive diplomatic, intelligence, and bureaucratic records of the 
governments of Britain and Iran, and of APOC remain at best sketchy about the more 
intimate details of the transformations of quotidian and individual and collective lives 
during this period. We know, for example, that life in Abadan was very hard in the 
1910’s to 1930s, or that the Bakhtiyari rank and files were highly alienated during the 
enclosures of their pastoral territories, that tribal Arabs in Abadan were highly 
resentful of the encroachment of soldiers, migrants, and Oil Company men on their 
land, or that working conditions in the refinery and the oilfields were extremely 
difficult, but we know little about how these hardships, resentments, and alienations 
were actually experienced by people living through the experience. 
The changeover in sources from the 1930s onward is noticeable, as local 
working people, intellectuals, political activists, government and Oil Company 
experts and functionaries, began to produce very different types of records and 
analyses ranging from reporting about living conditions, political aspirations, cultural 
changes, work habits, social ties, and power relations in the oil complex, as well as 
changing property relations, contracts, police records, economic and commercial 
activities, etc. The historical sources and available materials from roughly 1929 
onward provide a very different picture and ample raw materials for pulling together a 
more complex portrait of the social life of oil in the region than the former era.   
The second reason behind the relative obscurity of the earlier formative phase 
of the oil complex has to do with the perspective of those who have produced what 
historical records we have of this era. As we have seen throughout the text, British 
explorers and political agents, Oil Company officials, and Iranian statesmen, 
functionaries, and writers, did not deem the experiences of subaltern populations as 
significant enough to record, except from an instrumental perspective that served the 
priorities and interests that they found relevant. Thus, we have remarkably detailed 
primary as well as secondary sources produced over long decades by British political 
and intelligence agents, which provide invaluable knowledge about the region, even if 
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they remain at best partial when it comes to gaining more intimate insight into how 
these revolutionary historical transformations were experienced from the perspective 
of the heterogeneous local populations3. Likewise, there is a growing body of 
contemporary political historiography of the province, the state, various local ethic 
groups, and the oil industry in Iran, but this important literature also favors the role of 
large institutions such as the national state and APOC, and tends to emphasize as as 
analytical framework macro processes such as industrial capitalism and nation state 
building in such a way that they are often presented as ready-made and all too 
powerful makers of history. As a result, in this literature the histories of subaltern 
populations are offered as mere case studies proving the general forward trend of 
history (see chapter 1). 
To fill this void and reconstruct the social history of the oil encounter in 
Khuzestan we have focused on the built environment of oil in Khuzestan and the 
urban process in Abadan as an entry point into that formative period.  Analyzing the 
built environment of oil allowed us to link together various geographies that are 
usually understood to be separate as part of an interlinked process and to nlyze the 
social agencies that built these environments. Most importantly, the rural, agrarian, 
and pastoral regions of Masjid Soleyman and Abadan were analyzed as part of the oil 
complex that also included their urban and industrial spaces. Thus, “the country and 
the city” have not been analyzed as two separate places, but as a unified but uneven 
space produced by the interconnected practices of the same set of social agents4. What 
connected them together were the enclosures of collective lands, pastures, and 
territories, to pave the way for the process of the initial accumulation of oil 
capitalism. Rather than treating this process as a fait accompli I have tried to show 
how it was a protracted and coercive process that led to great social dislocations, 
while it continued to be contested in various forms.  
Chapter 4 brought in a transnational dimension, by historicizing the medical 
and social reform practices that began to be implemented during the formative period 
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of 1870s-1918 in Europe and the colonies in response to the exigencies of mass 
politics, industrial and scientific change, and the world war. The emerging role of 
professional middle class experts in formulating the social question and devising new 
practices of governmentality in response to these dislocations was discussed in 
chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
Last, analyzing the urban process in Abadan (chapters 3, 5, and 6) allowed us 
to focus on the frictions between the heterogeneous local populations, the Oil 
Company, the newly formed administrative apparatus of the central government, and 
British and Iranian state actors. By placing the micro history of the urban struggles 
around the Bazaar of Abadan at the center of analysis I have tried to demonstrate how 
each of these institutions and sets of historical actors were formed through relentlessly 
contentious interactions with each other. Chapter 6, in particular, demonstrated how 
APOC tried to carve out exclusive enclaves in Abadan by using the justification of 
medical and scientific knowledge and the practical techniques of urban planning. The 
urban struggles over reshaping the city’s spaces and physical amenities contributed to 
the state institutions, as well as the citizens, defining their roles and shaping their 
collective and institutional practices.  
As an entry point I have used the different and conflictual notions of property 
to analyze how various groups and institutions tried to establish exclusive access to 
land (and space) in the city as well as the country. By analyzing property and legal 
contracts as social relations of power we have gained an insight into how the initial 
enclosures and dispossession of the Bakhtiyari and tribal Arab societies took place to 
pave the way for the assemblage of the oil complex was assembled in Khuzestan. 
In the following sections I will provide an overview of the transformations of 
the oil complex’ transformations from 1927 to 1941. I will first discuss the larger 
geopolitical changes that took place in Khuzestan; before proceeding to sketch out the 
new dynamics of labor activism that emerged with the 1929 Abadan oil workers’ 
strike; and conclude with an overview of the urban transformation of Abadan during 
this period.   
  
Patching Together a Fragmented Provincial Geography with Guns and Oil: 
 In 1924 the Prime Minister Reza Khan visited APOC installations at Abadan 
and the Fields and was received formally and with eager hospitality by the APOC 




management. The event carried remarkable symbolism as the first visit to the 
province by an Iranian head of state in centuries5. Khuzestan, known from the 16th 
century as ‘Arabistan’, had become virtually autonomous from the rest of the country 
during the turbulent previous centuries6. The visit had even greater practical 
significance: Reza Khan had accompanied the army to Khuzestan to subjugate Sheikh 
Khaz’al’s autonomous rule. The British Government had tried to dissuade him by 
attempting mediation and issuing threats, to no avail (chapter 2). The previous year 
autonomous southern tribes had attempted to forge a “Southern Confederate Alliance” 
to collectively resist the central government’s pending incursions; but their effort fell 
apart amidst rivalries and discord, partly fueled by Reza Khan playing them against 
each other. The Army took a month to arrive. Once there, the balance of power 
shifted permanently (see chapters 2,3,5). Sheikh Khaz’al submitted and offered to pay 
his arrear taxes, the formal bone of contention with the central government. But he 
was arrested and deported a few months later, and his authority in the province, the 
linchpin of a confederate system of tribal alliances, was replaced by that of a Military 
Governor and appointed central government bureaucrats7.  
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Reza Shah's Visit to Abadan 1931  
 
Source: Ministry of Petroleum, Iran 
 
Soon after these events a growing flood of appointed government officials and 
administrators began to arrive. Ahmad Kasravi, the prominent nationalist intellectual, 
was one of these officials who had been appointed earlier in 1923 to head the new 
judicial administration in Ahvaz, now designated as the new provincial capital. As 
had others before him, such as Najm al-Molk in the 19h century (Chapter2), Kasravi 
arrived from Tehran by a circuitous and long journey through Baghdad and sailing 
down the Tigris, taking weeks to arrive at his post8. For Kasravi the experience was 
like travelling to a foreign and exotic land over a hazardous route. Until the mid 
1920s a trip by horse from Abadan to Tehran took approximately four weeks, 
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effectively longer and considerably more dangerous than a sea voyage to London9. 
However, things were about to change with remarkable speed.  
Iran had a vast and rugged territory, with few established roads fit for carriage 
transport, let alone modern vehicles. Historically, camel and mule caravans had 
replaced wheeled transport since pre-Islamic times, and especially the mountain 
access routes to Khuzestan were difficult and hazardous in the extreme10. In the first 
quarter of the 20th Century, with all the political uncertainty and acute hardships 
plaguing the country, maintaining the transport and communication networks had 
become even more challenging11.  
This fragmented geography also characterized the province itself. Arnold 
Wilson who was in Mohammareh around 1910 as acting Consul remarked “Sixty 
years ago or so there was regular traffic from Dizful to Hamadan and Central Persia. 
Now tribal feuds have made traffic impossible”12. Prior to APOC building a Company 
railroad connecting Masjed Soleyman to Abadan and Mohammareh the 130 km 
journey to the oil fields could take up to five days, especially in bad weather. Once 
completed the narrow gage Company railroad reduced this to one day13. Motorcars 
further accelerated this spatial integration drastically, with profound social 
consequences, as we shall see. Prior to WWI motor transport were a luxury and a 
novelty (See Chapter 4). Arnold Wilson, who was from a middle class background 
and a colonial officer in the service of the Government of India in southern Iran, first 
experienced riding a motorcar in 1910 in an APOC owned vehicle on a visit Masjid 
Soleyman14. For different reasons both the British as well as the southern tribes 
viewed paved roads, and especially railroads, with considerable apprehension until 
the mid 1920s (See chapter 2)15.  
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Wilson who surveyed and mapped the western regions of Iran for selecting 
alternative railroads routes saw the situation thus:  
“Russia wants a trans-Persian railroad to India (bad for Persia and for India); 
Britain wants railroads from the Gulf to the interior, but nowhere near 
Russia…Having the oilfields in British hands, it is incumbent on us not to 
allow them to be imperiled by a Russian southward push by means of a 
Russian controlled railway and Russian trade”.  
 
In a 1913 conversation with a Lur Clan Headman with whom he was staying 
overnight during his survey, Wilson was told that the tribes appreciated the benefits of 
roads and railways, but what they feared was the increasing power of cities, the 
bureaucracy, and the state:  
“A railway through Luristan would increase the power of the Central 
Government in SW. Persia to levy taxes, which would be spent elsewhere, 
mainly in the Capital, by men with no interest whatsoever in the welfare or 
interests of the people of SW. Persia”16.  
 
As the tribes saw it Railways brought security, but only for the cities. Despite 
his own prescient misgivings Wilson insured his host that the security brought by 
railroads would not be at the expense of the tribes, but by the improvements in 
general welfare that would accompany them. In hindsight his host was probably more 
clear-sighted than the colonial officer.  
Britain doggedly tried to control the financing and construction of the Iranian 
transnational railway to make sure the project remained tied to its own strategic 
interests, especially now that Tsarist threat had been replaced by what she saw as the 
more insidious Soviet menace. During the major APOC re-organization of 1926 Percy 
Loraine the Minister in Tehran, Cadman the APOC chairman, Chamberlain the 
Foreign Secretary, and his assistant Lancelot Oliphant, did their best to coordinate 
their efforts to prevent the independent railway schemes that were being prepared by 
Tehran17. The construction of the transnational railroad had become an obsession with 
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Iranian nationalists who perceived it as the golden solution for overcoming chronic 
‘backwardness’. These nationalists understood the persistent objections and 
interferences by the Great Powers since the end of the 19th century against successive 
attempts to fund and build a national railroad as a conspiracy that ought to be 
overcome at all costs if Iran were to become a modern and prosperous nation18.  
In 1925 Britain had been alarmed by a law passed by the Majles to impose a 
special consumer tax on sugar and tea in order to finance the national railroad 
construction (chapter 2). Loraine was concerned that if this were to happen the Iranian 
government would no longer be dependent on British loans or oil royalties, and could 
employ American firms and engineers instead to help it with the scheme19. They 
asked Cadman to delay negotiations over a new concession, and to,  
“Tie the oil renegotiations to the railway scheme. Iran will become dependent 
as no one will build railroads in Iran without full measure of security on 
capital, nor will railroads produce enough income ever for working expenses 
for the first ten years…The Government will have to subsidize the railroads 
directly…They will have no choice but to come to us then”20.  
 
However, the drastic events in Khuzestan had changed all these calculations, 
as we saw in chapter 2, and once Sheikh Khaz’al was ousted the British Government 
and APOC had little option but to throw in their lot with Reza Shah. 
                                                           
18 Ehsani, “Tabar Shenasi-e Tarh-ha-ye Bozorg-e Tose’eh dar Iran-e Mo’aser. I intend to write about 
the social history of the railroads in Iran at a different occasion. Here I am merely sketching the 
relevant parts for our current story. 
19 “Loraine, British Legation in Tehran, to Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary, London”, 14 January 1926, 
Dossier 1: Correspondence with Foreign Office Relating to Visit to Tehran, BP 71183  
20 “Loraine to Cadman” 18 February 1926, BP 71183.  The British preferred an East West route to 
connect Mesopotamia and India, both their territories. In the case of a North South route they wanted 
the construction to begin from the Persian Gulf, and end at Tehran, staying well away from Soviet 
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chosen route may be, to immediately connect the capital with the oil areas in Khuzestan. A more 
economic choice would have been a main line connecting the country’s largest cities, Tabriz, Tehran, 
Isfahan, Shiraz, with the largest open ports on the Persian Gulf, either Bushehr or Bandar Abbas. As it 
were, the construction proceeded and the railroad was completed by 1938. It was a great feat of 
engineering, built at great cost and hardship for ordinary people. Ironically, the greatest beneficiaries of 
the project were the Allies who occupied Iran in 1941, deposed Reza Shah, and used the railroad to 
supply the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front. See Ehsani, “Tabar Shenasi-e Tarh ha-ye Bozorg-e 
Tose’eh"; Clawson, “Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution 1920-40”; Steen 
Andersen, “Building for the Shah: Market Entry, Political Reality and Risks on the Iranian Market, 
1933–1939,” Enterprise & Society 9, no. 4 (2008): 637–69; Cronin, The Making of Modern Iran: State 
and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921-41; Melamid, “The Geographical Patterns of Iranian Oil 
Development,” 211–214. 




The consequences of the new alliance between the Oil Company and the 
army, and the game-changing impact of new modes of transportation and 
communication, became evident almost immediately. In July 1925, shortly after 
Khaz’al exile, Arab tribes of southwest Khuzestan rose in revolt, and attacked 
Mohammareh. In a stunning change of strategy the Oil Company made its transport 
vehicles available to carry army troops from Ahvaz to crush the revolt of its erstwhile 
allies (chapter 6). Arnold Wilson, now the Company Manager at Mohammareh, called 
on gunships and Indian troops from Basra for help, but their intervention proved 
unnecessary21. Modern vehicle transport provided by APOC and fueled by Abadan 
refinery products had aided the new Iranian army to eliminate quickly and effectively 
the threat of Arab tribes who had been guarding the oil industry until a few months 
before. A new uneasy alliance had been sealed. From now the Oil Company together 
with the State, its army, its bureaucratic institutions, and its national laws, would 
continue together the project of reshaping the geography of the province, and of 
regulating the lives of its people in order to pave the way for the effective operation of 
oil capitalism and the consolidation of an integrated nation state. 
 
The 1925 Arab revolt was the first of many subsequent tribal insurgencies that 
challenged the new political order in the coming years. By late 1920s Reza Shah 
began a major project of coercive resettlement of the pastoral tribes, who comprised a 
quarter of the total population of the country. The immediate cause of the 1925 Arab 
tribal revolt was the abuses they had suffered from army troops who had been 
confiscating grain, foodstuff, and pack animals (see chapter 6). The year 1925 was 
especially difficult for the local population: there was severe drought and famine 
across the country; in Khuzestan the acting military governor who had replaced Sartip 
(Colonel) Zahedi was suspected by the Oil Company of having communist 
sympathies; and his troops had been confiscating pack animals to facilitate food 
imports from Iraq and provisioning the army22. It was an explosive mélange. In the 
fragile agrarian pastoralist economies of the region mules, horses, sheep, water 
buffalo, pack animals, and grain, could make the difference between life and death, 
and between relative affluence and high status versus destitution:  
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“[Horses and] Mares are the most valuable commodity of an Arab. They’ll 
deprive themselves of food to keep hold of them. Mares are bought and sold in 
peculiar ways, seldom is the whole animal bought by a single keeper. Each 
buys one or more legs. The one who owns the forelegs stables, feeds, and 
exercises her”23. 
 
However, the more deep-rooted cause of the revolt was the collapse of the 
social-political order that had been personified in the position of Sheikh Khaz’al and 
his court. While the revolt was crushed in Mohammareh and Abadan remained 
relatively calm; “Inland, however, the unrest among the Arabs continued due partly to 
their resentment of the Persian troops’ behavior and partly because they had in many 
cases been deprived of all tribal authority”24 [my emphasis].  
 
Inevitably, the vacuum created by the elimination of the existing social and 
political order and the demise of the role of the local magnates began to be filled by 
the State and the Oil Company, through a highly fractious relationship where the 
boundaries of sovereignty of each were to be relentlessly contested in the coming 
years. In the footsteps of the army and bureaucrats came national laws and 
regulations, conscription, roads, the railroad, the national currency, as well as a 
growing stream of people hoping to make a living working for the oil industry or on 
its margins. Growing motorcar transport, increasingly fueled by petrol produced in 
Abadan, and distributed by APOC through a nationwide supply network25, played a 
vital role in forcing through this geographic integration26. With a paved road linking 
Masjed Soleyman to the rest of the province, followed by more feeder roads 
extending into the highlands and the countryside, the historical advantage of their 
geographic isolation as part of their strategic defense and autonomy rapidly 
disappeared for the Bakhtiyaris in the highlands of Zagros. In the interwar years the 
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(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992).  
26 Alexander Melamid, “Petroleum Product Distribution and the Evolution of Economic Regions in 
Iran,” Geographical Review 65, no. 4 (October 1, 1975): 510–25. 




expanding road network transformed the oil industry itself by allowing it to spread 
out beyond its originally limited scale (see Figure 1).  
Motorcars allowed the rapid transportation of heavy equipment and 
manpower, and significantly facilitated the Company’s exploration and extraction 
activities in previously inaccessible locales. They opened new feeder roads and made 
possible the rapid repair and constant monitoring of pipelines, as well as the fast 
expanding communication and transportation grid. During WWI, in 1915-1916, the 
pipeline sabotage by the Germans and their tribal allies had taken three months to 
repair. Now it could be done in days. By the end of 1920s, shortly after Kasravi had 
arrived in Ahvaz via a long and difficult journey, regular motorcar travel became 
possible, with the trip from Tehran to Khuzestan taking two days to complete in good 
weather. APOC assisted in the road-building project, by contributing to the 
construction of the northbound Dezful--Khorramabad road through the notoriously 
unsafe Luristan highlands. The Company provided help in surveying and mapping the 
route, and made cost estimates for the project. It also began supplying subsidized 
petrol products to the construction project, and for provisioning the market in the rest 
of the country27.  
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Map 4: Khuzestan Inbound and Outbound Geographic Links28 
 
These new geographic developments facilitated the mass movement of troops, 
as well as bureaucrats, official visitors, entrepreneurs, and migrant workers to the 
province. Before this period the geography of oil in Khuzestan had been limited to a 
linear corridor formed around the two nodes of crude oil extraction in Masjed 
Soleyman in the north, linked via pipeline transport southward to be refined at 
Abadan, and from there exported by tankers via the river Shatt al Arab. Now, 
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however, thanks to the new networks of road transportation, the refinery at Abadan 
began supplying various petroleum products in reverse direction, northward to 
Masjed Soleyman and Ahvaz, and soon to the rest of the country29. The change 
affected material production as well, as domestic demand grew fast for products such 
as tar and bitumen for paving roads, lubricants and petrol for engines, and Kerosene 
for generators and lighting. These products began to be packaged and distributed for 
the expanding internal market from 1930s.  
Equally significant, motorcars allowed the horizontal spread of the oil 
networks within the province: Car transport facilitated the discovery and exploitation 
of alternative fields - such as Haftgel, Gachsaran, Lali, and Aghajari - in remote 
locations where extending the Company railroad would have been impractical and 
uneconomical. Soon the idea of developing alternative deep-sea ports on the coast of 
the Persian Gulf began to be considered as the solution for allowing the berthing of 
larger tankers, and of avoiding the problems that plagued Abadan and Khorramshahr 
(as Mohammareh had been renamed). Foremost among these problems was the 
ongoing river boundary disputes with Iraq, and the logistical difficulty of the constant 
dredging of the heavily silted Shatt al Arab. Eventually, the pristine lagoons of Khor 
Mousa and the nearby tiny port of Ma’shour were selected and a new seaport began to 
be built there; although the idea of building a new refinery there to handle the 
production of Aghajari was ultimately abandoned in favor of an underwater pipeline 
to the Kharq Island30.     
It is important to emphasize, again, that the path was opened for motorcars, 
the railroad, and the military-bureaucratic integration of Khuzestan into a nation-state 
framework only after the existing social and political structures had been subjugated 
and dismantled, and collective pastoral and tribal territories had been enclosed. Along 
with this new geography came the process of increasing commoditization of everyday 
life, including labor and its reproduction (housing, food, transportation, etc.). The 
process also opened the gates for the significant movement of population to 
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Khuzestan, and the expansion of a significant wage labor market in its urban areas. 
The increasing integration of the province into national politics and market relations 
had created a situation where global trends and national policies began to quickly and 
directly affect all aspects of life.  
The Great Depression of 1929 and the coercive and military settlement of 
pastoral tribes by the central government that began in 1928 and accelerated 
throughout the 1930s contributed to the growing army of the unemployed. But in 
southern and western Iran, this trend was briefly offset by the intense demand for 
labor during the construction of the transnational Iranian Railways. However, once 
the railroad had been completed in 1938 a new wave of mass unemployment ensued, 
especially in the western regions. The import-substitution-industrialization policies 
that the central government had launched in the 1930s (see the next section) 
momentarily alleviated this crisis; but the military occupation of the country during 
the WW2 once again imposed great hardships on a population that was ill equipped to 
absorb it. The occupying Allies used the recently developed infrastructures of the oil 
industry, the transport networks of new roads and railways, and the abundant and 
destitute cheap manpower, to supply the Soviet Union and shore up the Eastern Front. 
The occupation caused severe wartime hardships, especially in the south and the west 
due to military food requisitions and the labor drafts that undermined subsistence 
agriculture and food production. These developments contributed to a trend where the 
draw of the labor market and the urban economies of Khuzestan’s oil cities became 
often the only hope of economic survival for the growing throngs of migrants who 
began to flood the province31.     
 
Table 7 shows the demographic trends over the period under discussion. It 
should be noted that no official census data exists until 1956. The figures are 
compiled from various sources, and some are at best intelligent estimates based on 
scanty and scattered sources available. Despite its sketchiness the table reveals several 
important trends: The expansion of oil cities, particularly Abadan, had accelerated 
significantly prior to the completion of the Railroads in late 1930s, due to the 
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Roots and Impact of the 1929 Abadan Oil Workers’ Strike.” 




increasing availability of relatively cheap bus transport32. But the subsequent growth 
after the occupation in 1941 becomes truly noticeable.   
 
Table 7: Estimated Population of Khuzestan and Selected Cities (000) 
 
Sources: Compiled from Adamec (1976): 5; Ansari (1974); Author’s estimates; Bamberg (1994); 
Ferrier (1982): 276; ILO (1950): 131; Iran National Census (1956); Issawi (1971); Lorimer (1986); 
Neligan (1926); Seccombe & Lawless (1987): 32; Seccombe & Lawless (1993): 191, 193, 194; 
Shahnavaz (2005); Vieille, et.al. (1964, 1969) 
 
In the interwar years Khuzestan was transformed from one the most sparsely 
populated and rural provinces of Iran, where prior to WWI at most 10 percent of the 
population lived in urban areas, to one of its most urbanized, with 40 percent of a 
much larger population living in what were now urban areas33 (see table 1). Most of 
this urban growth took place in oil cities, primarily Abadan and Masjed Soleyman; as 
well as in Ahvaz, which became both one of the headquarters for AIOC operations as 
well as the new seat of provincial government in 1926.  The extent to which the oil 
complex had been one of the main causes of this urbanization and the formation of an 
industrial labor market can be glimpsed from an ILO report into working conditions 
in the oil industry, which concluded that Abadan in 1949 had “an estimated 
population of 173,000, of whom 133,000, or 77 percent were company employees and 
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Khuzestan 180 N/A 410 543 N/A 1,43 
Abadan 14 24 40 - 60 61 173 226 
Masjed 
Soleyman 
Seasonal 1 6 - 20 N/A N/A 
45 
Ahvaz 0.3 - 1.0 4 10 30 N/A 120 
Mohammareh/ 
Khoramshahr 
3.0 - 6.0 10 - 16 20 20 N/A 
19 




their dependents. Most of the remaining 44,000 were workers employed by 
contractors, independent craftsmen and merchants and their families”34.  
 
Photograph 22: Ahvaz in 1932 
 
Source: BP Archives 
  
However, the urban impact of the oil industry and state institutions was 
uneven. Ahvaz, for example, had initially suffered as the commercial steamship 
transport on Karun, as well as the Lynch Road mule track across Zagros went into 
permanent decline with the advent of motorized transport. However, the city’s 
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bureaucratization, as well as its location as the hub of the transnational railways 
compensated for this loss35. On the other hand, the historic cities of Khuzestan, in 
particular Shushtar, Dezful, Ramhormoz, and Behbahan, entered a long period of 
relative isolation and stagnation36; while entirely new urban areas emerged as railroad 
towns (Andimeshk); ports (Mahshahr, formerly Ma’shur); army garrison towns 
(Ramshir, formerly Khalafabad); or oil company towns (Haftgel, Aghajari).  
Elsewhere, the historic and traditional economies and social relations on 
which they were based were hard pressed to continue functioning. In the Persian Gulf 
the pearling industry gradually all but disappeared. Likewise, the ship/boat building 
industry in Mohammareh/Khorramshahr as well as in Basra were hit hard but did not 
completely disappear. As the fishing and sea trade were taken over by new motorized 
vessels, traditional boat builders began fitting their craft with engines, although the 
construction of larger vessels moved to the coastline of the Persian Gulf. Similarly, 
the thriving date cultivation and trade along the Shatt al-Arab became subsumed 
under the new commercial shipping and oil traffic and land speculation that had 
deeply affected the river coastline37. Date groves and small-scale date farming 
survived in both Mohammareh/Khorramshahr and Abadan, mainly because of a 
continued demand for the crop as a staple food throughout the Persian Gulf region, 
although they were pushed to the margins of the local economies, overshadowed by 
the vast global businesses of oil and transnational shipping. In Abadan, 
Khorramshahr, and along the fertile coast of Shatt al Arab and Karun, date farming 
became a ‘traditional’ enclave for indigenous Arabs to hang on to the remaining 
vestiges of their land and productive activities. 
Table 8 reveals that by mid century a substantial share of the population of the 
new urban centers created by the exigencies of the oil industry and the policies of the 
central state had been settled in these cities continuously, beyond the first generation. 
These census figures are by district, and not by urban areas. The districts include the  
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peri-urban and the rural hinterland of the cities in question. Nevertheless they reveal 
 
Table 8: Migration Patterns by Census District & Birthplace of Migrants  
by Province (1956) 
(The last 6 rows show the percentage of migrants coming from each cited region) 
 
Source: National Census of Iran (1956) 
* “North” includes the provinces of  Gilan, Mazandaran, East and West Azarbaijan 
** Until 1954 the Bakhtiyari districts were administratively part of Isfahan, prior to being 
designated as a separate province 
 
 
interesting patterns that had been established after half a century of oil production and 
national integration in the province. Thus Abadan, the largest city in the province and 
still the highest receiver of migration to its district, had nearly 60 percent of its 
population who had been born there. By contrast, Shushtar, the previous historical 
seat of provincial government, had had virtually no immigration and only 5 percent of 
its population had been born outside the district. While 42 percent of the population 
of Abadan had been born elsewhere, the vast majority of these migrants had come 
from within Khuzestan (24%), or the adjoining provinces in the south of country 
(60%). Very few were migrating to the oil city from Tehran (the Central Province) or 
the northern provinces (8% of all migrants).  
Although the 1956 census, which was the first nationwide survey of the 
population, compounded the places of origin, for example Isfahan and Yazd, it should 
be noted that ‘Isfahan’ had until recently (1954) been the administrative province in 
control of most of the Bakhtiyari highlands of Zagros. Likewise, the adjoining tribal 
pastoralist regions of Kohkilouyeh and Mamsani had been administratively 

































































































































Abadan 284 161 42 24 24 5.0 36 3 4 
Ahvaz 213 151 29 53 3.0 8.0 25 6 0 
Masjed 
Soleyman 
170 135 20 21 0 1.0 70 1 0 
Khorramshahr 68 45 32 50 10 7.0 11 6 3 
Shushtar 57 55 5 50 0 4.0 44 3 4 




Bushsher and the northern coast of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, we can surmise 
that the high rate of migration from these southern regions of the country adjoining 
the province of Khuzestan and from within the province itself to the oil cities of 
Abadan and Masjed Soleyman, to the port of Khorramshahr, and the administrative 
center Ahvaz, indicated the flow of labor power from the pastoralist and agrarian 
regions with close historic economic and geographic ties to southwest Khuzestan to 
the established wage labor markets and urban economies of these oil cities. 
 
Table 9:  Geographic Origin of Iranian Oil Industry Employees, 1956  
(% of total) 
 
Source: Melamid (1959): 209  
 
Table 7 reveals a relatively similar pattern for those employed in the oil 
industry during the same period. The figures demonstrate the consolidation of labor 
by the oil industry within the region, together with a continued “pull factor” from the 
adjoining pastoralist and agrarian regions of the south. By the mid twentieth century 
industrial labor in the oil complex, and the accompanied urbanization in the built 
environment of oil, had become an established reality in Khuzestan and throughout 
southern Iran. 
 
LABOR ACTIVISM IN THE INTERWAR YEARS: 
 The consolidation of the oil complex brought with it new forms of labor 
activism among the industrial working class. The new collective political agency of 
the industrial workers was a direct result of the formation of a large class of 
wageworkers in the oil industry, and their geographic concentration in the centers of 
oil production of Khuzestan. The turning point for this new trend in labor activism 
came with the 1929 oil workers strike in Abadan, which had been organized by 
 Fields Abadan 
Born in Khuzestan 61 40 
Born in Adjoining Provinces 34 48 
Born Elsewhere in Iran 5 13 




Yousef Eftekhari (chapter 6)38. By this date the urban built environment of oil had 
become the staging ground for new forms of collective labor agency that were to 
affect other industrial centers across the country.  
 On Mayday 1929, some 9,000 oil workers, out of a total Iranian workforce 
of 15,000, went on strike at the Abadan oil refinery39. Their collective action caught 
APOC by surprise, and effectively brought production to standstill. Even though the 
strike was suppressed after three days through the “strong action by the military 
governor of Abadan backed by troops from the [Masjid Suleiman] garrison”40, 
nevertheless the ensuing crisis had deep repercussions for industrial and labor 
relations. The strikers were demanding a wage increase of 15 percent; the shortening 
the working day from ten to seven hours in the summer and eight hours in the winter; 
the right to establish an independent trade union, and the recognition of Mayday as an 
official holiday41. Eftekhari states that the strike’s top demand was to force the 
government to refuse to renew the Oil Concession with APOC, because of the 
Company’s abusive records. In particular, strikers demanded an end to the practice of 
“blacklisting” of the workers who had been targeted for being subversive, disruptive, 
or unproductive. What especially outraged the strikers was the Company’s callous  
treatment of workers who had been injured and disabled during work, or the families 
of those who had died as a result of work injuries: 
“The Company used the blacklist to permanently lay off workers who had 
been injured at work and were now unable to work and did not have any 
insurance. We demanded an end to these permanent layoffs, as well as an end 
to the chronic abuse of workers. They routinely abused and tormented 
workers…Workers had no place to live, and had to sleep next to the river. The 
Company refused to provide them with shelter. Their wives went hungry, and 
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often had to walk around half naked and dressed in rags. Abadan was a bizarre 
place the like of which I had not seen anywhere. Even the truly backward 
Tajikistan wasn’t as bad as this place.”42 
  
  APOC reports also mentioned the workers’ demand for “complete equality 
[between] Indians [and] Persians”43, and described the strike as a “Bolshevik plot”44. 
APOC field managers believed the workers’ demands were “formulated to cloak real 
Bolshevik activity and not likely to materialize”.45 Fearing the worse, the British 
Consul of Mohammerah/Khoramshahr even requested the warship “Cyclamen to 
move down the Shatt al-Arab to a point within easy reach of Abadan”46. There were 
indeed some Marxist organizers involved in the strike such as Yousef Eftekhari who 
played an important role in helping workers coalesce and articulate their grievances. 
But the personal account of his organizing work in Abadan makes clear that workers’ 
grievances were real and not ideologically motivated, to the point that they were quite 
ready and willing to confront the powerful Oil Company to demand improvements in 
their appalling living and working conditions. 
The repression of the 1929 strike was harsh and immediate. More than a 
hundred activists were deported from the province and the army imposed martial 
law47. But the ensuing calm was temporary and soon after labor discontent broke out 
in the oilfields of Masjid Suleiman, before spreading to other industries. On 28th May 
1929, some 300 railway workers of the American Ulen Company based near Ahwaz 
demanded higher wages48. Once more and now on the advise of APOC, the Ulen 
Company approached the Governor General of Ahwaz to arrest the “ringleaders”49.  
The labor protests of 1929 were crushed through the collaboration of the 
Iranian army, APOC, and the implicit threat of the British Royal Navy. Their reaction 
revealed the paranoia among Oil Company and government officials of communist 
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influence among industrial workers of the country’s largest and most strategic 
industries. The workers’ demands for more decent pay and better treatment were 
ignored until after the suppression of what was considered their most subversive 
demand: autonomous representation through their own union. 
 
Throughout the interwar period, Iranian industrial workers attempted on 
numerous occasions to establish collective representation, but were repeatedly put 
down. The overall pattern that developed was to ignore workers’ outburst and 
demands for self-representations, regardless of the circumstances50. The police would 
then arrest and imprison the leaders, but later on the government or employers would 
make some concessions in the form of pay increases, or occasionally pass legislation 
and government acts aimed at reducing the risks of recurring future crises. This 
pattern of employer and government response to workers’ demands for self-
representation had three key motives: To placate protestors and defuse the situation; 
to clarify that no autonomous workers’ self-representation would be tolerated and any 
and all demands had to be channeled only through the bureaucracy; and third, to 
better regulate and control the labor market, including using workers’ demands to 
pressure employers into various concessions that suited state policies. 
The authoritarian modernization of Reza Shah’s reign defined the formative 
interwar period. Building the institutions of a modern nation state coincided with 
building a modern economy, based on industrial manufacturing and its requisite 
infrastructure. Thus, while the state engaged in using its newly constituted army to 
repress local autonomies and coercively forge a national identity, its policies also 
created a class of wage workers who had no option but to sell their labor in the new 
factories.  
 
At the end of WWI urban Iranian workers in manufacturing had been mostly 
engaged in small craft workshops, but by 1941 Iran had a fairly substantial wage 
labor force employed in large factories. How did the Iranian workers experience this 
proletarianization? What were the state policies that contributed to the formation of a 
labor market? Were workers simply the object of an authoritarian, but ultimately 
progressive process of modernization? Or did they exercise an influence in shaping 
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labor and industrial relations during this formative period? Traditional labor 
historiography tends to privilege the spectacular moments of labor protest and open 
labor activism, such as the 1929 oil workers strike in Abadan as answers to these 
questions. However, by such standards the urban industrial workers do not figure very 
prominently as active historical agents during the interwar years. There are a few 
scattered moments of open labor protest here and there, like the brief events of 1929 
in Abadan and Ahwaz but, by and large, these strikes and open protests seem to have 
been rare and isolated events. 
The moments of open labor protests are important indicators of industrial 
workers discovering a collective voice, but they do not tell the whole story. The 
repression of such protests and the workers’ failure to consolidate trade unions and 
other forms of collective self-representation does not imply they remained passive 
objects of a history that bypassed them. Instead, I will make the following four points: 
First, the interwar industrialization programs in Iran also involved the often-
coercive process of making a working class. The violent and protracted process 
though which peasants, craftsmen, and pastoralists became industrial wage workers is 
integral to the forms of labor agency that emerged during this period. To understand 
the new patterns of the social and political agency of labor we ought to look at the 
country and the city as a unified but uneven space, that was being transformed to suit 
the exigencies of initial capital accumulation and nation-state formation, as we have 
done in previous chapters. 
Second, the apparently scattered moments of open labor protests across the 
country during the inter war years were not as isolated and unrelated as it may appear. 
As we have seen, these were turbulent times during which large populations moved to 
flee war, epidemics, and poverty, in search of livelihood, survival, and security. 
Experiences travelled with people across space, and inspired new actions. Migrating 
workers, political activists, labor organizers, extended families, and foreign workers 
with their transnational connections, were among the conduits through which 
repertoires of experience travelled across space and time and inspired novel practices 
and formed new collectivities. 
 Third, workers’ actions at their place of work, and their collective influence 
on shaping events were not limited to the rare moments of open militancy under 
authoritarian regimes of the factories and the police state, which Reza Shah’s 




autocracy had become by the 1930s. Non-confrontational forms of resistance, 
attrition, desertions, moral appeals, indirect and direct negotiations, and other tactics 
to improve the collective social life of labor were more common and effective that is 
currently understood. For example, as we saw in chapter 5, labor flight was a 
common response of casual as well as skilled workers to the harsh and coerced 
conditions of work and life under APOC during WWI and its aftermath. So were 
sabotage and armed attacks on facilities. Insurgencies also remained part of the 
repertoire of workers’ resistance to proletarianization or Company encroachments on 
collective territories. These insurgencies lasted while the casual workers kept a foot in 
adjacent tribal social structures, and the military structures of the Ilat and Ashayer still 
had the ability to mobilize enough force to confront the military, and resist state and 
Company policies. 
 As the oil complex consolidated other forms of workplace and urban based 
collective solidarities and actions came to be added to the repertoires of subaltern 
resistance. During the 1920s in Abadan, where most of the estimated urban 
population of 60 thousand were recent migrants, workers and their families were 
constantly engaged together with other social groups in urban collective struggles 
over housing, access to land, food supplies, and sanitary conditions (chapter 6). These 
urban movements were not directly related to work conditions, but to the reproduction 
of the laborers and other people drawn into the circuit of oil capitalism. That is why 
understanding the changing daily life of workers, and how they fit into the wider web 
of social relationships that accompanied the mechanisms of capital accumulation and 
nation state formation is integral to developing a more comprehensive social history 
of this period. 
 Fourth, state policymakers and administrators, as well as employers were 
more apprehensive of, and responsive to, workers’ demands that it is generally 
believed. Acknowledging workers’ unions and self-representation may not have been 
acceptable to the authorities, or to the Oil Company who treated any such attempt as a 
Bolshevik plot. However, it is also surprising to discover in archival sources how 
much workers grievances and demands actually affected legislation, social policies, 
management strategies, and economic considerations by state administrators as well 
as employers (chapter 6). 
 




Successive Waves of Industrialization and Labor Activism 
The history of industrialization in the interwar era can be roughly divided into 
two periods: 1919-1931 and 1931-1941. In the first period, the government facilitated 
and encouraged private investments by introducing a series of new legislation. The 
administrative and centralized registration of properties and contracts, the 
establishment of a National Bank (Bank-e Melli) that took over the currency mint and 
monetary policy from the British owned Imperial Bank, and the improving security of 
roads and transport routes, were important features of these policies51. However, the 
onset of the Great Depression in 1929 initiated a far more interventionist economic 
policy by the state. Financial and monetary constraints on the budget overlapped with 
the enormous government burden of investment in the trans-Iranian railroad and other 
major infrastructure projects. The collapse of oil royalties, and the protracted dispute 
over the new Concession (1930-1933) further strained the treasury revenues. Nor was 
Reza Shah willing to curtail the army’s significant budget. In response to these 
economic pressures which significantly affected the private sector the state imposed a 
monopoly on foreign trade, and began to directly invest in manufacturing and 
industrial ventures in order to maintain the pace of industrialization52. This phase of 
dirigiste state capitalism lasted from 1931 to 1941, and further intensified the 
processes of urbanization and centralization that were already in evidence in the 
previous decade. Escaping poverty and acute shortages, and faced with the disruption 
of the coercive policies discussed before, people flocked to cities in search of jobs and 
wages in new government owned industries. 
This geographic shift to the cities changed the nature of industrial labor. In the 
early 1920s, there were only few industrial plants that employed more than a hundred 
workers, apart from the oil industry in the south. These larger factories were located 
mainly in the northern provinces, and included the Arsenal in Tehran, a sugar refinery 
in Kahrizak, two textile mills in Tabriz, and a match factory in Khoy. The change 
over the following two decades was drastic, with over 346 manufacturing plants 
established by the eve of the country’s military occupation in 194153. During the same 
period the annual rate of state budget allocation to industrial investment had grown on 
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average 25 per cent54. The largest industrial employers among these were the long-
existing cotton and wool spinning, and textile-mills that altogether employed 
approximately 26 thousand workers. 
 
Table 10 Growth of the Labor Force in Selected Industrial Sectors 
INDUSTRIES EARLY 1920S EARLY 1930S LATE 1930S 
Oil  7,000-8,000 17,000 31,000 
Spinning and Textile  < 1500 1800 25,700 
Leather Tannery Not Available Not Available > 5000 
Electricity Plants 100 200 600 
Construction and Road 3,300 Not Available 60,000 
Mining 200 Not Available 3,000 
Railways - - 14.500 
Car Transport - 12,000 20,000 
Carpet Not available Not Available 250,000 
Willem Floor, Industrialisation in Iran 1900-194 (Durham: University of Durham Press, 1984), p. 29. 
 
From a national perspective, the 1929 Abadan strike of 1929 was one of the 
first expressions of collective demand for self-representation by a new industrial class 
that had been gradually formed in larger cities since the end of the WWI. Following 
the defeat of oilworkers’ strike at the Abadan refinery, the covert activities of the 
labor activists continued with more energy. In May 1931 the workers of the Vatan 
state-owned textile factory in Isfahan began a strike calling for improvements in 
working and living conditions55. “The strike was almost total, and even 8 year old 
children participated. A few workers of the weaving department, who wanted to 
continue to work, were induced to strike as well.” Marching towards the city centre, 
the workers articulated their demands that included a change from piecework to a 
monthly salary; an eight-hour working day with a living wage and overtime; adequate 
leisure time for half a day per week with pay.  
Following a police attack on the marchers and the arrest of a number of strike 
leaders workers returned to work the following day. However, they stopped work 
after eight hours as planned. More police harassment could not induce the strikers to 
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rescind their demands. Finally, following some intense negotiations between the 
representatives of the government, the director of the factory, and the representatives 
of the workers, the government backed off and reached an agreement with the 
strikers, accepting most of their demands, including the reduction of the working day 
from twelve to nine hours, and extending the lunch break from half an hour to one 
hour. Throughout the 1930s the Isfahan textile workers’ achievement in rectifying the 
working day regulations remained a benchmark not only for Iranian workers who 
wished to fix their working days, but also for the government in introducing new 
legislation regulating employers’ and employees’ associations. 
 The Isfahan textile strike was the last in the chain of labor strikes in interwar 
Iran. The gradual decline of labor activism in the 1930s was not simply due to the 
repressive political measures adopted by the new regime. The state-sponsored 
industrialization policies that were implemented in the wake of the Great Depression 
of 1929 had increased labor demand and had led to a relative shortage of skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. In the 1930s the Iranian Parliament passed a series of laws to 
improve working conditions in factories, workshops, and offices. These legislations 
included the Factory Act of 1936, which comprised the organization of miscellaneous 
training projects and the improvement of working conditions, housing, health and 
nutrition; the 1937 Act regarding the employment of prisoners in industrial and 
agricultural sectors; and the 1939 Act regarding the working conditions of medical 
personnel in government service. Important as these legislations were, they do not tell 
the whole story of whether or not working and living conditions for the industrial 
wageworkers improved as a result. However, they do indicate that an industrial wage 
working class had been formed in larger cities, and despite their heterogeneous ethnic 
and geographic background these workers were gradually forging solidarities and 
gaining a collective voice by posing demands for improved living and working 
conditions. In this context the 1929 Abadan oil workers’ strike was the watershed for 
new forms of collective class agency that gained greater political relevance during the 
post WW2 period of oil nationalization struggles. 
 
The Urban Process in Abadan 1929-1941 
 After highly protracted and contentious negotiations that began in 1928 the 
Iranian government granted a new 60-year oil concession to APOC in 1933. At one 




point in 1932 an enraged Reza Shah unilaterally cancelled the existing concession, 
and only backed off after implicit British threats of military retaliation. The aftermath 
of the agreement had significant political fallouts, as Reza Shah’s reign became more 
arbitrary and he eliminated some of his closest political allies, including Teymourtash 
and Sardar Asad Bakhtiyari, whom he suspected of disloyalty and collusion with the 
British. Some of the most significant clauses in the new agreement included the 
reduction of the concession area, a payment of £1 million to settle past disputes, 
improved royalties for Iran, the provision of cheaper petroleum products in Iran 
through a network of distribution set up by APOC, and a commitment by the Oil 
Company to reduce its dependence on foreign employees and increase substantially 
the share of its Iranian workforce by training them at various levels56.  
 The 1933 concession was not particularly more advantageous to Iran, and its 
political fallouts poisoned domestic Iranian politics and strongly worsened public 
opinion against the Oil Company and Britain (see chapter 1 and the discussion of 
disputes over royalties). The new concession also had repercussions in Abadan and 
Khuzestan, as it made APOC even more concerned about its public image and how to 
deal with new concessionary terms, and to find more effective ways to reduce the 
potential of labor strife and nationalist backlash. The issue of Iranianization of the 
workforce took on greater urgency, along with the recognition that further reducing 
the reliance on casual laborers and increasing a loyal, better co-opted, and permanent 
workforce was the best strategy to pursue in the new and increasingly more hostile 
atmosphere.  The result was a commitment by the Oil Company to the significant 
expansion of its social programs in the Company enclaves, especially education, 
leisure activities, and housing provision. The rest of this chapter will briefly outline 
these changes in general terms. 
   
As seen in previous chapters, the urban spaces of Khuzestan’s oil cities had 
been characterized by segregation and dualism between Company enclaves and their 
indigenous local surroundings. However, this segregationist geography had its limits 
and was implemented unevenly, and against considerable resistance. Thus, Masjed 
Soleyman had more of the characteristics of a classic company town than the much 
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larger and more heterogeneous Abadan (chapters 3, 6). Despite these important 
variations the Company enclaves shared certain spatial characteristics that reveal how 
urban design and central planning were used as instruments of social training and 
employment management and control. These characteristics were apparent if one 
compared the company enclaves in Abadan to the Shahr [Abadan Town] and other 
indigenous neighborhoods that fell outside its direct jurisdiction.  
Whereas “formal” company enclaves were subdivided into strictly hierarchic, 
centrally planned, and meticulously segregated spaces, the “informal” urban areas 
were an amalgam of different construction materials, and types of shelter and 
architectural forms used by different social groups who lived in close proximity and 
intermingled with each other. Over time, this glaring contradiction within and 
between these spaces – between the formal and informal spaces, the legal and 
subversive, the ordered and disciplined, the chaotic and lively, the rich and destitute, 
the modern and hybrid, the controlled and repressed, and the anarchic and 
spontaneous – came to define the character of these oil towns, and especially of 
Abadan 
 By the mid 1930s the formal company spaces of Abadan consisted of several 
enclaves ringing the refinery or set apart by various Company facilities, the residents 
of which were carefully assigned housing according to their job, rank in the company 
roster, and even race, nationality, and ethnicity57. A rigid and inflexible hierarchy 
defined the neighborhood, street, alley, and the specific house assigned to each 
individual employee according to his formal status, work record, skill, and even 
ethnicity, and marital status (the vast majority of formal employees being male). 
Senior European staff were housed in “Braim”, which consisted of large villas and 
bungalows set on green lawns, surrounded by parks and gardens and lined with 
English hedges, and built on lots averaging 1000 m², and 4.5 units per hectare. 
Workers’ neighborhoods, such as Bahmanshir and Bahar, were row houses with high 
walls and tiny courtyards, built in straight lines and wall-to-wall, averaging 120 m², 
with a density of 26 to 31 units per hectare (See Figure 2). In between these extremes 
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lay the middle- and lower-staff neighborhoods, such as Bawardeh, which were 
combinations of these two forms in terms of architecture, design, and scale58.  
 
Figure 2: Layout and Density of Workers’ Neighborhoods in Company Areas of 
Abadan59 
 
 The employment of several construction and architectural firms under the 
overall direction of the architect J.M. Wilson (worked for APOC 1926-1941) 
provided an urban and architectural coherence to these company enclaves60. As the 
Iranianization policies became more pressing after 1933, the racial segregation that 
had previously separated the spaces of routine interaction and daily life between 
Iranians, Indians, and the English and Europeans gradually became less marked, in 
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comparison to the occupational and class distinctions that served as the norms 
segmenting city spaces, although they did not disappear altogether.  
These forms of designed spatial segregation and planned inequality were 
glaring visual signs of the “modernity” of Masjed- Soleyman and Abadan61. In 
addition, these oil cities had other unprecedented urban amenities that set them apart 
as conspicuously modern. They were the sites of the first airports, motor vehicles, 
cinemas, technical schools, mixed schools (boys and girls, foreign and Iranian), 
leisure clubs, sports clubs, bus services, mass transport, luxury inns, well-equipped 
hospitals, etc., in Iran and the region. At the same time, all these amenities were 
segregated for different social layers and classes, to the extent that Masjed Soleyman 
even had separate cemeteries for workers and staff. 
 This system allowed the social position and status of each individual 
employed by the Company to become public knowledge through his residential 
address, the means of transportation and the medical facilities he and his family were 
allowed to use, the social and athletic clubs he was allowed to join, and the schoolsis 
children could attend. At the same time, because the Company’s internal organization 
was also to an extent a meritocracy, and as each step up the career ladder translated 
into greater material privileges and social status, workers were encouraged both to 
feel envious and to compete against each other, and to pursue individual and personal 
rather than collective benefits. Transforming urban amenities and city spaces into 
symbolic capital was one of the most effective instruments for controlling the 
population in these cities. 
 
Modernizing the Household 
By the mid 1930s the Company was increasingly faced with the exigency of 
finding ways to house its enormous workforce, but it also had to adapt it to the 
stringent technical exigencies and special demands of modern industry. Once trained 
and familiarized with the rigors of their industrial jobs, permanent workers became 
valuable assets, human capital, that needed to be retained, to be kept relatively 
content, dependent on their wages, and docile. The designed spaces of the city 
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increasingly became an instrument for achieving these goals. The details of the urban 
design, from the layout and architecture of the houses to the types of material used in 
their construction, the variations in the designed and organized spaces of 
entertainment and leisure, the types of walls and enclosures surrounding residences 
and their heights, the length and width of streets and alleys, the morphology of 
planned formal neighborhoods, and the types of kitchens, lavatories, and amenities 
made available collectively or installed in individual units, etc. were all intentional 
elements of a mechanism of spatial socialization in the Company enclaves. 
 The French geographer Xavier de Planhol has argued that the walled-in row 
houses of the workers were designed to duplicate “native architecture” and a sense of 
privacy, rooted in “Islamic values”.62 In fact, far from adhering to the local rural and 
pastoral domestic architectural forms these row houses were designed with two 
apparent purposes in mind: first, the mass production of a great number of cheap and 
durable residential units and, second, to directly intervene in the domestic space of the 
family and to modernize it.63  
For one thing there were essential elements of local domestic architecture 
missing from these designed Company housing for workers. The tiny courtyards and 
high walls prevented air circulation, a great inconvenience in the atrociously humid 
and hot summer months. The widespread use of new or modern construction 
materials, such as bricks, roof plates, concrete, and metal frames, instead of adobe, 
reeds, rushes, and lumber (from palm drees), were faster, standardized, capable of 
being industrially mass produced, and cheaper; but unlike traditional materials they 
did not have the ability to modify extreme seasonal and climatic fluctuations. As a 
result, these Company houses depended on modern amenities, such as electricity, 
fans, some form of air conditioning, and heaters (gas and electricity were provided 
exclusively by the Company, and at its discretion), over time became common 
features in Company housing. The provision of these modern amenities, as well as 
sewerage, piped water, and medical facilities, helped to augur in new notions of 
personal hygiene and public health. 
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 In Company towns the monopoly ownership by the Company of the means of 
production, as well as of reproduction, is the main instrument of social control. In 
other words, both occupation and the source of income – as well as real estate, 
housing, and social services – are in the monopoly of the Company. In market 
societies the household, aside from being the smallest social unit, plays a key role in 
in shaping the “individual”, and in placing him/her within larger networks of social 
relations necessary for the continued accumulation of capital. For this reason larger 
institutional powers, especially the state and organized capital, consistently attempt to 
penetrate the household and to shape and regulate it according to their norms and 
interests. This intervention often requires the imposition of radical change upon 
existing household organizations, and sometimes even the prevention of the survival 
of these older forms.  
The rigidly fixed residential architecture of the Company housing in the 
enclaves of Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman, prevented the accommodation of large 
extended families, the basic unit of social life in the region. Nor did it allow the use of 
the domestic space for alternative economic and productive activities that were 
prevalent throughout the region, such as the maintenance of livestock and poultry for 
the production of meat, dairy, and eggs, or vegetable garden plots. The small, one- or 
two-roomed houses were not even practical for traditional handcrafts, such as kilim 
weaving. All these activities, quite widespread in the region up to this day, are crucial 
for allowing the household to act as an autonomous economic unit by providing 
additional income and food supplements. As importantly, these economic activities 
also happen to be the realm of the economic agency of children and, especially, 
women. 
 Overall, the designed domestic architecture of the Company enclaves 
promoted the nuclear family as its privileged unit, but it also altered gender roles 
within the household, as well as the other major division of labor between different 
generations. In this setting the adult male becomes the sole legitimate economic 
agent, in the sense of his productive activity being socially validated through the labor 
market. The workplace was thus separated and set apart from the place of residence, 
and the result of the male wage earner’s economic activity would return to the 
household in the monetary form.  




The other consequence of this spatial division of labor was to make the house 
the exclusive domain of the wife/woman, but at the same time to deprive it of the 
economic and productive activities it previously allowed. At the same time, domestic 
space also became a boundary between the private and the public domains, and thus a 
physical constraint for women who could no longer easily and routinely cross the 
porous boundaries of the household space into the public arena as economic 
producers in their own right64. 
 This spatial and gender division of labor effectively imposed a new role of 
homemaker upon women living in Company enclaves, and in many ways 
dramatically limited their former social roles. Contrary to the “traditional” extended 
household of pastoralist and agrarian local societies, the “modern” nuclear family was 
a social form imposed by the domestic architecture of Company enclaves. For one 
thing, the Company housing architecture curtailed the number of children and other 
generations or relatives who could live under the same roof, primarily because of the 
shortage of space and the architectural design of the houses. Ordinarily, the only other 
generation who could reside in these houses were the children who, instead of 
participating in collective household productive activities, were sent out to schools 
(vocational and regular) in order to eventually replace their parents at home, at the 
workshop, the refinery, and the oil fields, after several years of disciplined training 
and socialization65. 
 This modernization of the family, gender, and women has been a mainstay of 
“modernity”. However, its early imposition from above in Khuzestan’s company 
towns set the stage for its replication as a desired model of development later on 
across the country, long after the AIOC (Anglo Iranian Oil Company, as APOC came 
to be renamed after 1933) had relegated its role to the oil Consortium and the Iranian 
state in 1953. The anomie and social problems mentioned have remained acute in the 
newer and smaller company towns of Khuzestan and elsewhere, such as the agro-
industrial model villages of Dezful, the sugar-cane plantations of Haft-Tappeh, the 
steel town of Mobarakeh, the copper-mining town of Sarcheshmeh, the industrial-
machinery town of Arak, etc. This is especially the case for women, where 
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geographic isolation and their seclusion in the household is not relieved by the large 




The wide boulevards and the grid pattern that characterized the formal spaces 
of Abadan distinguished it from other Iranian cities in the interwar period. The 
physical layouts of historical Iranian cities tend to follow the local physical 
topography, primarily as the means of water allocation by gravity67. They have 
narrow, winding alleys and culs-de-sac, lined by high brick or adobe walls, intended 
to defend neighborhoods from wind and dust, extreme fluctuations in climate, and 
from physical and military attacks and molestation. In these cities an important part of 
the flow of everyday social life outside the home and workplace is shaped in the 
public space of streets and bazaars. 
 The formal public space of company towns differs from this historical model 
in several important respects. In Abadan, instead of long and narrow winding alleys 
forming a functional and protective maze, the front doors of the row houses designed 
for workers open onto either short, narrow, and straight alleys that abut onto large 
streets at both ends, or directly onto large avenues (see Figure 2). In this way each 
house is set up as distinct from its neighbors, and separated from the neighborhood, 
the intimate street life, and ultimately from the workers’ society. Any collective 
protest or suspicious gatherings among neighborhood residents can be quickly 
detected, and each street, alley, and even neighborhood can be easily cordoned off 
from the others should the need arise (see Figure 2). 
 The assignment of housing by the Company, based on occupation, rank, and 
race, and the constant reassignment of the personnel within the Company hierarchy, 
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made the forging and maintenance of lasting spatial solidarities difficult. Because the 
independent ability to choose one’s residence was denied the workers seeking 
company housing, the formation of autonomous and spontaneous networks of 
solidarity in space by using common kinship, ethnic background, or geographic 
origins, were near impossible. 
 In Abadan, the intention to use urban space as an instrument of controlling the 
population can be readily detected in the details of the design of the neighborhood and 
public spaces of the Company enclaves and formally designed parts of the city. In a 
1960s study the French sociologist Paul Vieille and his collaborators pointed out 
some glaring examples of these coercive and panoptic aspects of the urban design of 
Abadan in a study that is still one of the best examples of spatial analysis in Iran.68 
The motives followed in the urban design of Abadan, they argued, were not the 
conventions of urban planning, nor the price of land and economic calculations, but 
the separation and distinction of different areas of the city from one another by a 
central authority. It is self-evident that if different city neighborhoods were 
constructed adjacent to each other, the provision of common services and 
infrastructure would be far cheaper due to the economies of scale. In fact, Abadan’s 
neighborhoods were built apart and separated by wide stretches of empty terrain, wide 
roads, pipelines, the administrative and industrial facilities and, of course, the 
enormous bulk of the refinery itself. This imposed separation prevented easy 
intermingling and routine pedestrian interactions, as well as potentially dangerous 
collective congregations between separate city sections. 
 Figure 3 is an aerial photograph of Abadan taken in the 1940s. The view is to 
the north, with Shatt al-Arab River to the west (left) and Iraqi territory visible in the 
upper section of the photograph. In the foreground is the Bawarda staff neighborhood. 
The bulk of the refinery is in the middle, with Braim, the neighborhood of the senior 
staff visible as a green triangle just north of the refinery, near the river. In between 
Bawarda and the Refinery lies the Shahr or Abadan Town, with its apparently chaotic 
and maze-like pattern, cut through by several wide avenues and access roads linking 
Bawarda and the Refinery. These wide access roads were built after 1926 (see chapter 
6). 
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Bawarda is kept separate from Abadan by a wide swath of seemingly open land, 
where some workshops and storage sheds are scattered about. The open area abuts 
into a wide ditch, which was dug after 1926, to heated protest by city officials and 
townspeople (chapter 6).   
 In Company enclaves roads did not connect different city sections to traffic 
exchanges. Rather they ended in several bottlenecks that allowed the surveillance of 
all communication between different parts of the city. Guard posts marked the 
boundaries of different neighborhoods, and there were regular police stations near or 
at the entrance to workers’ neighborhoods. APOC was the monopoly owner of all 
land in the formal company enclaves. It was responsible for organizing different 
sections of these enclaves, as well as for creating, maintaining, and reinforcing the 
distinctions between its different parts.  
 
Photograph 23: Bawarda & Jamshid Housing Estates. Staff Housing in 
Foreground Against Workers Housing in Background 
 
 























Photograph 23 is an aerial picture of two Company neighborhoods of Abadan 
in the 1940s. In the foreground we see the senior staff housing development in North 
Bawarda, and in the background the row houses of Jamshid neighborhood for mid 
ranking workers, and further still lies the workers housing in Bahmanshir 
neighborhood.  The water tower at the center also acts as a watchtower. The road grid 
separates neighborhoods, but also serves the functions of protection, as well as 
surveillance in a visibly panoptic manner. The contrast in the density as well as 
availability of green open space is detectable, even in this distant aerial photograph. It 
is also clear that streets in these Company neighborhood are not intended for lingering 
or social interactions, as there are no shops, stalls, parks, benches, trees, fountains, or 
any other vestige of public intercourse available for residents outside their domestic 
space. The public space of Company areas is limited to Company clubs and buildings. 
  
In Masjed-Soleyman the local topography and physical setting of oil wells and 
extraction facilities had to a large extent aided and modified the process of social 
engineering. While its oilfields produced a high yield Masjed Soelyman remained 
firmly in the grip of APOC, and was more stringently controlled as an exclusive 
company town than the much larger and more cosmopolitan Abadan. Houses and 
urban facilities were constructed, in a spread-out fashion, around oil wells and the 
industrial facilities. Specific neighborhoods were often called after these facilities – 
for example Nomre-e Yek (Number One, referring to the first oil well discovered), 
Nomre-e Chehel (Number 40), Naftak (Little Oil), Naftoun, etc. The distances and 
areas between neighborhoods were intentionally left barren and undeveloped, and 
were connected by narrow Company-built roads passing through rugged hills.  
Every attempt by the local population to build unauthorized hovels and houses 
were immediately confronted by the Company’s bulldozers and demolished. As in 
Abadan, official Company areas were built separately from one another, and had only 
one narrow access road in and out. Neighborhoods were designed either in a circular 
pattern, or as parallel streets that were interconnected by perpendicular streets, but 
dead ended on both sides, cutting and isolating the neighborhood from the world 
beyond, except through the single and easily guarded access road. 




 Company neighborhoods were segregated according to rank and status, set in 
separate locations with different amenities and characteristics. The senior managers 
lived in Shah Neshin (Seat of the King), senior staff in Naftak and Talkhab, junior 
and petty staff in Nomre-e Chehel, Camp Scotch, and Pansion-e Khayyam; and 
workers in Naftoun, Do Lane (Two Lanes), Seh Lane (Three Lanes), Bibian, etc. 
 





 In Masjed-Soleyman, as in Abadan, the formal Company spaces of leisure and 
social interaction were differentiated according to rank and class. Senior staff and 
managers had membership to Bashgah-e Markazi (the Central Club), junior staff had 
the Bashgah-e Iran, and workers Bashgah-e Kargari (Workers’ Club), located in 
Naftoun. Only members and their guests had access to each club. Aside from the 
medical facilities that were available to the public, but with segregated wards for 
Europeans and Company enployees, the rest of the town’s population, if not 
employed by the Oil Company, had no access to Company facilities, especially the 
clubs. Social clubs had more or less similar facilities, such as a cinema, restaurant, 




cafeteria, swimming pool, ping pong, bingo, billiards, etc. The difference was not so 
much in the range of amenities as the quality and, more important, the prestige 
conferred by membership of each institution, which played an important role in 
bestowing symbolic status on individuals and their family. In Masjed Soleyman even 
the company stores and the range and types of “rations” assigned to employees were 
segregated and distinguished by rank and social class.69 
 
Photograph 26: Masjed Soleyman Staff Housing 
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Photograph 27: Abadan. Club Cateen for European Staff 
 
Production of Place as a Contested Process 
Place is a social construct that both constitutes and is constituted by social 
relations (see chapter 1). The production of place and the interpretation of its 
meanings are equally contested processes. People and institutions struggle over 
defining, using, and shaping space and place according to their individual and 
collective interests. We have been discussing how the APOC built Khuzestan’s oil 
towns and the architectural and design rational behind it. I have argued that this 
rational was both utilitarian, as well as a discursive exercise of power. The Company 
wanted to attract and maintain a labor force that would be at the same time competent, 
efficient, modern, and submissive. However, there has always been a fragile balance 
between the power of the Company over place, and its own clear lack of autonomy 
from both global markets, as well as domestic and local dynamics. On closer scrutiny 
we have seen that the structured coherence of this industrial landscape has always 
been shaky and open to contestation. 
 Company towns of the twentieth century, have been designed by using two 
contradictory as well as complementary principles: the idea of general welfare and the 
assimilation of the labor force into the generic values of the “middle class”, and, on 
the other hand, the praxis of colonialism, both internal and external, in the form of a 
one-sided domination over an alien and weaker region and people, for the main 




purpose of extracting natural resources and human abilities70. Contrary to the first 
principle, the aim of colonial social planning is not necessarily to integrate and 
standardize the subjugated region and people into a larger unit (national, for 
example), but rather to create and proliferate its internal divisions, differences, and 
distinctions in order to better control and dominate it. 
 The presence of both these principles could be detected in Abadan and 
Masjed-Soleyman. These cities were built in isolated regions, away from any 
significant centers of urban population. Various planned aspects of the urban design 
of the Company enclaves intended to instill among its employees new norms of work, 
and appropriate principles and behaviors that conformed to the needs of modern 
industry and capital accumulation in oil. Even though the Oil Company was not a 
“colonial power” per se, nevertheless it made free use of colonial practices and 
techniques of urban planning, as well as relying on principles of industrial 
management and corporate welfare policies. The standard of living, the available 
social services and urban amenities, the level of education and technical training, and 
the overall urban culture of Masjed-Soleyman and Abadan began to exceed the rest of 
the country from the 1930s, although acute social and spatial inequalities continued 
and became increasingly politicized and an unsustainable liability.  
In Abadan the spontaneous growth of Shahr or the indigenous city, created an 
alternative geography outside the socially engineered confines of the Company 
enclaves. Characterized by a high population density of mostly destitute and displaced 
people from across southern Iran, the “native city” as Company officials called it, was 
characterized by a hodgepodge of dwelling types, shops, stalls, bazaars, “informal” 
residential and commercial neighborhoods, illegal hovels and shanties, and especially 
forbidden places housing brothels, drug sellers, and smugglers who made the most out 
of the city’s location on the border.  
These subversive places grew adjacent to the manicured lawns and hedges of 
fancy Company neighborhoods such as Braim and Bawardeh. Workers’ squatter 
neighborhoods like Abolhassan, Ahmadabad, and Karun had grown next to formal 
Company compounds with posh Persian names such as Pirouz (Victorious), Bahar 
(Spring), and Farahabad (Refreshing). The “public” spaces of the formal Company 
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enclaves were confined to clubs, athletic fields, Company stores, and urban amenities 
that only employees of the Company could access. In contrast, the informal Abadan 
Town and squatter neighborhoods were crisscrossed with winding alleys and constant 
urban confusion and hubbub, teeming with pedestrians, peddlers, and people until the 
small hours of the dawn. Despite its poverty, the Shahr presented a lively, 
heterogeneous, unruly, sometimes dangerous, and unsupervised public arena to all 
denizens of the city, whether employed by the Company or not. The two cities 
confronted each other with striking contrasts: the formal city was affluent, 
comfortable, ordered, and staid. It was shaped by disciplinary powers of separation, 
distinction, ranking, and surveillance that kept its residents under relentless control. 
The spontaneous and informal city was impoverished and destitute, but had a 
relatively untrammeled public life, in the more conventional sense of the word. It was 
open, integrated, public and, at the same time, quite hectic and anarchic.71 
 In these “free zones”, which did not belong to the Oil Company and laid 
outside its control and surveillance, all manner of people inevitably worked, 
cohabited, and mixed together: villagers and tribesmen, Arabs, Lurs, Bakhtiyaris, 
Turks, Isfahanis, oilworkers, political activits, prostitutes, policement and bureaucrats, 
sailors, merchants, smugglers, men and women, rich and poor, etc. The majority of oil 
workers also lived in the Shahr and outside Company enclaves. A third of the 
population of the Shahr  and some sixty per cent of residents of the notorious 
Ahmadabad were Company employees in the interwar years. In other words, the 
Company’s efforts to mold and create an ideal workforce through its spatial designs, 
was consistently subverted as a result of contamination by these adjoining, visible, 
and accessible “free zones”. As a result of the co-presence of alternative places, the 
tight and controlled cast of the planned Company enclaves was continuously broken, 
making Abadan a lively and cosmopolitan place with a strong sense of identity. No 
matter how powerful the Oil Company and its economic resources and organizational 
abilities were, it could not in the end manage to impose a full hegemony upon the 
place it had created. Spontaneous civil institutions, informal networks of trade, guild, 
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and subversive politics, religious and ethnic activities, always remained prominent 
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Dit proefschrift is een sociale geschiedenis van het ontstaan van de Iraanse olie-
industrie en de vorming van de arbeidersklasse daarbinnen in de provincie Khuzestan 
in Iran tijdens de eerste decennia van de 20e eeuw tot aan het uitbreken van de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog (1908-1941). Het proefschrift concentreert zich op de vorming 
van de bebouwde omgeving van Abadan, een industriestad die snel werd gebouwd 
door de Anglo-Persian Oil Company om 's werelds grootste raffinaderij te huisvesten 
tijdens een turbulente periode tussen 1909 en 1927. Abadan werd al snel het hart van 
een onderneming die meehielp met het  transformeren van lokale omstandigheden, 
maar ook van de nationale economische en politieke relaties, regionale geopolitiek en 
het mondiale industriële kapitalisme. 
 De belangrijkste stellingen van dit proefschrift zijn drieledig. De eerste 
stelling is dat het vormen van de arbeidersklasse in de olie-industrie de ontmanteling 
van de bestaande vormen van het sociale en economische leven in de regio met zich 
meebracht. Door de grondonteigening van de lokale bevolking werd industriële 
loonarbeid het belangrijkste alternatief om in levensonderhoud te voorzien. Om de 
sociale geschiedenis van de oliewerkers te kunnen duiden is het belangrijk om de 
landelijke en pastorale werelden waaruit arbeiders kwamen te begrijpen, net zoals het 
belangrijk is te onderzoeken hoe ondergeschikte werknemers en bevolkingsgroepen 
zich verzetten tegen de gedwongen ondergang van hun vroegere sociale leven, hoe zij 
over hun nieuwe omstandigheden onderhandelden en hebben bijgedragen aan de 
vormgeving van de moderne industriële en extractieve orde van het oliekapitalisme 
dat hun wereld verving.  
 De tweede stelling is dat het vormen van de olie-industrie in Iran niet 
simpelweg de verspreiding van kapitaal, technologie en kennis van het westen naar 
een 'achterlijk gebied' betekende, maar dat het een voorbeeld is van verweven Global 
Labor History waarin de vereisten van kapitaalaccumulatie en de formatie van de 
natie-staat verschillende regio's, populaties, en vormen van economische activiteit bij 
elkaar brachten. Dit proces ging vaak gepaard met geweld. De derde stelling is dat de 
sociale geschiedenis van arbeid in de olie-industrie het beste bestudeerd kan worden 




direct of indirect betrokken waren bij de constructie van de olie-industrie samen 
kwamen en op elkaar inwerkten binnen de bebouwde omgeving van Abadan. 
 De benadering van dit proefschrift is interdisciplinair, zowel theoretisch als 
methodologisch. Het combineert inzichten van de kritische sociale geografie, 
marxistische politieke economie en sociale geschiedschrijving met een 
poststructuralistische analyse van machtsverhoudingen. Methodologisch steunt dit 
proefschrift op veldwerk van de auteur uitgevoerd in de provincie, gecombineerd met 
uitgebreid gebruik van primair archiefmateriaal en secundaire historische en 
analytische literatuur. 
 
De stedelijke en geografische benadering van het proefschrift biedt een uniek 
perspectief op de sociale geschiedenis van arbeid in de olie-industrie. De bebouwde 
omgeving van Abadan was de materiële en fysieke plaats die werd gevormd door de 
acties en interacties van alle belangrijke maatschappelijke actoren die betrokken 
waren bij het tot stand komen van deze mondiale industrie, en op haar beurt omlijstte 
deze omgeving de activiteiten van deze actoren en bood hen structuur. Sommige van 
deze maatschappelijke actoren waren direct betrokken bij het ontstaan van de olie-
industrie. Deze actoren betroffen de lokale landelijke bevolking van boeren en 
veehouders, die als loonarbeiders, bewakers en tijdelijke arbeiders in dienst van de 
olie-industrie waren. Het ging ook om Iraanse regeringsfunctionarissen die ernaar 
streefden om de industrie te reguleren en om het gezag van een opkomende natie op te 
leggen aan een afgelegen provincie. Tenslotte bestonden deze actoren ook uit 
internationale oliehandelaren, aanleggers van boortorens, ingenieurs, accountants, 
stedenbouwkundigen en adviseurs, die de eerste fundamenten van het oliekapitalisme 
in de Perzische Golf legden. 
 Er waren echter ook andere sociale actoren betrokken bij de vorming van de 
olie-industrie, die weliswaar niet in deze sector werkten, maar toch hun levens erdoor 
zagen veranderen, en zelf bijdroegen aan de consolidatie van de olie-industrie. Tot 
deze secundaire actoren behoorden soldaten, Britse diplomaten, kinderen en verre 
families, stedelijke grondbezitters, politieke activisten, smokkelaars, prostituees, 
bedelaars, lokale boeren, handelaren, politiemensen en arme migranten die naar de 
stad kwamen om in de marges van de olie-industrie te leven en te werken. Dit 




interactie van al deze actoren, waardoor de sociale geschiedenis van olie en de 
vorming van de arbeidersklasse in de olie-industrie in Khuzestan in essentie de 
geschiedenis van stadsvorming is. 
 Hoofdstuk 1 legt het theoretisch kader van dit proefschrift uit. Het introduceert 
en beschrijft een aantal concepten waarmee de kritische benadering van de sociale 
geschiedenis van olie in dit proefschrift bestudeerd wordt. Deze concepten zijn o.a. oil 
complex, oil habitus, and oil encounter. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de regionale en nationale configuraties van de 
Perzische Golf en Iran die vanaf de late 19e eeuw tot 1926 bepalend waren voor de 
wereldpolitiek van het Britse imperium. Het analyseert de perspectieven en motieven 
van verschillende politieke actoren in Iran, Engeland, Brits India, en Khuzestan, en 
evalueert de gevolgen van de ontdekking van olie en de ontwikkeling van de olie-
industrie op hun onderlinge verhoudingen. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat hoewel de 
Britse staat na het einde van de Eerste Wereldoorlog eenheid uitstraalde, ze in feite 
geplaagd werd door interne spanningen en praktische beperkingen terwijl ze 
geconfronteerd werd door de mogelijkheden en gevaren van het politieke systeem in 
Iran en de olie-industrie die daar gebouwd werd. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft zodoende de 
mondiale en regionale geopolitieke achtergrond die nodig is om de sociale 
geschiedenis van de Iraanse olie-industrie te begrijpen. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de lokale agrarische en pastorale samenlevingen in 
het zuidwesten van Iran omdat ze deel uitmaakten van de mondiale verhoudingen van 
het oliekapitalisme. Dit hoofdstuk kijkt naar de politiek van eigendom en de 
wettelijke contracten tussen het oliebedrijf, stamhoofden en lokale zakenmensen om 
het proces waarmee lokale samenlevingen ondergeschikt werden gemaakt aan de olie-
industrie inzichtelijk te maken. Het verbindt ook de rurale populaties, het achterland 
van Abadan en het fysieke landschap met de olie-industrie. De sociale geschiedenis 
van olie en arbeid zijn namelijk niet alleen verbonden met de plaatsen van directe 
productie (de raffinaderijen), exploitatie (de olievelden), maar ze zijn ook verbonden 
met de rurale gebieden waaruit olie-arbeiders gerekruteerd worden en die 
getransformeerd werden doordat olie-installaties de bestaande economische en sociale 
levensvormen vervingen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de mondiale effecten van de Eerste Wereldoorlog op 




opkomst van het Fordsime – een sociale en politiek-economische orde gebaseerd op 
industriële massaproductie en consumptie – mogelijk maakte. Dit hoofdstuk 
onderzoek de transformaties van industriële arbeidsverhoudingen, de invloed van 
massapolitiek en de veranderende rol van de staat die sociale maatregelen 
introduceerde als reactie op toenemende conflicten tussen sociale klassen. Deze 
analyse biedt maakt het mogelijk om de ontwikkeling van industriële 
arbeidsverhoudingen in de Iraanse olie-industrie te kunnen plaatsen binnen het kader 
van Global Labor History. Het laat zien dat deze verhoudingen niet reeds bestaande 
praktijken waren die vanuit Groot-Brittannië en de rest van Europa naar Iran 
getransplanteerd werden, maar dat ze onderdeel waren van grotere mondiale trends.  
 Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 integreren deze inzichten in de micro-analyse van de 
stedelijke en sociale transformaties van Abadan in het interbellum, toen de 
consolidatie van de olie-industrie plaatsvond. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de vestiging 
van het rekruteerbeleid en de  beperkte sociale maatregelen die de oliemaatschappij 
tegen wil en dank, en met enig paternalisme introduceerde om arbeiders en 
hooggekwalificeerde werknemers aan te trekken voor werk in de extreem moeilijke 
omstandigheden van de olie-industrie. Deze maatregelen bestonden uit 
onderwijsvoorzieningen om Iraanse arbeiders beter op te leiden, de bouw van sociale 
faciliteiten voor Europese werknemers, en de vestiging van pr-activiteiten om het 
imago van het bedrijf te verbeteren. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 concentreert zich op de stedelijke politiek van Abadan en de 
transformatie van deze door migratie en industrie gevormde stad. De oliemaatschappij 
probeerde in naam van de bestrijding van besmettelijke ziektes en de bevordering van 
de volksgezondheid een hiërarchische en rationele orde aan Abadan op te leggen. 
Maar deze maatregelen creëerden exclusief voor Europese en geprivilegieerde 
werknemers bestemde enclaves en leidden tot vormen van segregatie die kwaad bloed 
zetten bij de benadeelde groepen. Er ontstonden solidariteitsbewegingen in Abadan 
die olie-arbeiders en andere inwoners samenbrachten in collectieve acties tegen de 
pogingen van het oliebedrijf om mensen te evacueren en exclusieve enclaves te 
creëren. Deze bewegingen die ‘het recht op de stad’ opeisten creëerden nieuwe 
vormen van stedelijke identiteit, en smeedden nieuwe politieke allianties die het 





 Hoofdstuk 7 bevat de conclusies van het proefschrift over de sociale 
geschiedenis van Abadan, de provincie Khuzestan, de olie-industrie, de werkende 
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